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Abstract  
 
Late antique and medieval Islamic legal histories:  
contextual changes and comparative (re)considerations 
 
by  
 
Lena Salaymeh 
 
Doctor of Philosophy in History  
 
University of California, Berkeley  
 
Professor Ira Lapidus, Co-Chair 
 
Professor Beshara Doumani, Co-Chair  
 
 
This dissertation demonstrates the contingent and contextual nuances of Islamic legal 
history by balancing precise legal case studies with broad-spectrum jurisprudential surveys. 
This work places Islamic legal history within diverse late antique (seventh to tenth centuries 
CE) and medieval (tenth to fifteenth centuries CE) contexts through specific comparisons with 
rabbinic legal traditions.  By delineating intricate legal changes involving several generations 
of jurists, my research demonstrates the flexibility, expansiveness, and contingency of Islamic 
legal traditions within a meta-narrative about the transformations of law in the “Near East.”  I 
offer a historical understanding of the ambiguous and mutable nature of law and illustrate the 
complexity of legal pluralism and the struggle for legal-politcal authority that underlies the 
formation of orthodoxy.  This research challenges common reifications of “Islamic law” as an 
inevitable outcome or a static, monolithic whole.    
Introduction.  This chapter provides a literature review of contemporary Islamic legal 
historiography and comparative studies of Jewish and Islamic law.  I demonstrate that (1) 
Islamic law is not an independent entity with an identifiable “birth” or 
unchanging/fundamental characteristics and (2) Islamic and Jewish legal similarities result not 
from “borrowing,” but from historical instances of dialectical interchange, from shared 
customary traditions, and from shared contexts.  The introduction outlines the dissertation’s 
objective of introducing critical readings of non-legal sources to Islamic legal historiography in 
order to reconstruct legally heterodox practices of jurists in the late antique era.   
Chapter 1: Legal historiography – a case study in international law.  This chapter uses a 
variety of underused historical and legal sources (sīrah, maghāzī, muṣannafāt, masānīd) to 
reconstruct the treatment of prisoners of war during the Prophetic era (610-632 CE) in Medina 
and in the decades immediately afterward.  I argue that both historical narratives and late 
antique juristic opinions indicate that it was likely impermissible to execute prisoners of war, a 
position that differs from medieval juristic rulings that generally permitted the execution of 
prisoners of war.  This chapter proposes that medieval Muslim jurists participated in the 
writing of Islamic historiography – a process that inherently involved the fusion of pre-Islamic 
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traditions and a modification of the historical evidence.  In so doing, these medieval jurists 
facilitated and created the historical bases for their legal opinions, which should be 
understood not as simply outcome-determinative, but as a complex process of legal norm 
articulation.   
Chapter 2: Legal heterodoxy – a case study in taxation.  Building upon the first chapter, this 
chapter further investigates the overlapping roles of historians and jurists in Islamic late 
antiquity through a case study on the charity tax.  This case study scrutinizes a variety of 
underexploited historical and legal sources in order to clarify how historiographic “certainty” 
can be achieved through the critical reading of heterodox (i.e. non-orthodox and legally 
pluralist) sources.  Some late antique and medieval jurists made the charity tax incumbent on 
minors or others lacking full legal capacity because they conceptualized the category of 
“Muslim” in ways that were distinct from ritual practices.  This chapter argues that Islamic 
charity was unique in its degree of regulation by comparing Islamic doctrines with their 
rabbinic counterparts.  I use the category of taxation to emphasize the administrative aspects 
of charity and to expand conceptualization of late antique religious identity from a purely 
confessional model to a quasi-citizenship model, thereby expounding how legal history 
enriches social history.   
Chapter 3: Legal changes – a case study in family law.  This chapter presents two 
chronologies of legal changes in Jewish and Islamic legal history related to wife-initiated 
divorce using a wide array of legal texts and documentary evidence.  Interweaving these two 
narratives of wife-initiated divorce, I argue for a historicized, contextual understanding of law 
by demonstrating that the changes in each legal system were part of a regional, socio-political 
process of juridical professionalization.  I demonstrate that the characterization of a particular 
Gaonic decree related to wife-initiated divorce as an “innovation” caused by Islamic 
“influence” is historically inaccurate and reflects a broad struggle for legal authority.    In both 
legal systems, divorce – in terms of jurisprudence and practice – transformed from contract 
dissolution to contractual breach.  I argue that these changes were the result of contingent 
socio-political contexts of empire expansion, professionalization of jurists, and elaboration of 
urban market structures. 
  Conclusion.  The conclusion brings together the theoretical and methodological 
approaches implemented in each of the dissertation’s three chapters to argue for a specific 
approach to the study of Islamic legal history.  I advocate that overcoming contemporary 
Islamic legal historiography’s major weakness – the de-contextualization of late antique 
Islamic legal practices – requires exploring relatively unexploited historical sources and 
grounding Jewish-Islamic legal comparisons in actual cases.  The culmination of these claims is 
the periodization for Near Eastern legal history that I offer as an alternative to the traditional 
periodization of Islamic law.  By contrasting late antique Jewish and Islamic legal doctrines 
with medieval Jewish and Islamic legal doctrines, this conclusion reveals that both legal 
systems formulated a legal “orthodoxy” during roughly the same period.   
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Preface 
 
A significant challenge of interdisciplinary research and writing is “speaking” to 
distinct audiences simultaneously.  Different readers will find diverse sections of this 
dissertation to be “simplistic” or “stating the obvious.”  I have chosen to emphasize clear 
explanations, at times at the cost of redundancy for expert readers, in order to facilitate 
accessibility for a broader audience.  This dissertation is not intended to be read by specialists 
in only one field and, therefore, it will be read differently by individual scholars. 
In this dissertation, the reader will notice I avoid identifying Islamic and Jewish legal 
systems as “religious law.”  This is because I am interested in problematizing the very 
assumptions that underlie the category of “religious law” by demonstrating how “legal” and 
how quintessentially “human” both legal systems were and continue to be. 
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Introduction 
 
Toward a genealogy of “Islamic law” 
 
The accusation that something is against Islamic law (or “sharīʿah”) is hurled repeatedly 
amidst contemporary socio-political controversies; the implementation of “sharīʿah” is a 
political slogan and a popular aspiration; non-Muslim governments demand reform or 
abolition of this “sharīʿah” while many Muslims demand its unadulterated application.  In the 
United States, a certain paranoia about a potential invasion of “sharīʿah” has animated recent 
political discourse.  Contemporary scholars in Islamic studies similarly discuss the 
applicability, flexibility, and even relevance of “sharīʿah” while presuming its stability or 
normativity.  All these actors presume that there is some definable body of law that is 
“sharīʿah” – ahistorical, divine, and unchanging.  But “sharīʿah” means and has always meant 
different things to different people.  Islamic law encompasses not only juristic debates, but 
political and socio-economic ones.1  Common conceptualizations of Islamic law in the 
contemporary world are historically inaccurate because they do not fully appreciate that 
Islamic legal systems could have been very different – they could have been something else 
entirely.2  To understand what that something else could have been, we have to immerse 
ourselves in an Islamic legal past without assuming that it inescapably leads to an Islamic legal 
present.  This requires engaging critically with Islamic legal-historical sources by situating 
them within their late antique contexts and comparing them to their late antique 
counterparts.3  While there are myriad forms of and perspectives on Islamic legal systems 
today, my interest is in the historical contingencies that produced these contemporary 
expressions and that is why I focus on late antique Islamic legal history.4   
This dissertation examines, in three case studies, how late antique Muslim society 
transformed its hybrid legal-cultural context.  This diverse Near Eastern context was an 
                                                                  
1 In this dissertation, “Islamic law” means Islamic legal systems and practices.  It is, by definition, polycentric (i.e. 
there are multiple legal opinions on most legal issues), pluralist (i.e., there are multiple sources of legal authority), 
and constantly changing. 
2 In appreciating contingency, this dissertation’s objective is genealogical because “genealogy serves a critical 
purpose, exposing the contingent and 'shameful' origins of cherished ideas and entrenched practices.” Mark 
Bevir, "What is genealogy?," Journal of the Philosophy of History 2, no. 3 (2008): 264. 
3 Extending late antiquity to include the Islamic period was initiated by Peter Brown.  See Peter R. L. Brown, The 
world of late antiquity: from Marcus Aurelius to Muhammad, Library of European civilization (London: Thames and 
Hudson, 1971).  See also Peter R. L. Brown, The world of late antiquity: AD 150-750  (New York: W.W. Norton, 1989).  
4 Like many in the field of Islamic studies, in the past, I used the term “early Islamic” because late antique is not 
widely-used.  See Lena Salaymeh, "Early Islamic legal-historical precedents: prisoners of war," Law and History 
Review 26, no. 3 (2008).  But I believe “late antique Islam” is more accurate and appropriate than “early” Islam and 
therefore use this terminology throughout this dissertation.  Sizgorich explicitly situated the beginnings of Islam 
in late antiquity, explaining “The birth and early growth of the Muslim community within a late antique cultural 
milieu did nothing to undermine the evolution of a distinctively Islamic cultural tradition.  Rather, the tradition 
begun within that milieu would prove so powerful as to recast ancient signs and symbols as uniquely its own.” 
Thomas Sizgorich, "Narrative and community in Islamic late antiquity," Past & Present, no. 185 (2004): 42. See also 
Thomas Sizgorich, Violence and belief in late antiquity: militant devotion in Christianity and Islam  (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008). 
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amalgamation of Arabian tribal, Roman provincial, Sasanian, and Jewish legal practices.5  There 
is an emerging scholarly trend in the direction of situating Islamic beginnings within late 
antique studies and this dissertation is part of that broader scholarly project.6  Islamic legal 
traditions and systems do not have a tangible “origin” or “evolution”; there are only shifts and 
transformations in Islamic legal practices and theories within concrete and existing Islamic 
communities.  Beginnings – rather than origins – are the focus of my legal-historical inquiry.7  
Each case study situates a particular late antique Islamic legal doctrine within the historical 
context in which it began and traces how the legal reasoning of jurists changed between the 
late antique and medieval eras.8  Islam is commonly constructed as a unified whole, which 
prevents full recognition of the nuances and details of Islamic societies, their institutions, their 
social and legal practices, and – perhaps most importantly – their transformations.  This 
dissertation demonstrates how a non-developmental historicism can refine understandings of 
Islamic legal history.9 
It is not uncommon for contemporary Islamic legal scholarship to mention some 
extinct schools of law in passing.10  But these references have not provoked serious scholarly 
                                                                  
5 The “Near East” is a problematic political (specifically, imperialist), rather than geographic category.  I would 
prefer to use the more geographically descriptive (and less geopolitically constructed) term Southwest Asia, but 
the reader may be unfamiliar with this term.  As I use “Near East” here, I primarily refer to Mesopotamia, the 
Arabian Peninsula, the Levant, and Egypt. 
6 There is an emerging trend of situating Islamic history within a late antique context.  For instance, Chase 
Robinson noted that “a koine of late antique religious architecture that includes the Ḥijaz can now provisionally 
be identified” Chase F. Robinson, "Reconstructing early Islam: truth and consequences," in Method and theory in the 
study of Islamic origins, ed. Herbert Berg (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 133.  But even scholars within this trend continue to 
accept a problematic periodization that differentiates between “late antiquity” and “early Islam.”  This is evident 
in a recent text that distinguishes between the late antique context and the rise of Islam. See Chase F. Robinson, 
ed. The formation of the Islamic world, sixth to eleventh centuries, The new Cambridge history of Islam (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011).   
7 “What is found at the historical beginning of things is not the inviolable identity of their origin; it is the 
dissension of other things.  It is disparity.” Michel Foucault, The Foucault reader, trans. Paul Rabinow (1984), 79. 
8 A common critique of historicism is that it entails a historian’s identification of an “object” and “fabrication” of 
a context.  Tomlins suggests this critique in Christopher Tomlins, "What is left of the law and society paradigm 
after critique? Revisiting Gordon's “Critical Legal Histories”," Law & Social Inquiry 37, no. 1 (2012): 164.  (Legal 
historicism is the subject of recent debates among legal historians.  See "Symposium on Gordon's 'Critical Legal 
Histories'," Law & Social Inquiry 37, no. 1 (2012).)  Responding to critiques of historicism, Bevir explains that 
“Postfoundationalism thereby dispels both the postmodernist and modernist ideas of historical distance.  It 
suggests that historians cannot access the past and secure facts apart from the context of their present concepts 
and theories. The past only ever appears in our present beliefs; it is never given at a distance.” Mark Bevir, "Why 
historical distance is not a problem," History and Theory 50, no. 4 (2011): 25. 
9 Dominant historicist approaches are developmental in orientation; this dissertation implements radical 
historicism as defined by Bevir: “Radical historicism overlaps with a nominalist and constructivist social ontology 
that emphasizes the contingency and contestability of beliefs, actions, and practices.  Thus, it denaturalizes 
beliefs, actions, and practices that others’ conceive as in some way or other natural: when other people believe 
that certain social norms or ways of life are natural or inevitable, radical historicists denaturalize these norms 
and ways of life by suggesting that they arose out of contingent historical contests.” Bevir, "What is genealogy?," 
271. 
10 Some examples: Abou El  Fadl notes, “there are many extinct schools such as the schools of Ibn Abī Laylā (d. 
148/765), Sufyān al-Thawrī (d. 161/778), al-Ṭabarī (d. 310/923), al-Layth b. Saʿd (d. 175/791), al-Awzāʿī (d. 157/774), 
Abū Thawr (d. 240/854), Dāwūd b. Khalaf (the Zāhirī) (d. 270/884) and many more.” Khaled Abou El Fadl, And God 
knows the soldiers  (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, Inc., 2001), 27.  Dutton observes, “many more 
than these [legal schools] in the formative period of Islamic law in the first to third centuries AH, such as those of 
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efforts to reconstruct the jurisprudential practices of late antique jurists.11  This dissertation 
attempts to begin the complicated process of re-inscribing these jurists and their legal 
practices in Islamic legal historiography.  To understand the significance of late antique 
jurisprudence, I contrast it with antecedent, neighboring, and successor jurisprudence among 
Muslims, Jews, and other Near Eastern communities.  The temporal scope of this project 
includes the seventh and eighth centuries, which are characterized by some scholars as part of 
a late antique “dark age” – marked by sparse and complicated sources, little archaeological or 
material evidence, and numerous conceptual mysteries.12  This dissertation is intended as an 
invitation for future research and inquiry to further illuminate these spaces darkened by 
scholarly neglect.  I interweave an array of historical evidence within an interpretive 
framework grounded in legal and social theory. 
This dissertation seeks to illustrate that (1) Islamic law is not an independent entity 
with an identifiable “birth” or unchanging/fundamental characteristics and (2) Islamic and 
Jewish legal similarities result not from “borrowing,” but from historical instances of 
dialectical interchange, from shared customary traditions, and from shared contexts.  Of 
course, Roman/Byzantine and Sasanian legal practices are part of this shared Near Eastern 
context and in some instances I will refer to these legal systems.  But my focus is on Islamic 
and Jewish legal systems because they coexisted in the same social space for several centuries 
and this unique situation lends itself to broad, comparative, and extended analyses.   
 
I. Limitations of contemporary Islamic legal historiography13 
 One objective of this dissertation is to fill a lacuna in existing Islamic legal 
historiography by explaining how late antique Muslim communities forged and continued to 
modify their own legal systems while adapting their antecedent, neighboring, and even 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
al-Awzāʿī (d. 157/774), al-Layth ibn Saʿd (d. 175/791), Dāwūd al-Ẓāhirī (d. 270/884), and ‘the two Sufyāns’, i.e. 
Sufyān al-Thawrī (d. 161/778) and Sufyān ibn ʿUyayna (d. 198/813)” Mālik Ibn Anas (d. 796; Arabia) et al., " riginal 
Islam: Mālik and the madhhab of Madina," Culture and civilization in the Middle East (2007): 2.  See also Wael B. 
Hallaq, Sharīʿa: theory, practice, transformations  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 36-54.  Patricia 
Crone, Roman, provincial and Islamic law  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 23-24. 
11 This is not the case in contemporary scholarship in Arabic because many recent texts discuss the jurisprudence 
of the Companions, Successors, and other late antique jurists.  I utilize and reference several such texts 
throughout this dissertation, including Mu ammad Rawwās Qalʿah'jī’s edited series, Silsilat maws ʿat fi h al-salaf.  
Notably, contemporary secondary literature in Arabic is generally more cognizant of continuity and of the 
significance of pre-professional jurists to Islamic legal thought; see, for example, Mu ammad  ūsuf Mūs , Tārī h 
al-fi h al-Islāmī, 2nd ed., 3 vols. (Cairo: Dār al-Maʿrifah, 1964-1966).  See also ʿAbd al-Majīd Ma mūd ʿAbd al-Majīd, 
al-Itti āhāt al-fi hīyah ʿinda aṣ ā  al- adīth fī al- arn al-thālith al-hi rī  (Cairo: Maktabat al-Khānjī, 1979). 
12 For conflicting perspectives on Islamic historiography, see ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Dūrī, The rise of historical writing among 
the Arabs, ed. Charles Issawi and Bernard Lewis, trans. Lawrence I. Conrad, Modern classics in Near Eastern Studies 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983).  See also Robert G. Hoyland, "History, fiction and authorship in the 
first centuries of Islam," in Writing and Representation in Medieval Islam: Muslim horizons, ed. Julia Bray, Routledge 
Studies in Middle Eastern Literatures (London and New York: Routledge, 2006).  Herbert Berg, ed. Method and theory in 
the study of Islamic origins (Leiden: Brill, 2003). 
13 An earlier version of this section was presented as “Myths of ‘Islamic law’ and false origins” as part of a panel I 
organized on ‘Revising Islamic Legal Historiography’ (which was sponsored by Middle East Medievalists) at the 
Middle Eastern Studies Association (MESA) annual meeting in Washington, D.C. on November 23, 2008. 
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internal legal systems.14  Effectively ignoring the 7th century, contemporary Islamic legal 
historiography characterizes the 8th through 10th centuries CE as the “formative” period of 
Islamic law and investigates its “evolution” or “development.”15  This period is the focus of 
what is arguably disproportionate academic interest.16  This scholarly interest is motivated by 
an evaluation of Islamic societies and institutions in tandem with ideological debates.17  In 
other words, scholarly assessments of Islamic beginnings are not isolated from contemporary 
or popular characterizations of Islamic societies today.   
  For the sake of brevity and clarity, I will focus here on a narrow body of Western 
scholarship written in or translated into English and the historical assumptions embedded 
within it.18  Surveying the academic gaps or emphases within the discipline of Islamic legal 
studies is beyond the scope of this study and has been initiated by others.19  Similarly, it is not 
my objective to critique the specifically ideological aspects of academic knowledge production 
                                                                  
14 It remains the case, as Hallaq claimed, that “the legal history of the first three centuries of Islam has yet to be 
written and must, in the process, abandon the archaic assumptions that have dominated  rientalism so far.” Wael 
B. Hallaq, "The quest for origins or doctrine? Islamic legal studies as colonialist discourse," UCLA Journal of Islamic 
and Near Eastern Law 2, no. 1 (2002-2003): 30.  
15 To be clear, the term “formative” is applied generally in Islamic historiography to refer roughly to the first 
century of Islamic history.  Most scholars distinguish between a “formative” and a “classical” period.  Chase F. 
Robinson, "Conclusion: from formative Islam to classical Islam," in The formation of the Islamic world, sixth to eleventh 
centuries, ed. Chase F. Robinson, The new Cambridge history of Islam (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).  
16 Hallaq, "The quest for origins or doctrine?," 3 (confirming that “the ‘origins’ of Islam in general and of Islamic 
law in particular were and continue to be, comparatively speaking, the focus of much of the writing in the field.”).  
This is supported by a recent survey of Islamic law teaching; Makdisi found that “Forty-six of the eighty-eight 
courses listed [in his survey of Islamic law courses at American law schools] (52 percent) focus on the origins and 
development of Islamic law, the methodology of reasoning from its sources, and a survey of its several 
substantive areas of law.” John Makdisi, "A survey of AALS law schools teaching Islamic law," Journal of legal 
education 55(2005): 4. 
17 Lockman notes, “nineteenth-century European Orientalist scholarship tended to focus on what scholars saw as 
Islam’s classical period, from its rise to the period in which it had supposedly reached its zenith and attained its 
purest form; everything thereafter was regarded as largely a story of decline and degeneration, or at least cultural 
and social rigidity and stasis.” Zachary Lockman, Contending visions of the Middle East: the history and politics of 
Orientalism  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 76. 
18 The most recent important texts discussing the late antique period are: Crone, Roman. Yasin Dutton, The origins 
of Islamic law: the Qurʾan, the  uwa  aʾ and  adinan  amal, Culture and civilization in the Middle East (Surrey: 
Curzon, 1999). Harald Motzki, The origins of Islamic jurisprudence: Meccan fiqh before the classical schools [Die Anfange 
der islamischen Jurisprudenz: Ihr Entwickllung in Mekka bis zur Mitte des 2./8. Jahrhunderts (1991)], trans. 
Marion H. Katz, Islamic history and civilization. Studies and texts, vol. 41 (Leiden; Boston Brill, 2002).  Wael B. 
Hallaq, The origins and evolution of Islamic law  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).  Hallaq modified and 
elaborated some of his views in Wael B. Hallaq, "Groundwork of the moral law: a new look at the Qurʾān and the 
genesis of sharīʿa," Islamic Law and Society 16(2009).  Equally influential, although earlier, are: Joseph Schacht, An 
introduction to Islamic law  (London: Oxford University Press, 1964); Joseph Schacht, The origins of Muhammadan 
jurisprudence  (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950); Joseph Schacht, "Foreign elements in ancient Islamic law," Journal of 
Comparative Legislation and International Law 32, no. 3/4 (1950). Joseph Schacht, "From Babylonian to Islamic law," 
Yearbook of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law 1(1994).  I will refer to all of these texts throughout this introduction. 
19 See Lama Abu-Odeh, "The politics of (mis)recognition: Islamic law pedagogy in American academia," The 
American Journal of Comparative Law 52, no. 4 (2004).  Jane F. Collier, "Intertwined histories: Islamic law and Western 
imperialism," Law & Society Review 28, no. 2 (1994).  Enid Hill, "Comparative and historical study of modern Middle 
Eastern law," American Journal of Comparative Law 26, no. 2 (1978).  
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within the varied discipline of Islamic legal studies.20  Nor is it my objective to undermine or 
disregard the significant contributions made by the diverse scholars whose works will be 
analyzed here; my intervention is only possible as the result of learning from them.  Moreover, 
I recognize that scholarship is constantly being modified and refined.21  This brief literature 
review is intended as a depiction of the most influential ideas in the field, not a critique of any 
individual scholar. 
 
Misconstruing “Islam” 
  In the field of Islamic studies, it is not uncommon to read about Islam’s “origins” or 
“formation.”22  These concepts are problematic because they project a unified essence to 
“Islam” that simply does not exist.23  Islam does not have independent existence; it does not 
have agency; therefore, the object of study is not “Islam,” but rather Islamic societies, 
institutions, traditions, and legal systems.  For this reason, it is preferable to use “Islam” 
exclusively in its adjectival form.24  Late antique Islamic society is, according to my definition, 
a fusion of several Near Eastern elements and, therefore, the distinction between Islamic and 
non-Islamic practices is nearly indiscernible in the beginning of Islamic history.  I identify the 
seventh through ninth centuries as Islamic late antiquity.25  The longstanding scholarly debate 
over so-called “foreign” influences on Islamic law (and Islamic history in general) assumes an 
anachronistic definition of “Islam” as an entity that can be separated from its late antique 
context.26  Because Islam is identified as a reified entity, scholarship seeks to define it and, 
                                                                  
20 On this issue, see Hallaq, "The quest for origins or doctrine?."  John Strawson, "Encountering Islamic law,"  
Critical Legal Conference held in New College(1993), http://www.witness-pioneer.org/vil/Articles/shariah/jsrps.html  
John Strawson, "Islamic law and English texts," Law and Critique VI, no. 1 (1995). 
21 Indeed, Hallaq’s 2009 article alters the views he espoused in earlier works – and parallels my own views – by 
dating the beginning of Islamic law to Qurʾānic revelations.  Hallaq states, “the Qurʾān was an incontrovertible and 
foundational source of the Sharīʿa already in the ﬁrst half of the Meccan period.” Hallaq, "Groundwork of the 
moral law," 272.  Therefore, references to his earlier scholarship are outdated, but I have maintained them 
because they are indicative of broader trends in the field.  
22 Case in point: an Index Islamicus database search (without date restrictions) for “Islam” and “origins” yielded 
approximately 275 results, whereas a search for “Islam” and “late antiquity” yielded only 30 results and a search 
for “Islam” and “beginning” yielded 27 results.  (Database search last accessed March 15, 2012.)  An example of the 
problematic consequence of conceptualizing Islam in terms of origins is Berkey’s conflation of Islam and medieval 
Islamic orthodoxy; he claims that “much of what we take to be typically 'Islamic' was in fact the product of a later 
period.” Jonathon P. Berkey, The formation of Islam: religion and society in the Near East, 600-1800  (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003), 105.   
23 This critique has been discussed before by Chase Robinson, who notes that “‘religion’ was conceptualized as a 
sphere of human action and belief that was distinct from other human activities (e.g. political movements or 
economic production), endowed with its own evolution (origins being given particular emphasis), and made a 
transcendent object through history.” Robinson, "Reconstructing early Islam," 105.  See, generally, Talal Asad, 
Genealogies of religion  (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993).  Comparatively, see Michael L. Satlow, 
"Defining Judaism: accounting for ‘religions’ in the study of religion," Journal of the American Academy of Religion 74, 
no. 4 (2007). 
24 This echoes Robinson’s exhortation, “let us abandon ‘Islam’ as a term of historical explanation.” Robinson, 
"Reconstructing early Islam," 134. 
25 See footnote 3 and 4.  
26 While the following discussion surveys relatively more recent literature, Crone has chronicled the history of 
this line of inquiry: “In 1925 Bergsträsser published an article arguing that is was Arab custom rather than Near 
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consequently, Islamic law is similarly conceptualized as a substantive being.  Some Islamic 
legal specialists have even attempted to identify precisely where and when Islamic law was 
“born.”27  A related expression of the search for Islamic “formation” is evident in attempts to 
demarcate when Islam became a distinct religious movement.28  These kinds of investigations 
are reifications of Muslim identity that impose an external classification of “Muslim” that is 
arbitrarily based on the scholar’s assumptions of what constitutes “Islam.”29  Just as being 
Muslim has different implications at different moments in time, so too does Islamic law have 
distinct manifestations.   
  Joseph Schacht was one of the most influential scholars of Islamic law.30  Schacht 
implied that late antique Muslims were wrong to consider “the retention of pre-Islamic legal 
practices as normal.”31  Of course, all societies recycle the practices of their ancestors, so it 
actually is not only normative, but impossible not to retain prior practices.32  Schacht asserted 
that “concepts and maxims originating from Roman and Byzantine law, from the Canon law of 
the Eastern Churches, from Talmudic and Rabbinic law, and from Sasanian law, infiltrated into 
the nascent religious law of Islam during its period of incubation, to appear in the doctrines of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Eastern law (Roman or other) which went into the Sharīʿa, and in 1933 Nallino argued much the same.  In 1947 
and 1949 Bousquet, Hassam and Wigmore all asserted the parthenogenetic origins of Islamic law, while FitzGerald 
in 1951 classified Roman influence as 'alleged'; and though occasional discussion, and even occasional suggestion, 
of Roman influence has continued since then, it has not been to much effect.” Crone, Roman: 5. 
27 See, for instance, Samuel D. Goitein, "The birth-hour of Muslim law?," The Muslim World 50, no. 1 (1960). 
28  This is exemplified in the work of Fred M. Donner, Muhammad and the believers: at the origins of Islam  (Cambridge, 
Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010).  Donner’s hypothesis resembles Boyarin’s work on 
Judaeo-Christianity. (See Daniel Boyarin, Border lines: the partition of Judaeo-Christianity, Divinations (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004).)  But Donner’s thesis relies too heavily on a presumption that the 
semantic distinction between muʾmin n and muslim n correlated to a social reality; he thereby adopts an 
evolutionary conceptualization of ‘Islam’ as an entity with identifiably ‘essential’ characteristics and this 
positivist approach is historically problematic.  Moreover, Donner applies a modern conceptualization of 
conversion that is alien to Islam’s late antique context.  In some ways, Donner’s work is an extension of claims 
articulated in Robert G. Hoyland, "New documentary texts," Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 69, 
no. 3 (2006). 
29 Indeed, those scholarly presumptions are themselves based on sources whose author-compilers 
anachronistically project their understanding of Islam onto the past: “the accounts about the Prophet 
Mu ammad, the early Islamic conquests, the First Civil War, and the early caliphate do display a kind of uniform 
view of the community of Believers as being united from the start around a conception of Islam that resembles 
the 'classical Islam' of the second and third centuries AH.  We might liken these accounts collectively to a mirror, 
in which the authors of the second and third centuries looked to see Islam's origins, but saw reflected mainly 
themselves—their own understandings of how those origins 'must have been,' based on the conditions and ideals 
of their own age.” Fred M. Donner, Narratives of Islamic origins, Studies in Late Antiquity and Early Islam 14 
(Princeton: The Darwin Press, 1998), 284. 
30 See Jeannette Wakin, Remembering Joseph Schacht (1902-1969), Occasional Publications 4 (Cambridge (MA): Islamic 
Legal Studies Program, Harvard Law School, 2003).  In an incisive article that pieces together Schacht’s many 
statements concerning “influences” on Islamic law and tests them, Ze’ev Maghen notes that "Schacht is both 
anticipated and succeeded by scholars who support the notion of heavy outside influence on the formation of 
Islamic jurisprudence and positive law." Ze'ev Maghen, "Dead tradition: Joseph Schacht and the origins of 
'popular practice'," Islamic Law and Society 10, no. 3 (2003): 292. 
31 Schacht, An introduction: 20. 
32 This is because “all cultures are involved in one another; none is single and pure, all are hybrid, heterogeneous, 
extraordinarily differentiated, and unmonolithic.” Edward Said, Culture and imperialism  (New York: Vintage Books, 
1993), xxv.   
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the second century A.H.”33  He thereby alleged “that many prominent features of Islamic 
civilization, notwithstanding a deceptive Arab appearance, turn out to be borrowings from the 
Hellenistic and the Iranian world.”34  He appears to have located this “borrowing” in Iraq.35  
Schacht’s claims about the “non-Arab” aspects of Islamic law are ideological clichés based on 
faulty historical thinking. 
  For many scholars of Islamic legal studies, Schacht’s claim of legal-cultural “borrowing” 
– which ostensibly occurred in Iraq – is still influential.36  Like Schacht, Crone rejects the 
possibility of Arabia being the locus of Islamic law’s “origins.”37  While Crone recognizes some 
historical contingency,38 she also argues that Islamic law was derived from provincial Roman 
law (which likely occurred in the Fertile Crescent).39  Whereas Schacht emphasized Islamic 
“borrowing” from Graeco-Roman and Iranian cultures, Crone asserts the Aramaic cultural 
genesis of Islamic law.40  The “problem of origins and the problem of foreign elements”41 that 
                                                                  
33 Schacht, An introduction: 21 (emphasis added). 
34 Schacht, "Foreign elements in ancient Islamic law," 10 (emphasis added).  In the same article, he further posits 
an untenable distinction between inside and outside, claiming “I have shown that legal concepts and principles, 
including even fundamental ideas of legal science, entered Muhammadan law from outside, in particular from 
Roman law, and have further shown how their adoption took place.  Whether these influences amount to little or 
much is irrelevant; the important fact is that they did happen.” Ibid., 17.  Crone repeats Schacht’s use of the term 
“deceptive,” claiming that “The Arab appearance of the Sharī‘a is striking, but deceptive: it testifies to its ideal, 
not its actual origins.” Patricia Crone, "Jāhilī and Jewish law: the  asāma," Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam 
4(1984): 155. 
35 Crone notes that “Schacht never discussed the possibility that Roman law was transmitted to Islam through 
Umayyad Syria.  On the whole he believed all foreign elements to have been picked up in Iraq, the province in 
which the classical Sharīʿa was born; and the fact that supposedly Roman elements frequently looked somewhat 
un-Roman he attributed to the wear and tear to which they had been exposed before transmission to Islam.” 
Crone, Roman: 8.  Jokisch echoes Schacht in identifying the location of such ‘borrowing’: “it is here [Baghdad], in 
the bosom of humanism, and not in Kūfa, Madīna or anywhere else, that Islamic law was born.” Benjamin Jokisch, 
Islamic imperial law: Harun Al-Rashid's codification project, ed. Lawrence I. Conrad, Studien zur Geschichte und Kultur 
des islamischen Orients (Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2007), 20. 
36 Maghen notes that "Many scholars influenced by Schacht have also supported and extended the 'massive 
importation' postulate. The disclaimers of these authors--coupled as they are with confident declarations 
regarding the large amount of borrowing that 'must' have taken place--make for frustrating reading." Maghen, 
"Dead tradition," 294.  A recent example of this kind of polemics is the claim that “a culture (Islam) borrowed the 
legal system or large parts of it from another culture (Byzantium).” Jokisch, Islamic Imperial Law: 45.   
37 Crone claims, “The tribal organisation of the Arabs on the one hand, and the collective amnesia whereby the 
Prophet’s Medina came to be revered as the true home of the Sharīʿa on the other, meant that the Arabs gave an 
archaic stamp to the law which they received.” Crone, Roman: 99 (emphasis added). 
38 “It would thus seem that law in the first century of Islam was caliphal law, and that Schacht's 'administrative 
practice' is a euphemism for a nascent legal system which might in due course have become the classical law of 
Islam: there is nothing to suggest that it is any less authoritative or any less comprehensive than that which the 
scholars were to create.” Ibid., 16.  Crone’s work is one of the more influential examples of the application of 
Schacht’s borrowing thesis (with modifications). 
39 “The a priori case for a Roman and/or provincial component in Umayyad law is thus very strong… arguments for 
Roman influence can probably never be as decisive as those for Jewish origins; but it is the best we have.” Ibid.  
Elsewhere, Crone and her co-author assert that “the key transmitters of originally ancient Near Eastern culture 
will prove to be the inhabitants of the Fertile Crescent, now assisted by the Arabian tradition and now without it, 
but not usually the Arabians on their own.” Patricia Crone et al., "The ancient Near East and Islam: the case of lot-
casting," Journal of Semitic Studies 55, no. 2 (2010): 450. 
40 “Consequently, a great deal of Islamic culture is Aramaic culture, brought into Islam in the form in which it had 
developed under Greek and Persian rule, to develop in new directions thereafter.” Crone et al., "The ancient Near 
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Schacht emphasized is one that succeeding generations of scholars have sought to refute by 
insisting that Islamic law is an authentic continuation of Arab-Islamic legal thought.  Some 
scholars identify the lineage of Islamic law as Arabian,42 while others characterize it more 
specifically as Meccan43 or Medinan.44  Indeed, some scholars have written articles specifically 
contesting the Orientalist presumption of excessive “foreign” influences on Islamic law.45  All 
these scholars seem to adopt a nationalistic approach to legal historiography. 
  What underlies this scholarly interest in identifying the lineage of Islamic law is a 
question about legitimacy.  Scholars who describe Islamic law as having “borrowed” from 
some other legal system are claiming that Islamic law is not genuine because it is not “purely” 
Arab/Islamic in “origin.”  But their conceptualization of authenticity is impossible because 
cultures are inherently hybrid.46  As Asad explains “[T]here is no such thing as authenticity; 
borrowing and copying do not signify a lack.”47   Some form of Arabness extended beyond the 
imaginary borders of the Arabian Peninsula and into both the Byzantine and Sasanian 
regions.48  Similarly, Graeco-Roman culture continued to thrive after the beginning of Islam.49 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
East and Islam," 448-49.  Crone understands “Aramaic” culture as the shared culture of Christians, Jews, and 
pagans in the Near East and likely views this as roughly corresponding to Roman provincial law.   
41 Schacht, "Foreign elements in ancient Islamic law," 10. 
42 “Arabia has provided an equally, if not more, convincing source for much of the law that Islam came to adopt.” 
Hallaq, The origins and evolution of Islamic law: 4.  “Islamic law is a creature of the legal culture of the Near East, 
especially those forms of it that the Arabs of the south and the north lived and experienced between the fifth and 
seventh centuries AD.” Hallaq, Sharīʿa: 13. 
43 Motzki “limit[s] the scope for such an influence, temporally, to the end of the first/seventh century (including 
pre-Islamic times) and, spatially, to the Arabian Peninsula.” Motzki, The origins: xv.  See also Harald Motzki, "The 
role of non-Arab converts in the development of early Islamic law," Islamic law and society 6, no. 3 (1999). 
44 Dutton concludes that “Madinan ʿamal as depicted in the Muwa  aʾ represents a continuous development of the 
‘practice’ of Islam from its initial origin in the Qurʾan, via the sunna of the Prophet as its first expositor.” Dutton, 
The origins of Islamic law: 180.  See also his introduction in Ibn Anas (d. 796; Arabia) et al., "Original Islam." 
45 See Wael B. Hallaq, "Review: The use and abuse of evidence: the questions of provincial and Roman influences 
on early Islamic law," Journal of the American Oriental Society 110, no. 1 (1990). Motzki, "The role of non-Arab 
converts."  It is not my objective here to evaluate the substantive assertions made by either Hallaq or Motzki in 
these articles; such an endeavor would necessitate intense and extensive engagement beyond my purposes.   
46 See footnote 32. 
47 Asad, Genealogies of religion: 10.   
48 Trimingham notes that “the Arabs inhabited all the regions lying to the north of the Peninsula proper, Syria 
and Palestine, Mesopotamia and Babylonia, even parts of western Persia, intermingled with the Aramaic-speaking 
peoples of these regions.” John Spencer Trimingham, Christianity among the Arabs in pre-Islamic times  (London: 
Longman Group Limited, 1979), 1.  “The Arab element in the  rient and the Fertile Crescent was constantly 
replenished by waves of penetrators and immigrants, both seasonal and unseasonal, from Arabia.  It was this 
constant flow from the Peninsula that was the most important element in reinforcing the Arab presence in the 
 rient demographically and keeping it alive culturally.” Irfan Shahīd, Rome and the Arabs: a prolegomenon to the 
study of Byzantium and the Arabs  (Washington, D.C.: Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection, 1984), 11. In 
addition, “Documentary and narrative sources show Arabs as having been present in Egypt, including the 
Fayyūm, before the Muslim conquest.” Petra M. Sijpesteijn, "Shaping a Muslim state: papyri related to a mid-
eighth-century Egyptian official" (Dissertation, Princeton University, 2004), 89.  See also Jan Rets , The Arabs in 
antiquity: their history from the Assyrians to the Umayyads  (London; New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005). 
49 Bowersock observes in Islamic late antiquity “a remarkable continuity of Hellenism in both its cultural and 
pagan aspects.”  G. W. Bowersock, Hellenism in late antiquity, Jerome lectures; 18th ser. (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 1990), 80. 
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  Social psychology, particularly the theory of attribution bias, offers a lens through 
which to understand the contour of this debate – and the more extensive debate about the 
foreign versus Arab identity of Islam.50  Scholars attribute causality (of Islamic law’s 
development) to external (foreign) or internal (Arabian or Islamic) factors based on their self-
identification as or evaluation of observers or actors, respectively.  But in reality, both external 
and internal causal factors are always operational.  More precisely, the distinction between 
externality and internality in the beginning of Islamic history is not easily discernible – if at 
all.  This debate about “borrowing” reveals that answering the “origin” question requires 
defining culture in an impossibly monolithic way, often based on the fallacy of a single cause.  
Some Islamic legal studies scholarship suppresses the inevitable hybridity that characterizes 
any region or period and is entrapped in an artificial quandary of identifying the pure lineage 
of Islamic law.  Some recent scholarship has critiqued the limitations of scholarly 
identifications of “borrowing” or “influence.”51  Similarly, recent scholarship on Arabic 
translations of Greco-Roman and other texts has shifted away from the “borrowing” paradigm 
and toward an understanding of (literary) translation as a non-passive act of creation.52  These 
insights form the background to this dissertation’s approach. 
  Terms like “borrowing” and “influence” are embedded within an erroneous 
presumption of clear boundaries between Islamic and un-Islamic.53  Those boundaries are often 
drawn by modern scholars using modern identity categories to describe the past.  One 
symptom of this identity politics in scholarship is the ostensible competition to determine 
which “foreign” legal system was more influential.54  Such inquiries attempt to measure the 
influence or dissemination of each community’s legal traditions, but this is empirically 
                                                                  
50 See Lee Ross, "The intuitive psychologist and his shortcomings: distortions in the attribution process," in 
Advances in experimental social psychology, ed. Leonard Berkowitz (New York: Academic Press, 1977).  
51 An excellent critique is Michael L. Satlow, "Beyond influence: toward a new historiographic paradigm," in Jewish 
literatures and cultures: context and intertext, ed. Anita Norich and Yaron Z. Eliav (Providence, R.I.: Brown Judaic 
Studies, 2008).  See also Michael E. Pregill, "The Hebrew Bible and the Quran: the problem of the Jewish ‘influence’ 
on Islam," Religion Compass 1, no. 6 (2007). 
52 For example, Gutas asserts that “translations are seen from the very beginning as part of research processes 
stemming from intellectual currents in Baghdad and as such creative responses to the rapidly developing Arabic 
scientific and philosophical tradition.  Study of the complexes emancipates one from the perennial but moot 
problems of essentializing conceptualizations and explanations, such as the extent of the 'originality' of Arabic 
science and philosophy, or the 'creativity' or lack thereof of Arabs and Semites.” Dimitri Gutas, Greek culture, 
Arabic thought  (New York: Routledge, 1998), 150.  Similarly, Vagelpohl discusses “the status of translations as 
literary creations in their own right.” Uwe Vagelpohl, Aristotle's Rhetoric in the East: the Syriac and Arabic translation and 
commentary tradition, Islamic philosophy, theology and science, v. 76 (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2008), 209.  
53 Daniel Boyarin explains that “Borders themselves are not given but constructed by power to mask hybridity, to 
occlude and disown it.” Boyarin, Border lines: 15.  Similarly, Satlow explains that “To be a Jew in antiquity could 
mean many different things to different people; to make a priori assumptions about who the ‘Jews’ were is to 
obscure the way in which Jewish identity could be fluid. Put differently, the ambiguity of the very criteria by 
which historians of the Jews gather their data (i.e., ‘Jew’) needs to be recognized.” Satlow, "Beyond influence," 45. 
54 This is discernible in Crone’s discussion of Roman law’s “influence.”  She claims, “It is plain from papyrological 
and other evidence that the law of the Near Eastern provinces was never wholly Romanised and numerous 
peregrine institutions survived under a more or less Roman veneer.  This is a point of fundamental importance to 
historians of Islamic law, and the conclusion of the present work is that provincial practice contributed far more 
to the Sharīʿa than did Roman law.  But it would nonetheless be a mistake to preclude the possibility of Roman 
influence on the ground that Roman law was not really practised in the Roman Near East at all.” Crone, Roman: 14.   
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impossible.55  Of course, these observations about scholarly interests in measuring the 
“Arabness” of Islamic law extend more broadly to Islamic studies in general.56  The notion of 
borrowing is effectively useless because it fails to account for the transformation and 
integration of pre-Islamic communities into late antique Islamic society.  In other words, 
integrating one’s own culture into a newly-established community is not borrowing: it is an 
assimilative process.  In late antiquity, several Near Eastern elements constituted the very 
definition of Islam.    
 
Misjudging law 
  Societies with legal actors or law enforcers have law.  Yet much Islamic legal 
scholarship characterizes late antique Muslim societies as either not having a legal system, or 
having a legal system that was not Islamic, or having a legal system that was immature.57  All 
these interpretations are equally problematic, because they are based on a narrow definition 
of “law” that fails to appreciate that it is the existence of jurists or other legal actors that 
signifies law.  Schacht claimed that “During the greater part of the first century Islamic law, in 
the technical meaning of the term, did not as yet exist.”58  For Schacht, “the starting-point of 
Muhammadan jurisprudence lies in the practice of the late Umaiyad [sic] period”59 and not 
earlier.  Schacht alleged that Islamic law did not exist before 100 AH (after hi rī) because he 
defined Islamic law as the product of surviving legal schools.60  The very act of attempting to 
identify a date for the beginning of Islamic legal history illustrates an assumption that the first 
Muslim community did not have a legal system from its beginning.61   
 The interest in offering a date for Islamic law’s “origins” is a manifestation of the 
reification of Islamic law that belies a presumption against continuity as these scholars seem 
intent on identifying a moment of rupture that simply did not exist.62  After Schacht, 
                                                                  
55 Absent an empirical study of every known “Islamic” legal doctrine from late antiquity and its equivalent in the 
region’s non-Islamic legal systems, it is not possible to determine which system is the most “influential.”  
Moreover, in many cases, it is simply impossible to differentiate between Islamic and other Near Eastern legal 
practices during late antiquity.  
56 By way of example, Berkey claims “Arabia may be where Islam began, but the cultures and traditions of other 
areas, most notably the more populated regions of the Near East from Egypt to Iran, arguably played a more 
critical role in the subsequent delimitation of Islamic identity.” Berkey, The formation of Islam: 29. 
57 This may be a manifestation of a presumption about the nature of law in pre-modern versus modern societies.  
Rouland notes that “In spite of evolutionist prejudices, there is no radical distinction, in nature, between law in 
modern societies and traditional societies.” Norbert Rouland, Legal anthropology, trans. Philippe G. Planel 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), 243. 
58 Schacht, An introduction: 19. 
59 Schacht, The origins: 1.  
60 Schacht alleged that “the traditions from the Prophet do not form, together with the Koran, the original basis of 
Muhammadan law, but an innovation begun at a time when some of its foundations already existed.” Ibid., 40. 
61 See footnote 27.  This is inherently related to the broader scholarly interest in identifying “unique” Islam.  
Berkey, for example, claims that “Anything we can now recognize as a distinctively Islamic tradition did not 
coalesce until relatively late—the end of the seventh or beginning of the eighth century.” Berkey, The formation of 
Islam: 60. 
62 Indeed, this problematic notion of discontinuity is evident in other works.  For example, “ ne of the principal 
themes of the study at hand is to show that the early development of Islamic law was in no way continuous.” 
Jokisch, Islamic Imperial Law: 3. 
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succeeding generations of scholars have sought to offer alternative – usually earlier – dates for 
the beginning of Islamic law.  Crone appears to date Islamic law to the beginning of Islam, but 
embedded within an evolutionary presumption; she claims: 
Islamic law, it would seem, evolved from embryonic beginnings to classical 
shapes within less than two hundred years.  Very much indeed must have 
happened in the period from about 620 to 820, that is in the period for which 
our documentation is poor.  Our chances of being able to reconstruct the origins 
of Islamic law with any degree of certainty are accordingly somewhat limited.63 
Motzki argued that Schacht dated Islamic jurisprudence too late and suggested 25-50 hi rī.64  
Primarily by examining early monographs, Motzki traces what he classifies as Meccan fiqh to 
scholars of the middle of the first hi rī century (approximately 670 CE), claiming that their 
traditions influenced the ‘development’ of Islamic jurisprudence.65  Dutton identified “the 
formative period of Islamic law in the first to third centuries AH”66 as being equivalent to the 
period before the emergence of the legal schools.  Dutton proposes refinement of Schacht’s 
categories by emphasizing the distinction between sunnah and ʿamal; he thereby contests 
Schachtian perceptions of disjunction between acts of the Prophet, sunnah, and  adīth.67  
Hallaq’s earlier work similarly defined “the ‘formative period’ as that historical period in 
which the legal system arose from rudimentary beginnings and then developed to the point at 
which its constitutive features had acquired an identifiable shape.”68  In more recent work, 
Hallaq explicitly dates Islamic law to the beginning of Islam, but continues to distinguish a 
later, more mature form.69   
                                                                  
63 Crone, Roman: 26. 
64 Motzki expressly states that “The beginnings of a law that was Islamic in the true sense of the word and of 
theoretical occupation with it are placed too late by a good half to three quarters of a century.” Motzki, The 
origins: 296. 
65 For an overview of Motzki’s historical outline, see ibid., 287-93.  Motzki contends that “In view of the conditions 
ascertained for Mecca the following assumptions made by Schacht must be revised: that for the better part of the 
first/seventh century there existed no Islamic law ‘in the technical meaning of the term;’ that the foundations of 
what later became Islamic law were laid by the  ādīs and governors of the Umayyad dynasty.” Ibid., 296. 
66 Ibn Anas (d. 796; Arabia) et al., "Original Islam," 2.    
67 Like Motzki, Dutton maintains both an “origin” and a linear development of Islamic law.  The Muwa  aʾ, 
composed by Mālik ibn Anas (d. 179/795) and dated to approximately the year 150/767, is a book of ʿamal, which 
according to Dutton, is “not only our earliest formulation of Islamic law, but also our earliest record of that law as 
a lived reality rather than the theoretical construct of later scholars.” Yasin Dutton, The origins of Islamic law: the 
Qurʾan, the uwa  aʾ and adinan  amal ibid. (Surrey: Curzon, 1999), 4. 
68 Hallaq, The origins and evolution of Islamic law: 2-3.  Criticizing both the Schachtian and post/anti-Schachtian 
perspective of tracing Islamic law, Hallaq argues that “[t]o search for the ‘origins’ of Islamic law in the long 
process of hadīth evolution – as some prominent modern scholars have done – is therefore to miss the point 
altogether.  In the present work, the pre-hadīth forms of Islam (including sunan, ‘ilm and ra’y) are as valid as those 
that emerged later.” Ibid., 200.  
69 Hallaq posits that “’law’ took off where and when morality began, with the revelation of the ﬁrst Sūrahs in 
Mecca. It was then and there that ‘Islamic Law’ began, and it was thence that the intricate moral blueprint was to 
be given further ‘legal’ and other elaborations. These elaborations became the full-ﬂedged Sharīʿa, one that was 
morally grounded and supremely Qurʾānic, from the very start.” Hallaq, "Groundwork of the moral law," 279.  
Hallaq observes “Two stages of development preceded and paved the way for the rise of the doctrinal schools: the 
first was the stage of study circles and the second the stage of the personal schools.” Hallaq, Sharīʿa: 60.  Hallaq’s 
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  Many scholars focus on offering a date for the beginning or “formation” of Islamic law 
because they define Islamic law in a particular way: as one of the surviving professional legal 
schools that came to dominate in a later period.  Islamic legal scholarship largely ignores 
Islamic legal practice in the first century of Islam because, measuring it against the later, 
professional legal system, it appears (erroneously) incomplete or deficient.  Furthermore, the 
longstanding emphasis on certain texts has led scholars to ignore evidence of Islamic legal 
thought or practice outside of identifiable legal (fiqh) texts,70 such as biographical or other 
social history texts.71  This narrow approach to sources assumes that reading texts in isolation 
is sufficient for knowledge production.72  It is as if the absence of self-identified legal texts 
means that a legal system did not exist before the first hi rī century.  But the formation of the 
orthodox legal schools was not inevitable.73  There is significant historical evidence of legal 
practice during the first century of Islam in a variety of historical texts (including sīrah, 
maghāzī, muṣannafāt, and masānīd) that have not been properly investigated.  The problem is 
not sources; the problem is anachronistic, backward projection of orthodox Sunnī Islamic law 
onto legal practice of an earlier period that is fundamentally distinct.  There was much more 
law in late antique Muslim societies than previously assumed and that law is multi-vocal, 
contested, and leads to unintended consequences.  
 
Misunderstanding historical change 
The emphasis on “origins” in Islamic legal historiography reflects an implicitly 
evolutionary or developmental theory of history.74  Islamic legal development is, 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
schemata – indeed, the impressive corpus of his work – forms the background narrative of Islamic legal history 
that my research seeks to clarify and to elaborate.   
70 Motzki states that “If this study can contribute to bringing back the debate on the origins of Islamic 
jurisprudence and early traditions in general to a more ‘philological’ level of interpreting the texts – ‘philological’ 
does not necessarily mean ‘uncritical’ or essentialist’ – then it will have fulfilled its purpose.” Motzki, The origins: 
xvii.   
71 In a different context, Gordon offers an explanation for this influence, asserting, “This is why, long after the 
discrediting of evolutionary theories of history, legal history was still so frequently written as if these theories 
still held sway.  For the historian who restricts his sources to the strictly legal, there often is no explanation 
available other than the genetic.” Robert W. Gordon, "Introduction: J. Willard Hurst and the common law 
tradition in American legal historiography," Law & Society Review 10, no. 1 (1975): 20.   
72 “The primary aim of  rientalism is to uncover the deep symbolic significance of Islamic cultural expression, of 
which the Arabic language is the primary vehicle.  Hence research has been traditionally focused on the literary 
outpourings of the ‘ruling institutions.’” Bryan S. Turner, Marx and the end of Orientalism  (London: George Allen & 
Unwin Ltd, 1978), 6.     
73 “Having severed Islamic legal concepts from both their origins and their operational frameworks, orientalist 
scholars concluded that fiqh products and Islamic law were one and the same, a divine dictation, which was 
incapable of change.” Haifaa Khalafallah, "The elusive ‘Islamic law’: rethinking the focus of modern scholarship," 
Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations 12, no. 2 (2001): 143. 
74 By way of comparison, this correlates to Whiggish understandings of history that were prevalent among 
scholars of Western legal systems.  Robert W. Gordon’s observes “a Whiggish notion of law as progress, so that, by 
means of gradual adaptation, the ancient and essential principles of legal order may be seen as ever more 
efficiently and purely realized (with some allowances for lapses and setbacks) in practice.  In this synthesis, legal 
history is often written as the story of the genetic ancestors or ‘origins’ of the legal forms of the present and of 
the gradual developing of these embryos into their mature modern condition.” Robert W. Gordon, "The past as 
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unfortunately, understood as progressing from gestational obscurity to mature legal schools.75  
In this problematic framework, any law that existed prior to the “development” of uṣ l al-fiqh 
is immature and deficient.  However, the seemingly unbreakable association between Islamic 
law and uṣ l al-fiqh is historically inaccurate.76  A less problematic periodization of Islamic law 
will unshackle its “formative” period from a linear construction of history.   The beginning of 
an Islamic community is equivalent to the beginning of Islamic history. 
 
Mistaking methodologies as truth-generating 
No student of Islamic history can escape the conundrum of debates surrounding Islamic 
primary sources.77  But what few scholars in the field recognize is that “methodological” 
questions cannot be isolated from their ideological frameworks.  Thus when a scholar makes a 
claim about the supposed unreliability of late antique Islamic sources, it is inherently based on 
both a judgment about the society that produced those sources and a philosophical position 
about the nature of truth claims.  Scholars who fail to abstract their methodological positions 
avoid recognizing the results of their positions.  The following discussion is a brief overview of 
some recurring issues within controversies about Islamic sources.  Muslim historians of late 
antiquity cannot be identified as a homogenous group; there were myriad political and 
theological debates that animated late antique Muslim societies, which suggests that moments 
of consensus among Muslim historians should be taken seriously.78  Where our diverse textual 
evidence indicates unanimity is historical truth’s point of departure.  Our task is to investigate 
how to critically interpret our sources.79   
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
authority and as social critic: stabilizing and destabilizing functions of history in legal argument," in The historic 
turn in the human sciences, ed. Terrence J. McDonald (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 343.   
75 Gordon explains the problems and inaccuracies of viewing legal history as progressive development: “The 
assumptions of the evolutionary histories of nineteenth-century jurists, especially the assumptions of necessary 
stage developments in all – at least all ‘progressive’ – societies from communalism toward individualism, and 
status to contract, were…broken up by historicist critics who found that even English legal development had 
skipped stages or gone through them in reverse order!” Robert W. Gordon, "Historicism in legal scholarship," The 
Yale Law Journal 90, no. 1017 (1981): 1035-36.  
76 “Fiqh literature does not represent ‘Islamic law.’  Fiqh must be recognized as a generic term describing a 
repertoire of concepts that arose in a certain time and eventually created a series of intellectual and cultural 
syntheses and it must be studied as such.  Legality for Muslims, having partly developed outside state control, 
rests on a generic methodological framework that allows substantial differences, including an outright rejection 
of the whole edifice of fiqh.” Khalafallah, "The elusive ‘Islamic law’," 150. 
77 Robinson observes that “it is a measure of just how conservative the professional study of Islamic history 
remains that the noisiest controversy of the last 25 years concerns the reliability of our written sources, rather 
than the models according to which we are to understand and use them.” Robinson, "Reconstructing early Islam," 
115. 
78 Tucker observes, “It is surprising to note that historians of diverse interests, historical periods and contexts, 
creeds, nationalities, political opinions, and other collective identities have independently reached similar beliefs 
about history that resulted from the research of others.  Bearing in mind the radical heterogeneity of historians, 
it would have been reasonable to expect historians to disagree about political or religious historiography as much 
as they disagree about politics and religion.” Aviezer Tucker, Our Knowledge of the Past  (Cambridge: Cambridge 
Unviersity Press, 2004), 24. 
79 Robinson has already expressed a similar position: “it is a measure of just how conservative the professional 
study of Islamic history remains that the noisiest controversy of the last 25 years concerns the reliability of our 
written sources, rather than the models according to which we are to understand and use them.” Robinson, 
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i. contemporaneity 
 It is common for scholars of Islamic studies to allege that all the sources for Islamic 
history are unreliable because they were redacted or recorded at least a century after the 
events transpired.80  That the primary sources were not written contemporaneous with the 
events is not completely “damaging” to the historical value of these sources for numerous 
reasons.  First, contemporaneous sources are not inherently more reliable than later sources; 
there is no general rule that can be applied to all sources or that can guarantee the reliability 
of a particular kind of source.  Second, some sources should not be categorized as later because 
the narratives transcribed in written sources were initially orally composed and transmitted 
contemporaneously as part of both a literary and a living legal tradition.81  Specifically, some 
narratives about the Prophetic and Caliphal past were actively being used as precedents for 
legal decisions and were preserved not simply in literary form, but also in the form of social 
application.82  I refer to the overlap between historical sources and legal practice throughout 
the substantive chapters of this dissertation.  Third, these non-contemporaneous written 
sources are based on both oral materials and extinct written texts that were likely 
contemporaneous.  In other words, contemporaneous written materials are likely embedded 
within later written texts.83  Fourth, vast periods of history from a wide variety of areas are 
known to us exclusively through the accounts of non-contemporary sources; if these sources 
were rejected or presumed false, it would simply be impossible to write historiographies of 
these periods and places.  Instead, historians are tasked with presenting theories about the 
past by critically using whatever evidence is available to them. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
"Reconstructing early Islam," 115.  See also Chase F. Robinson, Empire and elites after the Muslim conquest: the 
transformation of northern Mesopotamia  (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000).   
80 Donner’s view in this regard is typical: “as any serious student of Islamic origins will know, these literary 
sources pose various problems as evidence for Islamic origins.  First of all, there is the fact that they are not 
contemporary sources; sometimes they were written many centuries after the events they describe.  It is obvious 
that reconstructing Islamic origins on the basis of such literary materials violates the first law of the historian, 
which is to use contemporary sources whenever possible.  Nor is this merely a nicety of principle; even a quick 
reading of some of the main literary sources for Islamic origins—particularly narratives on this theme—reveals 
internal complexities that give pause to the serious researcher.” (Donner 1998, 4, citation omitted) Donner, 
Narratives: 4. 
81 For a discussion of orality in Islamic historiography, see Gregor Schoeler, The oral and the written in early Islam, 
ed. James E. Montgomery, trans. Uwe Vagelpohl, Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern Literatures (London and 
New York: Routledge, 2006).    
82 “[T]he consensus exists because events actually did happen in the way described by our sources, and were so 
well known in the early community that all groups were required to accept the basic 'script' of events.” Donner, 
Narratives: 289.  This is not to imply that there are no slippages or ambiguities in these historical sources; for a 
relevant discussion, see Chapter 1. 
83 Wadad al-Qaḍī has demonstrated this quite convincingly and we should consider her insightful and precise 
work as indicative of broader characteristics of these materials. See Wadād al-Qāḍī, "An Umayyad papyrus in al-
Kindī’s Kitā  al-Quḍāt?," Der Islam 84, no. 2 (2008).  
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ii. orality and chains of transmission 
Primary textual sources for reconstructing late antique Islamic history were orally 
composed and transmitted for several generations before being transcribed in their surviving 
textual forms approximately a century after the events.84  Many specialists in the field of 
Islamic studies erroneously presume that the oral beginnings of late antique Islamic sources 
render these sources unreliable.85  Oral transmission – as the primary archival form – should 
not be presumed to be less reliable than written transmission, in light of scribal errors and 
problems of textual preservation and transmission.86  Throughout the late antique Near East, 
oral transmission was often supplemented by written transmission as part of an expansive 
educational process that intertwined oral and written forms of learning and communication.87  
Indeed, there is evidence that the earliest Islamic state relied on written documentation, 
which suggests that writing may have had a much stronger role to play in the beginning of 
Islamic history than commonly presumed.88  Research on the use of oral sources for 
historiography has demonstrated that oral sources should be compared to written sources and 
material/documentary evidence as a means of verifying historical probability.89 
 
iii. multi-vocality 
 One of the repeated criticisms of late antique Islamic sources is that they cannot be 
factual because they are inconsistent, as manifested in variant narratives of the same historical 
event.  This notion is based on the false premise that factuality is only possible where one 
version of past events exists.  Individuals experience, interpret, and relate facts differently.  
For example, variations in the testimonies of several witnesses to a crime are normative and 
do not preclude the admissibility of the testimony.  The expectation that only one consistent 
                                                                  
84 For a discussion of this process, see Schoeler, The oral and the written. 
85 For a relevant discussion, see James E. Montgomery’s introduction in ibid., 13.  Vansina counters assumptions 
about the unreliability of oral sources, noting that “oral tradition is not necessarily untrustworthy as a historical 
source, but, on the contrary, merits a certain amount of credence within certain limits.” Jan Vansina, Oral 
tradition: a study in historical methodology, trans. H. M. Wright (Chicago: Aldine Pub. Co., 1965, c1961), 1. 
86 Vansina explains that “oral traditions are historical sources which can provide reliable information about the 
past if they are used with all the circumspection demanded by the application of historical methodology to any 
kind of source whatsoever.” Vansina, Oral tradition: 183. On oral traditions generally, see Jan Vansina, Oral tradition 
as history  (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985).  On textual criticism, see Paul Maas, Textual criticism, 
trans. Barbara Flower (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967).  Schoeler also notes “it is as easy to falsify material in 
writing as it is in oral transmission!” Schoeler, The oral and the written: 41. 
87 Schoeler, The oral and the written: 41-47. 
88 Robin notes that “Cette réforme de l’écriture arabe pendant les premières décennies de l’Islam prouve que le 
premier État musulman (avant la sortie d’Arabie) n’a pas d’aversion pour l’écriture, mais, bien au contraire, en fait 
un usage constant.  Il serait bien étonnant, dès lors, que l’écriture n’ait pas été utilisée pour la transmission des 
données de la Tradition.” Julien Christian Robin, "La réforme de l’écriture arabe à l’époque du califat médinois," 
 élanges de l’Université Saint-Joseph 59(2006): 351. 
89 “Examination of the information on which a testimony is based is therefore the first step towards evaluating its 
reliability...The next step is to compare it with all the other testimonies which describe the same facts.  The 
comparative method is the one which enables the historian to arrive at an overall estimate of the relative 
reliability of the various testimonies.” Vansina, Oral tradition: 114. 
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narrative is factual is a manifestation of a positivist orientation.90  The processes used in 
transmitting, transcribing, and compiling late antique Islamic sources necessarily resulted in 
dissimilarities.91   
 
iv. fallibility 
  In the field of Islamic studies, two default modes of engaging historical sources 
dominate: one presumes they are false and looks for snippets of factuality and the other 
presumes they are true and searches for snippets of inaccuracy.  This is a manifestation of an 
oft-repeated critique of late antique Islamic sources that Muslim historians, transmitters, or 
compilers modified the “truth” in order to serve their interests or the interests of their 
patrons.92  Indeed, it has become common for scholars to claim that late antique Islamic 
sources reveal more about their compilers or authors than historical “facts.”93  But authors and 
compilers do not all have the same objectives and there is no hierarchical organization that 
appears to have altered Islamic sources to conform with a particular historical vision – in late 
antiquity or the medieval era.94  Every Islamic literary-historical source conveys the testimony 
of several historical actors; it is illogical to negate the veracity of all these sources based on 
problems (or fabrications) in some of the narratives.95     
                                                                  
90 Or, as Mohammed Bamyeh notes, “With some effort at listening to the interplay of ideational and discursive 
configurations reverberating through the classical story of Islam, almost all ‘contradictions’ uncovered by 
revisionist historians can be shown to be contradictions solely in modern logic and modality of reading.” 
Mohammed A. Bamyeh, The social origins of Islam: mind, economy, discourse  (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1999), viii. 
91 Schoeler provides a comprehensive and thorough discussion of variant traditions. Schoeler, The oral and the 
written: 33. 
92 Donner provides a succinct description: “The skeptical approach derives plausibility from years of source-
critical and tradition-critical research that has conclusively demonstrated the existence in Islamic tradition of a 
heavy overlay of pious legend and the influence of manipulations, distortions, and fabrications of all kinds.  This 
tampering with the tradition makes it unclear where the kernel of historical 'truth' may lie, and gives the skeptics 
the opening to claim that there is no historical kernel at all, only successive layers of repeatedly reshaped and 
redacted material.” Donner, Narratives: 25.  But note that Gil observed, “I find the general corpus of traditions – as 
preserved in the Arab sources – to be essentially genuine. I am well aware of the trend among some distinguished 
scholars, which is now in vogue to consider most traditions regarding the period of the Prophet to be mere 
inventions dating from later periods, a kind of typological construction. It is clear that there was some 
embellishment by later generations, often encouraged by rulers for propaganda purposes. As I discuss below, 
traditionalists were aware of such interests, which often conflicted with each other, and it is easy for us to detect 
them; basically, however, the facts we do have could not have been invented, and there is a fair amount of 
unanimity in the way they are presented.” Moshe Gil, "The earliest waqf foundations," in Related worlds: studies in 
Jewish and Arab ancient and early medieval history (Aldershot, Hampshire, Great Britain; Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate, 
2004), 125. 
93 Referring to narratives about the beginning of Islamic history, Donner claims “We might liken these accounts 
collectively to a mirror, in which the authors of the second and third centuries looked to see Islam's origins, but 
saw reflected mainly themselves—their own understandings of how those origins 'must have been,' based on the 
conditions and ideals of their own age.” Donner, Narratives: 284. 
94 Donner notes that there were “no 'authorities' who had the power to impose a uniform dogmatic view.” Ibid., 
27. 
95 As Motzki astutely noted, “The possibility that isnāds and biographies were fabricated does not allow one to 
conclude that they really were fabricated.  This must be positively proven first.  The proof that some isnāds or 
some information contained in biographies of tradents were really fabricated does not necessarily mean that 
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v. fictional alternatives 
In recent years, another approach to the sources has become apparent: some scholars 
have relinquished attempts to use late antique Islamic sources for historiographical purposes 
and chosen instead to explore the fictional or narrative aspects of these texts.96   While this 
approach serves certain literary – and perhaps ideological – purposes, I reject, as false, any 
assumption of a dichotomy between facts and narratives because facts are always embedded in 
narratives.97  To relegate these sources to an exclusively literary analysis does historical 
understanding a great disservice.  Like all historical sources, late antique Islamic texts are 
neither purely fictional nor purely factual.   
 
II. Alternatives to contemporary Islamic legal historiography 
Re-conceptualizing Islamic society 
It is possible to define late antique Islamic history as 613 CE (the Prophet’s declaration 
of Islam) to 750 CE (the end of the Umayyad dynasty and beginning of the ʿAbbāsid Empire).98  
The study of Islamic history’s beginnings must be situated within the field of late antique 
studies.  Placing Islam in its late antique context and emphasizing Islamic society as the object 
of inquiry does not necessarily render Muslim indefinite or meaningless.  Focusing on Islamic 
society and accepting that what it meant to be Muslim simply changed (and continues to do so) 
over time and according to region does not in any way diminish or deny the syncretism or 
hybridity of religious identity.  While some late antique Muslims may have practiced Jewish, 
Christian, or pagan rituals, this does not mean that they were not Muslims.  Belief and ritual 
practices are not comprehensive identity markers.  The historical evidence of conquests 
suggests that becoming Muslim was similar to changing one’s citizenship or political 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
most of them or even all of them were.” Harald Motzki, "The question of the authenticity of Muslim traditions 
reconsidered: a review article," in Method and theory in the study of Islamic origins, ed. Herbert Berg (Leiden: Brill, 
2003), 245. 
96 For instance, Rubin states, “The question 'what really happened' in Mu ammad's times is not the one asked in 
this book, which instead is concerned with the manner in which the texts tell the story of Mu ammad's life, and 
is aimed to discover how the various evolving versions of this story tell us about the image of the Prophet as 
perceived by the believers among whom these texts were created and circulated.” Uri Rubin, The eye of the 
beholder: the life of Mu ammad as viewed by the early Muslims: a textual analysis, Studies in late antiquity and early 
Islam, 5 (Princeton, NJ: Darwin Press, 1995), 1.  See also Suleiman Ali Mourad, Early Islam between myth and history: 
al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī (d. 110H/728CE) and the formation of his legacy in classical Islamic scholarship, Islamic Philosophy, 
Theology and Science. Texts and Studies, 62 (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2006).  That scholars, such as Mourad, are able 
to identify texts as pseudepigraphal should be indicative of the potential for critical reading – rather than an 
indictment of the sources. 
97 For postfoundationalists, historical distance (i.e., the presumed gap between facts and narratives is not a 
problem.  Bevir explains, “All knowledge—including natural science as well as history—involves a kind of 
theoretical or literary construction of the facts.” Bevir, "Why historical distance is not a problem," 32. 
98 This periodization is based, in part, on Peter Brown’s observation that “the late seventh and the early eighth 
centuries, and not the age of the first Arab conquests, are the true turning-point in the history of Europe and the 
Near East.” Brown, The world of late antiquity: 200. 
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affiliation: it was not just about faith.99  To nuance our understanding of Islamization, we must 
integrate notions of citizenship because religious beliefs were intimately connected to political 
activities and aspirations.  Many scholars (both Muslim and non-Muslim) seem unwilling to 
recognize that what being Muslim means fundamentally changes, varying according to time 
and place.100  Islam is not a timeless category, but the creation of Islamic orthodoxies can be 
traced to particular historical moments.  This project seeks to explore predecessor legal 
orthodoxies and dissenting legal opinions in late antiquity.   
 
Redefining “law” 
Recent work in socio-legal studies and in legal anthropology indicates that the 
definition of law in Islamic studies is deficient.101  Instead of defining “Islamic law” as what is 
encoded in surviving legal texts, this dissertation will utilize legal traditions and practices 
documented in a variety of historical sources produced during the first century of Islam, 
therefore, before the emergence of professional legal schools.  The oral tradition is capable of 
preserving legal precedents and this dissertation mines late antique Islamic legal texts for 
evidence of oral traditions.102  There is no universal definition of Islam or Islamic law that can 
be disassociated from its historical and social contexts.103  Indeed, my objective is to explore 
Islamic legal polycentricity within the context of Near Eastern legal pluralism during late 
antiquity.104  The specific application of late antique contextualization is acutely warranted in 
the study of law because customs – part of the default normative ordering of society – are a 
source of law in every legal system.  In late antique Islamic societies, customs are an 
amalgamation of tribal, Roman-Byzantine, Zoroastrian, Jewish, and Syriac Christian traditions.  
Many scholars have discussed the continued practice of these legal traditions in Islamic 
societies.105  The problem in this area of scholarly inquiry is not the investigation into pre-
                                                                  
99 For a multi-dimensional definition of religion, see Smart’s seven dimensions of religion in Ninian Smart, The 
world's religions  (Cambridge University Press, 1989).  
100 Donner’s use of the term “believers” is simply unnecessary for two reasons: (a) these terminological 
distinctions impose a reified (ahistorical) definition of Muslim; (b) the community he describes appears to have 
self-identified as Muslim, even if later generations defined and practiced Islam differently.  In other words, the 
historical process that Donner describes is that of a Muslim community whose rituals or beliefs changed.  Donner, 
Muhammad and the believers. 
101 Rouland suggests that this is “the ethnocentricism of Western law: the identification of law with the state.” 
Rouland, Legal anthropology: 3. 
102 Underlying the aggrandizement of written legal texts and corresponding diminishment of the oral tradition is 
a clear scholarly bias: “Classic legal theory has a pejorative view of orally based law, which is defined negatively in 
relation to written law.  In our view this approach bears all the hallmarks of evolutionism, and should not be 
spared criticism.” Ibid., 170.  
103 As Talal Asad explains, “there cannot be a universal definition of religion, not only because its constituent 
elements and relationships are historically specific, but because that definition is itself the historical product of 
discursive processes.” Asad, Genealogies of religion: 29.   
104 Reza Banakar, "Power, culture and method in comparative law," International Journal of Law in Context 5, no. 1 
(2009): 82 ("the diversity of sources and forms of law within the same social space (legal pluralism) or within the 
same legal system (legal polycentricity).").  On legal pluralism generally, see Sally Engle Merry, "Legal pluralism," 
Law & Society Review 22, no. 5 (1988).  
105 One example is the administrative apparatus of the caliphate, which continued many Roman-Byzantine 
practices – such as the legal status of non-Muslim subjects.  Coulson notes that “The legal status of non-Muslim 
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Islamic legal norms, but rather the notion that the adoption and adaptation of those norms is 
“un-Islamic” despite it being impossible to create a legal system that is unrelated to its 
predecessors.  Islamic legal traditions did not emerge in a vacuum: they are the continuation, 
with modifications, of earlier Near Eastern legal practices.106  Indeed, neglecting thorough 
exploration of pre-Islamic Arabian legal traditions is the result of polemics, as well as scarce 
and difficult sources.107  Late antique Islamic legal culture was undeniably heterogeneous.108  
Whereas a basic mode of inquiry in Islamic legal studies is diachronic doctrinal analysis, my 
research seeks both to broaden the definition of law beyond doctrine and to recognize 
discontinuities in legal practice.  In selecting the case studies that form the substantive 
chapters of this dissertation, I made no assumptions about the continuity (or discontinuity) of 
pre-Islamic legal systems; instead, I sought to discover relationships between late antique 
Islamic legal doctrines and pre-Islamic legal systems. 
 
Re-reading the sources: textual criticism, contextualization, and protagonist voices 
  The presumed “problem” of the sources is intrinsically related to the assumed absence of 
institutions, such as a legal system.109  The only alternative to critically engaging the available 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
subjects in Islam was modelled [sic] largely on the position of the non-citizen groups in the Eastern Roman 
empire.  By the contract of dhimma, which embodied the notion of fides in Roman law.” Noel J. Coulson, A history of 
Islamic law  (Edinburgh: University Press, 1964), 27.  This is a clear example of legal continuity, but identifying 
which Roman legal doctrines continued to be implemented in Muslim societies is not an exact science.  Crone 
notes that “Not a single item of Goldziher's and Schacht's list of Roman elements in Islamic law has been proved, 
and several are demonstrably wrong.” Crone, Roman: 11. 
106 Robert Roberts noted that “There are many customs which are common to all Eastern nations and cannot be 
traced to the code of any particular people.” Robert Roberts, The social laws of the Qorân: considered and compared 
with those of the Hebrew and other ancient codes  (London: Curzon Press, 1971), 2.  Walter Young has made a similar 
assertion: “Islamic law is a natural outgrowth of its Near Eastern Semitic heritage.” Walter Young, "Stoning and 
hand-amputation: the pre-Islamic origins of the hadd penalties for zinā and sariqa" (Master's thesis, McGill 
University, 2005), 7.  Other scholars mention continuity of near eastern legal practices, without it altering a core 
assumption of “influence.”  By way of example, Judith Romeny Wegner’s comparative work is infused with 
notions of “influence,” although she recognizes that “both Jewish and Islamic law reflect the influence of the 
customary law of Mesopotamia.” Judith Romney Wegner, "The status of women in Jewish and Islamic marriage 
and divorce law," Harvard Women's Law Journal 5(1982): 4. 
107 To my knowledge, no legal scholar has systematically compiled pre-Islamic Arabian legal materials or 
compared them with their successor Islamic equivalents.  Hoyland notes that “It was quite common in the 
sedentary regions of Arabia to inscribe texts of a legal nature on stone.  The advantage of this was that these texts 
were then easily available for all to read (or have read for them) and would endure for many lifetimes.  The 
subjects are diverse: commercial ordinances…sanctions against criminals, hydrological legislation, cultic 
prescriptions, boundary settlements, property claims and so forth.” Robert G. Hoyland, Arabia and the Arabs: from 
the bronze age to the coming of Islam  (London: Routledge Press, 2001), 210.   
108 With modification, Crone’s notion of hybrid indigenous law is useful here: “What they [Muslim jurists] 
reshaped was essentially provincial practice.  This practice contained elements of Roman law in Syria and Egypt, 
just as it contained elements of Sasanid law in Iraq; and Roman law certainly, and Sasanid law probably, entered 
the Sharīʿa as a result.  But substantially it was of ancient Near Eastern and Greek origin, or in other words it was 
the indigenous law of the Near East as it had developed after Alexander. Crone, Roman: 99. 
109 Chamberlain noted this phenomenon in a different context: “Where the sociological emphasis has been on the 
'lack' of formal institutions and group structures, the historiographical problem has been to grapple with the 
'scarcity' of original document collections." Michael Chamberlain, Knowledge and social practice in medieval 
Damascus, 1190-1350, Cambridge Studies in Islamic Civilization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 2.   
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sources is erasing this period from history, as demonstrated by the “absence” of Islamic law 
espoused by many academics.110  Therefore, this project focuses on answering the more 
appropriate and effective question, How can we use the sources?  Some scholars have produced 
interesting and historically valuable work that is grounded in close and thorough readings of 
numerous Islamic sources.  But insufficient work has been done in the area of reconstructing 
lost texts or exploring the documentary evidence contained within literary texts.111  My 
dissertation will implement the heuristics outlined by scholars who have similarly asserted 
that scrutinizing the entire Islamic historiographical tradition, along with comparisons to non-
Islamic sources, is the only way to reach an “authentic” or “reliable” historiography of Islamic 
society during its first century.112   
 
III. Intersections: Jewish and Islamic comparative law113 
Within Western scholarly traditions, Jewish law has traditionally been viewed as a 
significant (if not the primary) source of “influence” on Islamic law – and vice-a-versa; most 
comparative Jewish and Islamic legal studies focus on this issue.114  I seek to replace the 
erroneous and problematic discourse of “borrowing” with a historically-nuanced recognition 
                                                                  
110 Chamberlain – referring to sources of a later period – offers another useful insight into this issue: “To ignore 
this information because it may be ‘untrue’ is to ignore what are perhaps the most productive sources on some of 
the critical questions of the social and cultural history of the period.” Ibid., 20. 
111 Leading works/scholars in this area include: I sān ʿAbbās, Shadharāt min  utu  maf  dah fī al-tārī h  (Beirut: Dār 
al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 1988). al-Qāḍī, "An Umayyad papyrus in al-Kindī’s Kitā  al-Quḍāt?." Wadād al-Qāḍī, "The 
salaries of judges in early Islam: the evidence of the documentary and literary sources," Journal of Near Eastern 
Studies 68, no. 1 (2009).  
112 “It is noteworthy that in a century of close work on Islamic origins, during which a vast number of new sources 
of every variety have been recovered from manuscripts and published, the new debates or opinion groups that 
have come to light appear to be not so much ones that reveal dangerous opinions suppressed by the 'authorities,' 
but marginal positions that simply died out for lack of sufficient interest to sustain them in the community.  For 
this reason, it seems plausible to assert that the traditional Islamic material, considered as a whole, 
notwithstanding the (sometimes) extensive redaction of particular parts of it, contains embedded within it 
sufficient material to reconstruct at least the main issues debated by Believers in the early Islamic period, and the 
basic attitudes of the main parties to those debates.” (Donner 1998, 28-29, citation omitted) Donner, Narratives: 28-
29. See also, al-Dūrī, The rise of historical writing among the Arabs.  
113 An earlier version of this section was presented as an invited presentation at “Muslims and Jews Together: 
Seeing from Without, Seeing from Within,” an International Conference/Workshop sponsored by University of 
California at Berkeley and at Davis (April 29, 2010). 
114 “Liebesny, Fitzgerald, Snouck Hurgronje, and Brunschvig, took Judaism as their point of departure in their 
quest for outside influences on Islam…It follows from the very brief survey above that modern scholarship largely 
agrees that Judaism influenced Islamic law or contributed to its consolidation; different authors, however, dispute 
the measure of that influence and its depth.” Gideon Libson, Jewish and Islamic law: a comparative study of custom 
during the Geonic period, Harvard series in Islamic law, 1 (Cambridge, Mass.: Islamic Legal Studies Program, Harvard 
Law School, 2003), 4.  Contrary to Libson’s claim about him, Fitzgerald critiqued the methodology underlying 
notions of “borrowing” – at least as it pertained to Roman law; Fitzgerald noted that “in general, the procedure 
even of some very eminent writers, has been to string together a list of resemblances, sometimes real but 
generally superficial and too often imaginary; and then to assert that such resemblances are in themselves proof 
of borrowing by the later from the earlier system.” S.V. Fitzgerald, "The alleged debt of Islamic to Roman law," 
The Law Quarterly Review 67(1951): 81.  For an example of scholarship claiming Islamic “borrowing” from Judaism, 
see Abraham I. Katsh, Judaism in Islām: Bi lical and Talmudic  ac grounds of the Koran and its commentaries, 3rd ed. 
(New York: Sepher-Hermon Press, 1980). 
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of shared customary practices.115  Notions of “influence” and “borrowing” are inaccurate 
because the boundary between inside and outside is more porous and imaginary than often 
presumed.  Jews and Muslims shared a common Near Eastern legal culture and altered their 
normative orders in ways that reflect both the internal dynamics of legal communities and the 
external, socio-political contexts.116  Meticulous research demonstrates that what was once 
conceptualized as “borrowing” is actually evidence of shared, historical practice.117   
Earlier comparisons of Jewish and Islamic legal systems adopted a problematic 
evolutionary understanding of both Jewish law and Islamic law and identified a particular time 
and place for Jewish legal “influence” on Islamic law.118  The reality, however, is that all legal 
systems are constantly in flux and that the concept of “influence” imposes a historically 
inaccurate notion of unilateral exchange.119  While some scholars recognize mutual “influence” 
(rather than cross-fertilization), they have erroneously limited it to particular periods.120  My 
viewpoint is that exchange occurs continuously and cannot be demarcated in time.  Assertions 
about the greater influence of one legal system or another tend to reflect the scholar’s own 
area of expertise, rather than an empirically-based comparative evaluation.121  Moreover, 
accidents of historical evidence preservation can easily skew our perception of the complex 
realities of Near Eastern legal systems by insinuating the idea of “influence” rather than 
                                                                  
115 Wasserstrom astutely asserted that “the debtor-creditor model of influence and borrowing must be abandoned 
in favor of the dialectical analysis of intercivilizational and interreligious process.” Steven M. Wasserstrom, 
Between Muslim and Jew: the problem of symbiosis under early Islam  (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995), 
11. 
116 Meron similarly suggested that “le droit musulman est en réalité la cristallisation d'un droit coutumier, 
notamment celui qui régissait la vallée du Tigre et de l'Euphrate, bien avant l'avènement de l'Islam” and 
identified “un droit coutumier commun aux droits juif et musulman.” Yaakov Meron, "Points de contact des 
droits juif et musulman," Studia Islamica, no. 60 (1984): 84-85, 117. 
117 See, for example, Crone and Silverstein on lot-casting: "What the striking similarity between Jewish and Islamic 
law reflects is not, in this particular case, Jewish Fortleben in Islam, but rather the shared roots of Jewish and 
Islamic culture in the ancient Near Eastern tradition. We seem to have here a case comparable to that of 
circumcision, practised by both the Jews and the Arabs (eventually Muslims), not by the one borrowing from the 
other, but rather by both retaining an ancient custom which had once been widespread in the Near East (notably 
in Egypt)." Crone et al., "The ancient Near East and Islam," 432. 
118 Libson articulates this clearly, noting “Both the time (8th or 9th century) and the place (Iraq and Syria) of the 
consolidation and crystallization of Islamic law have added an important dimension to our understanding of the 
factors that influenced the Muslims’ legal system. They located the encounter between Muslim jurists and 
Judaism in Iraq-Babylonia closer to the classical centers of Jewish scholarship, Sura and Pumbedita (and to the 
centers of Roman law), than previously thought.” Libson, Jewish and Islamic law: 6.  See also Judith Romney 
Wegner, "Islamic and Talmudic jurisprudence: the four roots of Islamic law and their Talmudic counterparts," The 
American Journal of Legal History 26, no. 1 (1982): 26. 
119 By way of example, Rabbinic law changed in the Gaonic period.  Libson recognizes that “The evolution of 
halakhah in the geonic period was primarily a continuation of talmudic tradition, although one cannot deny 
outside influence.” Libson, Jewish and Islamic law: x. 
120 Libson claims that “At the first stage, immediately after the birth of Islam, it was Jewish law that influenced the 
fledgling Islamic system, but during the geonic period the flowed changed direction, with Islamic law putting its 
imprint on halakhah. Most probably there was a transitional phase, lasting approximately from the mid-7th to 
late 8th centuries, during which the flow was two-way in parallel channels.” Ibid., 175. 
121 For example, Jokisch conveniently claims that “As a whole, however, one may clearly say that most of the 
Sharīʿa experts gave preference to Roman law, classical or post classical, and secondly to Jewish law.” Jokisch, 
Islamic Imperial Law: 75.  Not based on any systematic comparative study, Jokisch’s claim of Roman law’s primary 
“influence” simply legitimates the conclusions of his work. 
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shared history.122  While other scholars have acknowledged regional traditions as a source for 
“similarities” between Jewish and Islamic legal traditions, they did so without relinquishing 
the problematic framework of ‘influence.’123  My approach follows some previous scholarship 
in emphasizing that shared traditions (not “influence”) are the primary explanation for 
“similarities.”124   
What is unique about the relationship between Muslim and Jewish jurists is that both 
legal communities continued to practice and to modify their legal systems in the same social 
space for at least a century (the late antique through early modern periods).  Still, it is not my 
intention to assert Jewish legal traditions as relatively more “influential” than other legal 
traditions; such an inquiry is both impossible to measure and based on imagined boundaries of 
separation.  Underlying the assumption of influence is the erroneous belief that some legal 
systems (Jewish, Roman, etc.) were static and could then “influence” a legal system that was in 
the process of “forming.”125  This developmental perception of history is philosophically 
untenable and must be rejected.126 
Some scholars have refuted the viability of any comparative research into late antique 
legal systems.127  Others have avoided historical contextualization and instead focused on 
canonical legal texts (from disparate eras) of each religious community.128  In my opinion, both 
approaches are misguided.  The difficulties and uncertainties surrounding this research do not 
justify avoiding studying late antique Near Eastern legal culture through its subcomponent 
parts.129  This dissertation begins with the presumption that there is a common legal 
                                                                  
122 For instance, Crone and Silverstein note, “if it had not been for the chance preservation of the two Greek 
papyri, one might have taken lot-casting for the distribution of land in early Islamic society and classical law to 
represent a case of Jewish Fortleben in Islam; for until the papyri were discovered, it was only in rabbinic texts that 
the practice seemed to be alive in connection with inheritance shares.” Crone et al., "The ancient Near East and 
Islam," 431. 
123 Case in point: referencing similarities between Jewish and Islamic legal norms, Wegner asserts that “Several 
hypotheses will be advanced, including common semitic tribal origins, common environmental influences on the 
development of both systems, independents development (convergence), and strong evidence especially in 
Shāfiʿī’s case, of borrowing from talmudic sources.” Wegner, "Islamic and Talmudic jurisprudence," 30. 
124 Satlow, "Beyond influence." 
125 These evolutionary ideas were critiqued in the first section of this Introduction.  See also footnote 120. 
126 For a critique of developmental legal histories, see Gordon, Robert W. "Critical legal histories." Stanford Law 
Review 36, no. 57 (1984): 57-125. 
127 Melchert asserted that “Verifiable data from the first/seventh Islamic century are so scanty, both from within 
and without the Islamic tradition (e.g., records of non-Rabbinic Judaism), it seems unlikely we shall advance far 
beyond the sort of speculative reconstructions we have seen already from Crone and Hawting.”  Christopher 
Melchert, "The early history of Islamic law," in Method and theory in the study of Islamic origins, ed. Herbert Berg 
(Leiden: Brill, 2003), 324.   
128 By way of example, Neusner and Sonn assert that “ urs is a study in history and comparison of religions 
viewed as intellectual constructions.  We give an account of how sages imagine things, not how people actually 
conducted themselves.” Jacob Neusner et al., Comparing religions through law: Judaism and Islam  (London; New York: 
Routledge, 1999), 10.  See also Wegner, "Islamic and Talmudic jurisprudence." 
129 Libson notes that “The basic difficulty in determining which system (or systems) influenced Muslim law is the 
multiplicity of systems that might have contributed to its consolidation, ranging from early Arab customs, 
through the legal systems of the Ancient East, including Jewish and Christian religious law, to the classical 
systems of Greek, Roman-Byzantine and Sassanian-Persian law.” Libson, Jewish and Islamic law: 1.  But unlike 
Libson and other scholars, I am not concerned with debating degrees of influence.  
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background from which disparate legal communities formed their independent traditions.130  
My model for comparing Jewish and Islamic law emphasizes historical accounts of legal 
practices and legal communities in clearly delineated periods and social spaces.131  Existing 
comparative Jewish and Islamic legal scholarship is methodologically and theoretically limited 
by its emphasis on texts, on identifying similarities and differences, and on doctrine.   
 
Social context, instead of textual focus 
Scholarship that purports to compare Jewish and Islamic laws typically focuses on two 
modes of textual comparison: (1) between the Torah and the Qurʾān132 or (2) between the 
Babylonian Talmud and select medieval Islamic legal texts of the four surviving Sunni legal 
schools.133  Texts (or a body of texts) are presumed to be representative of the entire legal 
tradition.  Thus, it is assumed that by reading the Torah or the Qurʾān, one can discover the 
essential or fundamental aspects of each religion’s legal tradition.  Likewise, the Babylonian 
Talmud or medieval Islamic legal texts are perceived – and thereby constructed – as the 
definitive sources of Jewish and Islamic law.  This textual approach discounts the constantly 
changing meanings and applications of these texts within diverse interpretive communities; it 
ignores people.134  It is historically inaccurate because it compares texts from entirely different 
periods and social spaces, thereby ascribing independent existence to textual traditions in 
isolation from their interpretive communities.  This approach also elevates a particular textual 
tradition above its predecessors or successors; among the many erasures are the Palestinian 
Talmud, the legal practices of non-Rabbinic Jews, and the legal traditions of extinct and 
minority Islamic legal schools.  
Moreover, textually-based comparison is intertwined with religious orthodoxy because 
such comparisons are frequently a search for origins and a fixation on sacred texts.135  Text-
                                                                  
130 I concur with Mallat who encourages scholars to “seriously consider close resemblances in substance and form 
across religions and eras in favour of an identifiable, common Middle Eastern legal koine.” Chibli Mallat, 
Introduction to Middle Eastern law  (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 28. 
131 I concur with Banakar’s emphasis on contextualization: “the contextualisation of law should be regarded as the 
indispensable methodological characteristic of all comparative studies of law that aspire to transcend the 
understanding of law as a body of rules and doctrine. The method of contextualisation situates legal action, 
behaviour, institution, tradition, text and discourse in specific time and sociolegal space, thus, revealing law’s 
embeddedness in societal relations, structures, developments and processes.”  Banakar, "Power, culture and 
method in comparative law," 71. 
132 Case in point: “we focus on what by common agreement of the faithful governs through eternity.  For Judaism 
that is the Torah, and for Islam, the Qur’an and the Sunna.” Neusner et al., Comparing religions through law: 9. 
133 By way of example: “ ur picture of the two religions therefore conveys the vision of the virtuosi, the ideal of 
the sages of the Torah and of the scholars who articulated the classical works of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh).  
Anyone who wishes to compare the laws of the two religions will begin exactly where we do, but no one who then 
proposes to compare the two religions will end there.” Ibid., 11. 
134 A recent exception is Talya Fishman, Becoming the people of the Talmud: oral Torah as written tradition in medieval 
Jewish cultures  (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011). 
135 The “origins” or “essences” of religious traditions are historical constructs and, as Said asserted, “The state of 
mind that is concerned with origins is, I have said, theological.  By contrast, and this is the shift, beginnings are 
eminently secular, or gentile, continuing activities.”  Edward Said, Beginnings: intention and method  (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1985), 372-73.  There is, of course, scholarly interest in subverting orthodox 
interpretations of texts, but these trends are relatively recent and arguably less dominant. 
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based approaches promote and legitimate an orthodox expression of each religious tradition: 
certain (late antique) Rabbis define Jewish law and certain (medieval) Muslim jurists define 
Islamic law to the exclusion of all dissenting or alternative opinions (recorded in non-
canonical texts).  Consequently, similarities or differences between legal systems are 
attributed to innate characteristics of these texts or religions, rather than to a social context.136  
Specifically, doctrinal similarities in Jewish and Islamic legal systems can be the result of 
shared Near Eastern customary practices that are often unacknowledged by orthodox jurists or 
scholars.137   
 
Relationships, instead of similarities and differences 
The notion of legal transplants has had limiting effects on comparative Jewish-Islamic 
legal research.138  Contrary to the transplant thesis, similarities can arise from dialectical 
interchange in which two legal communities in the same social space are debating issues of 
common interest.139  Likewise, differences are not evidence of inherent or primordial 
separation between these legal traditions because borders are often constructed by elites.140   
Differences can indicate how one legal system defined itself as distinct from another or 
responded to distinct circumstances.  By investigating relationships, we can explore areas of 
convergence.141  
In terms of research questions, I want to suggest an alternative framework.  The 
standard question, “what are the Jewish and Islamic legal norms concerning topic x?” is one 
that invites a limited comparative framework of similarities and differences.  Instead, I suggest 
we should ask, “what were the legal norms of Jewish and Muslim peoples in place a during time 
b on topic x and how do these laws relate to each other?”  Shifting our expectations away from 
                                                                  
136 By way of example, Neusner and Sonn observe, “Why should the two religions concur on so many fundamental 
propositions concerning the form that religion should take in the here and now of ordinary life?  It is because of 
the character of the revelation – Torah, Qur’an – that each means to realize in the social order.” Neusner et al., 
Comparing religions through law: 247. 
137 See, for example, Young, "Stoning and hand-amputation."   
138 The notion of “legal transplants” should be applied in limited situations, where there is clear evidence; it is 
applicable to modern situations of one state incorporating the legal codes (or significant parts thereof) of another 
state.  See Alan Watson, Legal transplants: an approach to comparative law  (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1993).  
But I contend that legal transplantation is not relevant to Jewish and Islamic legal systems in the late antique and 
medieval periods. 
139 For instance, “at least in some cases, the seeming affinities between Jewish midrash and the Quran may be due 
to an ongoing dialogue over scriptural matters that took place in both communities in the medieval period, and 
not to Muhammad’s unequivocal ‘debt’ to Jewish informants.” Pregill, "The Hebrew Bible and the Quran," 655.  
Pregill further explains, “the Quran’s putative resemblance to its supposed ‘influences’ might very well reflect the 
transmission of elements from the tafsīr to the Jewish community, which then subsequently generated those very 
narratives wrongly understood as having ‘influenced’ the Quran in the first place.” Ibid., 656. 
140 Boyarin notes that “Borders themselves are not given but constructed by power to mask hybridity, to occlude 
and disown it.” Boyarin, Border lines: 15.  
141 “Wave theory posits that linguistic similarity is not necessarily the product of a common origin but may be the 
product of convergence of different dialects spoken in contiguous areas, dialects that are, moreover, not strictly 
bounded and differentiated from each other but instead shade one into the other.  Innovations at any one point 
spread like the waves created when a stone is thrown into a pond, intersecting with other such waves produced in 
other places and leading to the currently observed patterns of differentiation and similarity.” Ibid., 18. 
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simple similarities and differences facilitates observations of the relationships between 
polycentric Jewish and Islamic legal systems in the context of Near Eastern legal pluralism.142  I 
argue that to elucidate ambiguities in one legal system of the Near East, it is beneficial to 
examine the corresponding legal ideas and practices of a neighboring legal system.  Future 
research will unearth the depth of interdependence among the many legal systems of the Near 
East.143  Chapter 3 offers an exposition of the relationship between these two legal systems in 
terms of parallel transformations. 
 
Legal systems, instead of doctrine 
Scholarship that “compares” Jewish and Islamic law usually focuses on legal doctrines – 
instead of on legal systems as a whole.144  This perpetuates orthodox conceptualizations of 
religious law (as a set of unchanging divine laws), instead of providing contextualized accounts 
of law across space.  The specific scholarly emphasis on comparing Jewish and Islamic norms 
relating to women and the family reflects a modern conceptualization of religious law as being 
relegated to family law doctrines.145  In contrast, in Chapter 3, I focus on legal systems as a 
                                                                  
142 See footnote 104.  
143 As Glenn has noted "The interdependence of complex traditions is evident both from the difficulty in defining 
the starting points of major legal traditions (even the prophets retain much of previous law, now revealed) and by 
the ongoing, major forms of communication and debate between complex traditions." H. Patrick Glenn, Legal 
traditions of the world: sustainable diversity in law  (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 356. 
144 Some examples include:  M. R. Moodie et al., "Symposium on religious law: Roman Catholic, Islamic, and Jewish 
treatment of familial issues, including education, abortion, in vitro fertilization, prenuptial agreements, 
contraception, and marital fraud," Loyola of Los Angeles international and comparative law journal 16, no. 1 (1993). 
Mary F. Radford, "The inheritance rights of women under Jewish and Islamic law," Boston College international and 
comparative law review 23, no. 2 (2000). Stephen D. Ricks, "Kinship bars to marriage in Jewish and Islamic law," in 
Studies in Islamic and Judaic traditions, ed. William M. Brinner and Stephen D. Ricks, Brown Judaic studies; no. 110 
(Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1986).  In Arabic, see ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz  ūsuf ʿAbd al-Maq ūd, Ta addud al-zaw āt  ayna al-
yah dīyah wa-al-naṣrānīyah wa-al-islām: dirāsah mu āranah na dīyah  (Cairo: Dār al-Fikr al-ʿArabī, 2010). Mu ammad 
Rāmiz ʿAbd al-Fattā  ʿAzīzī, Ta rīm al-ri ā: fi al-islām wa-al-diyānatayn al-yah dīyah wa-al-masī īyah, Min silsilat al-
iqti ād al-Islāmī, 1 (Amman: Dār al-Furqān lil-Nashr wa-al-Tawzīʿ, 2004). A mad Ghazālī, al- alā  al-infirādī wa-
tadā īr al- add  minh  fī al-fi h al-islāmī wa-al-sharāʾiʿ al-yah dīyah wa-al-masī īyah wa-al-waḍʿīyah wa-al-ta niyāt al-
ʿara īyah al-muʿāṣirah: dirāsah mu āranah  (Cairo: Dār al-Nahḍah al-ʿArabīyah, 2000). Khālid Mu  af  Hāshim, al-
Jarīmah: dirāsah mu āranah  ayna al-sharīʿatayn al-yah dīyah wa-al-islām  (Harindun, Farjiniya: al-maʿhad al-ʿālamī 
lil-fikr al-islāmī, 2007).  āli  Mu ammad  Mu yī al-Dīn Kīlānī,  asāʾil al-a wāl al-sha hṣīyah  ayna al-diyānāt al-
thalāth: al-yah dīyah, al-masī īyah, al-islām  (Amman: Dār  āfā al-ʿIlmīyah lil-Nashr wa-al-Tawzīʿ, 2009). Hind 
Muʿadlalī, al- awā  fī al-sharāʾiʿ al-samāwīyah wa-al-waḍʿīyah  (Damascus: Dār Qutaybah lil-Ṭibāʿah wa-al-Nashr wa-
al-Tawzīʿ, 2002).  Abd al-Rāziq A mad  Qandīl, al- awārīth fī al-yah dīyah wa-al-islām: dirāsah mu āranah, Silsilat 
Faḍl al-Islām  al  al- ahūd wa-al- ahūdīyah, al- adad 13 (Giza: Markaz al-Dirāsāt al-Sharqīyah, Jāma at al-Qāhirah, 
2008). ʿInād Najr al-ʿAjrafī  ʿUtaybī, al-Qatl wa-al-sari ah fī al-yah dīyah wa-al-masī īyah wa-al-islām, Silsilat Tashrīʿ al-
 udūd fī al-adyān al-thalāthah, 1 (Riyadh: s.n., 1998); ʿInād Najr al-ʿAjrafī ʿUtaybī, al- inā wa-al- hamr fī al-yah dīyah 
wa-al-masī īyah wa-al-islām  (Riyadh: Dār ʿ lam al-Kutub, 2002); ʿAbd al-Rāziq A mad Qandīl, al- awārīth fī al-
yah dīyah wa-al-islām: dirāsah mu āranah, Silsilat Faḍl al-Islām ʿal  al- ahūd wa-al- ahūdīyah, al-ʿadad 13 (Giza: 
Markaz al-Dirāsāt al-Sharqīyah, Jāmaʿat al-Qāhirah, 2008). 
145 This is demonstrated by the relative over-emphasis on comparing Islamic and Jewish laws as they pertain to 
women and the family.  It is a reflection of a long-standing ideological interest/desire in “saving” the “ riental 
woman.”  In addition to the previous note, see, for example, Wegner, "The status of women."  Chapter 3’s case 
study is not an exception, although the heuristics and theoretical approaches are distinct.  Although, the case 
study was selected because Gideon Libson identified the Gaonic decree related to wife-initiated divorce as an 
innovation/deviation resulting from Islamic influence and Chapter 3 emerged out of my attempt to understand 
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whole by investigating the role of jurists, courts, law schools, scriptural hermeneutics, and 
procedural rules.  Research should be pursued that illuminates the relationship between 
Jewish and Islamic legal systems in terms of legal theory, sources, methodology, 
argumentation, and legitimation.146   
It should be noted that there is no neutral or universal language of “comparative law” 
that transcends legal cultures.  Consequently, the terminology I use to describe historical legal 
systems necessarily invokes “modern” or “foreign” legal categories.147  Exploring relationships 
between Jewish and Islamic legal history can clarify the relative meaning of legal terminology 
and thereby substantiate interpretations about the legal-historical past.148  Chapter 3 aims to 
shift comparative Jewish and Islamic legal studies away from attempts to identify causal 
relationships between these legal systems by implementing some of the methodological and 
theoretical alternatives outlined in this Introduction.149  Change in Near Eastern legal pluralism 
is the background narrative for this dissertation150   
 
IV. Sources in the dissertation case studies 
 The three case studies presented in this dissertation share some important 
commonalities in their approach to primary sources.  Each case study integrates insights from 
several genres of Islamic historical sources and juxtaposes the ensuing narrative with 
materials from other Near Eastern communities.  Within Islamic studies, this dissertation’s use 
of some sources (both historical-literary and documentary) and combination of heterogeneous 
sources is not prevalent.  Whenever possible, I have identified the author of a primary source 
by including his death date and his location.  Locations are not necessarily the place where an 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Libson’s assertion.  See Libson, Jewish and Islamic law: 110-12.  See also Gideon Libson, "Halakhah and law in the 
period of the Geonim," in An introduction to the history and sources of Jewish law, ed. Neil S. Hecht, et al. (Oxford; New 
York: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 1996), 235. 
146 Comparative law should incorporate “conception of law, theory of legal sources, methodology of law, theory of 
argumentation and theory of legitimation of the law.” Mark Van Hoecke et al., "Legal cultures, legal paradigms 
and legal doctrine: towards a new model for comparative law," The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 47, 
no. 3 (1998): 536. 
147 “Besides avoiding the pitfalls of whiggery, the legal historian must therefore also be cautious in applying 
current jurisprudential models to the past.  As has been seen, sensitivity to the voices of the past may often reveal 
that they spoke in different languages.” Michael Lobban, "Introduction: the tools and the tasks of the legal 
historian," in Law and history, ed. Andrew Lewis and Michael Lobban, Current Legal Issues 2003 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004), 5. 
148 There are insights to be gained from the kind of relational analysis I argue for here.  As Lévi-Strauss noted, 
“The error of traditional anthropology, like that of traditional linguistics, was to consider the terms, and not the 
relations between the terms.” Lévi-Strauss, Claude. Structural Anthropology. Translated by Claire Jacobson and 
Brooke Schoepf. New York: Basic Books, 1963, 46.  I am similarly interested in exploring the relationship between 
Jewish and Islamic legal ideas, or how they can be defined in relation to each other.  (However, I reject 
structuralism’s diminishment of human agency.) 
149 In this sense, I seek to implement Foucault’s observation that “we have to rid ourselves of the prejudice that 
history without causality could no longer be history.” Michel Foucault, Religion and culture, ed. Jeremy R. Carrette 
(New York: Routledge, 1999), 92. 
150 Goitein asserted that “as many of these [resemblances] seem to originate from parallel developments rather 
than from borrowing, the similarity between the two religions poses problems rather than solves them.” Goitein, 
"The birth-hour of Muslim law?," 23.  The perspective that will be outlined here is that “similarities” indicate 
continuation of antecedent Near Eastern practices and need not be perceived as problematic or causally related. 
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author was born, or where he died, but rather where he was intellectually active; in addition, I 
have used general and broad regional terms, rather than naming specific cities, even when 
that information is readily available.  I have also referred to translations of primary sources in 
order to introduce the general reader to these resources.151 
Chapter 1: Legal historiography – a case study in international law.  This chapter explores 
biographical sources (sīrah and maghāzī) to create a narrative about the treatment of prisoners 
of war during the Prophetic era (610-632 CE) in Medina and in the decades immediately 
afterward.  Pre-canonical  adīth collections (muṣannafāt and sunan) are used to survey the legal 
opinions of late antique Muslim jurists who practiced law prior to the consolidation of legal 
schools.  The chapter then reviews a variety of legal texts dating from the ninth through 
thirteenth centuries and representing four major Sunnī legal schools (Ḥanafī, Mālikī, Shāfiʿī, 
and Ḥanbalī).  Switching genres, I examine a major exegetical text, al-Ṭabarī’s Tafsīr of the 
Qurʾān, for information about how historical interpretive communities might have understood 
particular Qurʾānic verses with legal consequences.  Finally, the legal norms of pre-Islamic 
communities are introduced to suggest the complexity of intertextuality in the late antique 
Near East.  An objective of this chapter is to illustrate the overlaps of juristic texts and 
historical texts, since they were often recorded for both legal and historical purposes in late 
antiquity.   
Chapter 2: Legal heterodoxy – a case study in taxation.  This chapter presents a variety of 
Qurʾānic verses pertaining to the obligation to pay charity in order to demonstrate the 
multiple understandings of charity within the Qurʾān.  Drawing upon biographical and 
historical sources, the imposition of a charity tax by the Prophet is reconstructed.  The chapter 
then uses pre-canonical  adīth collections (muṣannafāt) and Shīʿī  adīth sources to establish 
that there are no sectarian differences in the reported amount of the charity tax.   I offer some 
contrasts between Islamic charity taxation practices with discussions of charity in antique 
rabbinic Jewish texts in order to highlight the distinctly regulatory aspects of Islamic charity 
taxation.  To scrutinize how various jurists interpreted the category of Muslim in relation to 
payment of the charity tax, I investigate an array of legal texts representing minority, 
sectarian, and majority opinions from the ninth through the fourteenth centuries.  The 
chapter then juxtaposes these multi-dimensional notions of Muslim identity with particular 
moments in Islamic history when taxation was the subject of controversies.  References to 
papyrological evidence of charity taxation are interspersed throughout the chapter. 
Chapter 3: Legal changes – a case study in family law.  This chapter uses a multitude of 
Jewish and Islamic legal texts dating from the third through fourteenth centuries to create two 
chronologies of legal changes in Jewish and Islamic legal history related to wife-initiated 
divorce.  The rabbinic reception of a seventh-century Gaonic decree about wife-initiated 
divorce is scrutinized by examining Jewish legal texts dating from the eighth through 
fourteenth centuries.  The chapter then offers an alternative understanding of this Gaonic 
decree by examining Near Eastern legal precedents, as evidenced in the legal texts of 
Byzantine and Zoroastrian communities.  Alongside papyrological evidence, this interweaving 
of legal evidence from several legal systems demonstrates that both Muslim and Jewish jurists 
transformed divorce from contract dissolution into contractual breach.   
                                                                  
151 I have consulted the original sources even when I have referred to works in translation.  I refer to English 
translations as part of a strategic effort to introduce non-specialist readers to these important sources. 
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In each of these case studies, I scrutinize a doctrinal law by digging deep into its 
historical past and situating it within a late antique context of hybrid legal practices.  
Comparison and contextualization produce alternative understandings of Islamic legal history. 
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Chapter 1: Legal historiography – a case study in international law1 
 
Prisoners of war: late antique precedents in medieval juristic  
 
The inseparability of law and history is evident when historical interpretation — an 
integral component of legal hermeneutics — results in juristic disagreement.  This chapter 
tracks the shift from prohibition to permissibility of prisoner of war execution in Islamic legal 
history between the late antique and medieval periods by demonstrating the connections 
between changing legal opinions and changing historiographical readings.  The legal category 
of “prisoner of war” is arguably a modern one; however, for our purposes, “prisoner of war” 
refers to soldiers or combatants captured during or immediately after warfare.  In the context 
of seventh-century Arabia, “combatants” generally means males above the age of puberty and 
capable of engaging in warfare.2  Contemplating the contrast between historical and 
jurisprudential interpretations of historical events with legal implications will facilitate 
investigation of the interactions between historiography and legal discourse.3  In this chapter, 
I will explore a few questions in order to highlight the ambiguous, overlapping roles of 
historians and jurists as they construct (legal) histories:   
(1) Do historical narratives about all the battles that occurred during the Prophet’s lifetime 
illustrate his legal practice concerning treatment of prisoners of war?;  
(2) After the Prophet’s death, how did late antique Muslim jurists adjudicate this issue?;  
(3) What legal reasoning did key Muslim jurists of the medieval period apply in permitting 
the execution of war prisoners?4;  
(4) What could explain the discrepancy between the chronologically earlier opinion 
(prohibiting prisoner execution) and the later, more dominant legal opinion (permitting 
prisoner execution)?5   
                                                                  
1 This chapter is a revised version of a previously published article, Salaymeh, "Early Islamic legal-historical 
precedents."  (For the sake of Law and History Review’s non-specialist audience, I refer to English translations of 
Arabic texts whenever possible, but the original sources were consulted in all instances.)  I thank Harry Scheiber 
and David Tanenhaus for their invitation to deliver an earlier version of this chapter at the Boalt-UNLV 
Symposium on Law, War, and History in February 2007.  I thank Ira Lapidus, David Lieberman, Hossein Modarressi, 
and the anonymous reviewer of Law and History Review for their comments and suggestions on a previous version 
of this chapter.  I thank Rhiannon Graybill, Maria Mavroudi, and Amr Osman for their comments on a revised 
version. 
2 The normative Islamic legal opinion is that non-combatants may not be killed.  Non-combatants are generally 
defined as children, women, the elderly, the sick (physically or mentall), and the disabled. 
3 This chapter’s approach to late antique Islamic sources presumes that “it seems plausible to assert that the 
traditional Islamic material, considered as a whole . . . contains embedded within it sufficient material to 
reconstruct at least the main issues debated by Believers in the early Islamic period, and the basic attitudes of the 
main parties to those debates.” Donner, Narratives: 28-29. 
4 This period is commonly described as “classical” within the field of Islamic studies.  However, I will use 
“medieval” to emphasize its connection to global history periodization or “professional” to refer to a significant 
characteristic of jurists during this period (namely, that the majority of them belonged to professional legal 
schools). 
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Asking and answering these questions will illustrate the complicated, dynamic process by 
which legal normativity changes despite juristic claims of “following” tradition. 
My focus is on late antique historiography and on the legal reasoning articulated by 
subsequent generations of Muslim scholars in an array of legal and historical texts, rather than 
on normative war practices that may have influenced legal opinions.6  I will occasionally refer 
to contemporaneous war situations, but I avoid fully exploring them because legal texts refer 
only to Islamic (especially Prophetic) precedents and because historical sources report an 
inconsistent variety of practices.7  Moreover, keeping prisoners of war alive (rather than 
executing them) likely burdened an army’s movement and resources (by generating additional 
needs for provisions) and burdened the local population near the battlefield; but these socio-
economic consequence to the legal ruling on war prisoner execution cannot be easily 
measured or historically reconstructed.  While I recognize the significance of context to 
jurisprudential reasoning, in this chapter my primary objective is to scrutinize the internal 
dynamics of legal reasoning.  Thus, historical analysis of each individual jurist’s possible 
contextual influences is beyond the scope of this chapter.  I contend that the dominant opinion 
pertaining to prisoner of war execution shifted from prohibition to permissibility as a result of 
jurists constructing authoritative precedents by maneuvering historical narratives.  By 
combining biographical, exegetical, historical, and legal sources, I demarcate that a significant 
shift in the majority juristic opinion (from prohibition to permissibility of prisoner execution) 
likely occurred in conjunction with a change in the juristic understanding of key historical 
events and Qurʾānic passages. 
 
I. Prisoners of war in Islamic history: the Prophetic period 
 It is necessary to begin by reconstructing the battles during the lifetime of the Prophet 
because his actions and legal pronouncements are authoritative in dominant Islamic legal 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
5 In contrast to the majority opinion (of the medieval period) permitting prisoner execution, there are minority 
opinions prohibiting it – such as the Shīʿī (Imāmī) school of law.  See al-Ḥasan  ibn   ūsuf  Ibn  al-Mu ahhar al-
Ḥillī (d.  1325;  Iraq), Tadh irat al-fu ahāʾ, 20 vols., Muʾassasat  l al-Bayt li-I yāʾ al-Turāth (Qum: Muʾassasat  l al-
Bayt li-I yāʾ al-Turāth, 1993/1994), v. 9, p. 154-55 (Imāmī Shīʿī: if a combatant is imprisoned after combat ends, he 
may not be executed and Imām decides between freeing, ransoming, or enslaving).  There is also a minority 
Ḥanafī opinion – represented by al-Ḥasan (bin Zīyād) and Ḥammād bin abī Sulaymān – that prohibits execution.  
See Mu ammad ibn A mad Sarakhsī (d. 11th cent; Transoxania) et al., Shar  al-Siyar al-Ka īr, ed.  alā  al-Dīn 
Munajjid, 5 vols. (Cairo: Maʿhad al-Makh ū āt bi-Jāmiʿat al-Duwal al-ʿArabīyah, 1971/1972), v. 3, p. 1024 (Ḥanafī). 
6 Khaled Abou El Fadl suggests that the prohibition of prisoner execution disappeared from Islamic legal history 
because it was “inconsistent with the war practices of the age.” Khaled Abou El Fadl, "The rules of killing at war: 
An inquiry into classical sources," The Muslim World 89, no. 2 (1999): 153.  For a brief overview of Islamic legal 
opinions on prisoners of war, see Abū Jaʿfar Mu ammad ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī (d. 923; Iraq), Kitā  al- ihād wa- itā  al-
 izyah wa-a  ām al-mu āri īn min  itā  i htilāf al-fu ahāʾ, ed. Joseph Schacht (Leiden: Brill, 1933), 141-46. 
7 For instance, the Life of Theodota of Amid (d. 698 CE) reports collecting ransom money from church attendees 
(living under Islamic rule) for the purpose of ransoming captives (presumably held by the Byzantines). See MS 
Jerusalem (St Mark’s, Syrian  rthodox Patriarchate) 199, fol. 557b (an 18th-century Arabic translation of a Syriac 
vita originally composed in the early eighth century).  Writing in the twelfth century, the Patriarch of Antioch, 
Michael the Syrian, reported both Muslim killing and freeing of war prisoners throughout the eighth century CE.  
See Michael I Patriarch of Antioch (d. 1199; Syria), Chronique de Michel le Syrien: patriarche jacobite d'Antioche (1166-
1199), trans. Jean Baptiste Chabot, 4 vols. (Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1899-1910), v. 2, p. 479, 501, 26 and v. 3, p. 1-2.  
(Thanks to Jack Tannous for these references.) See also Youval Rotman,  es esclaves et l’esclavage: de la éditerranée 
anti ue   la éditerranée médiévale : Ie- Ie si cles  (Paris: Belles lettres, 2004), 56-62, 68-75. 
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theory.8  The objective is to trace historical narratives about battles and prisoners in Islamic 
sources that later form the basis for jurisprudential precedents.  Therefore, the focus of the 
following pages is on reconstructing Muslim historical consciousness and not with 
authenticity or the version of history that is accepted by contemporary historians.  For the 
purposes of this chapter, all references to historical events are based on histories related by 
Muslim historians.   
Since there were no battles during the first decade of the Muslim community’s 
existence, this chapter investigates battles that occurred between 622 CE (the year of the hijrah, 
or migration) and 632 CE (the year of the Prophet’s death).  I will distinguish between raids and 
actual battles involving the military confrontation of two sides; only those events in which two 
armies appear to have challenged each other will be categorized as battles.9  In part, I achieve 
this goal by differentiating between conflicts motivated primarily by politics (i.e. battles) and 
economics (i.e. raids).10  Similarly, sources do not clearly delineate between combatants (killed 
during battle) and prisoner-combatants (killed in captivity), but I mine this distinction from 
details in the narratives.  The main sources for the following historical reconstruction of early 
Islamic warfare are the eighth-century biography by the Iraqi historian Ibn Is āq (d. 767 CE) 
and several  adīth collections (primarily late eighth- and early ninth-century texts).11  These 
sources are not intended to be exhaustive or factually authoritative, but rather to represent 
conventional Islamic historical knowledge.12   
 The first battle waged by the early Muslim community was at Badr in 624 CE/2 AH; a 
Muslim army of approximately 300 soldiers confronted the Quraysh army of nearly 1000.  (The 
Quraysh were the powerful pagan Arabs that had persecuted the Prophet and his followers in 
Mecca for approximately thirteen years.)  Combat began with a traditional three-on-three 
                                                                  
8 Application of the methodology of uṣ l al-fiqh is not what is intended.  Instead, it is a legal-historical tradition, 
since “already in the first/seventh century people consciously resorted to the Qurʾān and to rulings of the 
Prophet as sources of the law, if not as extensively as in later times.”  Motzki, The origins: 295.  For general 
introductions, see Wael B. Hallaq, A history of Islamic legal theories: an introduction to Sunnī uṣ l al-fiqh  (Cambridge, 
UK ; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1997).  See also Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Principles of Islamic 
jurisprudence, Rev. ed. (Cambridge [England]: Islamic Texts Society, 1991). 
9 This intentionally modifies the list of battles reported in canonical sources, such as Mu ammad Ibn Saʿd (d. ca. 
845; Iraq), Kitā  al- a a āt al- a īr, trans. S. Moinul Haq, assisted by H. K. Ghazanfar, 2 vols. (Karachi: Pakistan 
Historical Society, 1967), v. 2, p. 2.  See also Mu ammad Ibn Is āq (d. 767; Iraq) et al., The life of Mu ammad: a 
translation of Is ā ’s Sīrat ras l  llāh, trans. Alfred Guillaume (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2004, 1955), 659-60. 
Muslim ibn Hajjāj al-Qushayrī (d. 875; Khurāsān),  a i  uslim   eing traditions of the sayings and doings of the prophet
 uhammad as narrated  y his companions and compiled under the title al-Jāmiʿ-uṣ-ṣa īh,  y Imām uslim, trans. ʿAbdul 
Ḥamīd  iddīqī, 4 vols. (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf 1971-75), v. 3, n. 4462-70, pp. 1004-05.   
10 This is because raids or “Ghazw had always been an important component of the Bedouin economy of survival.” 
Bamyeh, The social origins of Islam: mind, economy, discourse: 42.  Thus, this differentiation between a raid and a 
battle is fashioned from indications in the sources. 
11 Ḥadīth is a narration of what the Prophet or one of his companions said, did, or acknowledged.  See Harald 
Motzki, Ḥadīth: origins and developments  (Aldershot; Burlington, VT: Ashgate/Variorum, 2004).  On the biographical 
literature, see Harald Motzki, ed. The biography of Mu ammad: the issue of the sources, Islamic history and 
civilization. Studies and texts, v. 32 (Leiden; Boston, MA: Brill, 2000). 
12 Consequently, evaluating the authenticity of sources is immaterial.  Secondary literature is avoided in this 
historical account precisely because the objective is to sketch what Muslims knew or believed about their history.  
Also, Wāqidī’s Kitā  al- aghāzī is not used as a main source for reasons of historical influence and reliability.  For 
an evaluation of Islamic historical sources, see Donner, Narratives.  
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challenge; the three Muslims defeated the three Quraysh.  Open combat then began, but only 
lasted a few hours before most of the Quraysh army fled.  Nearly 70 Quraysh were killed in 
battle, with a comparable number taken captive. 
Historical reports concerning the handling of the majority of Badr prisoners are 
relatively consistent and transparent: they were ransomed.13  The Prophet apparently 
consulted two of his companions (Abū Bakr and ʿUmar, the first two caliphs who succeeded 
him) on the situation of the prisoners; the former recommended ransoming and the latter 
recommended execution.14  It appears that the Prophet considered the possibility of executing 
the prisoners, but rejected it.  Yet there are also reports that two Quraysh prisoners – both of 
whom had tormented the Prophet when he was in Mecca – were executed: al-Naḍr bin al-
Ḥārith and ʿUqbah b. Abī Muʿī .15  Al-Naḍr had vehemently opposed the Prophet in Mecca, but 
it is not possible to determine whether the Prophet ordered or approved his killing, which may 
have occurred during battle.16  In Mecca, ʿUqbah had placed the fetus of a camel on the 
Prophet’s back while he was prostrating in prayer.17  The same  adīth that reports ʿUqbah’s 
active involvement in this humiliation of the Prophet also states that ʿUqbah was seen “lying 
slain in the battlefield.”18  This account directly contradicts the other report of ʿUqbah’s 
execution.19  Consequently, a student of Islamic historiography may question the occurrence of 
these executions – or, at least, the timing (i.e., during or after battle).  Indeed, both individuals 
are listed as Quraysh losses, not prisoners, at Badr – possibly implying that they were killed 
during battle.20  Moreover, it is unclear if these executions represent exceptional cases – for 
example, if these two individuals were killed in retaliation for a particular crime in accordance 
with tribal custom.  To delineate the status of this event as specific or general, we must analyze 
both the situations of the other Badr prisoners and prisoners from other battles. 
Of course, every historical source reflects the motivations and projections of its author, 
but by reading a variety of sources against each other, we can trace inconsistencies and then 
we may scrutinize how Muslim jurists dealt with these inconsistencies.  In this case, the two 
purported prisoner executions at Badr contradict not only the reported decision against 
                                                                  
13 ʿAbd al-Razzāq ibn Hammām al-Ḥimyarī al- anʿānī (d. 827;  emen), uṣannaf fī al- adīth, ed. Maʿmar ibn Rāshid 
and Ayman Na r Azharī, 12 vols. (Beirut: Manshūrāt Mu ammad ʿAlī Bayḍūn, Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmīyah, 2000), v. 5, 
p. 141, 44, 240.  On the historical value of this source, see Harald Motzki, "The mu annaf of  Abd al-Razzāq al-
 an ānī as a source of authentic a ādīth of the first century A.H.," Journal of Near Eastern Studies 50, no. 1 (1991). 
14 In another version, the Prophet consulted the community, which chose ransoming.  ʿAbd Allāh ibn Mu ammad 
Ibn Abī Shaybah (d. 849; Iraq),  uṣannaf fī al-a ādīth wa-al-āthār, ed. Sa īd La  ām, 9 vols. (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 
1989), v. 7, p. 673 & v. 8, p. 474-75. 
15 al-Ḥimyarī al- anʿānī (d. 827;  emen), uṣannaf: v. 5, pp. 140-41, 250. Ibn Abī Shaybah (d. 849; Iraq),  uṣannaf: v. 
8, p. 477. 
16 Pellat, Ch. "al- Naḍr b. al- Ḥārit h b. ‘Al ama b. Kalada b. ‘Abd Manāf b. ‘Abd al-Dār b. Ḳu ayy." Encyclopaedia of 
Islam. Edited by: P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel and W.P. Heinrichs. Brill, 2007. Brill 
Online. University of California UC Berkeley. 20 May 2007 
<http://www.brillonline.nl/subscriber/entry?entry=islam_SIM-5730>  
17 Ibn Abī Shaybah (d. 849; Iraq),  uṣannaf: v. 8, p. 441.  al-Qushayrī (d. 875; Khurāsān),  a i  Muslim: v. 3, n. 4421-
22, pp. 986-987.   
18 Ibn Abī Shaybah (d. 849; Iraq),  uṣannaf: v. 8, p. 441.  al-Qushayrī (d. 875; Khurāsān),  a i  Muslim: v. 3, no. 4424, 
p. 987. 
19 See footnote 15. 
20 Ibn Is āq (d. 767; Iraq) et al., The life: 337. 
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execution, but also many other accounts.  The Prophet “divided the prisoners amongst his 
companions and said, ‘Treat them well.’”21  Ibn Is āq cites one of the prisoners as recounting 
that “when they ate their morning and evening meals they gave me the bread and ate the 
dates themselves in accordance with the orders that the apostle had given about us.  If anyone 
had a morsel of bread he gave it to me.”22  It is also reported that the Prophet was unable to 
sleep because a Badr prisoner was bound too tightly; he relaxed once his bindings were 
loosened.23  These narratives indicate that the Badr prisoners of war were fed and clothed 
before being set free – some without and others with ransoms.  Ibn Is āq narrates the situation 
of a poor prisoner (and poet) who requested to be set free; the Prophet granted his request on 
condition that he not fight against the community again.24  While these historical narratives 
romanticize the Prophet’s piety and “saintly” behavior, they also suggest that most prisoners 
from the battle of Badr were not executed and were specifically protected by the Prophet’s 
command and practice.  When these narratives about the majority of Badr prisoners being 
treated well are compared with the conflicting narratives about two prisoner executions, it 
becomes more difficult to determine a lucid historical precedent for legal purposes.  The 
significance of these contradictory and vague narratives is in how these historical incidents 
will be interpreted by later generations of Muslims – especially jurists.25  Scrutinizing 
narratives from early Muslim historiography about succeeding battles may illuminate a 
historical pattern. 
 The second major Muslim battle was at U ud in 625 CE/3 AH.  The Quraysh of Mecca, 
angered by the preceding year’s defeat, fortified their army and returned to battle the Muslim 
army.  Interestingly, ʿUmar is reported as claiming that after the Prophet consulted and 
rejected his advice at Badr (see above), prisoners were executed rather than ransomed at 
U ud.26  Yet historical works do not indicate that any prisoners of war were taken.27  The 
subsequent battle occurred in 627 CE/5 AH and is known as the Battle of the Trench because the 
Muslim community dug a defensive trench around a critical part of the city of Medina.  The 
battle was basically a prolonged siege: the confederation of troops led by the Quraysh could 
not cross the ditch and after three weeks of surrounding the city of Medina, cold, sand storm 
weather purportedly sent them fleeing.  There are no reports of prisoners being taken.28  The 
                                                                  
21 Ibid., 309.  
22 Ibid.  
23 al-Ḥimyarī al- anʿānī (d. 827;  emen), uṣannaf: v. 5, p. 240.  
24 Ibn Is āq (d. 767; Iraq) et al., The life: 318.  (Incidentally, this poet reportedly did help Quraysh in their next 
battle, U ud, against the Muslim community.) 
25  For an example of how a jurist interpreted these events, see ʿAbd al-Salām ibn Saʿīd Sa nūn (d. 854; Tunisia) et 
al., al- udawwanah al- u r  li-Imām āli  i n  nas al- ṣ a ī, ed. ʿ s  ibn Masʿad Zawāwī, 5 vols. (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub 
al-ʿIlmīyah, 1994), v. 1, p. 502-03. 
26 Ibn Abī Shaybah (d. 849; Iraq), uṣannaf: v. 8, p. 475. 
27 Ibn Is āq (d. 767; Iraq) et al., The life: 387-89.  Other sources suggest one prisoner (the poet from the battle of 
Badr) was executed, but this may have occurred during battle or as a result of his violating a prior agreement (not 
to fight against the Muslim community) with the Prophet.  This discrepancy needs further investigation, beyond 
the scope of this chapter. 
28 Ibid., 459-60. Readers familiar with early Islamic history are asked to consider this depiction of history seriously 
and not reflexively presume any omission based on prior exposure to the Islamic historical tradition. Section V 
will explain why a prevailing historical interpretation (both academic and non-academic) concerning Banū 
Qurayẓah constitutes a problematic special case. 
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subsequent battle was also a prolonged siege – this time at Khaybar in 628 CE/6 AH; no 
prisoners are reported to have been taken captive.29  In 629 CE/7 AH, the Prophet sent 
numerous letters to diplomatic figures around the Arabian peninsula.  His emissaries were 
reportedly killed by Northern Arab tribes under Byzantine protection.  Consequently, a 
Muslim army marched northward to Mūʾtah to confront a large Byzantine army that defeated 
them.  No Byzantine prisoners appear to have been taken.30  The Battle of Ḥunayn took place in 
630 CE/8 AH.  Women, children, and apparently combatants were taken as captives, but they 
were all released without ransom.31 
 In compiling this brief sketch of Prophetic battles, I have relied upon a set of canonical 
Islamic historical texts.  But the historical summary presented here of the Prophet’s treatment 
of war prisoners differs from some historical and contemporary sources in its categorization of 
battles and its exclusion of later historical sources.32  In other words, as previously mentioned, 
this chapter distinguishes battles from expeditions or raids.33  The Prophet’s battles, all of 
which occurred during the last decade of his life, offer us only two clear situations in which he 
dealt with combatant prisoners of war – Badr and Ḥunayn.  At Badr, most prisoners were 
ransomed, in accord with tribal custom.  At Ḥunayn, the prisoners were set free without 
ransoms.  In all the battles following Badr, no prisoners appear to have been executed.  This 
series of events would be logical if the general directive after Badr to treat a prisoner well 
precluded the prerogative of execution and was implemented in subsequent battles.  Viewed in 
light of narratives from all the battles during the Prophet’s lifetime, the overall treatment of 
prisoners of war at Badr more likely suggests the impermissibility of poor treatment (including 
killing). 
 This interpretation (against the permissibility of prisoner execution) of the imperfect 
historical record is corroborated by historical narratives about raids during the Prophet’s life.  
For instance, the Prophet ordered that someone be set free when he was captured during a 
raid.34  Another  adīth explicitly suggests that not executing prisoners is divinely approved (or 
ordained).35  Similarly, the detailed history of raids compiled by al-Wāqidī relates that during 
the raid of Nakhlah a prisoner was taken and ʿUmar ibn al-Kha  āb wanted to kill him, but the 
                                                                  
29 A few non-combatant captives were taken as booty, but no “soldiers” were captured.  Ibid., 511, 14-16. 
30 Ibid., 535. 
31 Ibid., 570, 76. Mu ammad ibn Ismāʿīl Bukhārī (d. 870; Khurāsān),  a ī  al-Bu hārī   The translation of the meanings 
of  a i  al-Bu hārī,  ra ic-English [Jamiʿ al-sahih], trans. Muhammad Muhsin Khan, 9 vols. (Medina: Dar al-Fikr, 
1981), v. 4, p. 235. 
32 See, for example, ʿAbd al-Salām bin al-Ḥasan Adghīrī, Ḥukm al-asr  fī al-Islām wa-mu āranatuhu  ī al- ān n al-dawlī 
al-ʿāmm  (Rabat: Maktabat al-Maʿārif, 1985), 89-117.  But see Raʾūf Shalabī, al-Jihād fi sa īl  llāh: ma ālatuhu wa-
wasāʾiluhu wa-āhdāfuhu  (Cairo: Dār al-Turāth al-ʿArabī, 1974), 106-07.   
33 See footnote 9. 
34 The individual was Thumāma.  al-Qushayrī (d. 875; Khurāsān),  a i  Muslim: v. 3, n. 4361, pp. 962-963.   
35 The report narrates that “eighty persons from the inhabitants of Mecca swooped down upon the Messenger of 
Allah (may peace be upon him) from the mountain of Tanʿīm.  They were armed and wanted to attack the Holy 
Prophet (may peace be upon him) and his Companions unawares.  He (the Holy Prophet) captured them but 
spared their lives.  So, God, the Exalted and Glorious, revealed the verses: ‘It is He Who restrained your hands 
from them and their hands from you in the valley of Mecca after He had given you a victory over them.’” ibid., v. 
3, n. 4452, p. 1001. 
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Prophet prohibited it.36  These isolated incidents of raids further imply that the Prophet’s 
normative practice was to protect the lives of prisoners.   
  Indeed, ransoming prisoners was a profitable enterprise that benefited these struggling 
tribal communities.  That execution of war prisoners was an economically poor choice – in 
comparison to ransoming or enslavement – is unmistakable.  While historical sources attribute 
piety to the Prophet’s practice of protecting prisoners, it may have also been motivated by an 
economic interest in benefiting from ransoming.37  Although there was a clear incentive not to 
execute war prisoners, there appears to be little evidence for why prisoners should be 
executed (other than retaliation/revenge against particular individuals).  To answer the first 
question (Do historical narratives about all the battles that occurred during the Prophet’s 
lifetime illustrate his legal practice concerning treatment of prisoners of war?) that I posed: we 
cannot arrive at a definitive conclusion concerning the permissibility of executing prisoners of 
war.  However, the strongest conjecture based on the available historical evidence in Muslim 
historiography suggests that the Prophet’s legal practice was to treat prisoners of war well and 
not kill them.38  But it must be noted that there are no reports of the Prophet explicitly 
prohibiting execution of prisoners of war.  The remainder of this chapter considers how late 
antique and medieval jurists contended with the precedential value of this historical evidence, 
since these narratives were integral to their (legal) education and formed the precedential 
basis of their jurisprudence. 
 
II. Late antique jurists 
  Surviving historical sources offer limited information from which to reconstruct 
judicial activity directly following the Prophet’s death.  But reports about the legal opinions of 
the Prophet’s companions are contained in late antique compilations and continued to be 
mentioned in medieval juristic texts.39  The Prophet’s companions often acted as jurists and 
they may have prohibited prisoner execution,40 but there are conflicting reports about their 
jurisprudence.41  However, among succeeding generations of Muslim jurists, there is a more 
                                                                  
36 Mu ammad ibn ʿUmar Wāqidī (d. 822; Medina/Iraq), ed. Kitā  al- aghāzī (Beirut: ʿ lam al-Kutub, 2006), 48. 
37 Indeed, exegetes attributed this economic motivation to the Prophet.  See footnote 86. 
38 For a contemporary text echoing this interpretation, see ʿAbd al-Wā īd Mu ammad Fār,  sr  al-har : dirāsah 
fi hīyah wa-ta  ī īyah fī ni ā  al- ān n al-duwalī al-ʿāmm wa-al-sharīʿah al-islāmīyah  (Cairo: ʿ lam al-Kutub, 1975), 192.  
39 As the citations in this section indicate, the legal opinions of the Prophet’s companions, successors, followers, 
and the famous late antique jurists who led legal circles are reported in historical compilations of the 8th and 9th 
centuries (sunan and muṣannafāt), as well as jurisprudential texts (up to the 14th century).  I have also relied on 
Mu ammad Rawwās Qalʿah'jī’s contemporary compilations of the legal opinions of prominent jurists of the first 
Islamic century; his work is based on extensive research in late antique and medieval Islamic texts. 
40 Concerning prohibition of prisoner execution, Ibn Rushd mentions that: “Al-Ḥasan ibn Mu ammad al-Tamīmī 
reported that there is a consensus of the Companions on this issue.” Averroes Ibn Rushd II (d. 1198; 
Spain/Morocco), Bidāyat al-mujtahid wa-nihāyat al-muqtaṣid ed. Mājid al-Ḥamawī, 4  vols.  (Beirut:  Dār Ibn  Ḥazm,
1995), v. 2, p. 738. 
41 Awzāʿī reports conflicting practices (killing or ransoming/enslaving prisoners) of ʿUmar ibn al-Kha  āb, the 
second caliph.  ʿAbd al-Ra mān ibn ʿAmr Awzāʿī (d. 774; Syria), Sunan al- wzāʿī: a ādīth wa-āthār wa-fatāwá, ed. 
Marwān Mu ammad al-Shaʿʿār (Beirut: Dār al-Nafāʾis, 1993), 403.  Likewise, there are conflicting reports about the 
practice of ʿUmar’s son.  See Mu ammad Rawwās Qalʿah'jī, aws ʿat fi h ʿ  d  llāh i n ʿUmar: ʿaṣruhu wa- ayātuh, Fī 
sabīl mawsūʿah fiqhīyah jāmiʿah; 7 (Beirut: Dār al-Nafāʾis, 1986), 118. 
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readily identifiable historical group in the Islamic legal tradition that prohibited prisoner 
execution.  It is comprised of early and renowned figures in Islamic legal history: Saʿīd bin 
Jubayr (d. 714 CE), Ḥasan al-Ba rī (d. 728 CE), and ʿA āʾ bin Abī Rabā  (d. 732/3 CE).42  They were 
some of the earliest jurists in Islamic history who adjudicated prior to the emergence of 
professional schools of law.  They (and others) are reported to have cited the consensus of the 
Prophet’s companions, the historical practice of the Prophet, and a verse of the Qurʾān (47:4) as 
limiting the options for dealing with prisoners of war to freeing or ransoming them.43  
Specifically, Ḥasan al-Ba rī (and possibly ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿAbbās, d. 687/8) prohibited prisoner 
execution based on Qurʾān 47:4 and asserted that prisoners may only be ransomed or freed.44  
This verse states, “Therefore, when ye meet the unbelievers, smite at their necks; At length, 
when ye have thoroughly subdued them, bind a bond firmly (on them): thereafter (is the time 
for) either generosity or ransom.”45  This group of late antique Muslim jurists likely found no 
discrepancy between this Qurʾānic verse and the practice of the Prophet, with which they must 
have been intimately familiar.   
  This opinion against prisoner execution was not, however, unanimous – although at 
this stage it was not simply a minority or dissenting one.  ʿUmar ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz (d. 720 CE) is 
reported to have prohibited prisoner execution, but also to have executed one prisoner under 
peculiar circumstances.46  Other late antique jurists – including Ibrāhīm al-Nakhaʿī (d. 717 CE) 
and Sufyān al-Thawrī (d. 778 CE) – permitted prisoner execution as one of several options 
available to a Muslim leader.47  Mujāhid (d. 718 CE) claimed that the companions of the Prophet 
formed a consensus that Qurʾān 47:448 was abrogated by Qurʾān 9:549, thereby providing a 
Muslim leader with the options of execution, ransom, freeing, or enslaving prisoners of war.50  
                                                                  
42 Reported in Muwaffaq al-Dīn ʿAbd Allāh ibn A mad Ibn Qudāmah al-Maqdīsī (d. 1223; Syria), al- ughnī, ed. ʿAbd 
Allāh ibn ʿAbd al-Mu sin Turkī and ʿAbd al-Fattā  Mu ammad Ḥulw, 16 vols. (Imbābah, Cairo: Hajr, 1986), v. 13, p. 
45 (Ḥanbalī).  Also reported in Ibn al-Mu ahhar al-Ḥillī (d. 1325; Iraq), Tadh irat al-fu ahāʾ: v. 9, p. 156 (Imāmī Shīʿī).   
43 Ibn Abī Shaybah (d. 849; Iraq), uṣannaf: v. 7, p. 671, 73-74.  Also cited in Ibn Qudāmah al-Maqdīsī (d. 1223; Syria), 
al- ughnī: v. 13, p. 45 (Ḥanbalī).  Ibn al-Mu ahhar al-Ḥillī (d.  1325;  Iraq), Tadh irat al-fu ahāʾ: v. 9, p. 156 (Imāmī 
Shīʿī).   
44 Mu ammad Rawwās Qalʿah'jī, aws ʿat fi h al-Ḥasan al-Baṣri, 2 vols., Fī sabīl mawsūʿah fiqhīyah jāmiʿah;9 (Beirut: 
Dār al-Nafa  ʾis, 1989), v. 1, p. 127-28.  Mu ammad Rawwās Qalʿah'jī,  aws ʿat fi h ʿ  d  llāh i n ʿ   ās, Fī sabīl 
mawsūʿah fiqhīyah jāmiʿah; Silsilat mawsūʿat fiqh al-salaf (Beirut: Dār al-Nafāʾis, 1996), 121. 
45 Qurʾān 47:4, The Holy Qur-ān, trans. ‘Abdāllah  ūsuf ‘Alī (Al-Madīnah Al-Munawarah: King Fahd Holy Qur-ān 
Printing Complex, 1989-1990), 1560. 
46 This particular prisoner is reported to have killed many Muslims in battle in intensely violent ways.  
Mu ammad Rawwās Qalʿah'jī,  aws ʿat fi h ʿUmar i n ʿ  d al-ʿ zīz, Fī sabīl mawsūʿah fiqhīyah jāmiʿah; Silsilat 
mawsūʿat fiqh al-salaf (Kuwait: Jāmiʿat al-Kuwayt, Lajnat al-Tāʾlīf wa-al-Tʿarīb wa-al-Nashr, 2001), p. 171.   
47 Mu ammad Rawwās Qalʿah'jī,  aws ʿat fi h I rāhīm al-Na haʾī, 2 vols., Fī sabīl mawsūʿah fiqhīyah jāmiʿah; 8 
(Beirut: Dār al-Nafa   ʾis, 1986), v. 1, p. 282. Mu ammad Rawwās Qalʿah'jī,  aws ʿat fi h Sufyān al-Thawrī, Fī sabīl 
mawsūʿah fiqhīyah jāmiʿah; Silsilat mawsūʿat fiqh al-salaf, 10 (Beirut: Dār al-Nafāʾis, 1990), p. 156.  Unfortunately, 
these sources do not report the reasoning relied upon by these jurists in declaring this legal opinion. 
48 See footnote 45. 
49 “But when the forbidden months are past, then fight and slay the pagans wherever ye find them, and seize 
them, beleaguer them, and lie in wait for them in every stratagem (of war).” The Holy Qur-ān: 497.  Abrogation 
basically means that the legal significance of one verse is overruled by a second verse revealed at a 
chronologically later time. 
50 al-Ḥimyarī al- anʿānī (d. 827;  emen), uṣannaf: v. 5, p. 143-44.; Ibn Abī Shaybah (d. 849; Iraq),  uṣannaf: v. 7, p. 
672.  These verses will be discussed in more detail below.   
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This brief overview suggests that during the late antique period, those jurists who sanctioned 
prisoner execution did so based on verse abrogation and (possibly) political expediency.  How 
these legal opinions related to Prophetic practice is a more complicated matter because it is 
unclear what oral and written traditions were in circulation and what legal significance such 
traditions had for these jurists.  At this point in Islamic legal history, many jurists appear to 
have understood the Qurʾān as prohibiting prisoner execution and to have disagreed about 
what the Prophet’s practice was.  Despite the diversity of opinions, it is clear that the 
prohibition of prisoner execution was a strong legal opinion supported by major jurists of the 
seventh/eighth centuries CE.  I emphasize this because medieval Muslim jurists legitimated 
their jurisprudence by claiming continuity and preservation of the legal practices of their 
predecessors.  Moreover, the multiplicity of these legal opinions corresponds – perhaps 
directly – to the variations in the historical sources about the treatment of prisoners of war in 
the Prophetic era.  If even these late antique jurists who lived closest in time to the Prophet 
were unaware of or unable to come to a consensus on the Prophet’s practice pertaining to war 
prisoners, how would later generations of jurists establish a Prophetic precedent? 
 
III. Professional Islamic legal discourse 
Medieval jurists consolidated a majority opinion that accepted execution of prisoners 
of war.51  These professional Muslim jurists authored their own individual legal texts or their 
legal opinions were recorded by their students; in addition to these surviving texts, there is a 
genre of juristic disagreement – texts that record differences of opinion among jurists – that 
further illuminates and substantiates juristic debates about the permissibility of executing 
prisoners of war.  In the medieval era, jurists gradually began to identify with a particular legal 
school as legal reasoning and opinions became further codified.  This section briefly 
summarizes the legal opinions of a few mainstream and prominent Muslim jurists from the 
“professional” period.  These legal opinions represent several centuries and four major Sunnī 
legal schools (Ḥanafī, Mālikī, Shāfiʿī, and Ḥanbalī).52  The aim of this intentionally ahistorical 
presentation is to identify trends and assumptions in dominant legal discourse and to 
demonstrate that Prophetic precedent is not the most significant factor in medieval Islamic 
legal reasoning.  Rather than being exhaustive or authoritative, this is an outline of the 
discursive framework in which jurists treated the question of prisoners of war.53  I have 
selected a few influential texts that are representative of a larger body of legal texts and will 
allow us to focus on the salient modes of legal reasoning in the medieval era.  The legal schools 
represented in this selection share a basic formula for deriving Islamic legal rulings, dictating 
that the highest authority is the Qurʾān and the secondary authority is the Prophet’s 
statements or deeds.  In this context, it is of particular interest how jurists grappled with the 
historical record, given that the narratives cited in the preceding section were integral to their 
                                                                  
51 There was no consensus on the treatment of war prisoners, as documented by Ibn Ḥazm.  ʿAlī ibn A mad Ibn 
Ḥazm (d. 1064; Spain),  arāti  al-i māʿ fī al-ʿibādāt wa-al-muʿāmālat wa-al-iʿtiqādāt  (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmīyah, 
1970), p. 114 (Ẓāhirī: jurists disagree about treatment of war prisoners in terms of killing, ransoming, and freeing). 
52 Sunnī legal schools differ in many respects, but these differences are not pertinent to this study.  The Imāmī 
Shīʿī legal school opinion is a minority one, prohibiting prisoner execution.  See footnote 5. 
53 Focus will again be on primary texts (rather than secondary literature) in order to contrast the historical and 
legal depictions of prisoners of war. 
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(legal) education.  In other words, how did jurists reconcile all of the divergent historical 
narratives they inherited (presented in Sections I and II)?   
 
Silent authority and precedents of “professional” jurists 
One of the earliest extant Islamic juristic texts discussing prisoners of war is the Siyar of 
Shaybānī (d. 805 CE), a Ḥanafī Iraqi jurist.  Shaybānī recorded the teachings of Abu Ḥanīfah (d. 
767 CE) on the authority of Shaybānī’s teacher, Abū  ūsuf (d. 768), a prominent figure in the 
Ḥanafī school of legal thought; in this way, the substance of Shaybānī’s text dates to the life of 
Abu Ḥanīfah (about fifty years earlier).  Abu Ḥanīfah reportedly stated that “The Imām is 
entitled to a choice between taking them to the territory of Islam to be divided and killing 
them…[The Imām] should examine the situation and decide whatever he deems to be 
advantageous to the Muslims.”54  Although limited by the form of its transmission, it is 
noteworthy that Abu Ḥanīfah does not appear to have referred to any precedents or legal 
authority – or his student does not report the basis of his legal reasoning.  The legal question 
and response are succinctly and simply presented because he likely assumes the legitimacy of 
these options.55  Notably, Abu Ḥanīfah was nearly a contemporary of the three jurists who 
opposed prisoner execution.56  It is probable that he was aware of their opinion on prisoner 
execution, so it is interesting that he did not attempt to refute their reasoning. 
 Al-Qayrawānī (d. 996 CE), a Mālikī Tunisian jurist, declared that “It is not wrong to kill a 
non-Arab unbelieving prisoner, but no one is to be killed after being given a guarantee of 
safety (amān), and treaties with the enemy are not to be violated.”57  A non-Arab unbelieving 
prisoner in al-Qayrawānī’s time could have been Byzantine – though not in al-Qayrawānī’s 
home of Tunisia, but rather in Crete.  To give an example of contemporary war practices, 
Byzantine Emperor Nikephoros II Phocas (d. 969 CE) advised his soldiers on prisoner execution 
in his military treatise.58  I mention this in order to situate al-Qayrawānī’s text within a 
historical context in which prisoners of war was a lived reality, but it must be recognized that 
                                                                  
54 Mu ammad ibn al-Ḥasan  Shaybānī (d.  804/5;  Iraq), The Islamic law of nations: Shay ānī s Siyar, trans. Majid 
Khadduri (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press 1966), p. 100 (Ḥanafī). 
55 This succinctness is also evident in a twelfth-century Ḥanafī legal compendium; see Abū Bakr ibn Masʿūd Kāsānī 
(d. 1189; Syria), Badāʾiʿ al-ṣanāʾiʿ fī tartī  al-sharāʾiʿ, ed. A mad Mukhtār ʿUthmān, 10 vols. (Cairo: Zakarīyā ʿAlī  ūsuf, 
1968), v. 9, p. 4307.  There is a minority Ḥanafī opinion prohibiting prisoner execution (see footnote 5).  
56 See footnote 42. 
57 ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿAbd al-Ra mān Ibn Abī Zayd al-Qayrawānī (d. 996; Tunisia), The Rísâla: treatise on Mâlíkî law of 
ʿAbdallâh Ibn-Abî-Zayd Al-Qayrawânî (922-996): an annotated translation, trans. Joseph Kenny (Minna: Islamic 
Education Trust, 1992), p. 107.  See also ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿAbd al-Ra mān Ibn Abī Zayd al-Qayrawānī (d. 996; Tunisia), 
al-Risālah al-fi hīyah  (Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 1986), p. 189 (Mālikī: it is permissible to kill prisoner 
combatants).  Al-Qayrawānī likely presumed that believing (i.e., Muslim) prisoners may not be killed.  This may be 
a reference to  ughāh, Muslims who resist government authority.  See Khaled Abou El Fadl, "The rules of killing at 
war: An inquiry into classical sources," The Muslim World 89, no. 2 (1999): 146. 
58 “Mais s'il arrive qu'ils soient poursuivis par l'ennemi, les cavaliers devront aller rejoindre les quarante autres 
restés sur place, mettre à mort ou envoyer en avant les prisonniers qu'ils auront faits, s'en aller au plus vite et 
gagner l'endroit bien défendu.” Byzantine Emperor Nikēphoros II Phōkas (d. 969), Le Traité Sur la Guérilla de 
l'Empereur Nicéphore Phocas (963-969), trans. Gilbert and Haralambie Mihăescu Dagron, Le monde Byzantin (Paris: 
Editions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1986), 74.  This implies that Byzantines likely accepted 
or practiced prisoner execution in cases when the army was retreating and these prisoners were slowing them 
down.  It is entirely unclear if this practice had any effect on their Muslim neighbors. 
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it is entirely unclear if this specific example was relevant to al-Qayrawānī.  Since al-Qayrawānī 
did not elaborate, it would be too speculative to link Byzantine war practices with his legal 
reasoning.  As in the case of Abu Ḥanīfah, al-Qayrawānī seemed unconcerned with historical 
precedents or legal authority for this particular issue.  Followin his Mālikī antecedent, Ibn ʿAbd 
al-Barr (d. 1071 CE) succinctly identifies a Muslim leader’s options to deal with prisoners of war: 
killing, freeing, ransoming, or enslaving.59  
 Al-Nawawī (d. 1277 CE), a Shāfiʿī Syrian jurist, asserted that a Muslim leader may kill, 
ransom, or enslave a prisoner of war based on the needs of society, without citing the Qurʾān 
or historical precedents.60  In contrast, his Shīʿī (Imāmī) Iraqi contemporary, Jaʿfar ibn al-Ḥasan
Mu aqqiq al-Ḥillī (d. 1277 CE), noted that prisoners who were captured during warfare may not 
be killed and that the Imam may choose between freeing, ransoming, or enslaving war 
prisoners.61  The Ḥanbalī Syrian jurist Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 1328 CE) also declared that a ruler has 
four options for dealing with prisoners; he asserts “This is the opinion of the majority of the 
jurists, as they have concluded from the Book and the Sunna; though some jurists consider the 
liberation of such a captive as well as the ransom in return for his liberty as abrogated.”62  The 
permissibility of executing war prisoners was so obvious to him that Ibn Taymiyah simply 
pointed to the Qurʾān and Prophetic practice, without any elucidation.63  For these 
distinguished jurists, representing each of the four main Sunnī schools of law, Qurʾān and 
history were either irrelevant or provided so obvious an authority/precedent that it did not 
need to be explained.  Since these legal texts are part of a broader discursive milieu – in which 
the text of the Qurʾān, content of  adīth, and historical precedents were intimately familiar – it 
is possible that this silence of authority and precedent is only striking to a present-day reader.  
Still, it is remarkable that historical precedents (section I) or previous juristic opinions (section 
II) are not engaged.  This reticence in explaining the basis of their legal reasoning may have 
been a component of broader legal dynamics in which rationalists did not engage issues of 
precedent, but it was unlikely to have been the case for later jurists.64  Precedents and juristic 
opinions may have been less influential to medieval Muslim jurists than we assume based on 
our contemporary understandings of normative Islamic jurisprudence. 
 
                                                                  
59  ūsuf ibn ʿAbd Allāh Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr (d. 1070; Spain), Kitā  al- āfī fī fi h ahl al- adīnah al- āli ī, ed. Mu ammad 
Mu ammad A īd Wuld Mādīk Mūrītānī, 2 vols. (Riyadh: Maktabat al-Riyāḍ al-Ḥadīthah, 1980), v. 1, p. 467 (Mālikī). 
60 Abī Zakarīyā Mu yī al-Dīn ibn Sharaf al-Nawawī (d. 1277; Syria), Rawḍat al- āli īn, ed. ʿ dil A mad ʿAbd al-
Mawjūd, ʿAlī Mu ammad Muʿawwaḍ, and Jalāl al-Dīn  Abd al-Ra mān ibn Abī Bakr Suyū ī (d. 1505), 8 vols. (Beirut: 
Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmīyah, 1992), v. 7, p. 450-51 (Shāfiʿī).  See also Abī Zakarīyā Mu yī al-Dīn ibn Sharaf al-Nawawī 
(d. 1277; Syria) et al., al- a m ʿ, shar  al-Muhadhab, ed. Zakarīyā ʿAlī  ūsuf, 18 vols. (Cairo: Ma baʾat al-ʿ  imah, 
1966-69), v. 17, p. 102 (Shāfiʿī). 
61 Jaʿfar ibn al-Ḥasan Mu aqqiq al-Ḥillī (d.  1277; Iraq), u htaṣar al-nāfiʿ fī fi h al-imāmīyah  (Tehran: Asadī, 1967), 
137 (Imāmī Shīʿī). 
62 These four options are freeing, ransoming, enslaving, or killing.  A mad ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm Ibn Taymīyah (d. 1328;
Syria), Ibn Taimiyya on public and private law in Islam; or, Public policy in Islamic jurisprudence [al-Siyasah al-shar'iyah fi 
islah al-ra'i wa-al-ra'iyah ], trans. Omar A. Farrukh (Beirut: Khayats 1966), 142, citation omitted (Ḥanbalī). 
63 This could be because his contemporaneous political situation – the Crusades – was a motivation for harsher 
treatment of prisoners.  When warfare became more intense, jurists may have been less concerned with justifying 
the execution of prisoners of war.  
64 Rationalists (ahl al-raʾy) were less likely to refer to Prophetic precedents than traditionists (ahl al- adīth).  But 
this was less relevant after the first century of Islamic history.  See Hallaq, Sharīʿa: 55-60. 
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Qurʾān and precedents in “professional” Islamic legal discourse 
 While some jurists omitted discussion of legal authority or precedents, others cited and 
explained specific Qurʾānic verses and historical events to support the permissibility of 
prisoner execution.  Māwardī (d. 1058 CE), a Shāfiʿī Iraqi jurist, listed the same four options 
delineated above (execution, enslavement, ransoming, and releasing).65  Māwardī asserted an 
obscure (and inconsistent) interpretation of Qurʾān 47:4,66 in which he implied that bonds 
should be tied around executed soldiers.67  He failed to explain how executed prisoners could 
be shown grace or ransom (as the verse demands).  In relying on this verse to substantiate his 
legal opinion permitting execution, he provided no historical context or examples of the 
Prophet (or his companions) executing war prisoners.  In contrast, Māwardī mentioned 
examples of grace and ransom from the biography of the Prophet and the history of the early 
Muslim community.68  By citing incidents from the Prophet’s practice that legitimize only 
some of the legal options he lists, Māwardī demonstrated the inconsistent significance of 
precedent to his legal reasoning.  Indeed, Māwardī’s uneven discussion of prisoner of war 
execution appears outcome determinative because it was based on a nonsensical 
interpretation of a Qurʾānic verse and on selective references to Prophetic precedents.   
To further support his ruling, Māwardī relied on a narrative alleging that the Prophet 
disapproved of ransoming.  He cited the aforementioned report (khabar)69 concerning the 
Prophet’s consultation with Abū Bakr and ʿUmar at Badr and then used it to interpret Qurʾān 
8:6770 as a condemnation of ransoming and a reproaching of the Prophet for ransoming the 
Badr prisoners.  Māwardī declared, “After this verse was revealed, God’s Messenger, God bless 
him and grant him peace, said, ‘Had God decreed our punishment in this verse, ʿUmar, you 
would have been the only one to escape it.’71  This is a peculiar report to use as a precedent 
because it is negative evidence, suggesting that the Prophet made a mistake by not executing 
prisoners of war.  But if the Prophet did err in his judgment, would there not be some reported 
statement of him more explicitly explaining his error and advising his followers of the proper 
course of action?  More importantly, other versions of this story do not cite the Prophet as 
approving ʿUmar’s earlier suggestion to execute prisoners.72  Māwardī uses this specific 
historical narrative to imply the legitimacy of prisoner execution – thereby evading furnishing 
an actual historical example of prisoner execution.  Living under the Būyids (r. 934-1055 CE), 
                                                                  
65 ʿAlī ibn Mu ammad Māwardī (d. 1058; Iraq), The Ordinances of Government [Al-ahkām al-sul āniyya w'al-wilāyāt 
al-dīniyya], trans. Wafaa H. Wahba, The great books of Islamic civilization (Reading Garnet, 1996), 54 (Shāfiʿī).  See 
also footnote 54.  See also his Shāfiʿī successor, Abū Is āq Ibrāhīm ibn ʿAlī ibn  ūsuf Fīrūzābādī al-Shīrāzī (d. 1083; 
Iran), al- uhadhdha  fī fi h al-Imām al-Shāfiʿī, 2 vols. (Cairo: Sharikat Maktabat wa-Ma baʿat Mu  af  al-Thānī al-
Ḥalabī  wa-Awlādahu bi-Mi r, 1959), v. 2, p. 236 (Shāfiʿī: Imām may choose to kill, enslave, ransom, or free male 
combatants (i.e. not minors) as he deems appropriate).   
66 See footnote 45.  
67 Māwardī (d. 1058; Iraq), Ordinances: 54. 
68 Ibid., 54-55. 
69 See footnote 14. 
70 Qurʾān 8:67: “It is not fitting for a Prophet that he should have prisoners of war until he hath thoroughly 
subdued the land.  Ye look for the temporal goods of this world; but Allah looketh to the Hereafter: And Allah is 
exalted in might, Wise.” The Holy Qur-ān: 489. 
71 Māwardī (d. 1058; Iraq), Ordinances: 50-51. 
72 See footnote 14.  See also al-Qushayrī (d. 875; Khurāsān),  a i  Muslim: v. 3, n. 4360, p. 962.  
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Māwardī was unlikely to have been influenced by ongoing battles with non-Muslims, since the 
Būyids were involved in conquering Muslim territories.  Could Māwardī’s juristic opinion on 
prisoners of war have been a polemical dispute with the Būyid Shīʿī jurists around him?  Here 
again, it is difficult to identify the contextual background to this jurist’s legal resoning. 
Like Māwardī, Ibn Rushd (d. 1198 CE) scrutinized the Qurʾān for evidence concerning the 
execution of war prisoners.  This Mālikī Spanish jurist and philosopher clarified that the 
disagreement among jurists “stems from the conflict of the acts (of the Prophet), and the 
conflict of the apparent meaning of the Qurʾānic text with the acts of the Prophet.”73  Ibn 
Rushd explained Qurʾān 47:474 as indicating that “after taking prisoners the imām can only 
pardon or take ransom.”75  But, like Māwardī, Ibn Rushd claimed that Qurʾān 8:6776 implies that 
execution is better than ransoming (exemplified by the mistake made at Badr) and that the 
Prophet’s acts relating to treatment of prisoners were inconsistent.77  What is curious about 
Ibn Rushd’s interpretation of Qurʾān 8:67 is that he defined the key verb (yuthkhina) as killing 
whereas he interpreted the same verb (athkhantumuhum) in Qurʾān 47:478 as meaning 
overcoming or subduing.  The root of this verb (th-kh-n) can mean slaughter, subdue, or even 
apply oneself energetically; it is peculiar that within one discussion of these two verses, Ibn 
Rushd defines the same verb inconsistently.  He asserts that the status of this verse as 
abrogated or not is the crux of the legal controversy.79  He claims that those who argued that 
prisoner execution is not permissible believed that Qurʾān 47:4 abrogates the acts of the 
Prophet, which is contrary to the reasoning of his predecessors (specifically, the late antique 
jurists discussed in Section II).80  Thus, he presumes that the minority opinion (prohibiting 
prisoner execution) relies on the same understanding of historical events as his own (i.e. that 
the Prophet executed war prisoners), rather than an alternative version.  What could have 
motivated Ibn Rushd to rationalize the execution of war prisoners?  Ibn Rushd was born during 
the Almohad rebellions, received protection from  aʿqūb al-Man ūr (Almohad Amīr, r. 1184-
1199 CE), and, toward the end of his life, witnessed Almohad victories over the Portugese (in 
                                                                  
73 Averroes Ibn Rushd II (d. 1198; Spain/Morocco), The Distinguished Jurist s Primer: a translation of Bidāyat al-mujtahid 
wa-nihāyat al-muqtaṣid ed. Muhammad Abdul Rauf, trans. Imran Khan Nyazee, 2 vols. (Reading: Garnet Publishing, 
1994), v. 1, p. 456 (Mālikī). 
74 See footnote 45. 
75 Ibn Rushd II (d. 1198; Spain/Morocco), Jurist's Primer: v. 1, p. 456 (Mālikī). 
76 Qurʾān 8:67 “It is not fitting for a Prophet that he should have prisoners of war until he hath thoroughly 
subdued the land.  Ye look for the temporal goods of this world; but Allah looketh to the Hereafter: And Allah is 
exalted in might, Wise.” The Holy Qur-ān: 489. 
77 Ibn Rushd II (d. 1198; Spain/Morocco), Jurist's Primer: v. 1, p. 456 (Mālikī).   
78 “Therefore, when ye meet the unbelievers (in fight), smite at their necks; at length, when ye have thoroughly 
subdued them, bind (the captives) firmly: therefore (is the time for) either generosity or ransom…” The Holy Qur-
ān: 1560. 
79 Ibn Rushd II (d. 1198; Spain/Morocco), Jurist's Primer: v. 1, p. 457 (Mālikī). 
80 "Those who maintained that the verse, which is specific about the matter of captives (prohibiting execution), 
has abrogated the acts of the Prophet, said that the captive is not to be executed.  Those who maintained that the 
verse neither mentions captives nor is its purpose the final disposal of the question of what is to be done to the 
captives, and that the act of the Prophet (God's peace and blessings be upon him) is an addition to what is in the 
verse, when they take into account the censure of the failure to execute the captives said that the execution of 
the captives is permitted." ibid.   
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1191 CE) and the Castilians (in 1195 CE).  Ongoing battles with Christian armies may explain why 
Ibn Rushd assumed the permissibility of prisoner of war execution. 
Al-Rāfiʿī (d. 1226 CE), a Shāfiʿī Iranian jurist, claims that there are historical precedents 
of the Prophet practicing all four options, with the precedent of execution coming from the 
executions of al-Naḍr and ʿUqbah at Badr, as well as of Abā ʿAzzah al-Jumahīī at U ud.81  He 
asserts that a leader must determine which of the four options is best for the community.  He 
then cites two Qurʾānic verses (8:67 and 47:4) and explains that they were context specific: he 
asserts that 47:4 demands either the freeing or ransoming of prisoners because the community 
was strong, whereas 8:67 recommends execution of prisoners (in his interpretation) because 
the community was weaker.82  While al-Rāfiʿī refers to a change in circumstances, he does not 
elaborate on the relevant historical details. 
This brief presentation of the legal reasoning of some major jurists of the tenth through 
thirteenth centuries has demonstrated a remarkably disjointed use of Qurʾānic authority and 
inconsistent references to  adīth and historical precedents.  This variety is reflective of the 
legal polycentricity that is endemic to Islamic legal traditions, but it also suggests that 
precedent (i.e. Prophetic practice as preserved in historical sources) is less instrumental to the 
reasoning of Muslim jurists than might be presumed.  While the Prophetic practice may be 
characterized as inconclusive, all these jurists approach the issue of prisoners of war with little 
concern for expressly justifying the legal opinions they advocate with clear legal-historical 
precedents.  None of the juristic texts cited here discussed the  adīth concerning the Prophet’s 
commands that prisoners of war be treated well.  Most jurists simply discussed the legal status 
of prisoners of war without even reconciling their judgments with the historical narratives 
about most war prisoners being ransomed or freed.83   
A possible explanation for these inconsistent references to precedent is that these 
juristic opinions were outcome determinative or utilitarian, and this is yet another example of 
jurists using legal rhetoric to arrive at their desired result.  Or perhaps the majority of jurists 
were legitimating “executive authority” by asserting that a ruler has a multitude of options or 
expressing their individual opinions without regard for precedent/authority.  Nevertheless, 
these explanations are too simplistic and too cynical because these jurists probably believed in 
the legitimacy of their legal rulings.  While the socio-political objectives of jurists certainly 
influenced their understandings of Qurʾān and Prophetic practice, in the course of debating 
other jurists or teaching their students, jurists must have had to defend their opinions by 
substantiating them.  Why did they not defend their legal opinion on the permissibility of war 
prisoner execution with exhaustive references to Prophetic precedents or refutations of late 
antique juristic opinions? 
                                                                  
81 ʿAbd al-Karīm ibn Mu ammad al-Rāfiʿī (d. 1226; Iran), al-ʿ zīz shar  al-wa īz: al-maʿr f  i-al-shar  al- a īr, ed. 
ʿAlī Mu ammad Muʿawwaḍ and ʿ dil A mad ʿAbd al-Mawjūd, 14 vols. (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmīyah, 1997), v. 11, 
p. 410.  His Shāfiʿī predecessor cites three executions at Badr, one at U ud, and one in Mecca.  al-Shīrāzī (d. 1083; 
Iran), al-Muhadhdhab: v. 2, p. 237 (Shāfiʿī: offering historical examples of Prophet executing prisoner combatants). 
82 al-Rāfiʿī (d. 1226; Iran), al-ʿ zīz: v. 11, p. 410.  His Shāfiʿī predecessor offered the same rationalization for a 
presumed “confusion” in the Qurʾānic verses.  al-Shīrāzī (d. 1083; Iran), al-Muhadhdhab: v. 2, p. 237 (Shāfiʿī: when 
Muslims were weak, they ransomed their prisoners; when they became strong, they executed them). 
83 This corresponds to Abou El Fadl’s observations about “a selective and creative process by which the jurists 
construct and negotiate certain values.” Abou El Fadl, "The rules of killing at war," 149, citation omitted. 
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Despite their abstract commitment to implementing authentically ‘Islamic’ rulings, 
most of these jurists seem unconcerned with explicitly identifying and examining historical 
precedents from the lifetime of the Prophet.  One reason for this phenomenon is that the 
jurists assumed the familiarity of the audience (likely other jurists or law students) with the 
text and exegesis of the Qurʾān, the biography of the Prophet, and late antique Islamic history.  
Even the jurists who did cite legal-historical authority seemed to perceive executing a war 
prisoner as historically normative in some way; Māwardī, Ibn Rushd, and al-Rāfiʿī selectively 
referred to Prophetic precedents that legitimated their interpretations of the Qurʾān.  I 
contend that this presumption of normativity arises from two interrelated traditions: exegesis 
and historiography.  The juristic outline presented above illustrates that jurists did not 
rigorously scrutinize historical materials to establish a definitive legal-historical precedent.  
Instead, by engaging the language of the Qurʾān (and not historical-legal precedents), the 
jurists were able to avoid an important legal-historical question: if the Qurʾānic ruling is to 
execute prisoners of war, when and how did the Prophet implement it after Badr?   
 
IV. Prisoners of war in Qurʾān and its exegesis 
  The previous section’s summary of some Islamic legal opinions on prisoner of war 
execution indicates that interpretation of Qurʾānic verses often relies on a historiographically-
based presumption – one that may be unarticulated – about a verse’s context.  As part of their 
training, jurists were educated in Qurʾānic exegesis (tafsīr).  In this section, I will examine one 
of the earliest and most influential exegetical texts, al-Ṭabarī’s Tafsīr.  Al-Ṭabarī (d. 923 CE) was 
an Iraqi jurist, historian, and exegete who was likely familiar with the reported traditions cited 
in Section I.84  His exegetical work illuminates the (contemporaneous and subsequent) juristic 
understanding of certain verses and was likely one of the sources used by many jurists.  Jurists 
who permitted prisoner of war execution may have abbreviated the explanations of their legal 
reasoning precisely because a canonical text offered a well-known scriptural and precedential 
justification for their legal opinions.  In al-Ṭabarī’s Tafsīr, a jurist may have located a post-Badr 
example of prisoner execution.   
  Al-Ṭabarī explains Qurʾān 8:6785 as a criticism of the Prophet for ransoming prisoners of 
war at Badr and claims that execution would have been preferable.  He interprets the verse as 
admonishing the Muslim community for trying to profit from war prisoners (by ransoming 
them), rather than killing them.86  Ṭabarī expounds on Qurʾān 47:4 as an instruction to tie the 
                                                                  
84 Donner notes that “it is reasonable to consider al-Ṭabarī’s work as a representative product of the early Islamic
historiographical tradition, if not, indeed, as the culmination and crowning glory of that tradition.” Donner, 
Narratives: 128. 
85 See footnote 70. 
86 Ṭabarī defines the key verb (yuthkina) as killing.  Abū Jaʿfar Mu ammad ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī (d. 923; Iraq), Jāmiʿ al-
 ayān ʿan taʾwīl āy al-Qurʾān, ed.  alā  ʿAbd al-Fatta  Khālidī and Ibrāhīm Mu ammad ʿAlī, 7 vols. (Damascus; Beirut: 
Dār al-Qalam; al-Dār al-Shāmīyah, 1997), v. 4, p. 101-02.  This corresponds to the interpretation of two other major 
exegetical scholars, Zamakhsharī and Bayḍāwī.  See Ma mūd ibn ʿUmar Zamakhsharī (d. 1144; Khwārazm), al-
Kashshāf ʿan  a āʾi  al-tanzīl wa-ʿuy n al-a āwīl fī wu  h al-taʾwīl, ed. ʿAlī ibn Mu ammad al-Sayyid al-Sharīf Jurjānī, 
A mad ibn Mu ammad Ibn al-Munayyir, and al-Ḥamawī Mu ibb al-Dīn Mu ammad ibn Abī Bakr, 4 vols. (Cairo: 
al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1966),  v.  2,  p. 168.  See also ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿUmar Bayḍāwī (d. 1286; Shīrāz),  nwār al-tanzīl wa-
asrār al-tāʾwīl. Beidhawii Commentarius in Coranum: ex codd. Parisiensi us, Dresdensi us et  ipsiensi us, ed. Heinrich 
Leberecht Fleischer, 2 vols. (Lipsiae: Sumptibus F.C.G. Vogelii, 1846-1848), v. 1, p. 374.  But see Muqātil b. 
Sulaymān’s suggestion of subdue and overcome in Muqātil ibn Sulaymān al-Balkhī (d. 767; Iraq), Tafsīr u ātil i n 
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bonds of a prisoner of war tightly lest he escape and cause harm.87  But he delineated a 
controversy about this verse that is evident in the juristic texts: some scholars believed that 
the verse is a valid, un-abrogated rule (thereby prohibiting prisoner execution),88 while other 
scholars believed that the verse was abrogated by Qurʾān 8:5789 or 9:590 -- or even 2:191.91  
(There is juristic disagreement about which verse did the abrogating.)  Ṭabarī referred to 
Ḥasan al-Ba rī’s prohibition of prisoner execution and indicated that it was based on a report 
that ʿAbdallāh ibn ʿUmar (son of the second caliph) refused to execute a prisoner in accordance 
with Qurʾān 47:4.92  Ṭabarī expressed his opinion that verse 47:4 is not abrogated and is a valid 
legal command; but he claimed that 9:5 is chronologically earlier than 47:4 and therefore offers 
a Muslim leader the additional option of executing war prisoners.  Ṭabarī alleged that it was 
the practice of the Prophet to kill some war prisoners and not others.93  The historical 
precedents he cites are the execution of ʿUqbah at Badr and the Banū Qurayẓah (discussed 
below). 
I will briefly present two examples of juristic texts that appear to rely on or concur 
with the historical interpretation embedded in Ṭabarī’s exegesis or some other medieval 
Islamic text.94  These two examples highlight that in the Islamic juristic tradition, Qurʾānic 
exegesis and historiography are intertwined and integral to Islamic legal reasoning.  This 
intricate intertextuality also reveals the dialectical, mutually influential relationships between 
historical narratives, exegesis, and legal opinions.  The Ḥanafī Transoxanian jurist, al-Sarakhsī 
(d. 1090 CE) mentioned the majority-condoned four options95 and then the minority opinion 
(within his legal school) against prisoner execution.  He explained that dissenting jurists (al-
Ḥasan and Ḥamād bin abī Sulaymān) relied on a narrative reporting that the son of the Caliph 
ʿUmar refused to execute a prisoner of war, implying that they considered this a binding 
precedent.96  Sarakhsī alleged to have historical evidence for the permissibility of execution 
after imprisonment in the Badr executions (al-Naḍr and ʿUqbah) and the story of Banū 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Sulaymān: 80-1 0 hi rīyah, ed. ʿAbd Allāh Ma mūd Shi ātah, 5 vols. (Cairo: al-Hayʾah al-Mi rīyah al-ʿ mmah lil-
Kitāb, 1979), v. 4, p. 44. 
87 al-Ṭabarī (d. 923; Iraq), Jāmiʿ: v. 6, p. 688. 
88 Notably, Imāmī Shīʿī jurisprudence rejects abrogation of Qurʾānic verses, which is why this legal school rejects 
prisoner of war execution as an option. Ibn al-Mu ahhar al-Ḥillī (d.  1325;  Iraq), Tadh irat al-fu ahāʾ: v. 9, p. 158 
(Imāmī Shīʿī). 
89 “If ye gain mastery over them in war, disperse, with them, those who follow them, that they may remember.” 
The Holy Qur-ān: 486. 
90 “But when the forbidden months are past, then fight and slay the pagans wherever ye find them, and seize 
them, beleaguer them, and lie in wait for them in every stratagem (of war).” Ibid., 497.  This verse was introduced 
at footnote 49.  See also al-Ṭabarī (d. 923; Iraq), Jāmiʿ: v. 6, p. 688-89. 
91 “And slay them wherever ye catch them…” The Holy Qur-ān: 80.  Awzāʿī claims that 2:191 abrogated 47:4.  Awzāʿī 
(d. 774; Syria), Sunan al- wzāʿī: 393. 
92 See Qalʿah'jī, aws ʿat fi h ʿ  d  llāh i n ʿUmar: 118. 
93 al-Ṭabarī (d. 923; Iraq), Jāmiʿ: v. 6, p. 689. 
94 Such as, A mad ibn Mu ammad Na  ās (d. 950; Egypt), Nāsi h wa-al-mans  h fī al-Qurʾān al- arīm, ed. 
Mu ammad ibn ʿAli Udfuwī (Egypt: al-Maktabah al-ʿAllāmīyah, 1938), p. 165-66. 
95 The four options are freeing, enslaving, ransoming, or killing.  See footnotes 60, 62, 65, and 81. 
96 Sarakhsī (d. 11th cent; Transoxania) et al., Shar : v. 3, p. 1024 (Ḥanafī). 
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Qurayẓah.  Departing from Ṭabarī’s exegesis, Sarakhsī declares that Qurʾān 47:4 was 
abrogated.97   
Similarly, Ibn Qudāmah (d. 1223 CE), a Ḥanbalī Syrian jurist, began his discussion of the 
treatment of prisoners of war by listing the same four options that the majority of jurists 
permit.  He referred to the dissenting opinions of three late antique jurists (Saʿīd bin Jubayr, 
Ḥasan al-Ba rī, and ʿA āʾ bin Abī Rabā ) and explained that they rely on the ransoming of Badr 
prisoners as a precedent and on Qurʾān 47:4 as limiting the options for dealing with war 
prisoners to the two (ransoming and grace) mentioned in the verse.98  Ibn Qudāmah 
substantiated his legal opinion with allusions to two executions at Badr (al-Naḍr and ʿUqbah), 
the killing of the poet (Abā ʿAzzah) at U ud, and the Banū Qurayẓah.99  The ambiguity of these 
historical precedents was discussed above (Section I) – except the story of the Banū Qurayẓah 
tribe.  Ṭabarī’s exegesis and the legal reasoning of both Sarakhsī and Ibn Qudāmah accept the 
abrogation of a key verse (47:4) based on a historiographical identification of a weighty 
precedent: the Prophet executing prisoners of war after Badr.  But does the Banū Qurayẓah 
incident offer a precedent for prisoner execution?   
 
V. Slippage: the complexity of historical categorization 
Many (if not most) jurists who permitted prisoner execution probably sincerely 
believed that the Prophet did execute prisoners of war.  But the possibility that two isolated 
and specific prisoner executions at Badr or one execution at U ud were sufficient for deriving 
such a significant opinion seems peculiar.  As Ṭabarī’s exegesis and some juristic texts confirm, 
there was another incident that was selectively cited as a historical precedent for prisoner 
execution.100  Some Qurʾān commentators,  adīth compilers, and jurists categorized (perhaps 
inaccurately?) an incident involving the tribe of Banū Qurayẓah as one of warfare, rather than 
breach of treaty or treason.101  Readers familiar with Islamic history may have noticed the 
absence of references to this incident in the first section summarizing battles during the 
Prophet’s life.  This was an intentional attempt to engage these historical sources while 
resisting interpretations of historical events provided by Muslim historians or jurists.102 
                                                                  
97 Ibid., v. 3, p. 1025 (Ḥanafī). 
98 Ibn Qudāmah al-Maqdīsī (d. 1223; Syria), al- ughnī: v. 13, p. 45 (Ḥanbalī). 
99 Muwaffaq al-Dīn ʿAbd Allāh ibn A mad Ibn Qudāmah al-Maqdīsī (d. 1223; Syria), al- ughnī, ed. ʿAbd Allāh ibn 
ʿAbd al-Mu sin Turkī and ʿAbd al-Fattā  Mu ammad Ḥulw, 2nd ed., 15 vols. (Cairo: Hajr, 1992), v. 13, p. 46 
(Ḥanbalī). 
100 By way of example, Mālik cites the execution of ʿUqbah and “seventy prisoners” in reference to Banū Qurayẓah. 
Sa nūn (d. 854; Tunisia) et al., al-Mudawwanah: v. 1, p. 502-03 (Mālikī). 
101 For a historical depiction of these events, see Abū Jaʿfar Mu ammad ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī (d. 923; Iraq), The victory 
of Islam, trans. Michael Fishbein, The history of al-Ṭabarī, VIII (Albany: State University of New  ork Press, 1997), 
p. 27-41.  An example of the classification discrepancies is that  adīth concerning the Banū Qurayẓah are in the 
book of warfare of later  adīth collections.  See al-Qushayrī (d. 875; Khurāsān),  a i  Muslim: v. 3, n. 4368-71, p. 
966.  But al-Shāfʿī classifies this incident under treaty violation.  See footnote 109. 
102 The focus of what follows is not moral evaluation (since contemporary morality is not superior to this history), 
but how and why a historical incident is interpreted by successive generations in certain ways.  This event is not 
entirely verifiable and its non-occurrence has been argued.  However, factuality is not relevant because our focus 
is on what Muslim jurists believed to have happened in late antique Islamic history – not what actually happened.  
For opposing interpretations of this narrative (as fictional or factual), see W.N. Arafat, "New Light on the Story of 
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The Banū Qurayẓah was arguably the most powerful of the more than dozen Jewish 
Arab tribes in Medina.103  When the Muslim community settled in Medina, the Prophet entered 
into some kind of treaty agreement (likely based on tribal legal custom) with this Jewish Arab 
tribe as well as others.104  Several years later, it was suspected and alleged that the Banū 
Qurayẓah collaborated with the enemy during the Battle of the Trench – thereby breaching the 
treaty agreement between the groups.  After the battle, a Muslim army besieged their fortress.  
The Banū Qurayẓah surrendered and Saʿd b. Muʿādh (chief of a clan allied with them) was 
appointed arbitrator – and may have specifically been chosen by Banū Qurayẓah for this role.  
Regardless of justifiability, he appears to have determined treason and imposed a tribal legal 
norm by ordering the execution of the combatants (i.e., men beyond puberty) and 
enslavement of the women and children.105   
Late antique Islamic historiography was generally structured around the recording of 
battles, such that the very genre of Muslim historical narratives is closely associated with 
warfare.106  Since this event immediately followed the Battle of the Trench, historical sources 
likewise place it directly after descriptions of the battle (which was actually a siege, since no 
actual warfare took place).  This may explain why readers (historically and 
contemporaneously) interpret the Banū Qurayẓah trial as part of the battle.  This is, of course, 
an interesting case of the structure of a historical narrative having substantive (legal) 
implications.  But should this incident be considered an Islamic – rather than tribal – legal 
precedent?  There are contradictory references to the Prophet approving or implementing the 
order that make characterizing it as an application of Islamic law problematic.107  The 
presumption that this incident is Islamic ignores the treaty agreement, third-party 
involvement, trial-like circumstances, indefinite legal application (tribal, Jewish, or Islamic?), 
and lack of combat that distinguish a battle and prevent it from from having clear precedential 
value.  In other words, what makes this event an “Islamic” legal precedent for Muslim jurists?   
Moreover, how relevant is the Banū Qurayẓah incident to Islamic jurisprudence on 
treatment of prisoners of war?  The late antique majority opinions (see Section II) and 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Banū Qurayẓa and the Jews of Medina," Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland (1976). M.J. 
Kister, "The massacre of the Banū Qurayẓa: a re-examination of a tradition," Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam 
8(1986).  For a discussion of the problematic motif of “Mu ammad and the Jews,” see Rizwi S. Faizer, "Muhammad 
and the Medinan Jews: a comparison of the texts of Ibn Ishaq's Kitāb sīrat rasūl Allāh with al-Waqidi’s Kitāb al-
maghāzī," International Journal of Middle East Studies 28, no. 4 (1996). 
103 See Michael Lecker, "Wāqidī's account on the status of the Jews of Medina: a study of a combined report," 
Journal of Near Eastern Studies 54(1995). 
104 See Michael Lecker, The "Constitution of Medina": Mu ammad's First Legal Document, Studies in Late Antiquity and 
Early Islam 23 (Princeton: The Darwin Press, 2004), 48.  The smaller, more numerous Jewish Arab tribes appear to 
have been party to the so-called Constitution, whereas the three largest and more powerful tribes entered into 
separate agreements. 
105 This ruling could have also been an application of Biblical law since there are reports that “Jewish law” 
(whatever that meant in 7th century Arabia) was applied in judgment against Jewish adulterers.  For the most 
often cited example, see Bukhārī (d. 870; Khurāsān),  a ī  al-Bu hārī: v. 8, bk 82, no. 825, p. 550. 
106 On the relationship between biographical and campaign literature, see Josef Horovitz et al., eds., The earliest 
biographies of the Prophet and their authors (Princeton: The Darwin Press, 2002), 4. 
107 The incident is described as the judgment of Saʿd in al-Ḥimyarī al- anʿānī (d. 827;  emen), uṣannaf: v. 5, p. 280.  
See also differing attributions of the judgment to God or Saʿd in Ibn Abī Shaybah (d. 849; Iraq),  uṣannaf: v. 8, p. 
503. 
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medieval dissenting opinions108 cited at the beginning of this essay may attest to a period in 
Islamic history when this event was explicitly not understood as relevant to prisoners of war.  
Indeed, even the medieval majority opinions (permitting prisoner execution, summarized in 
Section III) attest to the inexplicit and ambiguous precedential value of this event.  Juristic 
references to this incident fall under both discussions of non-aggression treaties and general 
ordinances for warfare, indicating that jurists themselves did not distinctly categorize this as 
war.  For example, al-Shāfiʿī cites the incident under treaty violation and does not clearly 
describe Banū Qurayẓah as war prisoners.109  Thus, some jurists probably differentiated 
between war prisoners and captured “traitors.”  Of all the juristic texts examined for this 
paper, only two explicitly cite Banū Qurayẓah as a precedent for prisoner execution and both 
are post-tenth century legal texts – meaning both are chronologically later than al-Ṭabarī’s 
Tafsīr.  Sarakhsī claimed that Banū Qurayẓah is the precedent for permissibility of execution.110  
A century later, Ibn Qudāmah observed that narratives about Banū Qurayẓah and two Badr 
executions “were disseminated and well-known.”111  More thorough and comprehensive legal-
textual searches would be necessary in order to claim that the Banū Qurayẓah became a 
precedent in a later period (i.e. in the medieval era).  But it is certainly remarkable that 
numerous earlier jurists and contemporaries of Sarakhsī and Ibn Qudāmah did not cite the 
incident as a precedent.  Whether stated or implied, if some jurists presumed this as precedent 
for executing war prisoners, then their reasoning discounts both the circumstances of this 
event and other historical precedents (discussed in Section I).  It is clear that many jurists 
avoided or neglected reconciling all the historical narratives pertaining to actual prisoners of 
war in their legal analysis.  These jurists may have believed it was unnecessary to thoroughly 
analyze each incident in which the Prophet dealt with prisoners of war because the Banū 
Qurayẓah incident was the presumptive basis for their conceptualization of prisoner execution 
as normative.   ther jurists may have believed that the Banū Qurayẓah incident was a 
precedent for punishing treason.  Of course, some jurists may not have differentiated between 
these two categorizations of the Banū Qurayẓah incident. 
It is possible that medieval Muslim scholars characterized an internal dispute with one 
of the Jewish Arab tribes as a war because, in their context, they conceptualized Jewish Arab 
tribes as clearly distinguishable from pagan and Muslim Arabs – a dichotomy (between Jewish 
and Arab) that is not historically attested for most of the seventh century.112  Indeed, the 
overwhelming evidence of intermarriage113 and integration,114 as well as of socio-political 
                                                                  
108 See footnote 5. 
109 Mu ammad ibn Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī (d. 820; Arabia/Egypt), al-Umm, ed. Ismāʿīl ibn  a y  Muzanī (d. 878), Reprint of 
the ed. published in Cairo, 1321 (1903/4) ed., 7 vols., Kitāb al-Sha b (Cairo: Dār al-Shaʿb, 1968), v. 4, p. 107. 
110 Sarakhsī (d. 11th cent; Transoxania) et al., Shar : v. 3, p. 1025. 
111 Muwaffaq al-Dīn ʿAbd Allāh ibn A mad Ibn Qudāmah al-Maqdīsī (d. 1223; Syria), al-ʿUmdah fī al-fiqh al-Ḥan alī, 
ed. al-Hawwārī and Anwar Zahrāʾ (Damascus: al-Dār al-Mutta idah lil-Ṭibāʿah wa-al-Nashr, 1990), p. 46.   
112 Donner suggests “the Believers may have adopted a distinct confessional identity as Muslims only in the 
second half of the first century AH.” Donner, Narratives: p. 99, footnote 1.  But see Amikam Elad, "Community of 
believers of ‘holy men’ and ‘saints’ or community of Muslims? The rise and development of early Muslim 
historiography," Journal of Semitic Studies 47, no. 2 (2002). 
113 See Michael Lecker, "A note on early marriage links between Quraīshis and Jewish women," Jerusalem Studies in 
Arabic and Islam 10(1987). 
114 Lecker notes that “fosterage was probably the social institute that facilitated the absorption of Arab children 
by Jewish clans.” Michael Lecker, " Amr ibn Ḥāzm al-An ārī and Qurʾān 2, 256: 'No compulsion is there in 
 48 
 
contracts, indicate that Jewish Arab tribes were an integral component of Medinan society.  
Most historiographical works about this event reify the religious identity of the tribe, thereby 
ignoring the salient historical fact that there were no apparent conflicts between the nascent 
Muslim community and the majority of Jewish Arab tribes in Medina and that there may be 
economic undercurrents to the strained relationship with Banū Qurayẓah.  The Banū Qurayẓah 
had been tax collectors for the Persians and were economic forces in Medina; the Prophet 
appears to have undertaken some redistribution of property that could have antagonized 
them.115  It is probable that at least some late antique jurists (and possibly the Prophet’s 
companions) did not share the same historiographical understanding of this incident as the 
medieval jurists; this difference in historical understanding may correlate to the differences of 
opinion on the legality of executing prisoners of war.  Medieval Muslim jurists either could not 
conceptualize the complex hybridity of Jewish-Muslim-Arab identity or chose not to accept it.  
Most contemporary historians have, unfortunately, continued to disregard the complex nature 
of historical identity by projecting modern identity categories on this historical period.  The 
prolonged existence of Jewish-Christians is a comparable historical case that further 
substantiates the likelihood of vague confessional identity during this period.116  Both the 
exegesis and historiography employed by medieval jurists signals that they assumed 
unambiguous confessional identities, manifested in violent hostilities between groups.  The 
reality of late antique Arabia was more complex than the emplotted narrative of Banū 
Qurayẓah written by medieval Muslim scholars. 
 
VI. Historical exegesis of the Qurʾān? 
Thus far, I advocated that the Qurʾānic interpretations of the majority of professional 
jurists do not reconcile with the historical evidence, but I did not provide a lucid 
reconstruction of an alternative (possibly earlier) exegesis.  Reflecting this mosaic of historical 
interpretations (Section I) onto the Qurʾān may evoke the exegesis of the late antique jurists 
who substantiated their judgment against prisoner execution with reference to Qurʾān and 
authoritative precedents.  The divergent historiographical and Qurʾānic readings that produce 
opposing legal judgments hinge upon identifying whether or not a particular verse (Qurʾān 
47:4) is abrogated.  A common means of identifying verse abrogation is to determine temporal 
order; while difficult to ascertain definitively, in this case, it appears that Qurʾān 8:67 was 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
religion'," Oriens 35(1996): 63.  See also Michael Lecker, "Zayd b. Thābit, 'a Jew with two sidelocks': Judaism and 
literacy in pre-Islamic Medina (Yathrib)," Journal of Near Eastern Studies 56(1997). 
115 See Mahmood Ibrahim, Merchant capital and Islam  (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990), 180.   
116 Daniel Boyarin noted that “In suggesting that Judaism and Christianity were not separate entities until very 
late in late antiquity, I am, accordingly, not claiming that it is impossible to discern separate social groups that are 
in an important sense Christian/not-Jewish or Jewish/not-Christian from fairly early on (by which I mean the 
mid-second century).” Boyarin, Border lines: 21.  Similarly, I recognize that in the beginning of Islamic history 
there were groups that could be identified as Muslim/not-Jewish, but the “fuzziness of the borders” that Boyarin 
discusses is relevant to understanding how Muslim identity changed in late antiquity.  See also R. Werblowsky et 
al., "Christianity," ed. Michael Berenbaum and Fred Skolnik,  Encyclopaedia Judaica 4(2007), 
http://find.galegroup.com/gvrl/infomark.do?&contentSet=EBKS&type=retrieve&tabID=T001&prodId=GVRL&docI
d=CX2587504287&eisbn=0-02-866097-8&source=gale&userGroupName=berk89308&version=1.0  
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revealed prior to Qurʾān 47:4.117  Therefore, on its own, chronological order of Qurʾānic verses 
necessitates a ruling that prisoners of war can only be pardoned or ransomed (as stated in 
Qurʾān 47:4).118  Viewing Qurʾān 47:4 as limiting treatment of war prisoners to pardoning or to 
ransoming is in line with the clearest historical evidence: after Badr (the occasion for Qurʾān 
8:67), the Prophet freed all the captives from the battle of Ḥunayn (the only other identifiable 
battle that resulted in prisoners).119  Yet given that it is not entirely known what chronological 
ordering of the Qurʾān medieval Muslim scholars presumed, this may not fully explain the 
contrary legal rulings.120 
 Abrogation of verses also relies on the categorization of some verses as specific and 
others as general – a process that began in late antiquity in conjunction with the transmission 
and study of the Qurʾān.  “Professional” jurists who permitted prisoner execution presupposed 
various conditions on verses, which led to verse Qurʾān 8:67121 being viewed as general (and, 
sometimes, Qurʾān 47:4122 as specific).  In light of the historical evidence presented above, the 
criticism in Qurʾān 8:67 appears to be that war should not be a primarily profitable enterprise 
(as Ṭabarī explained); that is, the verse instructs believers to battle for spiritual reasons, rather 
than economic incentives.  This insinuates that Qurʾān 47:4 was not a specific regulation, since 
it appears to have been subsequently implemented.  If Qurʾān 8:67 is not a general regulation 
and it does not override Qurʾān 47:4, then these two verses can be reconciled with the complex 
historical record.  The historical summary (Section I), prohibition of execution by the early 
jurists (Section II), and historical reconstruction of a key event (Section V), all interconnect 
with an exegesis that rejects the abrogation of verse 47:4.  In other words, reconciling the 
disparate historical evidence (biographical, legal, and exegetical) suggests that Qurʾān 47:4 
limits treatment of prisoners of war to freeing or ransoming, which was the Prophet’s practice, 
as preserved by the majority opinion of late antique jurists.  The perspective that Qurʾān 47:4 
was abrogated may have been prompted by genuine contentions, by projecting a particular 
historiography, by utilitarian objectives, or by adherence to a (legal or social) tradition.  I 
contend that all these factors played a role in constructing what jurists believed to be 
normative and I want to turn now to pre-Islamic customary practices and traditions. 
                                                                  
117 Theodor Nöldeke, Tārī h al-Qurʾān [Geschichte des Qorans], ed. Friedrich Schwally, Gotthelf Bergstrasser, and Otto 
Pretzl, trans. Georges Tamer (Beirut: Konrad Adenauer Foundation, 2004), xxxvi.  For the text of these verses, see 
footnote 70 (Qurʾān 8:67) and footnote 45 (Qurʾān 47:4). 
118 For an example of this legal argument, see Shalabī, al-Jihād fi sa īl  llāh: 104-05. 
119 This historical interpretation is evident in some contemporary texts, which suggests that executions of war 
prisoners were the consequences of some prior crimes unrelated to prisoner status.  See  Ulyān’s chapter on 
“Prisoners of war in Islam” in Mu yī Hilāl al-Sar ān, Asrá al- ar  fī al-Islām wa-al- ān n al-dawlī  (Baghdad: al-
Jumhūrīyah al- Irāqīyah, Wizārat al-Awqāf wa-al-Shuʾūn al-Dīnīyah, Majallat al-Risālah al-Islāmīyah, 1986), 39-51.  
See also Shalabī, al-Jihād fi sa īl  llāh: 104-07. 
120 Since it was necessary for scholars to study the chronology of Qurʾānic verses in order to determine which 
verses were abrogated, there was significant scholarly discussion on the issue.  But there were differences of 
opinion and it is difficult to conjecture a specific jurist’s perspective on the Qurʾān’s chronology.  A standard work 
on this topic is Jalāl al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Ra mān ibn Abī Bakr al-Suyū ī (d. 1505; Egypt), al-It ān fī ʿul m al-Qurʾān, ed. 
Mu ammad Abū al-Faḍl Ibrāhīm, vol. 2nd (Tehran: Manshūrāt al-Raḍī, 1984). 
121 “It is not fitting for a Prophet that he should have prisoners of war until he hath thoroughly subdued the land.  
Ye look for the temporal goods of this world; but Allah looketh to the Hereafter: And Allah is exalted in might, 
Wise.”  
122 “Therefore, when ye meet the unbelievers, smite at their necks; At length, when ye have thoroughly subdued 
them, bind a bond firmly (on them): thereafter (is the time for) either generosity or ransom.” 
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VII. Another possibility 
Thus far, this chapter has focused on textual continuities shared between late antique 
and medieval jurists: Qurʾān and historical narratives.  However, what constituted normativity 
for Muslim jurists of any period cannot exclusively be located in Islamic texts or Muslim 
historical figures.  The situation of wars against non-Islamic empires, for example, may have 
shaped (even subconsciously) how jurists viewed the legal status of prisoners of war.  Prisoner 
exchange was common between the Byzantine and Islamic empires during the eighth through 
tenth centuries,123 but actual war practices varied across time and region.  A more thorough 
analysis of socio-political contexts is beyond the scope of this chapter and would be likely 
inconclusive.   Moreover, jurists were not only concerned with overcoming their political 
adversaries because — as the summaries in Sections II and III demonstrate — these jurists 
believed they were following Islamic tradition, or what they supposed was Islamic tradition.  I 
am not here making a claim about internally-motivated legal reasoning as “good faith” and 
externally-motivated legally reasoning as “bad faith.”  Instead, I want to emphasize that all 
jurists are equally motivated by factors that are both internal and external to formal 
jurisprudential methodology. 
Perhaps some jurists presupposed the permissibility of prisoner execution because they 
confounded some pre-Islamic traditions with Islamic texts/narratives.  Generally, the Prophet 
and early Muslim jurists acted in harmony with the pre-existing socio-legal norms of the 
region.124  While difficult to establish definitively, it appears that pre-Islamic tribal custom was 
to ransom prisoners of war, but not to execute them. By comparison, Roman law assumed the 
enslavement of war prisoners, which was widely practiced.125  A significant pre-Islamic legal 
norm of the Near East that explicitly advocates prisoner execution is Biblical Law.  
Deuteronomy 20:13 states, “And when the Lord your God delivers it into your hand, you shall 
put all its males to the sword.”126  In light of the role that Jewish tradition played in late 
antique Islamic legal thought, it is possible that the normativity of prisoner execution is a 
remnant of the biblical tradition.127  Of course, no Muslim jurist cited the Torah as precedent 
for prisoner of war execution and there is an insufficient evidentiary basis for making such a 
claim.128  Because legal interpretive communities are fluid, the normalcy of prisoner execution 
                                                                  
123 Rotman,  es esclaves et l’esclavage: 56-62, 68-75. 
124 “In short, the Qurʼānic regulations modify in certain particulars rather than supplant entirely the existing 
customary law.” Coulson, A history of Islamic law: 15. 
125 See references to the enslavement of prisoners of war in The Digest of Justinian trans. Alan Watson, revised 
English-language ed., 2 vols. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998), 1:1.5.4.2 and 2:49.15.  See also 
The Institutes of Justinian: text, translation, and commentary, trans. J. A. C. (Joseph Anthony Charles) Thomas 
(Amsterdam; New York: North-Holland Pub. Co.; American Elsevier Pub. Co., 1975), I.3, p. 14.  
126 Michael David Coogan et al., eds., The new Oxford annotated Bible, augmented third ed. (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), 276.  This verse was generally understood as applying to an optional war.  The verse’s 
indifference to the category of non-combatant males is echoed in Ibn Ḥazm’s ruling that all male enemies – 
combatant or non-combatant – may be killed. ʿAlī ibn A mad Ibn Ḥazm (d. 1064; Spain), al- u allā, ed. Ḥasan 
Zaydān Ṭulbah, 12 vols. (Cairo: Maktabat al-Jumhūriyah al-ʿArabīyah, 1967-1971), v. 7, p. 345 (Ẓāhirī).  
127 “Borrowing” is an inaccurate way of characterizing the complicated transformation of these hybrid 
communities.  See Satlow, "Beyond influence." 
128 On the acceptability of non-abrogated, pre-Islamic laws (such as Biblical law) as a source of Islamic 
jurisprudence, see ʿAbd al-Ra mān ibn ʿAbd Allāh Darwīsh, al-Sharāʾiʿ al-sā i ah wa-madá  u  īyatihā fī al-sharīʿah al-
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within biblical custom could have subtly been integrated into Islamic legal thought.129  This 
suggests a deep-rooted historical tradition legitimating prisoner execution that is unrelated to 
the Qurʾān, or the practice of the Prophet and his companions, or normative Islamic legal 
methodology.  After all, these communities (Arab/Islamic, Jewish, Byzantine) were not easily 
distinguishable in late antiquity.  What was normative to a Muslim jurist was not grounded in a 
“purely” Islamic tradition and this may explain the juristic tendency to read the historical 
record as permitting, even prescribing, prisoner execution.   
 
VIII. Conclusion 
This chapter has focused on the “internal” dynamics of changing Islamic legal 
consciousness and consequently avoided fully engaging the influence of actual, 
contemporaneous practice to legal hermeneutics.  The reasoning of jurists during the medieval 
period relied — among other things — on interpretation of historical texts and of the Qurʾān.  
In the case of prisoners of war, the majority of these professional jurists arrived at 
interpretations that seem inconsistent — or, at least unconcerned — with some historical 
evidence or with some of the opinions of earlier jurists.  This chapter situated the Banū 
Qurayẓah incident within a broader framework of Islamic history; I contend that this historical 
understanding was shared by some early jurists and minority jurists (Shīʿī and Ḥanafī) who 
prohibited prisoner execution.130  It is unclear what the majority (professional or 
contemporary) Islamic legal opinion on prisoner execution would be if early Muslim historians 
had clearly distinguished between the Battle of the Trench and the Banū Qurayẓah incident. 
Nor can we determine what the prevailing legal opinion would be if professional jurists had 
applied more precision in their concurrent analysis of historical precedents and Qurʾānic 
verses.  But what we can determine is that the legal reasoning of jurists does not simply arise 
from the methodology they purport to apply or from presumed utilitarian objectives. 
Interpretations of and assumptions about legal texts and precedents — rooted in complex, 
multi-layered traditions — intermingle to produce juristic opinions.  Variations in Islamic 
historiography generate juristic disagreement 
This chapter has suggested familiar claims: precedent can be used to support a 
contradictory ruling; jurists are subjective and may make outcome-determinative decisions; 
jurists are not skilled historians and employ historiography in problematic ways.  But this 
chapter attempted to deepen these observations: most professional jurists began with a 
genuine presumption that executing prisoners of war is a viable option.  This may be 
unsurprising or normative, but my objective has been to scrutinize the juristic discourse, 
rather than pass judgment on the legitimacy of this perspective.  In citing Qurʾān or  adīth, 
most jurists instinctively understood these sources as sanctioning prisoner execution. The 
intertwined historical and Qurʾānic interpretations propounded by these jurists demonstrate 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Islāmīyah  (Saudi Arabia: ʿA. al-R. b. ʿA. A. al-Darwīsh, 1989).  On the dialectical relationship between Islamic and 
Jewish legal thought see Chapter 3 of this dissertation.Zeʾev Maghen, After hardship cometh ease: the Jews as backdrop 
for Muslim moderation, Studien zur Geschichte und Kultur des islamischen Orients; Beihefte zur Zeitschrift "Der 
Islam", Neue Folge, Bd. 17 (Berlin; New York: De Gruyter, 2006). 
129 Indeed, the integration of Biblical ideas in the Islamic conceptualization of  ihād is a fascinating topic, but 
beyond the scope of this chapter. 
130 For a contemporary presentation of this legal interpretation, see Shalabī, al-Jihād fi sa īl  llāh: 101-07. 
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the significance of these normative suppositions.  The intertextual process of “creating” 
precedents, as depicted in this essay, is not unique to the Islamic legal tradition.  For legal 
historians, this is a complicated inquiry into how historians construct histories, how jurists 
interpret those constructions, and how legal traditions apply these created legal-historical 
precedents.  This chapter has demonstrated the significance of intertexual legal-historical 
analysis by demarcating how jurists created the permissibility of prisoner of war execution as 
a historical truth.  Indeed, how jurists interpret historical narratives cannot be separated from 
historical writing or legal reasoning. 
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Chapter 2: Legal heterodoxy – a case study in taxation1 
 
Taxing citizens: socio-legal constructions of late antique Muslim identity 
 
I. Introduction 
 Charity is commonly perceived as a pious deed – a voluntary act performed by an 
individual in the service of the needy members of a community.  In the context of religious 
traditions, it often represents piety and spiritual-economic sacrifice.  In the late antique (ca. 
250-750 CE) Near East, for Christians and Jews, charity became an increasingly celebrated 
“public virtue” in service of “the poor.”2  Subsequently, late antique Muslims transformed 
these charity practices by regulating them: by making the payment of charity incumbent upon 
every Muslim, charity became a tax.3  And, in turn, the payment of the charity tax became a 
means of communally defining a Muslim – an identity that was constructed as the 
performance of acts that obfuscated the modern boundaries between “ritual” and “political.” 
 Recent studies of charity in Islamic history reflect this assumption of charity’s 
ineluctable role in religion.4  Scholars tend to project an association between charitable giving 
and religion in their studies of Muslim charity practices.5  Indeed, some scholars evaluate 
charity in historical contexts based on their own assumptions of what correct “religious” 
practice is or should be.6  This prevalent construction of charity as a ritual obligation prevents 
                                                                  
1 For reading and commenting on drafts of this chapter, I thank Rhiannon Graybill, Maria Mavroudi, and Amr 
Osman.  Different parts and versions of this chapter were presented at a panel I organized on ‘Muslim 
Historiography in Islamic Legal Reasoning’ at the American Society for Legal History annual meeting in  ttawa 
(November 15, 2008); a panel on ‘Religion and law in the medieval Mediterranean world’ at the American 
Academy of Religion annual meeting in San Francisco (Nov. 21, 2011); and the symposium “Legal Regimes and 
Legal Change in Antiquity” at UC Berkeley (April 14, 2012). 
2 Brown observed that “‘Love of the poor’ became a public virtue, which bishops and clergy men were expected to 
demonstrate, in return for public privileges.” Peter R. L. Brown, Poverty and leadership in the later Roman Empire, The 
Menahem Stern Jerusalem Lectures (Hanover and London: University Press of New England, 2002), 74. 
3 To be clear, there was an infrastructure and enforcement mechanism for the calculation and collection of the 
charity tax from the beginning of Islamic history.  The Prophet reportedly kicked out five people from the 
mosque for not paying their charity tax.  Mu ammad ibn  aʿqūb Kulaynī (d. 941; Iran), al-Uṣ l min al-Kāfī, ed. ʿAlī 
Akbar Ghaffārī and Mu ammad  khūndī, 3rd ed., 8 vols. (Tehran: Dār al-Kutub al-Islāmīyah, 1968), v. 3, p. 503, no. 
2 (Imāmī Shīʿī).  Also cited in Ibn al-Mu ahhar al-Ḥillī (d. 1325; Iraq), Tadh irat al-fu ahāʾ: v. 5, p. 9 (Imāmī Shīʿī). 
4 Miriam Frenkel et al., eds., Charity and giving in monotheistic religions (Berlin; New York: W. de Gruyter, 2009); 
Yaacov Lev, "The ethics and practice of Islamic medieval charity," History Compass 5, no. 2 (2007); Yaacov Lev, 
"Charity, pious endowments and royal women in medieval Islam," in Continuity and change in the realms of Islam : 
studies in honour of Professor Urbain Vermeulen, ed. Urbain Vermeulen, K. d Hulster, and J. van Steenbergen, 
Orientalia Lovaniensia analecta, 171 (Leuven: Peeters; Departement Oosterse Studies, 2008).  I critiqued reified 
approaches to the study of Islamic charity in Lena Salaymeh, review of Amy Singer, Charity in Islamic Societies (New 
York, Cambridge University Press, 2008), Journal of Interdisciplinary History 40, no. 4 (2010).  I follow Talal Asad in 
being skeptical about the relevance of the modern, Western category of religion to Islamic history. Asad, 
Genealogies of religion. 
5 See, for example, Frenkel et al., Charity and giving in monotheistic religions. 
6 For example, Lev claims that “The use of sacred charity for political and social ends fall within a broader pattern 
of the use and abuse of religion in medieval times wherein political rule of every kind, wars, social order, and 
social practices were presented as religiously inspired and sanctioned.” Yaacov Lev, Charity, endowments, and 
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scholars from understanding the multi-dimensional motivations and consequences of charity 
practices. 
 Late antique historical sources – biographical, historical, and legal – indicate that there 
were two competing and converging models of Islamic identity in the Near East: the first 
viewed being Muslim as being about the practice of certain rituals; the second viewed being 
Muslim as being a form of citizenship.7  The first emphasized an individual’s awareness of and 
relationship to a divine entity; the second emphasized an individual’s obligations toward and 
relationship to a Muslim community.  A historical analysis of the charity tax illustrates these 
two competing models and reveals the ways in which a majority of Muslim jurists (in the late 
antique and medieval eras) favored a hybrid form of the citizenship model.  In other words, 
orthodox Muslim scholars constructed Islamic identity through law in ways that – in modern 
terminology – are political and not purely confessional.  In this chapter, I trace the embedded 
hybridity of spiritual and political identity by exploring the public or communal dimensions of 
Muslim identity.  I will focus on reconstructing precedents from the earliest decades of the 
Muslim community (roughly 622-660 CE), prior to the emergence of the Umayyad empire (r. 
661-750 CE) in order to explore the notion of Muslim citizenship in the absence of an elaborate 
state structure.  I will then compare and contrast reports about pre-Umayyad charity taxation 
with medieval juristic texts.   
 I will investigate charity by delving into seemingly simple questions: (1) What is the 
charity tax?; (2) How much is the charity tax?; (3) Who should receive the charity tax?; (4) Who 
should pay the charity tax?; (5) Who does not pay the charity tax?; (6) Why is the charity tax 
significant?  In asking and answering these questions, I am interested in exploring how Muslim 
jurists articulated the relationship between paying the charity tax and being Muslim.  I intend 
this particular case study to demonstrate some of the ways in which contemporary 
religious/secular discourse limits our historical understanding.  To further substantiate the 
meaning of these practices for late antique Muslim identity formation, I will offer some 
comparative considerations from rabbinic law and reflect on Muslim identity in relation to 
Jewish identity.  My objective is to give substantive meaning to late antique “Muslim charity” 
by understanding it in relationship to “Jewish charity.”  In so doing, I will illustrate that, from 
the beginning of Islamic history, most Muslims did not understand Muslim identity as a 
private matter of faith, but rather as a public expression of socio-political and communal 
membership.  Indeed, this particular tension is one that manifests itself in numerous political 
and sectarian contests in Islamic history.    
 
II. What is the charity tax? 
Political entities depend on the extraction of taxes from their subjects in order to 
function, such that we may identify the existence of a state wherever we observe a system of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
charitable institutions in medieval Islam  (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2005), 1.  I contend that charity 
is not “sacred” and its usage as a political strategy should not be evaluated as “abnormal” in any way. 
7 I use “citizenship” to mean membership in a political society.  I do not equate my usage of the terms 
“citizenship” or “state” to the contemporary understanding of an individual’s relationship to a modern-nation 
state. 
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taxation.8  This “unscientific” definition has interesting implications for late antique Islamic 
history because the first Muslim community, organized under the political leadership of the 
Prophet, is not commonly perceived by contemporary scholars as constituting a “state.”  But 
the Prophet and his successors collected an annual tax – one that was dedicated specifically for 
the poor.  This social welfare measure was not simply a matter of piety; it was also 
governmental regulation.9  In other words, the Prophet instituted an Islamic state (in 
historicist terms) – one that dramatically transformed in subsequent years, but cannot be 
discounted as non-existent.  The Prophet’s political successors continued the administrative 
collection and regulation of taxes.10  This imposition of the charity tax was the subject of 
considerable political and legal debate in late antiquity.11 
Since even the earliest Islamic state collected taxes, I identify the Islamic legal 
obligation to pay charity as a charity tax.12  I do so as part of a broader interest in exploring the 
ways in which late antique Islamic charity taxation corresponds to modern taxation regimes – 
in the context of the United States, state or federal taxes for public welfare programs.  For the 
sake of clarity, I am excluding topics such as charity given at the end of the fasting month, the 
portion of the war booty that is set aside for charity, and the land tithe.13  To reconstruct 
charity taxation from the first four decades of Islamic history, I will probe a variety of 
historical sources, searching for both consistencies and inconsistencies. 
 
The charity tax in the Qurʾān 
An examination of the historical evidence establishes that charity taxation was an integral 
aspect of Muslim communal identity in the Prophetic period.  To reconstruct the Prophet’s 
message and practice of charity taxation, I rely on Qurʾān,  adīth, and biographical texts.  
Various Qurʾānic verses mandate the paying of charity, although the precise term used in 
Arabic varies.14  Qurʾānic verses do not explicitly delineate who should pay the charity tax or 
                                                                  
8 The historicist understanding of the state is developed by Bevir and Rhodes, who argue that “the state appears 
as a differentiated cultural practice composed of all kinds of contingent and shifting beliefs and actions, where 
these beliefs and actions can be explained through a historical understanding.”  Mark Bevir et al., The state as 
cultural practice  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 20. 
9 This is not a denial of the “religious” or faith-based significance of charity taxation.  Instead, my objective here is 
to simply offer a definition of a state that is both historical and flexible.   
10 Papyrological evidence substantiates that a charity tax was collected from Muslims by an Islamic state in the 
eighth century.  Sijpesteijn, "Shaping a Muslim state," 153.  The absence of a distinction between these two terms 
is reflected in the Qurʾān; later jurists elaborated a distinction between these terms. 
11 Sijpesteijn outlines the textual evidence of debates on the possibility of paying the charity tax directly to the 
poor/needy, without state intervention; these debates are preserved in the earliest  adīth collections, but not the 
later canonical ones. Ibid., 172-73. 
12 That charity was conceptualized by late antique Muslims as a tax is manifested structurally in legal texts that 
juxtapose charity and poll taxes.  In this way, these sections delineate the taxes for citizens and semi-citizens.  See 
footnote 138. 
13 These topics are elaborated in both  adīth collections and legal texts. 
14  Throughout this chapter, I intentionally do not assume that za āh is the only term that was used by late antique 
Muslims to refer to obligatory charity because, in fact, both ṣadaqah and za āh were used to refer to the charity 
tax.  While jurists gradually defined the former as voluntary charity and the latter as obligatory charity, there is 
no indication that this distinction was recognized by the first several generations of Muslims.  For a philological 
analysis of these terms, see Suliman Bashear, "On the origins and development of the meaning of za āt in early 
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how the tax should be calculated.  (Indeed, some verses that identify the charity tax as an 
obligation may have been addressed to Jews.15)  Some relevant verses include:16  
23:4 
(Mecca) 
And those who perform charity  
نونمؤلما ُةَرۡوُس  :( َنُولِع ٰـ َف ِةٰوَك ذزلِل ُۡهُ َني ِ ذلَّ
 
ٱَو٤) 
 
23:60 
(Mecca) 
Those who give what is due with fearful hearts because they will return to their Lord 
نونمؤلما ُةَرۡوُس : ْاَوتاَء ٓاَم َنُوتُۡؤي َني ِ ذلَّ ٱَو( َنوُعِجٲَر ِۡمہِ بَر َٰلَ
ِ
ا ۡمُہذ نَٱ ٌَلَِجَو ُۡمُہبُولُق ذو٠٦) 
 
27:3 
(Mecca) 
Those who pray, give charity, and acknowledge the hereafter 
لمذنلا ُةَرۡوُس :( َنُونِقُوي ُۡهُ ِةَرِخَۡلۡ
 
ٱِب ُهَُو َةٰوَڪذزل
 
ٱ َنُوتُۡؤيَو َةَٰول ذصل
 
ٱ َنُويمُِقي َني ِ ذلَّ
 
ٱ٣) 
 
31:4 
(Mecca) 
Those who pray, give charity, and acknowledge the hereafter 
ناَمقل ُةَرۡوُس :( َنُونِقُوي ُۡهُ ِةَرِخَۡلۡ
 
ٱِب ُهَُو َةٰوَك ذزل
 
ٱ َنُوتُۡؤيَو َةَٰول ذصل
 
ٱ َنُويمُِقي َني ِ ذلَّ
 
ٱ٤) 
 
32:16 
(Mecca) 
…they spend from what we  estowed upon them 
ةَدج ذسلا ُةَرۡوُس :( َنوُقِفُني ُۡمه ٰـ َنۡقَزَر ا ذمِمَو ا ً۬ عَمَطَو اً۬ فۡوَخ ُۡمہذ بَر َنوُعَۡدي ِعِجاَضَۡمل
 
ٱ ِنَع ۡمُُبُُونُج َٰفَاَجََتت٦٠) 
 
41:7 
(Mecca) 
Those who do not give charity and who deny the hereafter 
َتل  ُصف / ةدجسلا ٓمٰح ُةَرۡوُس :( َنوُرِف ٰـ َك ُۡهُ ِةَرِخَۡلۡ
 
ٱِب ُهَُو َةٰوَڪذزل
 
ٱ َنُوتُۡؤي َلَ َني ِ ذلَّ
 
ٱ٧) 
 
51:19 
(Mecca) 
And in their wealth and possessions (was remembered) the right of the (needy), him who 
asked, and him who (for some reason) was deprived 
تَیَرا  لَّا ُةَرۡوُس:   َووُرۡحَۡمل ٱَو ِل
ِ
ٓٮا ذسلِ ل 
ً۬ قَح ۡمِهِلٲَوۡمَٱ ِٓفَ ِم  (٦١)  
70:23-24 
(Mecca) 
Those who are regular in their prayers and those in whose assets there is a known right 
جراَعلما ُةَرۡوُس:  ( َنوُم
ِ
ٓٮاَد ِۡمہِتَلََص ََٰلَع ُۡهُ َني ِ
ذلَّ
 
ٱ٣٣) ( ًٌ۬مُولۡع ذم ً۬ قَح ۡمِهِلٲَوۡمَٱ ِٓفَ َني ِ ذلَّ
 
ٱَو٣٤) 
 
92:5 
(Mecca) 
As for him who gives and believes 
لْیللا ُةَرۡوُس :( ٰىَقذ ت ٱَو ٰىَطۡعَٱ ۡنَم ا ذَمٱف٥) 
2:276 
(Medina) 
God diminishes interest (riba) and amplifies charity, for God does not love disbelievers or 
sinners. 
ةَرَقَبلا ُةَرۡوُس : ِتٰـ َقَد ذصل
 
ٱ ِبُِۡريَو ْاَٰوِب  رل
 
ٱ ُ ذللَّ
 
ٱ ُقَحَۡميۗ(  مِِ َٱ  راذفَك ذ ُُ   ُّ ِ ُُ  َلَ ُ ذللَّ
 
ٱَو ٣٧٠) 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Islam," Arabica XL(1993).  Sijpesteijn notes that “The papyrus makes no distinction between the two terms ṣadaqa 
and za āt but defines both as a farḍ, duty.” Sijpesteijn, "Shaping a Muslim state," 153. 
15 These are Qurʾān 2:43, 2:83, and 2:110. 
16 The charity tax is described as on obligation in conjunction with prayer in the following Meccan verses: 19:31; 
19:55; 21:7; 23:4; 27:3; 31:4; 123:20  The same theme is mentioned in the following Medinan verses: 2:43; 2:83; 2:110; 
2:177; 2:277; 4:77; 4:162; 5:12; 7:55; 9:5; 9:18; 9:71; 22:41; 22:78; 24:37; 24:56; 33:33; 108:13; 138:5.  Elsewhere, payment 
of charity is described as being the subject of divine reward (and non-payment is the subject of divine 
punishment) or is described in generally positive or regulatory terms.  Meccan examples include: 7:156; 12:88.  
Medinan examples include: 2:219; 2:196; 2:263; 2:264; 2:267; 2:271; 2:276; 4:79; 4:91; 4:114; 9:58; 9:103; 9:104; 108:12-
14. 
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9:79 
(Medina)  
Those who slander the obedient ones of the believers in charity or the ones who find nothing 
except their work (to give in charity), they mock them and God will mock them for they will 
have painful torture. 
َةبو تلا ُةَرۡوُس : َد ذصل
 
ٱ ِفَ َينِنِمۡؤُۡمل
 
ٱ َنِم َينِع ِ  و ذطُۡمل
 
ٱ َنوُزِۡمَلي َني ِ ذلَّ
 
ٱ ُۡمۡہنِم َنوُرَخَۡسَيف ُۡهَُد ُۡجُ ذلَ
ِ
ا َنوُد َِيَ َلَ َني ِ ذلَّ
 
ٱَو ِتٰـ َقۙ ٌمِلَٱ ٌٌ ا َ َع ُۡمَهلَو ۡمُہۡنِم ُ ذللَّ
 
ٱ َر ِ َ  
(٧١) 
 
9:103 
(Medina) 
“Of their wealth ta e charity in order to purify and to sanctify them…” 
َةبو تلا ُةَرۡوُس : ۡنِم َۡ ُخ( اَہِب ِمہی ِ كَُزتَو ُۡهُُرِ هَُطت ً۬ َةقَدَص ۡمِهِلٲَوۡمَٱ٦٦٣) 
 
24:56 
(Medina) 
So esta lish regular prayer and give regular charity… 
رو نلا ُةَرۡوُس :( َنو َُحَُۡرت ُۡمڪذلََعل َلوُس ذرل
 
ٱ ْاوُعیِطَٱَو َةٰوَك ذزل
 
ٱ ْاُوتاَءَو َةَٰول ذصل
 
ٱ ْاُويمِقَٱَو٥٠) 
 
58:13 
(Medina) 
…pray and give charity and o ey God and His prophet for God is aware of what you do 
لةداَلمجا ُةَرۡوُس : ً۬ تٰـ َقَدَص ُۡكُٰٮَو َۡنَ ۡىََدي ََۡينب ْاوُم ِ  دَُقت نَٱ ُۡتُۡقَفۡشَٱَءۚ ُيمَِقَٱف ُۡكَُۡیَلع ُ ذللَّ
 
ٱ ٌَ ََ َو ْاُولَعَۡفت َۡمل ۡۡ
ِ
َاف  َُلوُسَرَو َ ذللَّ
 
ٱ ْاوُعیِطَٱَو َةٰوَك ذزل
 
ٱ ْاُوتاَءَو َةَٰول ذصل
 
ٱ ْاو ۥۚ  
( َنُولَمَۡعت اَمِب ُُۢيِبَخ ُ ذللَّ
 
ٱَو٦٣) 
 
These verses (and others not cited here) suggest two primary themes: that giving charity is a 
religious obligation on par with the central obligation of prayer17 and that charity is the right 
of the poor to a portion of the wealth of the non-poor (or a duty that the wealthy owe to the 
poor).18   
These two Qurʾānic themes reflect the similar ways charitable giving was understood in 
late antique near eastern cultures.  Pre-Islamic Arabs appear to have believed, if not practiced, 
that individuals with excess wealth should donate it.19  Similarly, late antique rabbis viewed 
charity as more important than all the other Jewish commandments.20  Christian bishops 
                                                                  
17 The phrase “establish regular prayer and regular charity” is mentioned in Qurʾān 73:20, 2:110, 2:177, 98:5, 24:56, 
58:13, and 22:78.  A contemporary scholar estimates that in 27 out of the 30 instances in which the word za āh 
appears in the Qurʾān, it is in conjunction with prayer.  A mad Idrīs ʿAbdū, al- āfī fī a  ām al-za āh: dirāsah 
mu āranah bayna al-madhāhi  wa-ārāʾ al-ʿulamāʾ  (ʿAyn Malīlah, Algeria: Dār al-Hudá, 2006), 6.  For a general 
discussion of the significance of these verses, see Michael Bonner, "Poverty and economics in the Qur’an," Journal 
of Interdisciplinary History xxxv, no. 3 (2005).   
18 See Qurʾān 51:19 (cited above), 70:24 (And those in whose wealth there is a well-known right), and 59:7 (What 
God has given to His messenger from the townspeople belongs to God, to His messenger, to kinfolk, to orphans, to 
the needy, and to the wayfarer, so that it circulates not only between the wealthy… ) in The Holy Qur-ān. 
19 M. M. Bravmann, "The surplus of property: an early Arab social concept," Der Islam 38(1962).  See also Bonner, 
"Poverty and economics in the Qur’an," 403.  This may be a reflection of life in Arabian society, where limited 
material resources and semi-sedentary lifestyles were incongruent with accumulation of wealth.  But, in the 
absence of more concrete evidence, I want to resist assuming a certain stereotype of Arabian society as relatively 
more egalitarian than more sedentary societies.   
20 Babylonian Talmud, Baba Batra 9a (charity is as important as all the other commandments).  Rabbis viewed 
“charity not as a favor to the poor but something to which they have a right, and the donor, an obligation.” 
Raphael Posner, Haim Hillel Ben-Sasson, and Isaac Levitats, "Charity," in Encyclopaedia Judaica, ed. Michael 
Berenbaum and Fred Skolnik (Detroit: Macmillan Reference, 2007). 
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disseminated teachings that emphasized the importance of charity as a devotional act.21  Thus, 
normative late antique charity practices identified charity as integral to prayer and as the 
right of the poor.  The Qurʾān seems to reflect these normative late antique conceptualizations 
of charity in its dual emphasis on the spiritual and economic necessity of charity taxation.22  
This might provoke some questions: how is a ritual act (such as prayer or charity tax payment) 
enforced as an obligatory act?  In other words, how did the Prophet and late antique Muslim 
leaders regulate charity taxation? 
 
The Prophet’s imposition of a charity tax 
To illuminate legal practices and norms that are not expressly stated in the Qurʾān, we 
need to examine historical materials about the Prophet’s life.23  Many historical sources 
identify the names of individuals and the names of the areas or tribes to which they were sent 
for the purpose of collecting the charity tax.24  By way of example, the Prophet sent al-Walīd to 
Banū al-Mu  aliq25 and sent ʿAmr bin Ḥazm to Banū al-Ḥārith26 to collect the charity tax after 
                                                                  
21 Peter Brown observed, “Every believer was to God what the beggar was to the giver of alms -- a being utterly 
dependent on the mercy of another.  Seldom in the history of religion (and never before in the history of the 
Greco-Roman world) had the essence of the human relationship to the divine been concretized in such starkly 
social terms, and in social terms characterized by such stark asymmetry.” Brown, Poverty and leadership: 86.  
Bishops were not the only social figures to promote charity, since “philanthropia was believed in and practiced by 
the Byzantine State as a religious, social, and political virtue.  Practically all the emperors, in one way or another, 
pursued the application of this noble attribute." Demetrios J. Constantelos, Byzantine philanthropy and social welfare, 
revised 2nd ed., Studies in the Social & Religious History of the Mediaeval Greek World, I (New Rochelle, NY: 
Aristide D. Caratzas, 1991), 100. 
22 Later in this chapter, I will show how these normative understandings of charitable giving likely resulted in a 
difference of opinion among Muslim jurists concerning specific aspects of the charity tax’s applicability to 
minors, the mentally incompetent, and slaves. 
23 Al-Ṭabarī reports that in the year 8 AH the Prophet sent ʿAmr b. al-ʿ   to ʿUmān in order to collect the charity 
tax. al-Ṭabarī (d. 923; Iraq), The victory of Islam: 142.  Al-Ṭabarī also reports that in the same year (8 AH) the Prophet 
sent ʿAmr b. al-ʿ   to collect the charity tax from al-Julandā.  Abū Jaʿfar Mu ammad ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī (d. 923; 
Iraq), The last years of the Prophet: the formation of the State A.D. 630-632/A.H. 8-11, trans. Ismail K. Poonawala, The 
history of al-Ṭabarī, IX (Albany: State University of New  ork Press, 1990), 38-39.  Despite these examples of 
charity tax collection, al-Ṭabarī inconsistently states that the charity tax was made obligatory in the year 9 AH.  
Ibid., 79. 
24 “The apostle sent out his officials and representatives to every district subject to Islam to collect the poor-tax. 
He sent al-Muhājir b. Abū Umayya b. al-Mughīra to  anʿāʾ, and al-ʿAnsī came out against him while he was there. 
Ziyād b. Labīd, brother of B. Bayāḍa al-An ārī, he sent to Ḥaḍramaut. ʿAdīy b. Ḥātim he sent to Ṭayyiʾ and B. Asad; 
Mālik b. Nuwayra, to B. Ḥanẓala. The poor-tax of B. Saʿd he divided between two men: Zibriqān b. Badr and Qays b. 
ʿ  im each to be in charge of a section; al-ʿAlāʾ b. al-Ḥaḍramī to al-Ba rayn, and ʿAlī b. Abū Ṭalib to the people of 
Najrān, to collect the poor-tax and to superintend the collection of the poll-tax.” Ibn Is āq (d. 767; Iraq) et al., The 
life: 648-9.  Ṭabarī reports a similar version of this list and explains that the Prophet sent out these delegations in 
the year 10 AH. al-Ṭabarī (d. 923; Iraq), The last years of the Prophet: 108.  
A canonical  adīth collection reports that the Prophet “appointed a man called Ibn Al-Lutbiya, from the tribe of 
Al-Asd to collect zakāt from Banī Sulaim.  When he returned, (after collecting the zakat) the Prophet checked the 
account with him.” Bukhārī (d. 870; Khurāsān),  a ī  al-Bu hārī: v. 2, p. 337 (no. 576).   
25 Ibn Is āq (d. 767; Iraq) et al., The life: 493. 
26 “Now the apostle had sent to them after their deputation had returned ‘Amr b. Ḥazm to instruct them in 
religion and to teach them the sunna and the institutions of Islam and to collect their alms…” ibid., 646.  Other 
versions of this narrative elaborate that ʿAmr bin Ḥazm was sent to the people of Yemen where he read a message 
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both tribes became Muslim.  In a historical chronicle, we find a narrative that specifies that the 
Prophet’s emissary collected charity “[only] from the rich and returned [what he took] to the 
poor.”27  Juxtaposed with these regulatory examples of charity taxation are narratives about 
voluntary giving.  ʿAbd al-Ra mān bin ʿAuf “gave 4,000 dirhams” to an alms collection, but this 
appears to be in the context of generous, voluntary giving.28  Likewise, Mukhayrīq (an Arabian 
Jew) left all his property to the Prophet, who then donated it in charity; but again, no details 
about the nature or amount of property are reported.29  Late antique practices of charitable 
giving are evident in Qurʾānic verses and in the Prophet’s other reported practices of 
redistribution.30  In addition to the regulatory aspects of charity taxation,31 non-payment of the 
tax was viewed as a sin with spiritual punishments.32  From the aforementioned Qurʾānic 
verses and the biographical materials, we can conclude that the Prophet or his representatives 
collected a charity tax of some kind.  If the charity tax were not an established aspect of late 
antique Muslim communal life, then we should find evidence that some Muslims contested the 
collection of charity taxation by the Prophet’s successors.  But the historical sources suggest 
that, in the post-Prophetic era, the charity tax was not challenged on “ritual” grounds, but 
rather on “political” grounds, as I will elaborate later in this chapter.33 
 
III. How much is the charity tax? 
Neither the Qurʾān nor the biographical texts offer details about the amount of charity 
tax that was (or should be) collected.  Juxtaposed with the detailed list of names of collectors 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
about the charity tax being one dinar for every 40 dinars.  Sulaymān ibn A mad al-Ṭabarānī (d.  971;  Syria), al-
  ādīth al- iwāl, ed. Mu  af  ʿAbd al-Qādir ʿA ā (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmīyah, 1992), 141-43. 
27 The Prophet sent “‘Amr b. al-‘   to collect alms [ṣadaqah] from Jayfar and ‘Amr, the two clans of al-Julandā from 
the Azd.  The allowed ‘‘Amr b. al-‘   to collect the alms [without interference], and so he collected it [only] from 
the rich and returned [what he took] to the poor.” al-Ṭabarī (d. 923; Iraq), The last years of the Prophet: 38-39.  This 
redistribution phrase is in many  adīth sources.  See footnote 42. 
28 Ibn Is āq (d. 767; Iraq) et al., The life: 622. 
29 Ibid., 241.  It is unclear if Mukhayrīq intended for the Prophet to distribute his property as charity or if the 
Prophet received the gift and unilaterally decided to donate it. 
30 “Muhammad asked that those landlords who could not develop their land because they lacked time or expertise 
hire workers who might have both but own no land.  At one point, he asked those landlords to give up the land for 
the benefit of those who could develop it.  With the regulation of the water supply that Muhammad devised, 
agricultural production was organized and land reclamation became possible; anyone who reclaimed fallow land 
owned it.” Ibrahim, Merchant capital and Islam: 88. 
31 See footnote 3. 
32 Punishment for not paying the charity tax was characterized in spiritual terms of retribution in the hereafter.  
Bukhārī (d. 870; Khurāsān),  a ī  al-Bu hārī: v. 2, p. 276-77 (no. 486: whoever does not pay the charity tax will be 
bitten by a poisonous snake on the day of resurrection). 
33 Shoufani notes that under the reign of Caliph Abū Bakr (d. 634) “many tribes detached themselves from Medina 
by refusing to pay the tax, or by following other prophets.  This movement of severing whatever ties the tribes of 
Arabia had with Medina is known in the Muslim tradition by the name of Riddah, apostasy.” Elias Shoufani, Al-
Riddah and the Muslim conquest of Arabia  (Toronto; Buffalo; [Beirut]: University of Toronto Press; Arab Institute for 
Research and Publishing, 1973), 4.  Shoufani’s thorough study demonstrates that the so-called “apostasy” wars 
were motivated by political and economic controversies, rather than a substantive debate about religious dogma 
or practice.  Indeed, Shoufani argues that the “apostasy” wars were integral to the broader Arab/Muslim 
expansion and conquest project and that the defecting tribes “were all antagonistic to Medina’s policy of 
expanding its hegemony over all the Arabs.” Ibid., 152. 
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and payees in the biographical sources (including the work of Ibn Is āq), this seems to be a 
peculiar gap in the historical sources.34  While agents likely collected taxes in kind (i.e., cattle 
or harvests) and in cash, specific amounts for these categories are not specified in the 
biographical sources.  This, however, does not indicate that the exact amounts were unknown 
to the late antique Muslim community or unknowable to us through historical research.  I 
want to explore here how we can reconstruct historical-legal practice from other sources, 
primarily collections of orally-composed and transmitted reports (i.e., mu annafāt and 
 adīth).35  This chapter concentrates on the very specific issue of the amount of charity tax 
that should be applied to money (i.e. gold or silver coins)36 that an individual has possessed for 
at least one year – rather than other forms of wealth (such as agricultural lands and cattle).37  
While I am not assuming a heavily-monetized economic system, there is papyrological 
evidence attesting that, in eighth century, taxes were collected in the form dinars, in addition 
to goats and sheep.38  The chapters on the charity tax in  adīth collections are sizable and I will 
not attempt to discuss all the subchapters here.39  I do so because I suspect that the tax rate on 
money was equivalent to the rate for other assets and because money was the primary form of 
liquid assets.40  
In the late antique  adīth collection of Ibn Abī Shaybah (d. 849), there are numerous 
reports of the Prophet having advised his followers to pay the charity tax.41  One individual, 
Muʿādh, is cited as reporting that when the Prophet sent him to deliver the message of Islam to 
a group, he instructed him to take charity from their wealthy individuals and give it to the 
                                                                  
34 Ibn Is āq (d. 767; Iraq) et al., The life: 648-49 (noting names of individuals sent to specific tribes to collect 
charity). 
35 Ḥadīth began as both a historical and legal activity combining storytelling and oral law compilation.  The use of 
these materials for Islamic historiography remains a deeply contested issue in Islamic studies scholarship.  See 
Motzki, Ḥadīth:  origins  and  developments.  Rather than engage in the abstract methodological debates of these 
controversies, I will instead illustrate how I use  adīth as a source of both social and legal history. 
36 Rather than all forms of silver and gold, juristic discussions generally focus on silver and gold coins (darāhim 
and danānīr). Ibn al-Mu ahhar al-Ḥillī (d.  1325;  Iraq), Tadh irat al-fu ahāʾ: v. 5, p. 118-19 (Imāmī Shīʿī).  For an 
introductory discussion of Islamic coins in late antiquity, see Stefan Heidemann, "Numismatics," in The formation 
of the Islamic world, sixth to eleventh centuries, ed. Chase F. Robinson, The new Cambridge history of Islam (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011).  See also Stefan Heidemann, "The merger of two currency zones in early Islam: 
the Byzantine and Sasanian impact on the circulation in former Byzantine Syria and Northern Mesopotamia," 
Iran, Journal of Persian Studies 36(1998).   
37 For a discussion on what types of property are subject to taxation, see Mu ammad ibn Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī (d. 820; 
Arabia/Egypt), al-Umm, 11 vols. (al-Man ūrah: Dār al-Wafāʾ lil- ibāʿah wa-al-nashr wa-al-tawzīʿ, 2001), v. 1, p. 80-
85; v. 3, p. 9-32. 
38 Sijpesteijn, "Shaping a Muslim state," 125. 
39 By way of example, Bukhārī discusses more than fifty subtopics of charity taxation.  Bukhārī (d. 870; Khurāsān), 
 a ī  al-Bu hārī: v. 2, p. 275-338.  
40 Monetization and cash circulation in the late antique Eastern Mediterranean is the subject of considerable 
scholarly debate that is beyond the scope of this chapter.  See John F. Haldon, Money, power and politics in early 
Islamic Syria: a review of current debates  (Farnham, Surrey, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2010).  See also 
Chapter 9 in Jairus Banaji, Theory as history: essays on modes of production and exploitation  (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 
2010). 
41 One of the earliest surviving  adīth compilations is Ibn Abī Shaybah’s  uṣannaf.  ʿAbd Allāh ibn Mu ammad Ibn 
Abī Shaybah (d. 849; Iraq),  l- itā  al-muṣannaf fī al-a ādīth wa-al-āthār, 9 vols. (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmīyah, 
1995), v. 2, p. 350-52. 
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poor among them.42  This text specifies that the Prophet (or his Companions) advised that 200 
dirhams is the minimum amount of wealth subject to a 5-dirham charity tax.43  Yet, nowhere is 
this amount cited as the Prophet’s actual practice, rather than simply a reported statement.44  
In other words, the entire chapter on charity does not report a single incidence of the Prophet 
or one of his delegates calculating and collecting particular amounts of charity.  While the 
chapter is distinguished by an absence of references to the amount of charity tax that the 
Prophet himself collected,45 it does include several consistent statements of the amount that 
was collected in the Prophetic era.   This amount is corroborated in another early compilation 
of  adīth, the  uṣannaf of al- anʿānī  (d.  827),  which  suggests  a  possible link between the 
Prophet’s reported statements concerning calculating charity and his reported practice of 
collecting charity.  Al- anʿānī reports that the Prophet sent a letter detailing charity tax 
amounts, including specifying a 5 dirham tax on 200 dirhams that have been in possession for 
a minimum amount of time (one year).46  Another early  adīth compiler and jurist, Mālik ibn 
Anas, reports that the charity tax is applied “to twenty dinars (of gold) or two hundred 
dirhams (of silver)” without referring to the Prophet.47     
 One way to corroborate the consistency of the charity tax amount as reported in these 
Sunnī  adīth collections is to compare these reports with those in Shīʿī collections.  This is 
because polemical or sectarian disputes about law often reflect different historiographical 
understandings of the Prophet’s legal practice.48  In the case of the charity tax, Shīʿī  adīth 
sources report the same amount or rate of charity tax as Sunnī sources.49  None of these  adīth 
collections refer to a specific time and place when the Prophet himself collected or ordered the 
                                                                  
42 Ibid., v. 2, p. 353.  “537. Narrated Ibn Abbas [SAS]: When Allāh's Apostle [SAS] sent Mu ā   to  emen, he said (to 
him), ' ou are going to people of a (Divine) Book.  First of all invite them to worship Allāh (Alone) and when they 
come to know Allāh, inform them that Allāh had enjoined on them, five prayers in every day and night; and if 
they start offering these prayers, inform them that Allāh has enjoined on them, the Zakāt.  And it is to be taken 
from the rich amongst them and given to the poor amongst them; and if they obey you in that, take Zakāt from 
them and avoid (don't take) the best property of the people as Zakāt.'” Bukhārī (d. 870; Khurāsān),  a ī  al-
Bu hārī: v. 2, p. 309-10.  This narrative about Muʿādh being instructed to redistribute the charity tax he collected is 
accepted in both Sunnī and Imāmī Shīʿī sources. Ibn al-Mu ahhar al-Ḥillī (d. 1325; Iraq), Tadh irat al-fu ahāʾ: v. 5, p. 
7, 9 (Imāmī Shīʿī: reporting Prophetic statement that the charity tax is an obligation collected from the rich and 
distributed to the poor).  In addition, the redistribution motif echoes the narrative discussed in footnote 27. 
43 Ibn Abī Shaybah (d. 849; Iraq),  uṣannaf: v. 2, p. 354-55.  This amount is interesting because rabbinic literature 
suggests that anyone who has 200 zuz (i.e., dinar) or more may not collect charity.  Palestinian Talmud, Peʾah 8:8.  
Does 200 dinars represent the poverty line in the late antique Near East? 
44 An exception is the  adīth cited in a later source.  See footnote 26. 
45 This observation applies to many  adīth collections I examined. 
46 ʿAbd al-Razzāq ibn Hammām al-Ḥimyarī al- anʿānī (d. 827; Yemen), al- uṣannaf, ed. Ḥabīburra mān Aʿẓamī and 
Maʿmar ibn Rāshid, 2nd ed., 11 vols., Manshūrāt al-Majlis al-ʿIlmī, 39 (Beirut: al-Maktab al-Islāmī, 1983), v. 4, p. 5-6.  
See also  aʿqūb ibn Ibrāhīm al-An ārī al-Kūfī Abū  ūsuf (d. 798; Iraq), Kitā  al-āthār  (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-
ʿIlmīyah, 1978), p. 87 (no. 429); p. 89 (no. 37) (Ḥanafī: charity tax is 5 dirhams out of every 200 dirhams).  It is 
difficult to determine the value of 200 dirhams, but the sources suggest that it was not an amount that only the 
wealthiest members of a society would have possessed; in other words, the “middle class” would have owned 200 
dirhams. 
47 Mālik Ibn Anas (d. 796; Arabia), al-Muwa  aʾ, trans. Jīhān Abd al-Raʾūf Hibah, 1st ed., 2 vols. (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub 
al-ʿIlmīyah, 2007), v. 1, p. 121-22. 
48 I demonstrate an example of this process in chapter 1. 
49 Kulaynī (d. 941; Iran), al-Uṣ l min al-Kāfī: v. 3, p. 510, no. 1;  p. 16, no. 5 & 7 (5 dirhams for every 200 dirhams; half 
a dinar for every 20 dinars). 
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collecting of this specific charity tax rate.  But in the context of these various  adīth 
collections which are characterized by the diversity of opinions reported on a wide range of 
legal matters, this consistent reference to 2.5% is remarkable.  The scholars involved in the 
project of collecting and transmitting narrations about the Prophet were also involved in the 
daily life of Muslim societies.  As both historians and jurists, they simultaneously recorded the 
historical practice of this charity tax amount and implemented it.  Because the political 
legitimacy of the caliphs who succeeded the Prophet was the subject of intense political 
challenges, the taxation regime was the object of scrutiny.  If the charity tax amount were not 
widely known or if it were established by one of the Companions, then late antique sources 
would most probably reflect some disagreement about the amount.  Moreover, since pre-
Islamic near eastern practices of charitable giving were at different rates, the consistency of 
2.5% is a specifically Islamic precedent that appears to have been widespread.     
 
Late antique Muslim jurists 
If the aforementioned historical evidence is reliable, then we should find confirmation 
in the practice of Muslim jurists; that is, if jurists were also historians who developed the law 
based on their understanding of legal history, then either they would adjudicate based on this 
historical precedent or they would dispute the validity of the precedent.  The first generation 
of jurists after the Prophet’s death was familiar with the Prophet’s practice from their direct 
experience with him or with the narratives cited above.   ne such individual, ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib 
(d. 661), the fourth Sunnī caliph and the first Shīʿī imām, reportedly stipulated possession of 
the wealth (a minimum of 200 dirhams) for a period of one year prior to paying the tax (of 5 
dirhams or 2.5%).50  In addition, he is reported to have described the rich as being directly 
responsible for the poor being hungry, unclothed, or overworked.51  ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿUmar (d. 
693), son of the second Caliph (ʿUmar ibn al-Kha  āb, d. 644), purportedly stated that a 
minimum amount of wealth (200 dirhams) free of debt must be accrued before the tax (5 
dirhams, or 2.5%) is applied.52  ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿAbbās (d. 687), a well-known commentator on the 
Qurʼān and jurist, also stipulated that a minimum amount of wealth (200 dirhams), free of debt, 
must be accrued before the tax (5 dirhams, or 2.5%) is applied.53  Again, in the context of early 
Islamic legal practice – which contains frequent examples of juristic disagreement – this 
apparent unanimity on the precise amount of the charity tax is significant.  Moreover, this 
unanimity was maintained by later juristic practices.54  
                                                                  
50 ʿAlī al-Riḍā Ibn Mūsá (d. 818; Khurāsān), al- i h al-mans   lil-Imām al-Riḍā al-mushtahir  i-fi h al-Riḍā Silsilat 
ma ādir bi ār al-anwār; 1 (Beirut: Muʾassasat  l al-Bayt li-I yāʾ al-Turāth, 1990), p. 195 (Imāmī Shīʿī: charity tax is 
5 dirhams out of every 200 dirhams).  al-Ṭabarānī (d.  971;  Syria), al-  ādīth al- iwāl: 145 (ʿAlī narrated from the 
Prophet that the minimum amount for charity tax liability is 200 dirhams and the tax amount is 5 dirhams).  See 
also Mu ammad Rawwās Qalʿah'jī,  aws ʿat fi h ʿ lī i n   ī  āli , Fī sabīl mawsūʿah fiqhīyah jāmiʿah; Silsilat 
mawsūʿat fiqh al-salaf, 4 (Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 1983), 295.   
51 Qalʿah'jī, aws ʿat fi h ʿ lī i n   ī  āli : 293. 
52 Qalʿah'jī, aws ʿat fi h ʿ  d  llāh i n ʿUmar: 391. 
53 Qalʿah'jī, aws ʿat fi h ʿ  d  llāh i n ʿ   ās: 368. 
54 Mu ammad ibn A mad Sarakhsī (d. 11th cent; Transoxania), Kitā  al- a s   li-Shams al-Dīn al-Sara hsī, 30 vols. 
(Cairo1906-1913), v. 2, p. 189 (Ḥanafī: charity tax is 5 dirhams for every 200 dirhams).  ʿAlī ibn Abī Bakr Marghīnānī 
(d. 1197; Farghāna),  l-Hidāyah   the Guidance: a translation of al-Hidāyah fī shar  Bidāyat al-mu tadī, a classical manual 
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All these reported statements of contemporaries of the Prophet substantiate the notion 
that the late antique Muslim community was aware of and consistently implemented a specific 
calculation of the charity tax that appears to have begun with the Prophet.  The absence of any 
conflicting reports on the calculation of monetary charity suggests that tax collection in the 
amount of 2.5% was an established, well-recognized practice.  Indeed, the striking conformity 
(of these numerous reports in several historical texts) reveals historical authenticity.55  That is, 
we may presume that the Prophet instructed or collected 5 dirhams out of every 200 dirhams, 
even without a specific report that this act occurred.56  This evidence suggests that the Prophet 
did establish paying the charity tax as an obligation for every Muslim.57  Indeed, the historical 
evidence of a uniform tax rate coupled with the sheer absence of sectarian or dissenting 
opinions on the tax rate or its obligatory nature indicate that the charity tax was an obligatory 
practice from the beginning of Islamic history.58 
As an aside, it should be noted here that  adīth compilers and late antique jurists do 
not appear to have considered the possibility that this amount was flexible – that it could be 
decreased or increased to serve the needs of the recipients of charity.59  In my searches of the 
primary texts, I have not found historical reports implying that the rate could be increased if 
necessary; instead, I found reports of a Shīʿī Imām asserting that 2.5% is sufficient to provide 
for the poor.60  This may suggest that most jurists either conceptualized the charity tax as 
being disconnected from the eradication of poverty, or believed that the Prophet’s particular 
practice was sufficient, or presumed some other source for poverty assistance.  The existence 
of a consistent Prophetic practice of calculating the charity tax resulted in Muslims not 
interpreting the Qurʾānic verses as requiring charity taxation that is proportional to the needs 
of the recipients outlined in Qurʾān 9:60.61  In other words, late antique Muslims recognized the 
theme of the right of the poor to a portion of wealth, but understood the Prophetic practice as 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
of Ḥanafī law, trans. Imran Ahsan Khan Nyazee (Bristol, England: Amal Press, 2006), 267 (Ḥanafī: charity tax is 5 
dirhams on every two hundred dirhams after 1 year).   
55 I do not use authenticity in the positivist sense of Factual Truth, but rather as historical truth.  Bevir observes 
that “For postfoundationalists, a fact is not given; it is a piece of evidence nearly everyone in a given community 
either accepts or perhaps has good warrant for accepting given the other intersubjective beliefs of that 
community.” Bevir, "Why historical distance is not a problem," 31.  
56  f course, it is possible that there is a gap between the Prophet’s exhortative commandments and his actual 
practice.  But if such a gap existed, then the sources would likely reflect some inconsistencies in this matter. 
57 This contradicts the unsubstantiated claim that a caliph initiated charity taxation as a legal obligation for every 
Muslim.  C. Snouck Hurgronje, "On the institution of za āt," in The development of Islamic ritual, ed. G.R. Hawting, 
The formation of the classical Islamic world; v. 26 (Aldershot [England]: Ashgate/Variorum, 2006), 207. 
58 Bashear argued that the charity payment was initially a “pre-institutional” practice of paying to expiate for 
sins. See Bashear, "On the origins," 112-13.  Sijpesteijn similarly argues that the charity tax was transformed “in 
the late Umayyad period” into “a formalized, state-controlled tax levied on all Muslims.” Sijpesteijn, "Shaping a 
Muslim state," 120.  While I recognize that the charity tax was the subject of numerous debates, I disagree with 
both Bashear and Sijpesteijn in their claim that the tax can be dated to the Umayyad era, since the historical 
sources suggest an earlier practice. 
59 But see the narrative of Caliph ʿUmar bemoaning his inability to redistribute wealth. 
60 Kulaynī (d. 941; Iran), al-Uṣ l min al-Kāfī: v. 3, p. 507 (no. 1) & 09 (no. 4). 
61 This is evident in the firm opposition of a highly influential contemporary jurist to any proposal that the 
charity tax amount be increased to meet social needs.  ūsuf Qaraḍāwī,  i h al-za āh: dirāsah mu āranah li-a  āmihā 
wa-falsafatihā fī ḍawʾ al-Qurʾān wa-al-sunnah, 2 vols. (Beirut: Dār al-Irshād lil-Ṭibāʿah  wa-al-Nashr wa-al-Tawzīʿ, 
1969), 1:244-46. 
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the only implementation of Qurʾānic commandments.  Thus, consistently taxing the 2.5% rate 
disconnects the payment of charity from the needs of the poor. 
 
Rabbinic charity taxation 
Comparing the late antique Islamic charity tax to the charity practices of antecedent 
Near Eastern communities offers an opportunity to identify some of the ways in which it both 
continued and transformed preexisting practices.62  Jewish (and Byzantine) legal practices 
suggest that establishing precise amounts of charity was common in this region.63  But 
surviving historical sources make it difficult to reconstruct precisely what these amounts were 
and how they were collected. 
According to late antique (roughly first to early seventh century) rabbinic texts, charity 
(and righteous deeds) is more important than all the Torah’s commandments.64  There appear 
to have been two forms of obligatory charitable giving among rabbinic Jews: (1) donating the 
tithe (or more, or potentially less) of one’s wealth to charity65 and (2) giving the poor food from 
a landowner’s harvest.  The latter obligation includes gleanings66 and leaving a portion of 
agricultural fields for the poor (the peʾah).67  In addition, charity was often collected during 
Purim68 and there was a charity fund (kuppah) for the local poor.  In the seventh sabbatical 
year, the harvest was presumably distributed to all the inhabitants of a city, including the 
poor.69 
 In late antique rabbinic legal literature, charity is one component of broader ritual 
practices and is primarily embedded within the legal topics of agriculture (zeraʿīm) and 
festivals (moʿed), which are the first and second orders of the Mishnah, respectively.  In 
contrast, in canonical Islamic legal literature, a full section is dedicated to the charity tax, 
which is often the third topic (following, not coincidentally, purity and prayer).70  These subtle 
structural differences between the placement and the extensiveness of rabbinic and of Islamic 
treatments of charity taxation are significant: whereas in late antique rabbinic Judaism charity 
is an integral part of ritual practices, in late antique Islam, charity taxation is a legal-political 
                                                                  
62 It is possible that late antique Near Eastern texts record ideas about or aspirations for charity taxation that were 
not actually practiced, but this possibility is not directly relevant to my objective.  In delineating these late 
antique charity practices, I am interested in how rabbis and others constructed charity taxation as an obligation. 
63 Posner, "Charity." and Andrew J. Cappel, "Poor," ed. Alexander P. Kazhdan, The Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium 
(Oxford University Press, 1991),  
http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t174.e4417. 
64 Babylonian Talmud, Baba Batra 9a.  See also Tosefta, Peʾah 4:19. 
65 Genesis 28:22 was interpreted as implying a tithe payment to the poor.  But I was unable to locate any historical 
evidence of rabbinic Jewish communities obligating the payment of the tithe. 
66 Palestinian Talmud, Peʾah 4:7 (gleanings belong to the poor). 
67 The parts of the field dedicated to the poor, in fulfillment of Leviticus 19:9 and Levitus 23:22, is peʾah.  Mishnah, 
Peʾah 1:2 (peʾah should not be less than one-sixtieth of harvest); Palestinian Talmud, Peʾah 1:2 (a minimum of one-
sixtieth of the field must be dedicated for the poor, but landowner must consider the needs of the local poor).    
68 Tosefta  Meg. 1:5 
69 Tosefta Shevīʿīt 8:1-8:2 (discussing distribution of harvest in seventh year) 
70 That the section on charity tax commonly follows prayer is a reflection of the juxtaposition of these two 
practices in Qurʾānic verses.  See footnote 17. 
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obligation with ritual characteristics.  This is particularly evident when we compare late 
antique and medieval rabbinic Jewish texts on charity: the medieval jurist Maimonides (d. 
1204) elaborated a regulatory framework for the collection of charity, some of which was 
unprecedented.71  His writings elaborate such issues as how to enforce charity taxation,72 levels 
of charitable giving,73 meeting the needs of the poor,74 and identifying recipients of charity.75  
Maimonides’ discussions of charity are more systematized than his late antique rabbinic 
predecessors. There is a significant difference between the context of late antique and 
medieval rabbinic legal texts that may explain the distinctiveness of Maimonides’ ideas within 
the rabbinic canon: Islamic practices had thoroughly “legalized” charity taxation.  When we 
compare the textual evidence of these two historical moments – late antique rabbinic charity 
versus medieval rabbinic charity – it is evident that charity became more structured within 
rabbinic Jewish communities.  I contend that this reflects a contextual change between the late 
antique and medieval Near East. 
 
IV. Who should receive the charity tax? 
  Thus far, this chapter presented historical evidence to establish that Muslims in late 
antiquity paid a specific charity tax amount.  Building on this foundation, I will explore 
precisely who paid the charity tax in order to illustrate the ways in which Muslim identity was 
formulated in ritual and in political terms, with a citizenship model ultimately becoming 
dominant.  To investigate further the relationship between charity taxation and membership, I 
want to briefly mention which groups were expected to receive the charity tax by late antique 
Muslims.  Qurʾān 9:60 defines who should receive charity: “Charity is for the poor and the 
needy, and those employed to administer the (funds); for those whose hearts have been 
(recently) reconciled; for those in bondage and in debt; in the cause of God.”76  Thus, the Qurʾān 
legislates the necessity of individual charitable giving and identifies recipients, although – as 
previously mentioned – the administrative details concerning amounts are not provided.  
Building upon this Qurʾānic mandate, Muslim jurists clarified the proper recipients or 
beneficiaries of the charity tax.  While jurists disagreed on some of the details concerning the 
definition of each recipient category, the late antique and medieval juristic consensus places 
                                                                  
71 Maimonides was the first known rabbinic figure to codify Jewish charity laws.  See Mark R. Cohen, "Maimonides 
and charity in light of the Geniza documents," in The Trias of Maimonides: Jewish, Arabic, and Ancient Culture ed. 
Georges Tamer (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2005). 
72 Mūs  ibn Maymūn Maimonides (d. 1204; Spain/Egypt), Mishneh Torah, 14 vols., Yale Judaica series (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1949), v. 7, p. 79 (Treatise II, 7.10, "He who refuses to give alms, or gives less than is proper 
for him, must be compelled by the court to comply, and must be flogged for disobedience until he gives as much 
as the court estimates he should give.").  
73 Ibid., v. 7, p. 91-92 (Treatise II, 10:7-14, "There are eight degrees of almsgiving, each one superior to the other."). 
Rambam, Mishneh Torah 10:7-15.  This appears to be an elaboration of Babylonian Talmud, Babā Metsīʿā 71a. 
74 Ibid., v. 7, p. 77 (Treatise II, 7:3, "You are commanded to give the poor man according to what he lacks."). 
75 Ibid., v. 7, p. 78 (Treatise II, 7:7, "One must feed and clothe the heathen poor together with the Israelite poor, for 
the sake of the ways of peace.").  ibid., v. 7, p. 79 (Treatise II, 7:13, "A poor man who is one's relative has priority 
over all others...").  
76 “Those whose hearts have been (recently) reconciled” probably refers to recent “converts,” or, more 
specifically, tribes that pledged allegiance to the Prophet. 
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emphasis on the poor.77  Papyrological evidence confirms that the charity tax was distributed 
to the poor and the needy in the eighth century.78  However, there is juristic debate about the 
categories of people excluded from receiving charity, which includes non-Muslims and 
slaves.79  These two categories (non-Muslims and slaves) are groups whose obligation to pay 
the charity tax was the subject of juristic disagreement and appears to have been implemented 
distinctly in different historical periods. 
 
V. Who should pay the charity tax? 
  There is a consensus, documented in historical and in legal texts, that all free, adult, 
and sane Muslims are recognized as subject to the charity tax on their wealth.80  Muslim jurists 
did not debate the applicability of the charity tax to women because it was taken for granted 
that women were subject to the tax.81  Since (free) Muslim women do not have diminished legal 
capacity (as is the case for minors or the mentally incompetent) and are not subject to 
limitations on their ownership of property, they are unencumbered legal persons.   In contrast, 
there are two main disagreements about the imposition of the charity tax on individuals 
without legal capacity (i.e., minors or the mentally incompetent) and on individuals with 
questionable legal capacity and property rights (i.e., slaves).  The charity payment of minors, 
the mentally incompetent, and slaves were not explicitly addressed in the Qurʾān or in  adīth 
collections.82  Biographical and historical texts do not cite any instances of the Prophet 
encountering or soliciting charity from a wealthy minor or slave.83  There is then no scriptural 
text or precedential authority addressing this question and, consequently, jurists debated the 
applicability of the charity tax on these groups.  The ensuing interpretive issues debated by 
Muslim jurists are indicative of broader socio-political disputes about Muslim identity and the 
economics of social welfare.  These disputes can again be classified in relationship to the two 
Qurʾānic themes previously delineated: charity taxation as a ritual versus political act. 
                                                                  
77 Ibn Rushd II (d. 1198; Spain/Morocco), Jurist's Primer: v. 1, p. 319-22.  There is a juristic discussion about ranking 
the “poor” and the “needy.” Ibn al-Mu ahhar al-Ḥillī (d. 1325; Iraq), Tadh irat al-fu ahāʾ: v. 5, p. 237 (Imāmī Shīʿī). 
78 Sijpesteijn, "Shaping a Muslim state," 159-60. 
79 Sa nūn (d. 854; Tunisia) et al., al-Mudawwanah: v. 1, p. 346 (Mālikī: excludes non-Muslims and slaves from 
receiving charity; prohibits building mosques with charity tax).  Abū  aʿl  Mu ammad ibn al-Ḥusayn Ibn al-Farrāʾ 
(d. 1066; Iraq), al-   ām al-sul ānīyah, ed. Mu ammad Ḥāmid Fiqī (Cairo: Mustaf  al-Babi al-Halabi, 1966), p. 115 
(Ḥanbalī: non-believers and slaves should not receive charity).   
80 According to al-Shāfiʿī, every free adult – regardless of age, sanity, or gender – is obligated to pay the charity 
tax.  al-Shāfiʿī (d. 820; Arabia/Egypt), al-Umm: v. 3, p. 66.  al-Nawawī (d. 1277; Syria) et al., al- a m ʿ: v. 5, p. 293 
(Shāfiʿī: charity tax obligatory on all free muslims, including minors and mentally incompetent).  A mad ibn 
Mu ammad Ṭa āwī (d. 933; Egypt),  u htaṣar al- ā āwī, ed. Abū al-Wafāʾ al-Afghānī, Silsilat al-ma būʿāt, 8 (Cairo: 
Dār al-Kutub, 1950), 47 (Ḥanafī: one who pays the charity tax must be free, adult, sane, and Muslim). 
81 Evidence from papyri indicates that in the eighth century women paid the charity tax in money. Sijpesteijn, 
"Shaping a Muslim state," 159.  A medieval text confirms this continued practice of taxing women: Ibn ʿAbd al-
Barr (d. 1070; Spain), Kitā  al- āfī: v. 1, p. 284 (Mālikī: charity tax is obligatory on all free Muslims, male or female).   
82 In many texts, a minor is synonymous with an orphan.  This is because, in this historical context, a minor with 
living parents was unlikely to have independent wealth.  Thus, the only minors who have wealth that could be 
subject to taxation are orphans with an inheritance. 
83 See the discussion of these sources (especially Ibn Is āq and Ṭabarī) in the section above on the Prophet’s 
imposition of the charity tax. 
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Late antique Islamic precedents: muddle on minors and silence on slaves 
There is no clear consensus in late antique historical-legal texts on whether minors 
must pay the charity tax.84  Al- anʿānī reports conflicting  adīth concerning the obligation of a 
minor orphan to pay the charity tax on his/her inheritance.85  Ibn Abī Shaybah’s  adīth 
compilation likewise reports conflicting opinions on the charity tax obligation for the wealth 
of a minor.86  Many of the Prophet’s companions, as well as some leading jurists, are reported 
(in Sunnī sources) to have obligated orphan minors to pay the charity tax.87  In her role as the 
legal guardian of two orphans, ʿ ʾishah, one of the Prophet’s wives, paid the charity tax on 
their wealth.88  ʿUmar ibn al-Kha  āb, the second Caliph, required payment of the charity tax 
on the property of an orphan because he encouraged investing the property so that it is not 
diminished by the charity tax.89  Sunnī sources likewise report ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib as articulating 
that the charity tax is due on wealth – meaning it is not attached to individuals – and therefore 
it must be paid on wealth owned by minors or the mentally incompetent.90  According to Sunnī 
sources, ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib paid the charity tax on behalf of minors under his guardianship.91  
However, in Shīʿī texts, ʿAlī is reported to have stated that orphans need not pay the charity 
tax.92  ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿUmar (d. 693), son of the second Caliph, required payment of the charity 
tax on the property of a minor93 on a yearly basis.94  There are conflicting reports on whether 
                                                                  
84  Mu ammad ibn ʿ sá Tirmidhī (d. 892; Khurāsān), Sunan al-Tirmidhī wa-huwa al-Jāmiʿ al-ṣahī , ed. ʿAbd al-Wahhāb 
ʿAbd al-La īf and ʿAbd al-Ra mān Mu ammad ʿUthmān, 5 vols. (Medinah: al-Maktabah al-Salafīyah, 1965), v. 2, p. 
76 (cites to Companions and to well-known jurists who impose and who reject charity taxation of minor). 
85 al-Ḥimyarī al- anʿānī (d. 827; Yemen), al- uṣannaf: v. 4, p. 66-70. 
86 Ibn Abī Shaybah (d. 849; Iraq),  uṣannaf: 2:379-80.  Another text that presents two conflicting reports on a 
minor’s obligation to pay the charity tax is Abū  ūsuf (d. 798; Iraq), Kitā  al-āthār: p. 92 (no. 451-53) (Ḥanafī: 
orphans/minors do not pay charity tax until they pray). 
87 ʿUmar ibn al-Kha  āb, ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib, ʿ ʾishah, Ibn ʿUmar, Al-Shuʿbī, ʿA āʾ, Shāfiʿī, Dāwūd, and Mālik obligated 
orphans to pay the charity tax. ʿAbd Allāh ibn Mu ammad Ibn Barakah (d. 10th; ʿUmān), Kitā  al- āmiʿ, ed. ʿ s  
 a y  Bārūnī, 2nd ed., 2 vols., Turāthunā (Beirut: Dār al-Fat , 1974), v. 1, p. 616 (Ibāḍī).  This is repeated in many 
other sources.  See footnote 103. 
88 Reported in many sources, including al-Shāfiʿī (d. 820; Arabia/Egypt), al-Umm: v. 3, p. 69 (no. 791), p. 73 (no. 95), 
p. 75 (no. 98).  Sa nūn (d. 854; Tunisia) et al., al-Mudawwanah: v. 1, p. 308 (Mālikī).  Mu ammad Rawwās Qalʿah'jī et 
al.,  aws ʿat fi h ʿ ʾishah umm al-muʾminīn:  ayātuhā wa-fi huhā, Fī sabīl mawsūʿah fiqhīyah jāmiʿah; Silsilat 
mawsūʿat fiqh al-salaf (Beirut: Dār al-Nafāʾis, 1989), 341 (minors and orphans obligated to pay charity tax). 
89 ʿUmar’s recommendation that the wealth of an orphan be invested to prevent diminishment by the charity tax 
payment is reported in numerous sources.  See, for example, Ibn Anas (d. 796; Arabia), al-Muwa  aʾ: v. 1, p. 124 
(Mālikī).  al-Shāfiʿī (d. 820; Arabia/Egypt), al-Umm: v. 3, p. 74, no. 796.  Sa nūn (d. 854; Tunisia) et al., al-
Mudawwanah: v. 1, p. 308. 
90 Qalʿah'jī,  aws ʿat fi h ʿ lī i n   ī  āli : 293-94.  Although the opposite view is reported in Sunnī sources, the 
opinion of ʿAlī is reported in Shīʿī sources as opposing the imposition of the charity tax on minors.  Ibn al-
Mu ahhar al-Ḥillī (d. 1325; Iraq), Tadh irat al-fu ahāʾ: v. 5, p. 11-13 (Imāmī Shīʿī).   
91 al-Shāfiʿī (d. 820; Arabia/Egypt), al-Umm: v. 3, p. 75, no. 799.  Sa nūn (d. 854; Tunisia) et al., al-Mudawwanah: v. 1, 
p. 308 (Mālikī).   
92 Kulaynī (d. 941; Iran), al-Uṣ l min al-Kāfī: v. 3, p. 541, no. 8 (Imāmī Shīʿī). 
93 Qalʿah'jī, aws ʿat fi h ʿ  d  llāh i n ʿUmar: 387-88. 
94 Ibid., 390-91. al-Shāfiʿī (d. 820; Arabia/Egypt), al-Umm: v. 3, p. 74, no. 797. 
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the noted jurist Ibn ʿAbbās (d. 687/8) required payment of the charity tax on the property of a 
minor.95   
The inconsistencies in these legal-historical texts concerning the charity tax liability of 
minors suggest that the Prophet did not deal with the situation and his contemporaries were 
unaware of either his practice or his opinion concerning the issue.  Moreover, there are no 
Prophetic precedents or reports from the Companions about practices related to the charity 
tax liability of slaves.  The absence of unambiguous historical precedents results in opposing 
juristic opinions echoing the two Qurʾānic themes cited at the beginning of this chapter: the 
charity tax as a religious obligation (therefore only applicable to free, sane, adults) or the 
charity tax as the right of the poor to some of the property of the wealthy (and therefore being 
applicable to anyone in possession of wealth, including a minor, a mentally incompetent 
person, or possibly a slave).  As I will expound, the majority opinion of medieval jurists 
accepted the latter understanding of charity taxation by making it obligatory upon all groups.    
 
Legal capacity: the majority opinion of professional jurists 
The majority opinion of medieval Muslim jurists – represented by three of the four 
surviving Sunnī schools of law (Mālikī, Shāfiʿī, and Ḥanbalī) – requires minors to pay the 
charity tax on their assets.96  These jurists make several claims to support their position that I 
will outline briefly.97  First, the Qurʾānic verses (particularly Qurʾān 9:103)98 and Prophetic 
 adīth99 requiring the payment of the charity tax are general commands that do not articulate 
any exceptions for minors.   
                                                                  
95 Qalʿah'jī, Maws ʿat fi h ʿ  d  llāh i n ʿ   ās: 367 (citing conflicting reports).  Ibn Barakah (d. 10th; ʿUmān), Kitā  
al- āmiʿ: v. 1, p. 616 (Ibāḍī: citing Ibn ʿAbbās as claiming that the charity tax is obligatory when prayer becomes 
obligatory). 
96 Mu ammad ibn Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī (d. 820; Arabia/Egypt), aws ʿat al-Imām al-Shāfiʿī al- itā  al-Umm, ed. A mad Badr 
al-Dīn Ḥassūn, 10 vols., Silsilat mu annafāt Mu ammad ibn Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī (Beirut: Dār Qutaybah, 1996), v. 2, kitāb 
al-zakāh, p. 95   98-99 (Shāfiʿī: charity tax is obligatory upon minors and mentally incompetent, regardless of 
gender).  Sa nūn (d. 854; Tunisia) et al., al-Mudawwanah: v. 1, p. 308 (Mālikī: minors and mentally incompetent are 
obligated to pay the charity tax).  Mu ammad ibn Na r Marwazī (d. 906; Samarqand), I htilāf al-fu ahāʾ, ed. 
Mu ammad Ṭāhir Ḥakīm (Riyadh: Aḍwāʾ al-Salaf, 2000), 450-52 (summarizing the juristic debates about a minor's 
charity tax liability).  Ibn Barakah (d. 10th; ʿUmān), Kitā  al- āmiʿ: v. 1, p. 601 & 14-15 (Ibāḍī: charity tax is 
obligatory upon minors and mentally incompetent).  Ibn Abī Zayd al-Qayrawānī (d. 996; Tunisia), al-Risālah al-
fi hīyah: p. 167 (Mālikī: charity tax is obligatory upon minors).  al-Shīrāzī (d. 1083; Iran), al-Muhadhdhab: v. 1, p. 147 
(Shāfiʿī: charity tax is obligatory upon minors   mentally incompetent).  Ibn al-Farrāʾ (d. 1066; Iraq), al-   ām al-
sul ānīyah: p. 155 (Ḥanbalī: women and minors pay the charity tax).  Ibn Qudāmah al-Maqdīsī (d. 1223; Syria), al-
 ughnī: v. 4, p. 69-70 (Ḥanbalī: guardians must pay the charity tax on behalf of minors and mentally incompetent).  
al-Rāfiʿī (d. 1226; Iran), al-ʿ zīz: v. 2, p. 561 (Shāfiʿī: a guardian must pay the charity tax on behalf of a minor or 
mentally incompetent).  al-Nawawī (d. 1277; Syria) et al., al- a m ʿ: v. 5, p. 293 & 96-98 (Shāfiʿī: charity tax is 
obligatory on minors and the mentally incompetent).  A mad ibn Luʾluʾ Ibn al-Naqīb (d. 1368; Egypt), ʿUmdat al-
sāli  wa-ʿuddat al-nāsi , ed.  āli  Muʾadhdhin, Mu ammad Ghiyāth al- abbāgh,  and  Mu yī  al-Dīn al-Kurdī 
(Damascus: Maktabat al-Ghazzālī, 1979), 143 (Shāfiʿī: charity tax is obligatory upon every free Muslim, including 
minors and the mentally incompetent). 
97 For an overview, see ʿAbdū, al- āfī fī a  ām al-za āh: 41-45 (discussing juristic proofs defending charity tax 
liability of minors and mentally incompetent). 
98 Qurʾān 9:103, “ f their wealth take charity in order to purify and to sanctify them.” 
99 There are two versions of a Prophetic statement that are most frequently cited.   ne is the Prophet’s instruction 
to take from the rich and give to the poor.  The other specifies that the Prophet sent Muʿādh to  emen to take 
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Second, a  adīth implies that minors must pay the charity tax because the Prophet 
instructs guardians to invest the wealth of orphans to prevent the diminishment of their assets 
from charity taxation.  The statement is reported in three chains of transmission or versions: 
by Shāfiʿī,100 by Ṭabarānī,101 and by al-Tirmidhī.102  If the statement were historically verifiable 
as Prophetic practice, we would have seen more consistent references to it in the historical 
texts.  The inconsistencies in these versions of the same basic statement suggest, however, that 
no one version of the statement can be categorized as reliable.  The statement may have been 
made by the second caliph, ʿUmar ibn al-Kha  āb (as it is attributed to him in Tirmidhī’s 
version) and then attributed as the statement to the Prophet.  Therefore, it is not possible to 
conclude precisely who made the statement, but only that it was a known opinion in the late 
seventh century. 
Third, jurists who require minors to pay the charity tax offer as proof the 
aforementioned practice of what appears to be the majority of the Prophet’s Companions 
(including ʿUmar, ʿAlī, ʿ ʾishah, and others).103  Some jurists make additional arguments: that 
redistribution of a minor’s wealth is in the best interests of society; that, by analogy, if a minor 
must pay tax on land, then s/he should pay tax on all forms of wealth; that the poor have a 
right to the wealth of the rich, even if the rich are minors or mentally incompetent.104  The 
legal reasoning of these jurists, despite their claims to the contrary, does not rely on a 
precedent of the Prophet.  Instead, it relies on their general interpretation of the purpose of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
from the rich to give to the poor.  Tirmidhī (d. 892; Khurāsān), Sunan al-Tirmidhī wa-huwa al-Jāmiʿ al-ṣahī : v. 2, p. 80 
(charity tax is taken from the rich and given to the poor).  Ibn Barakah (d. 10th; ʿUmān), Kitā  al- āmiʿ: v. 1, p. 602, 
14-15 (Ibāḍī: Prophetic statement, take from the wealthy and give to the poor).  But see Mu ammad ibn ʿ sá 
Tirmidhī (d. 892; Khurāsān),  aʿīf sunan al-Tirmidhī, ed. Mu ammad Zuhayr Shāwīsh and Mu ammad Nā ir al-Dīn 
Albānī (Beirut: al-Maktab al-Islāmī, 1991), 72 (report that Prophet took from the wealthy and gave to the poor has 
a weak chain of transmission). 
100 Reported by Shāfiʿī (d. 820) and by Bayhaqī (d. 1066), this version is mursal (i.e., the transmission chain is 
incomplete because it was narrated by  ūsif bin Māhik, who was a successor and did not meet the Prophet).  My 
translation of the  adīth: “Whoever is the guardian of an orphan with wealth, let him invest it and not let it sit so 
that it is reduced by the charity tax.” Cited in al-Shāfiʿī (d. 820; Arabia/Egypt), al-Umm: v. 3, p. 73, no. 794.  Also 
cited in al-Shāfiʿī (d. 820; Arabia/Egypt), al-Kitā  al-Umm: v. 2, kitāb al-zakāh, p. 99 (cites to  adīth about investing 
wealth of an orphan; some scholars identify it as mursal and others as marfūʿ).  See also ʿAbdū, al- āfī fī a  ām al-
za āh: 42.   
101 Reported by Anas Ibn Mālik (d. 712) and by Ṭabarānī (d. 971), this version is categorized as ṣa ī  (sound or 
authentic) by some and as  asan (good, but secondary to ṣa ī  in terms of authenticity) by others.  Cited in 
Sa nūn (d. 854; Tunisia) et al., al-Mudawwanah: v. 1, p. 308.  See also ʿAbdū, al- āfī fī a  ām al-za āh: 42. 
102 Reported by Tirmidhī (d. 892), Dāraqu nī (d. 995), and Bayhaqī (d. 1066), this version is maw  f (i.e., the chain of 
transmission stops at ʿUmar ibn al-Kha  āb, the second caliph, and does not reach the Prophet).  Tirmidhī (d. 892; 
Khurāsān), Sunan al-Tirmidhī wa-huwa al-Jāmiʿ al-ṣahī : v. 2, p. 76-77 ("guardians should invest a minor's wealth to 
prevent its diminishment from charity taxation"; chain of transmission to ʿUmar and to Prophet).  But see 
Tirmidhī (d. 892; Khurāsān),  aʿīf  sunan al-Tirmidhī: 69-70 (contested reliability of report that Prophet instructed 
guardians to invest an orphan's wealth to prevent diminishment from charity tax).  Also cited in al-Shāfiʿī (d. 820; 
Arabia/Egypt), al-Kitā  al-Umm: v. 2, kitāb al-zakāh, p. 99 (cites to ʿUmar’s statement that wealth of orphan should 
be invested to prevent its diminishment by charity tax payment).  See also ʿAbdū, al- āfī fī a  ām al-za āh: 42-43. 
103 al-Shāfiʿī claims a consensus of the Companions on the obligation of a minor to pay the charity tax. al-Shāfiʿī (d. 
820; Arabia/Egypt), al-Umm: v. 3, p. 73, no. 793 (Shāfiʿī).  See also Sa nūn (d. 854; Tunisia) et al., al-Mudawwanah: v. 
1, p. 308 (Mālikī).  Ibn Barakah (d. 10th; ʿUmān), Kitā  al- āmiʿ: v. 1, p. 616 (Ibāḍī).  See also footnote 87.   
104 These legal arguments are outlined by ʿAbdū, al- āfī fī a  ām al-za āh: 41-45.  See also al-Shāfiʿī (d. 820; 
Arabia/Egypt), al-Umm: v. 3, p. 68-76 (Shāfiʿī: minors are required to pay the charity tax because recipients have a 
right to their wealth). 
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charity tax – projected on Qurʾānic verses and various statements attributed to the Prophet – 
and on the historically reconstructed practice of the Companions.  Ultimately – to refer again 
to the two themes of the Qurʾānic verses I mentioned at the beginning – this majority view 
interprets the historical evidence in light of the verses that emphasize the right of the poor to 
the wealth of the wealthy.105  Indeed, some jurists defined the charity tax as a debt that every 
Muslim owes to society.106  In so doing, jurists constructed the charity tax as a political act that 
was distinguishable from ritual acts.  Since the legal capacity of minors was irrelevant to their 
charity tax liability – in the opinion of the majority of jurists – they were obligated to pay it 
because they were Muslim citizens, not because they were Muslim believers. 
 
Legal capacity: the minority opinion of professional jurists 
  In comparison, the minority opinion – represented among the surviving schools by 
Ḥanafīs and Shīʿīs (with minor differences between them) – does not obligate minors or the 
mentally incompetent to pay a charity tax on assets.107  Yet both Ḥanafī and Shīʿī sources 
include reports suggesting that if a minor’s wealth is being invested (i.e., it is accumulating 
profits), then the charity tax should be paid or calculated for payment after the minor comes 
of age.108  These jurists make several claims to support their position against the charity tax 
liability of minors that I will outline briefly.109   
                                                                  
105 Al-Nawawī, a Shāfiʿī jurist, states specifically, “the charity tax is not obligatory upon them [minors and the 
mentally incompetent], but rather it is obligatory on their wealth.” al-Nawawī (d. 1277; Syria) et al., al- a m ʿ: v. 
5, p. 298 (Shāfiʿī).  But see Ibn Ḥazm, who argues that the charity tax is an obligation like prayer, but makes it 
obligatory upon minors, the mentally incompetent, and slaves. Ibn Ḥazm (d. 1064; Spain), al- u allā: v. 5, p. 206 
(Ẓāhirī: legal capacity is irrelevant to charity tax obligation). 
106 Ibn Barakah (d. 10th; ʿUmān), Kitā  al- āmiʿ: v. 1, p. 603  15 (Ibāḍī). 
107 In addition to these surviving schools, Saʿīd ibn Jubayr (d. 714), al-Nakhaʿī (d. 717), and al-Ḥasan al-Ba rī (d. 
728), opposed imposing the charity tax on minors.  These minority opinions are reported in Ibn Rushd II (d. 1198; 
Spain/Morocco), Jurist's Primer: v. 1, p. 283-84.  And in Ibn al-Mu ahhar al-Ḥillī (d. 1325; Iraq), Tadh irat al-fu ahāʾ: 
v. 5, p. 11-12 (Imāmī Shīʿī: listing jurists who opposed charity taxation of minors).  See also: Abū  ūsuf (d. 798; 
Iraq), Kitā  al-āthār: p. 92 (Ḥanafī: no. 451, orphans not obligated to pay charity until they are required to pray).  
Ṭa āwī (d. 933; Egypt), u htaṣar al- ā āwī: 45 (Ḥanafī: no charity tax for minors, legally incompetent, slaves, or 
non-Muslims on their movable property or gold).  Marghīnānī (d. 1197; Farghāna), Guidance: 247-48 (Ḥanafī: 
slaves, minors, and mentally incompetent not obligated to pay charity tax).  Ibn al-Mu ahhar al-Ḥillī (d.  1325;
Iraq), Tadh irat al-fu ahāʾ: v. 5, p. 11-16 (Imāmī Shīʿī: legal capacity and sanity are prerequistes for payment of the 
charity tax).  ʿUthmān ibn ʿAlī al-Zaylaʿī al-Ḥanafī  (d.  1342/3)  et  al., Ta yīn al- a āʾi   shar   anz al-daqāʾiq, ed. 
A mad ʿAzzū ʿInāyah, 7 vols. (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmīyah, 2000), v. 2, p. 19 (Ḥanafī: only sane, free Muslim 
adults pay charity tax on wealth held for one year).  Mu ammad ibn Makkī Shahīd al-Awwal (d. 1384; Syria), al-
 umʿah al-Dimash īyah fī fi h al-Imāmīyah, ed. Mu ammad Taqī Murwārīd and ʿAlī A ghar Murwārīd (Beirut: Dār al-
Turāth; al-Dār al-Islāmīyah, 1990), 51 (Imāmī Shīʿī: charity tax is obligatory upon sane, free adults; it is not 
incumbent upon minors, slaves, or the mentally incompetent).   atāwá al-ʿ lamgīrīyah (1664-1672), 6 vols., al-Fatāwá 
al-Hindīyah al-musammāh bil-Fatāwá al-ʿ lamkīrīyah; wa-bi-hāmishih fatāwá Qāḍīkhān wa-huwá Fakhr al-Dīn 
Ḥasan ibn Man ūr al- zjandī al-Farghānī al-Ḥanafī (Beirut: Dār I yāʾ al-Turāth al-ʿArabī, 1980), v. 1, p. 172 (Ḥanafī: 
charity tax is not obligatory upon minors or mentally incompetent).  
108 Abū  ūsuf (d. 798; Iraq), Kitā  al-āthār: p. 92 (Ḥanafī: no. 456, calculate the charity tax of an orphan's wealth and 
inform him when he comes of age).  Ibn Mūsá (d. 818; Khurāsān), al-Fiqh al-mans   lil-Imām al-Riḍā al-mushtahir  i-
fi h al-Riḍā p. 196-98 (Imāmī Shīʿī: orphans do not pay charity tax unless their wealth is being traded/invested).  
Ibn al-Mu ahhar al-Ḥillī (d. 1325; Iraq), Tadh irat al-fu ahāʾ: v. 5, p. 13-15 (Imāmī Shīʿī: if the wealth of a minor or a 
slave is invested, then charity tax must be paid).  Some jurists differentiate between types of property liable to 
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  The minority jurists reason that, because minors do not have the full moral capacity 
(i.e. legal understanding) or intention to perform ritual acts (such as praying or fasting), they 
are not obligated to pay the charity tax.110  The minority opinion interprets Qurʾānic verse 
9:103111 as indicating that, since they do not need purification from sin, minors and the 
mentally incompetent are exempt from charity taxation.112  Minority jurists also cite a  adīth 
that exempts minors, the comatose, and the insane from liability.113  Some jurists also claim 
that as disadvantaged members of society, it is in the best interest of minors and the mentally 
incompetent not to tax their assets and that the charity tax obligation is attached to 
individuals, rather than wealth.114  Notably, these jurists are unconcerned with reconciling 
their opinion with evidence that Companions of the Prophet did oblige minors to pay the 
charity tax; that particular history lacks conclusive authority in the minority view – for a 
variety of reasons that are beyond the scope of this chapter.115  For the minority jurists, it is 
legal capacity that determines liability to pay the charity tax.116  How this ruling was actually 
applied in the varied geographic contexts of Islamic empires between the late antique and 
medieval periods is an important question for future research. 
  When jurists debated the charity tax obligation of minors and the mentally 
incompetent, they were implicitly debating a religious versus political definition of the charity 
tax.117  While Ḥanafīs viewed the charity tax as a ritual act and argued that minors are not 
obligated to perform ritual acts, Shāfiʿīs and others believed that the charity tax is an 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
charity taxation when owned by a minor, but I will not discuss these details here.  See ʿAbdū, al- āfī fī a  ām al-
za āh: 45. 
109 For an overview, see ʿAbdū, al- āfī fī a  ām al-za āh: 45-52 (discussing juristic proofs against charity tax liability 
of minors and mentally incompetent). 
110 So deep is the connection between the charity tax and prayer that some Shīʿī sources report that prayer is not 
accepted when charity has not been paid. Ibn al-Mu ahhar al-Ḥillī (d.  1325;  Iraq), Tadh irat al-fu ahāʾ: v. 5, p. 9 
(Imāmī Shīʿī). See also: al-Shāfiʿī’s response to this position in al-Shāfiʿī (d. 820; Arabia/Egypt), al-Umm: v. 3, p. 70-
72, no. 792.  Ibn Rushd II (d. 1198; Spain/Morocco), Jurist's Primer: v. 1, p. 284 (mentioning those who view the 
charity tax as a form of worship).  al-Zaylaʿī al-Ḥanafī (d. 1342/3) et al., Ta yīn al- a āʾiq: v. 2, p. 19 (Ḥanafī: because 
the charity tax is a ritual, one of the pillars of the religion, it is not obligatory upon minors and the mentally 
incompetent). 
111 Qurʾān 9:103, “ f their wealth take charity in order to purify and to sanctify them.” 
112 Ibn Ḥazm specifically opposes this view and argues that everyone needs purification from sin.  Ibn Ḥazm (d. 
1064; Spain), al- u allā: v. 5, p. 206 (Ẓāhirī: no category of exemption from charity tax). 
113 Cited in Ibn al-Mu ahhar al-Ḥillī (d. 1325; Iraq), Tadh irat al-fu ahāʾ: v. 5, p. 12 (Imāmī Shīʿī).  This statement is 
reported by Abū Dāwūd (d. 884) and by Nasāʾī (d. 915). ʿAbdū, al- āfī fī a  ām al-za āh: 48-49. 
114 ʿAbdū, al- āfī fī a  ām al-za āh: 49-52. 
115 Sunnīs and Shīʿīs disagree in their assessment of the Companions and identifying consensus for jurisprudential 
purposes.  See generally Hossein Modarressi Tabātabāʾi,  n introduction to Shīʿī law: a  i liographical study  (London: 
Ithaca Press, 1984).  
116 The payment of charity is obligatory on anyone who has legal capacity (i.e. not a minor), is sane, is free, and is 
able to act independently.  Mu aqqiq al-Ḥillī (d. 1277; Iraq), u htaṣar: 77 (Imāmī Shīʿī: charity tax is obligatory on 
sane adults, not minors, or slaves, or the mentally incompetent).  According to the same Imāmī Shīʿī jurists, the 
poll tax is not collected from minors, the insane, and women. Ibid., 134. 
117 Ibn Rushd (d. 1198), the medieval Spanish jurist, explained this juristic disagreement in the following way: 
“Those who said that it [the charity tax] is worship stipulated  ul gh [coming of age or puberty] of the person as a 
condition (for the obligation), while those who said that it is an obligatory right of the poor and the needy over 
the wealth of the rich did not take into account  ul gh [coming of age] of the person, among other things.” Ibn 
Rushd II (d. 1198; Spain/Morocco), Jurist's Primer: v. 1, p. 284.  
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obligation upon wealth – just like any other tax.118  The majority of jurists conceptualized 
Muslim identity in ways that correspond to contemporary understandings of citizenship, 
minority jurists defined Muslim identity as a faith-based choice.  For majority jurists, the 
charity tax was just like any other tax imposed by the state on its citizens to fulfill a public 
function.  In contrast, the minority perspective perceives the obligations of a Muslim as taking 
effect when an individual chooses Islam.  For minority jurists, the charity tax is a ritual act just 
like any other ritual act commanded by the divine.   
 
Legal ownership: Islamic juristic debates on slaves 
 In contrast to a minor, a slave is subject to basically the same religious obligations as a free 
person – of prayer, fasting, etc.119  Consequently, the juristic debate on imposing the charity 
tax on slaves is not about a slave’s religious obligations, but rather about the slave’s legal 
capacity and ability to own property.120  In other words, the juristic debate indicates that the 
issue of a slave’s ritual obligations was irrelevant.  There are three main juristic opinions that 
correspond to how jurists perceived a slave’s individual property rights.  The first (and 
possibly chronologically earliest) opinion imposes the charity tax on slaves, but this opinion 
was held primarily by late antique Muslim jurists not directly related to one of the surviving 
professional schools.121  The second opinion (represented primarily by the Mālikī and Shīʿī 
schools) does not require slaves to pay the charity tax.122  Some jurists who hold this opinion 
explain that slaves are property and therefore, like animals, they cannot own property.123  The 
third opinion requires slave owners to pay the charity tax on behalf of slaves and this is the 
opinion of Shāfiʿī, Abū Ḥanīfah, and others.124  Notably, both of these two opinions are attested 
                                                                  
118 Zamaksharī offers a succinct explanation about the differences of opinion between Ḥanafīs  and  Shāfiʿīs in 
Ma mūd ibn ʿUmar Zamakhsharī (d. 1144; Khwārazm), Ruʾ s al-masāʾil (al-masāʾil al-khilāfīyah  ayna al-Ḥanafīyah wa-
al-Shāfiʿīyah), ed. ʿAbd Allāh Nadhīr A mad (Beirut: Dār al-Bashāʾir al-Islāmīyah, 1987), 208. 
119 I will not address in this section the legal issues concerning Muslim slaves and, instead, take it for granted that 
a Muslim can be a slave, as is attested in surviving documentary evidence. 
120 For a summary of these juristic debates, see Marwazī (d. 906; Samarqand), I htilāf al-fu ahāʾ: 452-53 
(summarizing juristic debates on slaves). 
121 Ibn ʿUmar, ʿA āʾ, Abū Thawr, and the Ẓāhirīs.  Ibn Rushd II (d. 1198; Spain/Morocco), Jurist's Primer: v. 1, p. 284.  
Also reported in Ibn al-Mu ahhar al-Ḥillī (d. 1325; Iraq), Tadh irat al-fu ahāʾ: v. 5, p. 16 (Imāmī Shīʿī). 
122 Late antique jurists reported to have this opinion include Ibn ʿUmar, Jābir, A mad, and Abū ʿUbayd. Ibn Rushd 
II (d. 1198; Spain/Morocco), Jurist's Primer: v. 1, p. 284.  Ibn ʿAbbās is reported to have stated that since slaves 
cannot own property, they do not pay the charity tax.  Qalʿah'jī,  aws ʿat fi h ʿ  d  llāh i n ʿ   ās: 367. See also 
Sa nūn (d. 854; Tunisia) et al., al-Mudawwanah: v. 1, p. 306-07 (Mālikī).  ʿAlī ibn Jaʿfar Madanī (d. 825), asāʾil ʿ lī i n 
Jaʿfar wa-mustadra ātuhā, Silsilat ma ādir bi ār al-anwār, 8 (Beirut: Muʾassasat  l al-Bayt li-I yāʾ al-Turāth, 1990), 
260 (Imāmī Shīʿī: a slave does not pay the charity tax unless his/her owner permits it).  Ibn Abī Zayd al-Qayrawānī 
(d. 996; Tunisia), al-Risālah al-fi hīyah: p. 167 (Mālikī: charity tax is not obligatory upon slaves).  Ibn al-Mu ahhar 
al-Ḥillī (d.  1325;  Iraq), Tadh irat al-fu ahāʾ: v. 5, p. 16 (Imāmī Shīʿī: freedom is a prerequisite for payment of the 
charity tax).  
123 Ibn al-Mu ahhar al-Ḥillī (d. 1325; Iraq), Tadh irat al-fu ahāʾ: v. 5, p. 16 (Imāmī Shīʿī). 
124 Ibn Rushd II (d. 1198; Spain/Morocco), Jurist's Primer: v. 1, p. 284.  See also: al-Shāfiʿī (d. 820; Arabia/Egypt), al-
Umm: v. 3, 67.  al-Shīrāzī (d. 1083; Iran), al-Muhadhdhab: v. 1, p. 147 (Shāfiʿī: charity tax is not obligatory upon 
slaves).  al-Nawawī (d. 1277; Syria) et al., al- a m ʿ: v. 5, p. 293 (Shāfiʿī: charity tax is not obligatory upon slaves).  
 atāwá al-ʿ lamgīrīyah (1664-1672): v. 1, 171 (Ḥanafī: charity tax is not obligatory upon slaves). 
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in the Ḥanbalī school.125  Finally, there may be a fourth opinion, which does not impose charity 
taxation on either the slave or the slave owner.126  Therefore, the majority opinion (Ḥanafī, 
Ḥanbalī, and Shāfiʿī) among Muslim jurists in the medieval era was that slaves are liable to pay 
the charity tax (regardless of whether the slave or the owner actually pays it).  
 
Rabbinic legal practices 
  I previously cited juristic discussions about the categories of individuals who are 
obligated to pay the charity tax; these legal debates may seem unsurprising in the context of 
Islamic legal literature.  But when we compare these detailed juristic debates to their rabbinic 
predecessors, the significance of these discussions is more readily apparent.  Rabbinic legal 
sources do not include an exhaustive discussion of who, other than landowners, was supposed 
to pay charity.127  Indeed, it is difficult to determine from the available sources precisely who 
paid (or was supposed to pay) charity in Jewish communities during late antiquity.  Late 
antique rabbinic legal literature seems to assume that only adult men are obligated to pay 
charity.  Notably, according to the Rambam (d. 1204, Spain/Egypt, aka Maimonides), orphans 
do not pay charity, even if they are wealthy.128   The absence of comparable debates within 
rabbinic legal literature about the applicability of taxation suggests that it was not a 
controversial subject and implies that charity was not fundamentally relevant to the everyday 
practice of being Jewish.  Moreover, it suggests that in late antiquity, there was not an 
elaborate Jewish communal structure for collecting charity.  By comparison, there presumably 
was a systematized process for collection of taxes within Jewish communities to be paid to pre-
Islamic authorities.129  This distinction between rabbinic and Islamic legal texts on the issue of 
who is obligated to pay the charity tax reflects the historical realities of who distributed 
charity tax funds: rabbis distributed charity funds on behalf of their Jewish followers, but the 
Islamic state distributed charity funds paid by their Muslim constituents.  Consequently, in the 
late antique and medieval periods, what it meant for Jews to pay charity was a matter of ritual 
practice regulated by rabbis; what it meant for Muslims to pay charity was a public matter 
regulation by jurists and the state concurrently. 
 
Islamizing near eastern charity tax? 
 I want to focus for a moment on the minority Muslim opinions in two cases: (1) the 
minority (Ḥanafī and Shīʿī) opinion that children are not required to pay the charity tax and (2) 
                                                                  
125 Ibn Qudāmah al-Maqdīsī (d. 1223; Syria), al- ughnī: v. 4, p. 71-73 (Ḥanbalī: conflicting reports, slave owner pays 
charity tax on behalf of slave or no charity tax obligation for slave). 
126 Although conflicting legal opinions are reported, this perspective is cited in Ibn al-Mu ahhar al-Ḥillī (d.  1325;
Iraq), Tadh irat al-fu ahāʾ: v. 5, p. 17 (Imāmī Shīʿī: citing non-Imāmī Shīʿī jurists who declare that the charity tax is 
not obligatory upon slaves or their owners). 
127 Late antique rabbinic discussions of charity primarily concern peʾah, which is assessed on agricultural lands and 
is therefore only applicable to those who own land.  
128 Maimonides (d. 1204; Spain/Egypt), Mishneh Torah: v. 7, p. 79 (Treatise II, 7:12, "Orphans may not be assessed for 
charity").   
129 Brody notes that “It is generally assumed that as early as the talmudic period the Exilarch was responsible for 
the collection of taxes from the Jewish community, but there is no direct evidence for this.” Robert Brody, The 
geonim of Babylonia and the shaping of medieval Jewish culture  (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 71. 
 74 
 
the minority (Mālikī and late antique jurists) opinion that slaves are not required to pay the 
charity tax.  Both minority Muslim opinions correspond to the rabbinic practice of exempting 
minors and slaves from charity tax liability.  I am not interested in arguing for a causal 
explanation of “influence.”130  Instead, I want to suggest that orthodox rabbinic and minority 
Islamic opinions converged in viewing charity as a primarily ritual – rather than political – act.  
The majority Islamic opinion did not view charity taxation as a simple expression of 
confessional identity.  Indeed, the fact that various Qurʾānic verses commanding charity 
payment were addressed to Jews did not cause Muslim scholars much concern.131  This may be 
because the acts of praying to God and of paying the charity tax would render them Muslims, 
even if these acts did not completely replace their Jewish identity.  In other words, it was 
possible to be Muslim and Christian, or Muslim and Jewish, or perhaps even Muslim and pagan, 
in the beginning of Islamic history.  The legal distinctions articulated by jurists suggest that 
late antique Muslim identity was expressed in more political than ritual terms, particularly 
when compared to contemporaneous rabbinic Jewish identity.  This is not to suggest that 
Muslim identity was purely political, but rather that it is more expansive and ambiguous than 
commonly acknowledged. 
 
VI. Who does not pay the charity tax? 
  Women, minors, and slaves were all, according to the majority opinion of Muslim 
jurists, liable to pay the charity tax – regardless of their status in terms of ritual obligations.132   
But, in late antiquity, there was slippage between the taxation regimes for Muslims and non-
Muslims; this muddying was gradually erased in the medieval period when a “confessional” 
taxation system (charity tax for Muslims and poll tax for non-Muslims) was solidified.  This is 
noticeable in reports clarifying that Muslims do not pay the poll tax.133  Why would some 
Muslims have considered the poll tax as a potential tax on them?  Put simply, in late antiquity, 
there was a distinct kind of organization and signification in the taxation system.  
Papyrological evidence from the eighth century suggests that there were distinct tax regimes 
for Muslims and for non-Muslims, but these papyri cannot tell us what it meant to be Muslim 
during that time.134  Moreover, these papyri also indicate that the terms for poll tax and land 
tax were “used interchangeably” and that converts to Islam often paid the land tax.135  Indeed, 
it was not until the mid-eighth century that payment of the poll tax was distinguished from 
payment of the land tax.136  The primary historical distinction made between the charity tax 
and the poll tax is that the latter – in the beginnings of Islamic history – was a flat rate applied 
to each household (like the Roman model), rather than a proportional rate applied to each 
individual.  In the earliest period of Islamic history, the poll tax may not have been higher than 
                                                                  
130 I critiqued the notion of “influence” in the Introduction to this dissertation. 
131 Bashear identifies Qurʾān 2:43, 2:83, and 2:110 as addressing Jews. Bashear, "On the origins," 89. 
132 al-Shāfiʿī, for example, states this explicitly.  See al-Shāfiʿī (d. 820; Arabia/Egypt), al-Umm: v. 3, p. 68. 
133 Tirmidhī (d. 892; Khurāsān), Sunan al-Tirmidhī wa-huwa al-Jāmiʿ al-ṣahī : v. 2, p. 72-73 (Muslims do not pay poll 
tax).  But see Tirmidhī (d. 892; Khurāsān),  aʿīf sunan al-Tirmidhī: 67-68 ("Muslims do not pay the poll tax" is weak). 
134 Sijpesteijn notes that “a regularly state-collected tax expressly for Muslims is levied with a name different from 
that used for non-Muslims.” Sijpesteijn, "Shaping a Muslim state," 158. 
135 Ibid., 161. 
136 Ibid., 166. 
 75 
 
the charity tax; indeed, the sources suggest that the poll tax was likely lower than the charity 
tax.137   
  It is not an accident, then, that some (though clearly not all) juristic discussions of the 
poll tax occur within or immediately adjacent to the chapter on the charity tax.138  Jurists likely 
understood taxation as a means of differentiating between Muslims and non-Muslims.  So 
when the first caliph, Abū Bakr (r. 632-634 CE) fought a series of battles against tribes in the 
Arabian peninsula who refused to pay the charity tax, these battles were labeled riddah 
(defection) wars because the refusal to pay the charity tax was conceptualized as equivalent to 
rejecting Islamic authority.139  Later historians and jurists characterized Abū Bakr as fighting 
heresy (rather than imposing taxation).140  But if we understand payment of the charity tax as a 
form of declaring oneself Muslim, then the significance of Abū Bakr’s battles becomes more 
readily apparent.  Being Muslim was not simply a matter of religion: it was a hybrid identity of 
citizenship and faith. 
  The political nature of charity taxation resonates in a particularly interesting historical 
example that is often cited in both historical and jurisprudential texts: The second caliph, 
ʿUmar (r. 634-644 CE)reportedly negotiated with the Arab Christian tribe Banū Taghlib to allow 
them to pay some equivalent of the charity tax, rather than the poll tax.141  Does this mean that 
the Banū Taghlib tribe was considered Muslim in some way?  The historical sources are 
unclear.  Caliph ʿUmar reportedly made treaty agreements with three tribes (Tanūkh, Bahrāʾ, 
and Banū Taghlib) that they pay the charity tax; some jurists appear to have interpreted this 
charity tax payment as having been in addition to (rather than instead of) the poll tax or as 
                                                                  
137 al-Shāfiʿī (d. 820; Arabia/Egypt), al-Kitā  al-Umm: v. 5, kitāb al-jizyah, p. 74-80 (conflicting reports about the 
amount of the poll tax; one dinar per person may have been Prophetic practice; ʿUmar may have set poll tax for 
Syrians at 4 dinars per person, but there are reports of other amounts).   
138 Some examples include: Sa nūn (d. 854; Tunisia) et al., al-Mudawwanah: v. 1, p. 333 (Mālikī: mentions poll tax 
within discussion of charity tax).  Ibn Barakah (d. 10th; ʿUmān), Kitā  al- āmiʿ: v. 1, p. 632 (Ibāḍī: discussion of poll 
tax adjacent to charity tax; poll tax not collected from women, minors, slaves, or priests).  Ibn Abī Zayd al-
Qayrawānī (d. 996; Tunisia), al-Risālah al-fi hīyah: p. 168 (Mālikī: poll tax discussion immediately following charity 
tax).  Generally, later texts place discussions of the poll tax within the chapter on warfare. Ibn al-Mu ahhar al-
Ḥillī (d. 1325; Iraq), Tadhkirat al-fu ahāʾ: v. 9, p 275 (Imāmī Shīʿī). 
139 “Muslim traditionists considered all antagonists of Medina ‘apostates’ and called the war waged against them 
the War of Apostasy, Hur   al-Riddah.” Shoufani, Al-Riddah: 107. 
140 Shoufani notes that “Juristic arguments played a significant role in the definition of the term Riddah and the 
categorization of the groups involved in it.” Ibid., 102. 
141 The historical sources report the amount and reasoning inconsistently.  Abū  ūsuf (d. 798; Iraq), Kitā  al-āthār: 
p. 91 (Ḥanafī: no. 445, he imposed twice the charity tax in lieu of the land tax).  Qudāmah Ibn Jaʿfar (d. 932?) 
narrates: “‘Umar made a treaty with them stipulating that they should pay a double  adāqa tax, i.e. one dirham 
out of twenty dirhams but no jizya, and that they should not baptize their children as Christians and plunge them 
into heresy.  ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib, during his reign, said: If the Banū Taghlib had been left to my judgment, I would 
have killed their fighters and taken their children captive for their having violated the treaty by baptizing their 
children, thus forfeiting their right to protection.” Qudāmah Ibn Jaʿfar (d. 932?; Iraq) et al., Qudāma  . Jaʿfar s Kitā  
al- harā , part seven, and excerpts from       suf’s Kitā  al- harā , trans. Aharon Ben Shemesh, Taxation in Islām, v. 2 
(Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1965), 42.  See also Ibn Rushd II (d. 1198; Spain/Morocco), Jurist's Primer: v. 1, p. 284.  But al-
Ṭabarī (d. 923) reports that ʿUmar taxed them at the same rate as the charity tax and as double the charity tax.  
Abū Jaʿfar Mu ammad ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī (d. 923; Iraq), The Conquest of Iraq, Southwestern Persia, and Egypt, trans. G. 
H. A. Juynboll, The history of al-Ṭabarī, XIII (Albany: State University of New  ork Press, 1989), 62   91.  Other 
sources report double the charity tax as having been imposed on the Banū Taghlib.  a y  Ibn  dam (d. 818; Iraq), 
 a yā  en  dam s Kitā  al- harā , trans. Aharon Ben Shemesh, Taxation in Islām, v. 1 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1958), 55.  
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being the result of an exceptional case (i.e., a specific treaty agreement and not a general 
rule).142  By rationalizing this Banū Taghlib case as exceptional, historians and jurists neglected 
to appreciate the normativity of taxation as a means of classifying groups.  The charity tax 
signaled political membership, not only spiritual/religious membership.  In this light, we can 
understand a recurring motif in the conquest narratives as a Muslim leader offering 
citizenship (charity tax), or semi-citizenship (poll tax), or enemy status (no tax).143  The 
importance of redistribution in late antique Islamic society is manifested in Abū Dharr al-
Ghifārī’s protestations against Caliph ʿUthman’s (r. 644 - 656) nepotistic disbursements of 
public funds.144   
       
VII. Why is the charity tax significant? 
Charity taxation, conversion, and conquest were intimately intertwined in late antique 
Islamic history.145  The connection between the payment of the charity tax and being Muslim 
was so strong that some jurists considered any Muslim who questioned its legal status to be an 
apostate.146  One of the topics jurists debated was the obligation to pay the charity tax in the 
case of a Muslim who apostatizes; as in many other doctrinal areas, there are conflicting 
reports about the opinions within each orthodox legal school.147  (These discussions suggest 
that apostates were not always killed, contrary to the orthodox opinion that death is the 
appropriate punishment.)  One view is that even someone who no longer is Muslim is obligated 
to pay the charity tax.148  A second view indicates that some jurists viewed being Muslim and 
                                                                  
142 Ibn al-Farrāʾ (d. 1066; Iraq), al-   ām al-sul ānīyah: 155-56. 
143 By way of example, this motif is cited in al-Ṭabarī (d. 923; Iraq), The Conquest of Iraq, Southwestern Persia, and 
Egypt: 16 & 21. 
144 Some contemporary scholars celebrate this particular historical figure as a socialist. Mu ammad ʿAlī al- uwarī, 
    Dharr al-Ghifārī: al-ishtirā ī al-mu ārid  (Beirut: al-Muʾassasah al-ʿArabīyah lil-Dirāsāt wa-al Nashr, 1979).  
145 By way of example, the Umayyads refused to relieve new converts from the obligation to pay the poll tax and 
to collect the charity tax from them instead.  See  āli  Saʿīd  ghā, The revolution which toppled the Umayyads: neither 
 ra  nor ʿ   āsid  (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2003), 162.  “The early Umayyad fiscal system was unable to cope with the 
economic and social changes of the first Muslim century, and Umayyad officials consequently had to spend a large 
part of their time dealing with problems arising from this system while trying to maintain a steady fiscal income.  
Most attempts at securing an undiminished revenue flow from land-taxes ignored the transformation of the 
conquest society into one of settled continuity, forcing landholders to cultivate land they wanted to leave, having 
Muslims pay the same land-taxes as non-Muslims did, and coercing converts into remaining in non-Muslim tax-
categories.” Sijpesteijn, "Shaping a Muslim state," 183.  This issue became crucial in Murjiʾah activism.  See Khalil 
ʿAthamina, "The early Murji'a: some notes," Journal of Semitic Studies 35, no. 1 (1990).  Wilferd Madelung, Religious 
schools and sects in medieval Islam  (London: Variorum Reprints, 1985), 483.   
146 Ibn Qudāmah al-Maqdīsī (d. 1223; Syria), al- ughnī: v. 4, p. 5-7 (Ḥanbalī: charity tax obligation is Muslim 
consensus; anyone who denies that it is an Islamic commandment is an apostate).  Ibn al-Mu ahhar al-Ḥillī (d.
1325; Iraq), Tadh irat al-fu ahāʾ: v. 5, p. 7 (Imāmī Shīʿī: one who denies that the charity tax is an obligation is an 
apostate). 
147 al-Shāfiʿī (d. 820; Arabia/Egypt), al-Kitā  al-Umm: v. 2, kitāb al-zakāh, p. 96-97 (conflicting reports about the 
charity tax liability of a Muslim who apostatizes).   
148 An apostate from Islam is required to pay the charity tax; only Abū Ḥanīfah appears to have had the opinion 
that one who apostatizes is no longer obligated to pay the charity tax. al-Nawawī (d. 1277; Syria) et al., al- a m ʿ: 
v. 5, p. 295 (Shāfiʿī).  See also al-Rāfiʿī (d. 1226; Iran), al-ʿ zīz: v. 2, p. 561 (Shāfiʿī: a non-Muslim does not pay charity 
tax even after he converts to Islam, but a Muslim must pay charity tax even if he apostatizes).  ʿAbdū, al- āfī fī 
a  ām al-za āh: 39-40. 
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fulfilling Islamic obligations as a matter of rational choice to be made by a free adult, such that 
the choice not to be Muslim must relieve an individual from paying the charity tax.149  The first 
view is an extension of the Qurʾānic theme that charity taxation is the right of the poor to a 
portion of the wealth of the rich, while the second view is an extension of the Qurʾānic theme 
that charity taxation is a ritual act.  The numerous juristic debates explored here indicate that 
late antique and medieval Muslim jurists were deeply entangled in a project of drawing 
identity border lines.150   
 
VIII. Taxing as identifying: paying to be Muslim 
  This chapter has used the doctrinal issue of charity to correlate religious identity with 
notions of citizenship.  The legal discussion of who is required to pay the charity tax and who 
must receive it are both issues that were more institutionalized in Islamic law in comparison to 
Jewish law.  Of course, in the historical context of Jewish communities living under various 
empires, it is perhaps unsurprising that the internal taxation system was not severe.  Because 
the Islamic taxation system was, from the beginning, a means of taxing both members and 
quasi-members, it corresponded to a political framework for defining citizenship and semi-
citizenship.151  Who paid and received the charity tax in late antique Islamic societies was not 
simply a matter of fulfilling a religious obligation; instead, it was—for both Muslims, “semi”-
Muslims, and non-Muslims—a matter of paying taxes to the state. 
 It is not uncommon to hear contemporary Muslims describing charity as one of the 
“five pillars” of Islam or to hear contemporary Jews describing charity as a commandment 
(mitzvah).152  In both traditions, charity is commonly understood as a significant aspect of 
religious dogma and practice.  But late antique historical evidence indicates that charity was 
practiced in ways that are not equivalent to ritual or spiritual acts, but rather what we – in 
contemporary discourse – would describe as political acts.  This is because “religion” is a 
modern category that was dialectically constructed in relation to “secularism.”153  The category 
of “religion” is an anachronistic and reductive category that limits our understanding of late 
antique Islamic history and Muslim identity in late antiquity.154  Scholars who take “religion” 
                                                                  
149 Ḥanafīs and Mālikīs do not obligate apostates to pay the charity tax. ʿAbdū, al- āfī fī a  ām al-za āh: 39-40. 
150 Boyarin, Border lines. 
151 I use the term semi-citizenship to mean individuals who are neither full citizens nor non-citizens, but instead 
have an ambiguous middle status.  The term is elaborated by Elizabeth F. Cohen, Semi-citizenship in democratic 
politics  (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).  While Cohen’s work focuses on semi-
citizenship in democratic contexts, I believe the category is relevant to understanding the hierarchy of 
citizenship in late antique Islamic states. 
152 The reader may have noticed that I did not begin by referring to the charity tax as one of the “five pillars” 
because this chapter was concerned with interrogating charity practices prior to the formulation of this orthodox 
idea about the existence of “five pillars.”  Different versions of Islamic pillars are mentioned in the canonical 
 adīth collections.  See, for instance, Bukhārī (d. 870; Khurāsān),  a ī  al-Bu hārī: v. 2, p. 271-75. 
153 Fitzgerald explains, “what counts as ‘religion’ and what counts as ‘the secular’ are mutually delimiting and 
defining concepts, the distinction between them continually shifting depending on the context.” Timothy 
Fitzgerald, "Introduction," in Religion and the secular: historical and colonial formations, ed. Timothy Fitzgerald 
(London; Oakville, CT: Equinox Pub., 2007), 15.   
154 Fitzgerald observes that “As a consequence of the reification of religion, most religious studies scholars and 
many historians, anthropologists and other specialists, assume and write as though religion and the state have 
always been two essentially different domains of human endeavor, having some problematic but external 
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as a point of departure in their studies of Islamic history, misconstrue the basic flexibility and 
ambiguity of what it meant to be Muslim.155 
 When late antique Muslims paid the charity tax, did they perceive themselves as 
fulfilling a divinely-ordained command or as simply paying taxes to a political entity?  Was it 
any different for them than paying taxes to the Byzantines or the Sasanians?  It is unlikely we 
will ever formulate accurate answers to these questions.  Yet in pondering the possibilities, we 
certainly should not limit ourselves to assumptions about the charity tax as a ritual act.  It is 
impossible to reconstruct historically if any tribes or groups agreed to pay the charity tax to an 
Islamic political entity, while continuing to practice their pre- or non-Islamic rituals and 
beliefs.  But it is not difficult to imagine that this is what happened.  What it meant to convert 
to Islam in late antiquity may have much more to do with paying the charity tax to an Islamic 
state and accepting its political sovereignty, than performing a set of rituals or believing in a 
particular dogma.  What Muslims defined as “Muslim” in late antiquity was probably much 
more fluid than our historical sources convey; this exploration into the multi-faceted debates 
about charity tax liability suggest that it may have been more complicated than belief and as 
simple as paying a tax. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
relationship.” Timothy Fitzgerald, Discourse on civility and barbarity: a critical history of religion and related categories  
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 10. 
155 This narrow framework is evident in scholarship that seeks to date the “birth” of Muslim identity.  This is 
implicit in Donner’s differentiation between “believers” and Muslims in Donner, Muhammad and the believers. 
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Chapter 3: Legal changes – a case study in family law 
 
Every law tells a story: orthodox divorce in Jewish and Islamic legal histories1 
 
 Every law, when probed and prodded, tells a story about its historical trajectory, a non-
linear transformation with neither a definitive beginning nor an end.  The ensuing legal 
history is an insightful glimpse into a law’s past that is likely unfamiliar – perhaps even 
unexpected.  That legal narrative may not be relevant to present-day legal concerns, or it may 
have immediate resonance to a contemporary dilemma.  In either case, it may be exploited by 
legal actors in pursuit of an agenda.  For a legal historian, the challenge is to tell the story of a 
law while resisting attempts to simplify or to exploit the complexities of history. 
  The story I will tell here focuses on legal norms of wife-initiated (and acquired) divorce 
in Jewish and Islamic legal systems in the pre-modern era.  The received tradition narrates a 
woman’s minimal agency in divorce – in both Jewish and Islamic law – as intrinsic.  It is widely 
known – or presumed – that Jewish and Muslim women have relatively less access to divorce 
than their male counterparts in present-day religious courts.2  In both religious traditions, 
women can encounter difficulties in obtaining divorces.3  Using a wide array of historical 
                                                                  
1 This chapter was accepted at the 6th Annual American Society of Comparative Law Works-in-Progress Workshop, 
which convened at Yale Law School (February 12, 2011); I would like to thank all the participants of the workshop 
for their suggestions and especially my two commentators, Christine Hayes and Chibli Mallat, and the organizers, 
Jacqueline Ross, Kim Lane Scheppele, and James Whitman.  For reading and commenting on drafts of this chapter, 
I thank Daniel Boyarin, Charlotte Fonrobert, Rhiannon Graybill, Ira Lapidus, Maria Mavroudi, Laurent Mayali, Zvi 
Septimus, and Sam Thrope.  I would also like to thank Menachem Butler, the indefatigable Jewish studies 
bibliographer, for sending me numerous articles used throughout this piece.   Errors are mine alone. 
2 “The ruling now prevalent is that a woman initiating divorce proceedings according to Jewish law is required to 
submit a ground, chosen from a defined list appearing in the Talmud; barring such a ground, the husband cannot 
be coerced to grant a divorce.” Elimelech Westreich, "The rise and decline of the law of the rebellious wife in 
medieval Jewish law," in Jewish Law Association studies, XII (Zutphen conference), ed. Hillel Gamoran, Jewish Law 
Association Studies (Binghamton, N.Y.: Global Publications, State University of New York at Binghamton, 2002), 207.  
Generally, in modern states that apply some form of Islamic law, Muslim women are able to secure a divorce if (a) 
they can establish specific, judicially accepted grounds or (b) they relinquish their dower rights and negotiate a 
husband’s consent.  (Exceptions to this general situation are Egypt and Tunisia, which do not require the 
husband’s consent.)  See Emory University School of Law, "Islamic family law project: legal profiles,"  
http://www.law.emory.edu/ifl/index2.html.   
3 For a discussion of the Jewish chained wife (the agunah, a woman unable to obtain a divorce decree), see Jackson, 
Bernard S., Rabbi Dr. Yehudah Abel, Avishalom Westreich, Shoshana Borocin-Knol, and Nechama Hadari. "Agunah: 
the Manchester analysis." In Draft final report of the Agunah research unit, edited by Bernard S. Jackson: University of 
Manchester, January 2010.  By way of example, see a modern U.S. case, Avitzur v. Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d 136(1983).  See 
also Michael J. Broyde, Marriage, divorce, and the abandoned wife in Jewish law: a conceptual understanding of the agunah 
problems in America  (Hoboken, NJ: KTAV Pub. House, 2001).  Alan Lazerow, "Give and 'Get?' Applying the 
Restatement of Contracts to determine the enforceability of 'Get settlement' contracts," University of Baltimore Law 
Review 39, no. 1 (2009-2010).  (In this chapter, get is translated as divorce decree.)  On some of the difficulties 
encountered by Muslim women seeking divorces and contemporary legislation pertaining to it, see Oussama 
Arabi, "The dawning of the third millennium on shari'a: Egypt's Law no. 1 of 2000, or women may divorce at will," 
Arab Law Quarterly 16, no. 1 (2001).  See also Abdul Hakim Quick, "Al-Mu'allaqa: the Muslim woman between divorce 
and real marriage," Journal of Islamic Law 3, no. 1 (1998).  However, during my relatively recent legal-ethnographic 
research (sponsored by a Fulbright grant) of Jordan’s Islamic courts, I did not observe judges restricting women 
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sources, this chapter presents evidence that Jewish and Muslim women in the late antique 
period had relatively more access to divorce than women in the medieval era.4  I argue that 
changes in women’s divorce options are manifestations of multidimensional historical 
processes that illustrate law’s profoundly contingent contexts.5  Divorce in Jewish and Islamic 
legal systems underwent parallel transformations between the late antique (roughly, 250-750 
CE) and medieval (roughly, 750-1450 CE) periods as the result of common socio-political and 
jurisprudential dynamics.  By placing Jewish law and Islamic law into historical conversation 
with each other, this chapter challenges the norm of studying these legal systems from a 
primarily internal perspective. 
  Legal communities use narratives to illustrate legal rules and they also create 
“internal” narratives about their legal systems that have normative consequences.  The 
analysis presented here establishes that any statement of “what the law is” is embedded within 
a complex historical narrative generated by jurists.  Jewish and Muslim jurists construct 
internal narratives that are ahistorical and legitimate their own authority; this chapter 
employs historicism and thick descriptions of law to challenge those orthodox narratives.6  
Historicism is used here to disenchant (but obviously not to extinguish) orthodox religious 
power in order to facilitate non-hierarchical discussions of what Jewish and Islamic law was, is, 
and should be.7  Influencing the outcome of those discussions, in terms of specific legal norms, 
is not my objective here.8  Rather, an underlying aim of this piece is using historicism to wrest 
legal authority from authoritarian groups.9  The narration of legal changes outlined in this 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
from initiating or obtaining divorces; the main challenge women faced was receiving alimony and child support 
payments, not divorces. 
4 While some feminists and some religious reformers may find that this chapter resonates with or lends support to 
their own objectives, this is an unintended consequence of exploring the legal narrative.  And, it should be noted, 
that this is merely one case study and the stories of other laws may reveal a past that corresponds to very 
different values and expectations.  Instead of advocating for a specific doctrinal change, this chapter intends to 
illuminate aspects of Islamic and Jewish legal history that remain unappreciated.  Moreover, it should be noted 
that feminist strategies are not homogenous.  See Chandra Talpade Mohanty, Feminism without borders: decolonizing 
theory, practicing solidarity  (Durham; London: Duke University Press, 2003). 
5 As Foucault notes, "The purpose of history is to dissipate, not discover, the roots of our identity." Foucault, The 
Foucault reader: 95. 
6 By historicism, I mean specifically post-foundationalist, radical historicism and Nietzschean-inspired genealogy.  
See Bevir, "What is genealogy?."  Radical historicism is distinct from general historicist approaches.  See Bevir, 
"Why historical distance is not a problem."  As I use orthodoxy in this chapter, it is entirely unrelated to 
contemporary terminology (such as modern Orthodox).  Instead, orthodox simply means the existence of a 
(hierarchical) group or institution that is able to label certain religious groups or practices as heretical.   
7 I do not use “disenchant” in the Weberian sense because I contest Weber’s conceptualization of “religion” and its 
fabrication of the “secular.”  I use disenchant in the vernacular sense of deconstructing a myth.   
8 I intentionally abstain from modern and anachronistic conclusions.  This is an ethical stance in opposition to the 
totalizing project of modernity.  See, for example, Asad, Genealogies of religion. 
9 Abou El Fadl has described some of his scholarly work as pursuing a demonstration of historical malleability.  He 
noted, “By presenting the diversity within the legal discourse, I hoped to demonstrate the inability of the 
authoritarian to dominate and establish uniformity of certain issues in Islamic legal history.” Abou El Fadl, And 
God knows the soldiers: 35. 
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chapter is just one exploration into the shared nomos of Jewish and Islamic legal systems and 
the socio-political struggles over law within it.10   
  Recent, increased scholarly attention to the role of religion in the public sphere has 
invigorated legal discussions of the (in)compatibility of modern law and religious law.  But 
these debates in contemporary public discourse tend to ossify religious legal systems and to 
authorize certain voices over others.  It is not my intention to accommodate religion to 
neoliberal values, or to discover the lost purity or goodness of religion, or even to denounce 
religion.  These normative strategies are frequently counterproductive because they reify 
religion and subscribe to a false religious-secular dichotomy.11  This chapter challenges the 
terms of contemporary debates by highlighting the dissimilar voices within religious legal 
systems and by problematizing the conceptualization of “religious law” that underlies current 
controversies.  The forces of change in these two “religious” legal systems are not so different 
than for any other legal system.  It is the “law” aspect of these normative orders, rather than 
the “religion” aspect, that is my emphasis because legal analysis is essential to understanding 
both Jewish and Islamic legal systems.  
  This chapter analyzes historical evidence of both Jewish and Muslim women divorcing 
their husbands in late antiquity (roughly, 250-750 CE) and offers some provisional explanations 
for why women’s divorce options became more limited in the medieval period (roughly, 750-
1450 CE).  This case study indicates that comparative legal history illuminates dynamics of legal 
change that would otherwise remain unnoticed.  Studying a legal system in isolation from its 
context, which includes contiguous legal systems, obscures expansive and long-term changes.  
Instead, by plotting parallel changes over time in divorce practices among Jews and Muslims in 
the “Near East,” this chapter demonstrates that legal orthodoxy is not timeless.12  Jewish and 
Islamic divorce laws tell stories that are sporadic, unpredictable, and barely audible under the 
faux euphony of orthodoxy. 
 
I. Defining wife-initiated divorce13 
It is widely presumed that men have unlimited access and women have restricted 
access to initiate divorce in both Jewish and Islamic law.  This presumption, however, 
simplifies a complicated historical process – only part of which I will briefly explore here – in 
which a woman’s access to divorce changed over time.  I will focus primarily on jurisprudential 
                                                                  
10 On nomos, see Robert M. Cover, "Foreword: nomos and narrative," Harvard Law Review 97, no. 1 (1983).  (I thank 
Michael A. Helfand for suggesting the relevance of Cover’s article.)  See also Judith Resnik, "Living their legal 
commitments: paideic communities, courts, and Robert Cover," Yale Journal of Law and the Humanities 17, no. 1 
(2005). 
11 Fitzgerald explains “The concept of ‘a religion’ and its pluralization ‘religions’ is a modern category, has a 
specific set of historical conditions for its emergence…and is a fundamental part of modern Western ideology. 
Various important consequences flow from this.” Fitzgerald, "Introduction," 6. 
12 The “Near East” is a problematic political (specifically, imperialist), rather than geographic category.  I would 
prefer to use the more geographically descriptive (and less geopolitically constructed) term Southwest Asia, but 
the reader may be unfamiliar with this term.  As I use “Near East” here, I primarily refer to Mesopotamia, the 
Arabian Peninsula, the Levant, and Egypt. 
13 A preliminary version of this section was presented as an invited presentation at “Cross Currents: Jewish and 
Islamic Cultural Exchange, 600-1250 CE,” a symposium organized by the Joint Doctoral Program in Jewish Studies 
at the Graduate Theological Union and UC Berkeley (October 14, 2010). 
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texts and only secondarily on how these jurisprudential ideas were actually implemented 
because the surviving documentary sources make it difficult to reconstruct exactly what kind 
of access to divorce women – both Muslim and Jewish – had in the late antique and medieval 
periods.14  In what follows, I will present two concise chronologies of Jewish legal changes and 
Islamic legal changes in women’s access to divorce.   
It should be noted that I will intentionally not differentiate between a wife’s ability to 
“initiate” a divorce and her ability to “execute” a divorce.  Despite some ambiguous evidence, 
there is a strong presumption that women could not “cause” a divorce because a husband must 
deliver a divorce decree – a written one in the Jewish tradition and an oral one in the Islamic 
tradition.15  As will become evident, these two procedural moves – initiating and executing 
divorce – were likely more ambiguous (at least in late antiquity) than commonly assumed.  A 
wife’s ability to initiate divorce has legal effect only where a husband’s divorce prerogative is 
circumscribed – either by a court or by the wife herself.  Moreover, while family members 
were often involved in a Jewish or Muslim woman’s marriage, women were frequently 
independent actors during divorce.16 
 
II. A Jewish chronology of wife-initiated divorce17 
 
Rabbinic (70-620 CE) 
There is a thorny scholarly debate surrounding the evidence for Jewish women 
obtaining divorces or actually divorcing their spouses in antiquity and late antiquity.18  
Without delving into the details, it is evident that the diverse and varied situations of pre- and 
non-rabbinic Jewish women included wife-initiated divorce.19  The key documentary evidence 
                                                                  
14 A social history approach of investigating actual divorce processes cannot be sufficiently reconstructed using 
the available historical evidence.  This approach to family law history is exemplified in Martha Minow, "'Forming 
underneath everything that grows': toward a history of family law," Wisconsin Law Review 1985, no. 4 (1985).  
15 See the discussion in Avishalom Westreich, "History, dogmatics and hermeneutics: the divorce clause in 
Palestinian Ketubbot and the Geonic compulsion of divorce," Working Papers of the Agunah Research Unit (March 
2009): 2. 
16 Goitein notes, “At a divorce the wife normally acted on her own.  As customary as it was that the betrothal be 
enacted in the absence of the bride, the divorce, by contrast, required her presence.”  Samuel D. Goitein, A 
Mediterranean society: the Jewish communities of the Arab world as portrayed in the documents of the Cairo Geniza, 6 vols. 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967-1993), v. 3, p. 270.  Muslim women also frequently represented 
themselves in divorce, as will be discussed in the Islamic chronology of wife-initiated divorce. 
17 The periodization of Jewish legal history and dates of rabbinic texts used in this section are modified versions of 
the dates used in contemporary Jewish studies.  See Charlotte Elisheva Fonrobert et al., The Cambridge companion to 
the Talmud and rabbinic literature, Cambridge companions to religion (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007), xiii-xvi.  I will not discuss any of the rabbinic limitations placed on a husband’s ability to divorce 
because it is beyond the scope of my analysis.  (But see Babylonian Talmud, Gi  in 90a.) 
18 See David Instone Brewer, "Jewish women divorcing their husbands in early Judaism: the background to 
papyrus  eʾelim 13," The Harvard Theological Review 92, no. 3 (1999).  See also Robert Brody, "Evidence for divorce 
by Jewish women?," The Journal of Jewish studies 50, no. 2 (1999).  And see Bernard S. Jackson, "Some reflections on 
family law in the papyri," in Jewish Law Association Studies XIV, ed. Hillel Gamoran (Binghamton, NY: Global 
Academic Pub.; Binghamton University, 2002).  
19 “This right of women to divorce their husbands appears to have become a normal part of Egyptian 
Judaism…This is very different from Palestinian and later rabbinic Judaism where a woman could only demand a 
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is Aramaic marriage contracts of the Elephantine Jewish community dated to the fifth century 
BCE, which include a stipulation that a wife may initiate divorce and pay her husband a divorce 
settlement (i.e., not collect her dower).20 
Rabbinic jurisprudence on divorce is ostensibly built around one Biblical verse, 
Deuteronomy 24:1, which describes a husband delivering a divorce document to his wife.21  The 
verse does not specify if this divorce procedure is the only legally valid form of divorce.22  But 
rabbinic jurists elaborated a variety of justifications for divorce.  In the Tosefta (220-350 CE), 
the rabbis claim that a couple may not continue their marriage if either is afflicted with boils.23  
The Mishnah (early third century CE) briefly considers when a woman can demand divorce 
because of her husband’s impotence, her “uncleanliness,” or her status as illicit to Jews.24  The 
Mishnah also enumerates how a wife gradually loses her divorce settlement for being 
recalcitrant.25  Other rabbinic literature enumerates a husband’s unreasonable behavior or 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
divorce on the specific grounds named above." Brewer, "Jewish women divorcing their husbands," 354.  Also, in 
Palestine, “Some rich or influential Jewish women divorced their husbands under the Roman law.” Ibid., 356 
(citing evidence from Josephus).  But note that Jewish women may not, at this time (under the Herodians, 37 BCE 
to 92 CE) have perceived their acts as contrary to Jewish law. 
20 Friedman notes that “This right is embodied in a stipulation written in the marriage contracts from the fifth 
century B.C.E. Jewish community of Elephantine. As we learn from the Geniza fragments, such a stipulation was 
written in the ketubbot of Palestine through the eleventh century. Passages that reflect the wife’s rights for a 
divorce can be identified in the Talmudic literature. And in some localities, this usage became accepted legal 
practice in post-Talmudic times.” Mordechai A. Friedman, Jewish marriage in Palestine: a Cairo genizah study  (Tel-
Aviv; New York: Tel-Aviv University, Chaim Rosenberg School of Jewish Studies; Jewish Theological Seminary of 
America, 1980), v. 1, p. 313.  See also Mordechai A. Friedman, Geniza studies in Jewish marriage law  (s.l.: s.n., 1970), 4.  
Among the documentary evidence upon which Friedman relied is Babatha’s marriage contract (ca. 2nd century CE).  
See Yigael Yadin et al., The documents from the Bar Kokhba period in the cave of letters: Hebrew, Aramaic, and Nabatean-
Aramaic Papyri, 2 vols., Judean Desert Series (Jerusalem: Israel Exploration Society: Hebrew University of 
Jerusalem: Shrine of the Book, 2002), v. 1, p. 118-41.  Goitein concurred with Friedman in Goitein, A Mediterranean 
society: v. 3, p. 264. 
21 “Suppose a man enters into marriage with a woman, but she does not please him because he finds something 
objectionable about her, and so he writes her a certificate of divorce, puts it in her hand, and sends her out of his 
house.”  Coogan et al., The new Oxford annotated Bible, 283-84. 
22 For a brief introduction to Jewish divorce laws, see Rachel Biale, Women and Jewish law: an exploration of women's 
issues in halakhic sources  (New York: Schocken Books, 1984), 70-101.  For a more extensive examination, see 
Shlomo Riskin, A Jewish woman's right to divorce: a halakhic history and a solution for the agunah  (Jersey City: KTAV 
Pub. House, 2006).  Riskin is a major modern orthodox rabbinic figure and the arguments he presents in his text 
come from within an orthodox perspective. 
23 Tosefta, Ketubbot 7:11. See also Mishnah, Ketubbot 7:9-10 (a husband can be compelled to divorce his wife if he 
has certain blemishes or is repulsive). 
24 Mishnah: Nedarim 11:12 (three types of women who can be divorced, but retain their dower).  According to this 
passage, Jewish women used to make three claims (i.e., rape, impotent husband, refusal or inability to engage in 
intercourse) that warranted divorce and the full payment of the ketubbah, but the rabbinic sages changed these 
practices.  In the context of late antiquity, vows were a normative part of social discourse, such that a husband’s 
vows may be understood as a reason for initiating divorce. 
25 “Recalcitrant,” in this chapter, is equivalent to the category of moredet in Jewish law or nashiz in Islamic law – 
both of which concern a wife who is broadly perceived as disobedient to her husband.  Moredet is often translated 
as “rebellious,” but I prefer to translate it as “recalcitrant.”  Moreover, while there is significant rabbinic-legal 
discussions about what acts constitute recalcitrance (typically, either denial of sex or refusal to perform 
household chores), I contend that the wife’s actions are less significant than the underlying issue of her desire to 
divorce her husband.  In other words, a recalcitrant wife is often a woman who is seeking a divorce.  For a 
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defects that warrant a husband being forced to divorce his wife.26  In the Palestinian Talmud 
(220-425 CE), the rabbis comment that a woman’s right to divorce consists of tormenting her 
husband until he gives her a writ of divorce.27  But in the same text, it is suggested that, in 
accordance with a marriage contract stipulation, a husband should divorce his wife and pay 
half the dower (ketubbah) payment if the woman expresses an aversion to her husband.28  The 
Babylonian Talmud (200-650 CE) specifies that a woman is entitled to her dower if her husband 
is infertile or impotent.29  Moreover, a woman whose husband refuses to provide her conjugal 
rights can be divorced with the court’s intervention and receive her dower.30   
To summarize, surveying rabbinic literature indicates the following types of divorce 
were recognized in late antiquity: 
(1) A husband divorces his wife for whatever reason and pays her dower.31 
(2) A rabbinic court compels a husband to divorce his wife32 and pay the dower because the 
husband: 
a. has physical defects33 
b. imposes unreasonable restrictions or behavior34 
c. is sterile, impotent, or refuses to provide conjugal rights35 
d. works in a profession considered disgusting36 
e. or because the wife has made a vow prohibiting her husband from touching her37 
(3) A husband divorces his wife and does not pay the dower because the court has declared the 
wife to be recalcitrant (i.e., a moredet or in breach of contract)38 or because the wife  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
discussion of the moredet, see for example, ibid., Ketubbot 1:2 (wife loses seven dinarim for every week of her 
recalcitrance).   
26 Ibid., Ketubbot 7:1-5 (discussing various cases in which a husband makes unconscionable/unreasonable 
restrictions that warrant compelling the husband to divorce).  See also ibid., Ketubbot 7:9-10.  Palestinian Talmud, 
Ketubbot 7:1-5 (husband’s behavior that warrants divorce) and Ketubbot 7:8-9 (blemishes of which a wife was 
unaware warrant divorce).  See also the corresponding discussions in the Babylonian Talmud: Ketubbot 71a-71b and 
77a. 
27 Palestinian Talmud: Ketubbot 5:1. 
28 Ibid., Ketubbot 7:6.  A marriage contract stipulation suggesting a wife’s ability to initiate divorce is also 
acknowledged in ibid., Ketubbot 5:9. 
29 Babylonian Talmud: Ketubbot 65a-65b.  
30 Mishnah: Ketubbot 5:6-7 (a husband’s refusal to provide conjugal rights as grounds for adding to a woman’s 
dower).  Babylonian Talmud: Ketubbot 61b (if a husband refuses to provide his wife's conjugal rights for longer than 
specified periods, he must divorce her and pay her dower). 
31 The House of Shammai’s argument to limit a husband’s ability to divorce was refuted by the House of Hillel.  See 
Mishnah: Gī  īn 9:10. Mishnah,.  But the ketubbah payment was perceived as an impediment to the husband’s 
otherwise unencumbered right to divorce. See Babylonian Talmud: Ketubbot 11a and Yebamot 89a.   
32 Mishnah: Gī  īn 9:8.  See also Babylonian Talmud, Gī  īn 88b (a Jewish court may compel a divorce, but a non-
Jewish court may only do so based on the decision of a Jewish court; specific type of divorce decree, השועמ טג).  
See also Mishnah, Arakhin 5:6 (a husband is compelled to give a writ of divorce to his wife until he says he wills it) 
33 Ibid., Ketubbot 7:9. 
34 Ibid., Ketubbot 7:1-5. 
35 Ibid., Ketubbot 5:6. Babylonian Talmud, Ketubbot 91a. 
36 Ibid., Ketubbot 7:10. 
37 See footnote 24. 
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a. apostatized, ignored a Jewish precept, or acted immorally39 
b. refused sexual relations with her husband or performance of “wifely duties”40 
c. has blemishes or physical defects that impinge the marital relationship41 
The practical consequences of these rabbinic ideas on divorce likely varied from community to 
community.42  For instance, there is evidence of a Palestinian tradition of including a wife’s 
right to divorce in the marriage contract.43  Moreover, the rabbinic prerogative of annulling a 
marriage may have, in practice, been a means of granting a woman a divorce (without the 
husband’s deliverance of a divorce decree).44  Still, this brief schema delineates the basic ideas 
circulating about divorce within late antique rabbinic legal communities. 
 
Gaonic (620-1050 CE) 
In 650/651 CE, Gaonic rabbis issued a decree (taqqanah) that a recalcitrant wife (moredet) 
could procure a divorce immediately and not lose her dower (ketubbah).45  This decree 
abandoned the twelve-month waiting period and loss of dower stipulated for a recalcitrant 
wife in the Babylonian Talmud.46  Historical sources indicate that this decree was viewed by the 
majority of Gaonim as a legal enactment validated by judicial authority and social need.47  
Geniza evidence indicates that in the medieval Near East, Jewish women could initiate divorce 
by forfeiting some of their rights – what is often described as a “ransom” divorce, in line with 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
38 Mishnah: Ketubbot 5:5-7 (defining a recalcitrant wife). Mishnah, Ketubbot 5:5-7 (defining a moredet, recalcitrant 
wife); Palestinian Talmud, Ketubbot 5:8 (a “writ of rebellion” is a charge against or a deduction of the wife’s 
ketubbah payment); Babylonian Talmud, Ketubbot 63a (the ketubbah of a recalcitrant wife is reduced to depletion 
and she is divorced). 
39 Ibid., Ketubbot 7:6.  
40 Ibid., Ketubbot 5:7.  
41 Ibid., Ketubbot 7:8.  
42 For a broad overview, see Tal Ilan, History of Jewish women in late antiquity  (Jerusalem: The Hebrew University of 
Jerusalem, Rothberg School for Overseas Students, 1994).  
43 Friedman, Jewish marriage in Palestine: v. 1, p. 313.  See also Westreich, "History, dogmatics and hermeneutics," 
18-21.  
44 Babylonian Talmud: Ketubbot 3a and Gittin 33a (rabbis can annul betrothal by returning the dower money or by 
declaring the sexual act as non-marital, which corresponds to the two means of enacting a marriage).  See 
Avishalom Westreich, "Umdena as a ground for marriage annulment: between mistaken transaction (kiddushei 
ta‘ut) and terminative condition," Jewish Law Association Studies 20(June 10, 2010). 
45 See text #3 (Gaonic responsa of Rav Sherira Gaon) in Appendix I.  See also Libson, Jewish and Islamic law: 111.  
Brody, The geonim of Babylonia: 9, 62-63.  While I translate taqqanah as decree in this paper, it is to avoid confusing 
the reader.  The literal meaning of taqqanah is to straighten and it has the connotation of establishing, instituting, 
or ordaining a legal rule.   
46 Babylonian Talmud: Ketubbot 63b and 64a.  The relevant passage features the story of a woman being forced to 
remain married to her husband and implies that it is unwarranted to do so.  (See texts #1 and #2 in Appendix I.)  
But note that Westreich identifies the 12-month waiting period as a late Talmudic stratum.  Avishalom Westreich, 
"Compelling a divorce? Early Talmudic roots of coercion in a case of moredet," Working Papers of the Agunah 
Research Unit (May 2008): 12.  Dating the redaction of the Babylonian Talmud is beyond the scope of this article; in 
this chapter, I assume that by 650 CE either the Babylonian Talmud had been redacted or much of the material in 
it was associated with a corpus that would later be identified as the Babylonian Talmud. 
47 See texts #3 through #8 in Appendix I.  But see footnote 53. 
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the equivalent Arabic terminology.48  This historical evidence should be emphasized: the 
Gaonic practice of coercing a husband to divorce a “recalcitrant” wife was normative for 
centuries until its gradual undermining in the late medieval period.  In other words, when 
compared to the Rabbinic period (or, more precisely, rabbinic texts), an additional option may 
have been introduced, in which a woman could obtain a divorce decree immediately (instead 
of waiting twelve months) in exchange for relinquishing part (or all) of her economic rights.  
This differs from the contract stipulation described in the Palestinian Talmud49 because an 
explicit marriage contract stipulation does not appear to have been required and because 
women appear to have been able to initiate divorce proceedings as a result of the Gaonic 
decree.50  This form of wife-initiated divorce appears to have been implemented by the Gaonim 
as an extension of the Talmudic category of a recalcitrant wife.51  In his Halakhot Pesuqot, Rav 
Yehudai Ben Na man (d. late 8th century, Iraq) notes that only a rabbinic court’s coercion of a 
husband is a valid means of compelling a husband to divorce his wife.52  Rabbi Isaac Alfasi (d. 
                                                                  
48 See in particular the Judeo-Arabic documents cited in Mordechai A. Friedman, "Divorce upon the wife's demand 
as reflected in manuscripts from the Cairo Geniza," Jewish Law Annual 4(1981).   I concur with Friedman, who notes 
that “A more likely Jewish source for the ransom-divorce may be seen in that practice usually referred to as the 
Gaonic enactment concerning the moredet, the recalcitrant wife.  According to most traditions, this usage, 
instituted in Babylonia in 650-651, empowered a wife who could not bear living with her husband to initiate 
divorce proceedings.” Mordechai A. Friedman, "The ransom-divorce: divorce proceedings initiated by the wife in 
mediaeval Jewish practice," Israel Oriental studies 6(1976): 301.  Friedman further contends, “The iftidā’ was clearly 
undertaken by the wife on her own initiative, as a result of her unhappiness in the marriage.  The wife had 
renounced her claims against her husband on condition that he divorce her.” Ibid., 296.  Goitein concurred with 
Friedman and explained that the Arabic term for release ( arāʾa) sometimes referred to the divorce decree.  
Goitein, A Mediterranean society: v. 3, p. 267-8.  (See also texts #5 and #14 in Appendix I.) 
49 See footnote 28. 
50 Riskin, A Jewish woman's right to divorce: 56.  See also Menachem Elon, Jewish law: history, sources, principles [Ha-
mishpat ha-Ivri], trans. Bernard Auerbach and Melvin J. Sykes (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1994), v. 
2, p. 658-65 (discussing the Gaonic decree on the recalcitrant wife).  Libson explains, “There is ample evidence, for 
example, of women in the category known as ‘rebellious wife’ (ishah moredet) appealing to Muslim courts in order 
to circumvent Jewish law, which would not readily grant them a divorce; in such cases the geonim felt it necessary 
to deviate from talmudic law, in order to keep such women in the frame of Jewish courts…Thus, 
the geonim created a takkanah (enactment) that a ‘rebellious wife’ could obtain a divorce immediately, rather than 
wait the extensive time required by rabbinic law, without forfeiting the statutory value of her ketubbah (marriage 
contract).” Gideon Libson, "Jewish and Islamic law, a comparative review," in Encyclopaedia Judaica, ed. Michael 
Berenbaum and Fred Skolnik (Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2007), 265.  As will become clear, I challenge the 
view that this gaonic practice “deviated” from talmudic practice and argue that it should be understood as a 
customary practice, rather than an “innovative” enactment.  See Gideon Libson, "Halakhah and reality in the 
Gaonic period: taqqanah, minhag, tradition and consensus: some observations," in The Jews of medieval Islam: 
community, society, and identity, ed. Daniel Frank (Leiden: Brill, 1995), 72-74 and 84-86.  As a legal matter, I suspect 
that this Gaonic ‘taqqanah’ was more likely the continuation of an existing practice, which is generally suggested 
by Libson, but not specifically applied in this case. 
51 Friedman explains that “As far as the Geonim were concerned the fact that a wife could demand a divorce from 
her husband was not a new element introduced by the enactment.” Friedman, Jewish marriage in Palestine: v. 1, p. 
324.  Elsewhere, Friedman clarifies that “It would seem most likely that the practice which is referred to in our 
sources as iftidā’ and by Saadiah as xulʿ (ixtilāʿ) was nothing but the then accepted procedure for the recalcitrant 
wife, familiar to us from the Gaonic responsa.  The wife’s power to initiate divorce proceedings was thus 
recognized as standard procedure; and it was not necessary to write a special stipulation in the marriage contract, 
as was the Palestinian practice.” Friedman, "The ransom-divorce," 302. 
52 He is known as Yehudai Gaon.   ehudai ben Na man (d. late 8th century; Iraq), Sefer halakhot pesukot, ed. 
Solomon David Sassoon and Neil Danzig, Sifre Mekhon "Ahavat shalom" Yerushalayim (Jerusalem: Ahavat shalom, 
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1103 CE, Spain/Algeria), in his  efer ha-halkhot, written while he was living in Morocco, accepts 
the Gaonic practice (of coercing a husband to divorce a recalcitrant wife), but suggests that it is 
not based on talmudic practice.53 
To summarize, Gaonic divorce practices included: 
(1) A husband divorces his wife for whatever reason and pays her dower.54 
(2) A rabbinic court compels a husband to divorce his wife and pay the dower because the 
husband: 
a. has physical defects 
b. imposes unreasonable restrictions or behavior 
c. is sterile or impotent 
d. works in a profession considered disgusting 
(3) A husband divorces his wife and does not pay the dower because the court has declared the 
wife to be recalcitrant (i.e., a moredet or in breach of contract) or because the wife  
a. apostatized, ignored a Jewish precept, or acted immorally 
b. refused sexual relations with her husband or performance of ‘wifely duties’ 
c. has blemishes or physical defects that impinge the marital relationship 
(4) A wife divorces her husband, receiving either her full dower or part of it and without 
waiting twelve months. 
The final category was explicitly practiced in the Gaonic period, but it is unclear precisely who 
(husband or court) delivered the divorce decree.55 
 
Rishonim (1050-1400 CE) 
  In the post-Gaonic era, the Rishonim (roughly, medieval rabbis) further elaborated 
rabbinic opinions on when a woman could be divorced from her husband.56  Two sub-
categories in this period appear to have supplemented the rabbinic “short list” of grounds that 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
1998), 342 (it is valid for a non-rabbinic court to coerce a Jewish husband to divorce his wife if a rabbinic court 
authorizes the coercion). 
53 Rabbi Isaac Alfasi is known as the Rif.  Westreich notes that “R. Isaac Alfasi, active in the second half of the 
eleventh century, was the most prominent halakhist in Spain after the geonic period.   In his treatise,  efer ha-
halakhot, widespread throughout Spain (where he took refuge late in his life), he explicitly states that the ruling 
coercing the husband to divorce his rebellious wife originates in the geonic ordinance rather than in the Talmud 
itself.” Westreich, "The rise and decline," 209-10.   
54 But note that Rabbenu Gershom (d. 1028 CE) in Germany “enacted a decree which made it impossible for a 
husband to divorce his wife against her will.” Riskin, A Jewish woman's right to divorce: xii, 109. 
55 As in the case of evidence of Jewish women divorcing in antiquity, the interpretation of the historical record is 
obfuscated by an “orthodox” presumption that only husbands – not rabbinic courts – can deliver the divorce 
decree.  But the evidence of substantive flexibility (i.e., Jewish wives initiating divorces) insinuates some 
procedural flexibility (i.e., less formalism than the presumption that only husbands may deliver divorce decrees).  
Moreover, Karaites permitted judicial divorce decrees.  See footnote 131.  In addition, it is unclear if Islamic courts 
only coerced Jewish husbands to deliver divorce decrees or if they also provided judicial divorce decrees.  
56 Elaboration of Talmudic discussions include: (a) refusal or inability to provide wife sufficient maintenance 
(Joseph ben Ephraim Karo (d. 1575; Spain), Sh l an ʿ r  h  (1563), Even Haʿezer, Ketubbot 70:3.); (b) refusal of 
conjugal rights (ibid., Even Haʿezer, Ketubbot 76:11.); (c) husband’s inability to provide maintenance or sex (ibid., 
Even Haʿezer, Gī  īn, 154:3.).  A husband is compelled to divorce his wife if he engages in a disgusting profession 
(ibid., Even Haʿezer, Gī  īn, 154:1.)   
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warrant a court ordering a husband to divorce his wife: (1) the husband’s adultery57 and (2) the 
husband’s transgression of the laws of Moses (or apostasy).58  A woman’s ability to initiate a 
divorce without citing one of the grounds specified in the Babylonian Talmud became, during 
the period of the Rishonim, an issue debated by jurists with a variety of regional practices.59   
  Generally, the Rishonim debated a rabbinic court’s ability to coerce a husband to 
divorce his recalcitrant wife by making conflicting assertions about the so-called “origin” of 
the law: the Talmud or the Gaonic decree.  Rashi (d. 1105 CE, France) suggested that the Talmud 
was the source of the practice.60  His grandson (Rashbam, d. 1158 CE, France) upheld the decree 
by ruling that a husband should be coerced to divorce his recalcitrant wife.61  Rashbam’s 
brother, Rabbenu Tam (d. 1171 CE, France) rejected the Gaonic decree of coercing the husband 
to divorce his wife and effectively claimed that the Gaonic practice was unorthodox.62   
  In comparison, Maimonides (d. 1204 CE, Egypt) criticized, but did not entirely reject, 
Gaonic practices pertaining to a wife’s ability to demand a divorce as a recalcitrant wife 
(moredet).63  Maimonides differentiated between two types of recalcitrant wives: (a) one who 
“loathes” her husband must forfeit her dower in order for the husband to “be compelled to 
divorce her immediately”64 and (b) one who “rebels against her husband merely in order to 
torment him” becomes the subject of a daily public announcement threatening the forfeiture 
of her dower if she persists in her recalcitrance65; if she persists, then she is prohibited from 
                                                                  
57 Ibid. 
58 Maimonides (d. 1204; Spain/Egypt), Mishneh Torah: p. 27, 4.I.IV:15.  See also Karo (d. 1575; Spain), Sh l an ʿ r  h: 
Even Haʿezer, Gī  īn, 154:1. 
59 For a thorough discussion of the medieval debates on the recalcitrant wife doctrine, see Westreich, "The rise 
and decline." 
60 Rashi, Ketubbot 63b (see text #11 in Appendix I).  See also ibid., 212 (citing Rashi, Ketubot 63b). 
61 Ibid., 212 (citing Rashbam in Ṭur, Even Haʿezer, ch. 77).  
62 See text #12 in Appendix I.  See also ibid., 212 (citing  efer ha-yashar, Responsa sec. 24 and To afot, Ketubot 
63b). In his  efer ha-yashar, Rabbenu Tam claimed, “We hold the halakhic principle that Ravina and Rav Ashi are 
the last authoritative halakhic decisors, and even were the Geonim able to decree that a woman could collect her 
alimony from movable property, whether it be on the basis of Talmudic law or their own reasoned judgment, that 
is only as far as monetary value is concerned…we learned in the Talmud that [the Sages] did not force [a divorce] 
until twelve months, and they [the Geonim] advanced the forcing of the divorce before [the time which] the law 
[allows].” Riskin, A Jewish woman's right to divorce: 98-99.  Riskin suggests Rabbenu Tam’s influence: “Insisting that 
there was no Talmudic precedent for coercing a husband to divorce his wife on the basis of her subjective claim 
that he was repulsive to her, he rejected the earlier Gaonic decrees.  So overwhelming was his personality, and so 
cogent his legal reasoning, that his ruling influenced all subsequent halakhic authorities.  From his time onward, 
the tide turned in the other direction, and the position of earlier authorities such as Alfasi and Maimonides was 
rejected.  To this day the law is such that a woman who finds her husband distasteful has no legal recourse and 
must remain tied to a husband she abhors.” Ibid., xiii.  See also Westreich, "The rise and decline," 212.  See also 
Elon, Jewish law: v. 2, p. 661-62 (Rabbenu Tam invalidated the authority of Gaonim to enact divorce legislation). 
63 Maimonides (d. 1204; Spain/Egypt), Mishneh Torah: p. 90, 4.I.XIV:14.  See text #13 in Appendix I.   
64 Ibid., p. 88-89, 4.I.XIV:8.  
65 Shai Secunda has pointed out to me that this practice of making a public announcement is evident in 
Zoroastrian law, discussed in the Babylonian Talmud, and mentioned in the Palestinian Talmud in reference to a 
Babylonian sage.  Therefore, these public announcements were likely a Babylonian practice shared by many 
groups in that region. 
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receiving maintenance (i.e., alimony) for twelve months, when she finally receives her divorce 
decree.66   
  The debate among Rishonim about the legitimacy of the Gaonic decree was 
fundamentally related to broader questions of the authority of jurists.67  Rashba (d. 1310 CE, 
France) accepted Rabbenu Tam’s opinion that the Gaonic practice was not based on the 
Talmud, but did not describe it as legally invalid.68  Rabbenu Asher (d. 1327 CE, Spain) opposed 
the Gaonic decree on the grounds that it was not accepted by a majority of Jews and that social 
circumstances had changed since its enactment.69  By the early 14th century, a perspective of 
the Western Rishonim that the Gaonic decree was invalid began to take hold.  By the 16th 
century, a major Jewish law code required a woman to establish cause (under narrow 
circumstances) in order for a court to compel a divorce.70 
 It may be possible to differentiate the legal practices of the “East” – including Babylonia 
and North Africa – from the legal practices of the “West” – including primarily Europe.  Jewish 
communities in the East continued to coerce husbands to divorce their wives.  The perspective 
of Western rabbinic authorities appears to have arrived in the East at the end of the fourteenth 
century when two rabbinic jurists (Ribash and Rashbatz) moved from Spain to North Africa 
and prohibited coercion of a husband to divorce a recalcitrant wife.71 
This condensed chronology of Jewish women’s access to divorce indicates that a 
prevalent Eastern practice of rabbinic courts coercing husbands to divorce “recalcitrant” 
wives was gradually abolished by Western Rishonim (late medieval rabbis) as a result of its 
characterization as unorthodox.72  Rather than resolve the debate about the orthodoxy (or lack 
thereof) of the Gaonic practice, I want to turn to the Islamic chronology, which may elucidate 
some of the confusion in the authority issues of the Jewish chronology. 
                                                                  
66 Maimonides (d. 1204; Spain/Egypt), Mishneh Torah: 4.I.XIV:9-13 (p. 89-90).  
67 This is evident in many rabbinic texts and appears explicitly in Rabbi Yitzhak Ben Moshe (d. 1250, Vienna),  efer 
or zaruʿa.  See text #15 in Appendix I. 
68 See text #16 in Appendix I.  See also Westreich, "The rise and decline," 213-14.  Rashba claims that “It is now 
fitting to be very cautious about this issue, and not to act in accordance with this [Gaonic] decree at all, for it has 
already been nullified because of the generation.” Riskin, A Jewish woman's right to divorce: 119. 
69 Rabbenu Asher is known as the Rosh.  See text #17 in Appendix I.  Riskin, A Jewish woman's right to divorce: 126-27 
(Rosh claims that the Gaonic decree was for a particular generation and that Rabbenu Gershom represented 
uninterruped rabbinic tradition).  See also Elon, Jewish law: v. 2, p. 662-65.   
70 The Shul an ʿ r  h implies that a court will only coerce a husband to divorce his wife in calamitous 
circumstances.  Riskin, A Jewish woman's right to divorce: 133. 
71 Ribash is Rabbi Isaac Bar Sheshet (d. 1408, Spain/Algiers) and Rashbatzh (also Tashbatz) is Simeon ben Zemah 
Duran (d. 1444, Spain/Algiers) Westreich, "The rise and decline," 216-17. 
72 How to interpret the historical evidence of Jewish women initiating divorces is the crucial issue here.  Friedman 
summarized that “Jewish law certainly never empowered a wife to unilaterally issue a ge  and divorce her 
husband.  However, during a millennium and a half it was stipulated in ketubbot and rabbis eventually recognized 
as binding that through the wife’s initiative, if she found life with her husband unbearable, the court would take 
action to terminate the marriage.” Friedman, Geniza studies in Jewish marriage law: 27. 
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III. An Islamic chronology of wife-initiated divorce73 
 
Legal circles (610-750 CE) 
Most of the Qurʾānic verses dealing with the subject of divorce are addressed to men 
and discuss the post-divorce waiting period and alimony.74  But one key verse declares: “if you 
fear that they (the couple) cannot maintain God’s limits, then it will not be held against them 
(the couple) if she (the wife) forfeits something.”75  Major exegetical texts and other historical 
sources cite a story in which the Prophet approves a woman returning her dower (mahr) to 
effect a divorce.76  This is corroborated by a report that ʿUmar (d. 644), the second caliph, 
condemned criticism of women who demand a divorce by forfeiting their dower (what is 
known as  hulʿ).77  Thus, some form of payout is presumed to accompany the act of divorce and 
it is the initiating party – husband or wife – who effectively pays for termination of the 
marriage contract.   
Examining some of the earliest compilations of reports (muṣannafāt) can illuminate the 
orally-transmitted traditions from the era of the Prophet.78  These texts indicate at least three 
late antique Islamic divorce practices, all of which were recognized as valid without judicial 
intervention: 
(1) The most frequently discussed situation is of a husband divorcing his wife and paying a 
divorce settlement.79 
(2) A husband offers his wife the option of choosing divorce or staying with him; if she chooses 
divorce, he pays her a divorce settlement.80 
                                                                  
73 The periodization used in this section is my own and is not standard in the field of Islamic legal studies.  This 
Islamic periodization is elaborated and substantiated in a work-in-progress article, “Toward a genealogy of 
Islamic law.”   
74 The relevant verses are Qurʾān 2:228-232, 2:236-237, 2:241; 65:1-7; 4:35. 
75 Qurʾān 2:229. (Translations are my own unless otherwise noted.) 
76 This is a narrative about a woman named Ḥabībah.  ʿAbd al-Razzāq ibn Hammām al-Ḥimyarī al- anʿānī (d. 827;
Yemen), uṣannaf fī al- adīth, ed. Ḥabīb al-Ra mān al-ʿAẓamī, 11 vols. (Beirut: al-Maktab al-Islāmī, 1970-), v. 6, 502-
03.  The same narrative is reported in al-Bukhārī, Abū Dāwūd, al-Nasāʾī, and other texts.  Mu ammad ibn  azīd 
Ibn Mājah (d. 887; Iran), Sunan al- uṣ af , ed. Abī al-Ḥasan  Mu ammad  Ibn ʿAbd al-Hādī al-Sindī Ḥanafī, 2 vols. 
(Beirut: Al-Fikr, 1975), v. 1, p. 633 (implying that Ḥabībah pursued khulʿ because her husband was repulsive).  See 
also al-Shāfiʿī (d. 820; Arabia/Egypt), al-Umm: v. 6, p. 500, no. 2503 & no. 04.  Some versions of the narrative suggest 
that the husband was not consulted, but rather that the Prophet simply ordered the woman (Ḥabībah) to give 
back the garden she had received as her dower and the husband, upon learning of the Prophet’s decision, 
acquiesced.  This is a key procedural issue, since a husband’s unilateral prerogative to effect the divorce is not 
substantiated by all versions of this narrative. 
77 Ibn Abī Shaybah (d. 849; Iraq), uṣannaf: v. 4, p. 201.  
78 Two of the earliest surviving sources are of al- anʿānī (d. 827) and Ibn Abī Shaybah (d. 849).  I mine these sources 
for historical information about the mid-seventh to mid-eighth centuries.  On the reliability of these sources, see 
Motzki, "The mu annaf of  Abd al-Razzāq al- an ānī."  See also Motzki, Ḥadīth: origins and developments. 
79 Ibn Abī Shaybah (d. 849; Iraq),  uṣannaf: v. 4, kitāb al-talāq, passim.  al-Shāfiʿī (d. 820; Arabia/Egypt), al-Umm: v. 
6, passim. 
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(3) A wife divorces her husband and she pays some form of divorce settlement by 
relinquishing part or all of her dower.81 
In other words, the available historical evidence unambiguously records a wife’s ability to 
initiate and to effect a divorce in seventh century Arabia. 
 
Professionalization of legal schools (750-1050 CE) 
A comparison between the earlier  adīth collections (muṣannafāt) with slightly later, 
canonical ones, reveals that most of the later texts reduce the number of reports about wife-
initiated divorce (khulʿ) and include reports limiting such divorces to situations of the 
husband’s consent only.82  This is manifested most clearly in narratives that describe khulʿ 
divorces: wherein earlier texts included women’s voices, in later texts it is primarily men 
enacting khulʿ.83  Thus, whereas khulʿ seemed to have simply been the term used for wife-
initiated divorce in an earlier period, it became a term used for divorce situations in which the 
husband paid less than the full divorce settlement.84  Indeed, most Muslim jurists interpreted 
narratives about the Prophetic precedent permitting wife-initiated divorce85 as including a 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
80 This is based on a Prophetic precedent. Abū  ūsuf (d. 798; Iraq), Kitā  al-āthār: 139-41.  al-Ḥimyarī al- anʿānī (d.
827; Yemen), uṣannaf: v. 6, p. 515-26 and v. 7, p. 3-16.  Ibn Abī Shaybah (d. 849; Iraq),  uṣannaf: v. 4, p. 89-90.  Ibn 
Mājah (d. 887; Iran), Sunan al- uṣ af : v. 1, p. 632 (Prophet offered his wives divorce option). 
81 al-Ḥimyarī al- anʿānī  (d.  827;   emen), uṣannaf: v. 6, 490-91, 94-95, 500-06. Ibn Abī Shaybah (d. 849; Iraq), 
 uṣannaf: v. 4, p. 120-23, 28-29.  See also Bukhārī (d. 870; Khurāsān),  a ī  al-Bu hārī: v. 7, p. 149-51.  Notably, one 
of the narratives in the latter collection is of a woman who goes to the caliph and states that she regrets divorcing 
her husband.  Such a narrative could only be possible if women had the ability to divorce their husbands.  This is 
also recognized in Shīʿī sources. Madanī (d. 825), asāʾil ʿ lī i n Jaʿfar wa-mustadra ātuhā: 283 (Imāmī Shīʿī: a woman 
relinquishes any monetary claims agianst the husband in wife-initiated divorce).  There was a minority opinion 
that prohibited this option and another minority opinion that only permitted it with judicial intervention; but 
neither of these positions were normative. ʿAblah Ka lāwī, al-Khulʿ: dawāʾ mā lā dawāʾ la-hu: dirāsah fi hīyah 
mu āranah  (Cairo: Dār al-Rashād, 2000), 68-69.   
82 I compared the muṣannafāt of al- anʿānī (d. 827) and Ibn Abī Shaybah (d. 849) to Scott Lucas’s schematic study of
the texts of Bukhārī (d. 870), Muslim (d. 875), Dārimī (d.  869),  Ibn  Mājah  (d.  887),  Abū Dāwūd (d.  889),  and  al-
Tirmidhī (d. 892).  I found that later texts have fewer reports about  hulʾ and suggest several conditions (including 
a husband’s consent) that were not explicit in earlier texts.  Scott C. Lucas, "Divorce,  adīth-scholar style: from al-
Dārimī to al-Tirmidhī," Journal of Islamic Studies 19, no. 3 (2008): 368.   
83 By “earlier” and “later” I refer not only to the dating of specific texts, but also to the dating of the materials in 
the texts.  Later sources tend to introduce  hulʾ in the feminine verbal form, but then exclusively or primarily 
offer examples of men initiating this divorce.  See, for example, al-Shāfiʿī (d. 820; Arabia/Egypt), al-Umm: v. 6, p. 
502 (discussing khulʿ as a man's prerogative).  That many legal texts begin the section on  hulʿ by discussing a 
woman’s decision to divorce her husband suggests that women had some autonomy in this matter.  See, for 
example, Abū Is āq Ibrāhīm ibn ʿAlī ibn  ūsuf Fīrūzābādī al-Shīrāzī (d. 1083; Iran), al- uhadhdha  fī fi h al-Imām al-
Shāfiʿī, ed. Zakarīyā ʿUmayrāt and Mu ammad ibn A mad Ba  āl, 3 vols. (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmīyah, 1995), v. 
2, p. 489 (Shāfiʿī; section begins, "if a woman dislikes her husband...she may divorce him...").  But much of the 
subsequent discussions in these texts focus on a husband verbalizing or effecting the divorce through his oral 
proclamation.   
84 A husband can divorce through  hulʿ and pay less than the full settlement if (a) wife is recalcitrant; (b) wife 
commits a sin; (c) wife is disobedient.  ʿAbd al-Ra mān Jazīrī et al., Kitā  al-fiqh ʿal  al-madhāhi  al-ar aʿah wa 
madhhab ahl al-bayt, 5 vols. (Beirut: Dār al-Thaqalayn, 1998), v. 4, 472 (Mālikīs recommending khulʿ divorce of a 
recalcitrant wife), 73 (Ḥanbalis permitting khulʿ divorce of a recalcitrant wife).  See also ʿ mir  Saʿīd Zaybārī, 
   ām al- hulʿ fī al-sharīʿah al-islāmīyah  (Beirut: Dār Ibn Ḥazm, 1997), 75-76. 
85 See footnote 76. 
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requirement of the husband’s consent86 or as being prompted by a situation of abuse.87   
Additionally, some legal texts of this period associate wife-initiated divorce (khulʿ) and 
recalcitrant wives, which is not evident in  adīth compilations.88  Consequently, the legal 
possibility that seems to emerge in this period is a husband’s option to divorce his wife and not 
pay the full dower if she is considered recalcitrant (nashiz).89  The legal option of husbands 
paying less than the divorce settlement does not have a Prophetic legal precedent.90  Instead, it 
appears to have been elaborated by Muslim jurists in this period; notably, it resembles the 
rabbinic practices mentioned above.  Regardless of the initiating party (wife or husband), 
jurists debated the classification of  hulʿ as either a revocable divorce or irrevocable 
rescission.91  To summarize, by the end of the professionalization period, the following divorce 
practices were recognized92: 
(1) A husband divorces his wife for whatever reason and pays the divorce settlement in full. 
                                                                  
86 Arabi has also observed that the Ḥabībah narrative in the canonical text of al-Bukhārī does not indicate the 
husband’s permission was necessary for wife-initiated divorce. Arabi, "The dawning," 20. 
87 While Dārimī, Ibn Mājah, Abū Dāwūd, and al-Tirmidhī include a category of reports preventing a woman from 
seeking to divorce a non-abusive husband, the other texts (i.e., Bukhārī and Muslim) do not.  See Lucas, "Divorce, 
 adīth-scholar style: from al-Dārimī to al-Tirmidhī," 368.  Some sources includes several reports implying that it 
is wrong for a woman to demand a divorce without sufficient “justification.” See Ibn Mājah (d. 887; Iran), Sunan al-
 uṣ af : v. 1, p. 632-33.  And see Tirmidhī (d. 892; Khurāsān), Sunan al-Tirmidhī wa-huwa al-Jāmiʿ al-ṣahī : v. 2, p. 429-
30 (narratives about the evils of a woman demanding a divorce without sufficient justification).  By way of 
illustration, Nasāʾī (d. 915) and Ṭabarānī (d. 971) narrate the Prophetic story about the woman divorcing her 
husband and returning her dower (which is narrated in earlier collections), but add that the husband was abusive 
(which does not appear in earlier collections).  Ka lāwī, al-Khulʿ: 63.  See also al-Shīrāzī (d. 1083; Iran), al-
Muhadhdhab: v. 2, p. 71-72 (Shāfiʿī: Jamīlah pursued a khulʾ divorce because her husband was abusive).  But see that 
Bājī includes the narrative about Ḥabībah without stipulating the husband’s consent and includes a narrative 
about a woman who divorced (i htalʿat, feminine form of the verb  hulʿ) her husband. Sulaymān ibn Khalaf Bājī (d. 
1081; Spain), al- unta  : shar  muwa  aʾ  āli , ed. Mu ammad ʿAbd al-Qādir ʿA ā, 9 vols. (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-
ʿIlmīyah, 1999), v. 5, p. 295-300.   
88 Again, this is based on my comparison of muṣannafāt to later collections.  See the beginning of the section on 
khulʿ in Sa nūn (d. 854; Tunisia) et al., al-Mudawwanah: v. 2, 241-51.  Reports about a recalcitrant wife and wife-
initiated divorce are juxtaposed in al-Shāfiʿī (d. 820; Arabia/Egypt), al-Umm: v. 6 (kitāb al-khulʿ wa al-nushūz).  The 
section on recalcitrance (nush z) appears immediately before the section on wife-initiated divorce (khulʿ) in al-
Shīrāzī (d. 1083; Iran), al-Muhadhdhab: v. 2, p. 71-78 (Shāfiʿī: section on recalcitrance immediately precedes section 
on khulʿ).  In a different edition: al-Shīrāzī (d. 1083; Iran), al-Muhadhdhab: v. 2, p. 486-99.  Some Muslim jurists 
viewed khulʿ as being only permissible in situations of recalcitrance or loathing.  Ka lāwī, al-Khulʿ: 68.    
89 According to the Mālikī school and others.  See Jazīrī et al., Kitā  al-fiqh: v. 4, p. 472. 
90 In other words, there are no references to this practice in biographical or historical texts; in addition, the 
jurisprudential texts do not cite a Prophetic precedent.  There is no indication in the historical sources that a 
Muslim man in the Prophetic period could divorce a woman without paying the full dower. 
91 Awzāʿī (d. 774; Syria), Sunan al- wzāʿī: 338 (Awzāʿī: khulʿ is a revocable divorce).  Abū  ūsuf (d. 798; Iraq), Kitā  al-
āthār: p. 129 (Ḥanafī: a separation initiated by the wife is irrevocable).  Ibn Barakah (d. 10th; ʿUmān), Kitā  al- āmiʿ: 
v. 2, p. 196 (Ibāḍī: khulʿ is a revocable divorce).  Ibn Abī Zayd al-Qayrawānī (d. 996; Tunisia), al-Risālah al-fi hīyah: 
202   05 (Mālikī: khulʿ is irrevocable).  Note, there are conflicting opinions within each legal school; see Ka lāwī, 
al-Khulʿ: 113-17 (summarizing which jurists/legal schools view khulʿ as irrevocable or revocable divorce).     
92 Ibn Ḥazm synopsizes juristic opinions by noting that some jurists prohibit  hulʿ, while others make it 
conditional upon one of the following factors: (a) a political leader permits it; (b) the wife is having an affair; (c) 
the husband is abusive; (d) she refuses to purify herself; (e) she claims that her husband is repulsive; (f) she 
dislikes him and he is not compelling her (to relinquish her dower). Ibn Ḥazm (d. 1064; Spain), arāti  al-i māʿ fī al-
ʿibādāt wa-al-muʿāmālat wa-al-iʿtiqādāt: p. 74-75 (Ẓāhirī).  See also Ibn Ḥazm (d. 1064; Spain), al- u allā: v. 10, p. 286-
97 (Ẓāhirī).   
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(2) A husband divorces his wife and pays less than the divorce settlement under the category 
of  hulʿ, possibly because the wife is recalcitrant or immoral.93 
(3) A court declares a wife divorced and the husband pays the divorce settlement for the 
following reasons: 
a. if the husband is impotent or has a severe defect or disease94 
b. if the husband deserts the wife, fails to provide her maintenance, or is cruel95 
c. if the husband is insane96 
(4) A wife divorces her husband97 and forfeits the divorce settlement (dower) partially, 
completely, or even in excess under specific circumstances.98  According to many jurists, 
the husband’s consent is required.99 
(5) A husband offers his wife the option of choosing divorce or staying with him; if she chooses 
divorce, he pays her a divorce settlement.100 
                                                                  
93 Ḥanbalīs prohibit his taking more than the wife’s dower, whereas Mālikīs and Shāfiʿīs permit husbands to take as
much as, less than, or more than the dower amount he gave her.  Awzāʿī (d. 774; Syria), Sunan al- wzāʿī: 338 
(Awzāʿī: a husband may not take more than the dower in a khulʿ divorce).  al-Shāfiʿī (d. 820; Arabia/Egypt), al-
Umm: v. 6, p. 501.  Ibn Barakah (d. 10th; ʿUmān), Kitā  al- āmiʿ: v. 2, p. 195 (Ibāḍī: husband may not take more than 
dower in khulʿ).  Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr (d. 1070; Spain), Kitā  al- āfī: v. 2, p. 593 (Mālikī: defining khulʿ as wife losing 
entire dower and fidya as wife losing part of dower).  See also Kuwait, al- aws ʿa al-fiqhiyyah, vol. 19 (Kuwait: 
Ministry of trusts and Islamic affairs, 1990), 243. 
94 “An impotent husband must be allowed a year’s probation after which divorce takes place” and the wife is 
entitled to keep the entire dower.  ʿAlī ibn Abī Bakr Marghīnānī (d. 1197; Farghāna), The Hidaya: commentary on the 
Islamic laws, trans. Zahra Baintner, 2 vols. (Karachi: Darul Ishaat, 2007), v. 2, p. 217 (Ḥanafī).  See also Jazīrī et al., 
Kitā  al-fiqh: passim. 
95 al-Nawawī (d. 1277; Syria) et al., al- a m ʿ: v. 17, p. 110-12 (Shāfiʿī: if a husband cannot support his wife, they are
divorced).  See also Kuwait, al- aws ʿa al-fiqhiyyah, 19. 
96 But, there is a Ḥanafī opinion that a woman cannot demand judicial divorce if her husband is mentally 
incompetent or has a serious disease.  Marghīnānī (d. 1197; Farghāna), The Hidaya: v. 2, p.219 (Ḥanafī).  See also 
Kuwait, al- aws ʿa al-fiqhiyyah, 19. 
97 A wife can demand  hulʿ if (a) wife finds husband disgusting (incompatibility); (b) husband is abusive; (c) wife 
fears that she cannot be faithful. Sarakhsī (d. 11th cent; Transoxania), Kitā  al- a s  : v. 6, p. 171 (Ḥanafī: "if a 
woman divorces her husband...").   
98 The possibility that a husband could take in excess of the dower was a subject of juristic debate.  Mālik Ibn Anas 
(d. 796; Arabia), Muwa  aʾ al-Imām āli , ed. ʿAbd al-Wahhāb ʿAbd al-La īf, 2nd ed. (Beirut: al-Ma baʿah al-ʿIlmīyah, 
1979), 188-89 (unfavorable, but permitted, for husband to take more than dower in khulʿ).  Ibn Mājah (d. 887; Iran), 
Sunan al- uṣ af : v. 1, p. 633 (wife returns only her dower, not more, in khulʿ).  Ibn Barakah (d. 10th; ʿUmān), Kitā  
al- āmiʿ: v. 2, p. 195 (Ibāḍī: it is not permissible for a husband to take more than the dower in khulʿ).   Ibn Abī Zayd 
al-Qayrawānī (d. 996; Tunisia), al-Risālah al-fi hīyah: p. 205 (Mālikī: a wife may offer her dower, less, or more in 
khulʿ). 
99 While all the legal schools accept the validity of  hulʿ, most legal schools view it as a negotiated settlement.  Ibn 
Ḥazm (d. 1064; Spain), al- u allā: v. 10, p. 286 (Ẓāhirī: khulʿ only by mutual consent).  Ḥanafīs require the husband
to accept the wife’s  hulʿ offer in order for a divorce to be valid.  Jazīrī et al., Kitā  al-fiqh: v. 4, 494.  This resembles 
the common – although likely not universal – rabbinic perspective that a husband must deliver a get for a divorce 
to occur.   
100 Ibn Anas (d. 796; Arabia), Muwa  aʾ al-Imām  āli : p. 191-92 (giving wife divorce option with full dower). Abū 
 ūsuf (d. 798; Iraq), Kitā  al-āthār: p. 139-41 (Ḥanafī: women given choice to divorce and receive dowers).  Bishr 
ibn Ghānim al-Khurāsānī al-Ibāḍī (d. ca. 815; Khurāsān), Mudawwanah al-kubrá, 2 vols. ( man: Wizārat al-Turāth al-
Qawmī wa-al-Thaqāfah, 1984), v. 2, p. 56-67 (Ibāḍī).  Sarakhsī (d. 11th cent; Transoxania), Kitā  al- a s  : v. 6, p. 
210-23 (Ḥanafī: giving wife divorce option with full dower).  Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr (d. 1070; Spain), Kitā  al- āfī: v. 2, p. 
587-91 (Mālikī: giving wife divorce option with full dower).  But see Ibn Ḥazm negating the possibility of a woman 
being given the option of choosing divorce. Ibn Ḥazm (d. 1064; Spain), al- u allā: v. 10, p. 144-53 (Ẓāhirī). 
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When compared to the previous period, a wife’s ability to initiate divorce was circumscribed. 
 
Consolidation (1050-1400 CE) 
By the late medieval period, Muslim jurists had elaborated more details surrounding 
the divorce practices of the professionalization period.101  Jurists developed a taxonomy for 
divorce settlement types paid by a wife by trying to assign different terms for divorces in 
which the wife loses the dower, or more or less than the dower.102  They also continued to 
debate the classification of wife-initiated divorce as a revocable or irrevocable divorce 
(roughly equivalent to breach and rescission of the marriage contract).103  To summarize, 
Ḥanafīs, Mālikīs, later Shāfiʿīs, minority Ḥanbalīs, Ẓāhirīs, and a majority of late antique jurists 
viewed  hulʿ as equivalent to divorce and, therefore, revocable; but earlier Shāfiʿīs, a majority 
of Ḥanbalīs, and a minority of late antique jurists considered  hulʿ to be faskh, with the result 
that it is irrevocable.104  While there is no indication that jurists prohibited any of the divorce 
                                                                  
101 Ibn Rushd summarizes these medieval juristic perspectives: “Five opinions are, thus derived for  hulʿ.  First, 
that is not permitted at all.  Second, it is permitted in all circumstances, that is, even under duress.  Third, it is not 
permitted unless fornication is witnessed.  Fourth, it is permitted when there is fear that the limits imposed by 
Allāh will not be maintained.  Fifth, that it is permitted in all circumstances, except under duress, which is the 
most widely accepted (mashh r) opinion.” Ibn Rushd II (d. 1198; Spain/Morocco), Jurist's Primer: v. 2, p. 81. 
102 Jurists debated the permissibility of a husband taking more than the dower from the wife in  hulʿ.  Ibn Rushd 
summarizes this debate: “The term  hulʿ, however, in the opinion of the jurists is confined to her paying him all 
that he spent on her, the term ṣul  to paying a part of it, fidya to paying more than it, and mu āraʾah to her writing 
off a claim that she had against him.” Ibid., v. 2, p. 79.  Still, there is a difference of opinion on the possibility of a 
husband taking more than the divorce settlement in fidya.  See also: Marghīnānī (d. 1197; Farghāna), The Hidaya: v. 
2, p. 194-95 (Ḥanafī: it is legally permissible for husband to take more than the dower).  Ibn Qudāmah al-Maqdīsī 
(d. 1223; Syria), al- ughnī: v. 10, p. 269-70 (Ḥanbalī: it is permissible, but unfavorable, for husband to take more 
than dower; notes conflicting juristic opinions).  Majd al-Dīn Abī al-Barakāt ʿAbd al-Salām ibn ʿAbd Allāh ibn al-
Khiḍr Ibn Taymīyah al-Ḥarrānī (d.  1254/5; Syria/Iraq), u arrar fī al-fiqh ʿalá madhhab al-Imām   mad i n Ḥan al, 
ed. Shams al-Dīn Ibn Mufli  al-Ḥanbalī al-Maqdisī (d. 1362; Syria), Mu ammad Ḥasan Mu ammad Ḥasan Ismāʿīl, 
and A mad Ma rūs Jaʿfar  āli , 2 vols. (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmīyah, 1999), v. 2, p. 99 (Ḥanbalī: khulʿ divorce 
settlement may not exceed dower).  Mu aqqiq al-Ḥillī (d.  1277;  Iraq), u htaṣar: 227-28 (Imāmī Shīʿī: discussing 
debate about fidya).  The majority Shāfiʿī opinion permits a husband to take more than the dower as part of the 
 hulʿ divorce settlement, whereas the minority Shāfiʿī opinion disapproves of this practice. al-Nawawī (d. 1277; 
Syria) et al., al- a m ʿ: v. 16, p. 8-9 (Shāfiʿī: discussing divorce settlement amounts).  Shahīd al-Awwal (d. 1384; 
Syria), al- umʿah: 199-200 (Imāmī Shīʿī: he may take more than the dower in khulʿ; he may not take more than 
dower in mubāraʾah).  The two main juristic opinions (for and against a husband taking more than the dower in a 
 hulʿ divorce) are summarized in Ka lāwī, al-Khulʿ: 140-43.    
103 Zamakhsharī explains that  hulʿ is a revocable divorce ( alā ) for Ḥanafīs, whereas it is an irrevocable divorce 
(faskh) for Shāfiʿīs.  The difference is that Ḥanafīs permit reconciliation between the spouses under the original 
contract, whereas Shāfiʿīs do not.  Zamakhsharī (d. 1144; Khwārazm), Ruʾ s al-masāʾil (al-masāʾil al-khilāfīyah  ayna 
al-Ḥanafīyah wa-al-Shāfiʿīyah): 404-06.  See also: Ma mūd ibn A mad Marghīnānī (d. 1219/20; Farghāna), al- u ī  al-
 urhānī fī al-fiqh al-Nuʿmānī, ed. A mad ʿIzzū ʿInāyah, 11 vols. (Beirut: Dār I yāʾ al-Turāth al-ʿArabī, 2003), v. 3, p. 
501 (Ḥanafī: khulʿ is revocable divorce). Ibn Qudāmah al-Maqdīsī (d. 1223; Syria), al- ughnī: v. 10, p. 274-75 
(Ḥanbalī: cites conflicting reports among jurists about khulʿ as revocable or irrevocable).  Ibn Taymīyah al-Ḥarrānī
(d. 1254/5; Syria/Iraq),  u arrar: v. 2, p. 98 (Ḥanbalī: khulʿ is an irrevocable divorce).  Mu aqqiq al-Ḥillī (d. 1277;
Iraq), u htaṣar: 227 (Imāmī Shīʿī: summarizing debate on revocability of khulʿ).  al-Zaylaʿī al-Ḥanafī (d. 1342/3) et 
al., Ta yīn al- a āʾiq: v. 3, p. 182 (Ḥanafī: khulʿ is irrevocable divorce). 
104 Mu  af  Dhahabī, al-Khulʿ wa-a  āmuhu fī al-sharīʿah al-islāmīyah  (Cairo: Dār al-Ḥadīth, 2000), 60. 
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types previously practiced105, the distinctions between earlier and later legal texts imply that a 
woman’s access to divorce became limited to particular circumstances.106  In theory, women 
still had the legal right to divorce their husbands by paying a divorce settlement.107  Yet, 
juristic restrictions (as outlined in jurisprudential texts) seem to have limited this right to 
cases where a wife could establish grounds for divorce or to situations where the husband 
concedes to the divorce settlement.108  Notably, juristic discussions of wife-initiated divorce 
often occur adjacent to or in conjunction with the topic of recalcitrance.109  Still, court records 
                                                                  
105 For instance, men continued to give women the option of divorce and receiving the full divorce settlement, as 
evidenced in medieval juristic texts.  Marghīnānī (d. 1197; Farghāna), Guidance: 593-605 (Ḥanafī: women given 
choice to divorce and receive dowers).  al-Shīrāzī (d. 1083; Iran), al-Muhadhdhab: v. 2, p. 83-84 (Shāfiʿī: husband 
gives wife option to divorce and receive full dower).  al-Nawawī (d. 1277; Syria) et al., al- a m ʿ: v. 16, p. 88-93 
(Shāfiʿī: husband offers wife divorce option).  Jurists distinguish between “ta hyīr (granting a choice) and tamlī  
(granting possession of the right).” Ibn Rushd II (d. 1198; Spain/Morocco), Jurist's Primer: v. 2, p. 84 (summarizing 
the juristic debates on these divorce types).   atāwá al-ʿ lamgīrīyah (1664-1672): v. 1, p. 387-409 (Ḥanafī: men giving 
women divorce option without losing dower).   
106 For example, a Shāfiʿī text cites the main  adīth (as precedent) about a woman (Jamīlah) who pursued a  hulʿ 
divorce because her husband was abusive, but jurists cautioned against allowing  hulʿ when a husband is 
intentionally abusive in order to avoid paying the divorce settlement.  al-Nawawī (d. 1277; Syria) et al., al- a m ʿ: 
v. 16, p. 3-6 (Shāfiʿī: physical abuse as provoking wife-initiated divorce).  Notably, this suggestion that Jamīlah’s 
husband was abusive is not cited in many other versions of this narrative.  Other texts cite a narrative about a 
woman (Ḥabībah) who initiated a divorce because she found her husband repulsive.  Nūr al-Dīn ʿAlī ibn Abī Bakr 
Haythamī (d. 1405), Ghāyat al-ma ṣ d fī zawāʾid al-Musnad, ed. Khalāf Ma mūd ʿAbd al-Samīʿ, 4 vols. (Beirut: Dār al-
Kutub al-ʿIlmīyah, 2001), v. 2, p. 267-68 (Shāfiʿī: implying that Ḥabībah pursued khulʿ because her husband was 
repulsive).  This particular language about a wife being repulsed by her husband corresponds to the rabbinic 
terminology of when a woman may initiate divorce (see previous section). 
107 Ibn Rushd notes that “there is no dispute that a woman possessing discretion (a rashīda) has a right to transact 
redemption herself.” Ibn Rushd II (d. 1198; Spain/Morocco), Jurist's Primer: v. 2, p. 82.  See also Ibn Qudāmah al-
Maqdīsī (d. 1223; Syria), al- ughnī: v. 10, p. 267 (Ḥanbalī: wife has the right to "ransom" divorce).  al-Nawawī (d. 
1277; Syria) et al., al- a m ʿ: v. 16, p. 2 (Shāfiʿī: "if a woman loathes her husband...she may remove him by [paying] 
compensation...").  But numerous legal texts apply the term khulʿ to a husband divorcing his wife and not paying 
the full divorce settlement.  See, for example, al-Shīrāzī (d. 1083; Iran), al-Muhadhdhab: v. 2, p. 490-91 (Shāfiʿī).  
Most legal texts recognize that either spouse may divorce the other through  hulʿ.  al-Nawawī (d. 1277; Syria) et 
al., al- a m ʿ: v. 16, p. 37 (Shāfiʿī: either spouse initiates khulʿ).   atāwá al-ʿ lamgīrīyah (1664-1672): v. 1, p. 488 
(Ḥanafī: khulʿ in the masculine verbal form).  There is some inconsistency between the practice being identified as 
a woman’s option, but specified as necessitating a husband’s verbalization of the divorce. 
108 Ibn Rushd explains “the conditions in which redemption is permissible, the majority held that it is permitted 
with the mutual consent of the parties, unless consent to pay him is obtained by fear of injury to her.” Ibn Rushd 
II (d. 1198; Spain/Morocco), Jurist's Primer: v. 2, p. 81.  Marghīnānī (d. 1197; Farghāna), The Hidaya: v. 2, p. 194 
(Ḥanafī: implying that khulʿ necessitates mutual consent).   atāwá al-ʿ lamgīrīyah (1664-1672): v. 1, p. 488 (Ḥanafī: 
implying through dual verbal form that khulʿ is mutual agreement between spouses).  Jurists acknowledge that 
either spouse may initiate  hulʿ, but do not account for how to deal with a husband’s refusal. Ibn al-Naqīb (d. 1368; 
Egypt), ʿUmdat al-sāli  wa-ʿuddat al-nāsi : 336 (Shāfiʿī: khulʿ is permissible when one or both spouses want to end the 
marriage).   
109 Ibn Taymīyah al-Ḥarrānī  (d.  1254/5;  Syria/Iraq), u arrar: v. 2, p. 95   97 (Ḥanbalī: section on recalcitrance 
immediately precedes section on khulʿ).  al-Zaylaʿī al-Ḥanafī (d. 1342/3) et al., Ta yīn al- a āʾiq: v. 3, p. 185 (Ḥanafī: 
Prophetic precedent concerning Ḥabibah’s khulʿ divorce is explicitly interpreted as an example of a woman’s 
recalcitrance).   atāwá al-ʿ lamgīrīyah (1664-1672): v. 1, p. 488 (Ḥanafī: associating khulʿ with nushūz of either 
spouse).  Contemporary Egyptian Islamist-feminist ʿAblah Ka lāwī begins her monograph on  hulʿ with a 
discussion of recalcitrance (nush z), but argues that recalcitrance is not a condition for  hulʿ divorces.  Ka lāwī, al-
Khulʿ: 64.   
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from later Islamic periods establish that women continued to acquire divorces by forfeiting 
part or all of their dowers.110   
What this condensed chronology of Muslim women’s access to divorce suggests is that 
jurists gradually interfered with a wife’s ability to divorce her husband.  Notably, husbands 
gained the option of divorcing and paying less than the standard divorce settlement in 
situations where the wife was deemed recalcitrant. 
 
IV. Disenchanting the orthodox narratives111 
  Thus far, I have presented two distinct chronologies – one Judaic and the other Islamic 
– that outline historical changes in how jurists of each community conceptualized a woman’s 
right to divorce.  In both of these chronologies, jurists interpreted the legal opinions and 
practices of their predecessors within a juristic construction of historical “truth” that informs 
legal orthodoxy.  The orthodox Islamic legal story construes historical (specifically Prophetic) 
precedents as requiring a husband’s consent to wife-initiated divorce.  Distinctions between 
the legal practices of the late antique and medieval periods are elided to create a seamless 
narrative of women only being able to negotiate a divorce by forfeiting their dowers – or more.   
  Similarly, the orthodox Jewish legal story narrates legal changes to legitimate 
contemporary dominant practice.  In what is described as the Rabbinic period (70-620 CE), 
women did not have a no-fault divorce option because they could only initiate a divorce if they 
could prove just cause.  In the Gaonic period (620-1050 CE), the rabbis felt “pressured” by the 
influence of Islamic courts to change existing practices by facilitating a no-fault divorce option 
for women.  In the era of the Rishonim (1050-1400 CE), the rabbis corrected the “deviant” 
Gaonic practice and returned Jewish law to its “original” foundations by prohibiting women 
from no-fault divorce.   
  These separated chronologies legitimate orthodox jurisprudence and foster 
problematic misconceptions.  The orthodox Islamic narrative obscures that the specific 
procedural requirement of obtaining a husband’s acquiescence to the wife’s divorce initiation 
likely emerged in the medieval period.  The orthodox Jewish narrative obscures that the 
Gaonic practice of coercing a husband to divorce a “recalcitrant” wife was normative for 
centuries until its gradual undermining in the late medieval period. 
  I want to focus on problematizing a specific point of intersection between these two 
narratives: the orthodox Jewish narrative characterizes the Gaonic enactment (taqqanah) as an 
innovation (i.e. lacking talmudic precedent) caused by Islamic “influence” and many scholars 
accept this perspective.112  The question I want to explore is why this Gaonic decree has been 
interpreted – both by some Rishonim and by some contemporary scholars – as having deviated 
                                                                  
110 See Ronald C. Jennings, "Divorce in the Ottoman sharia court of Cyprus, 1580-1640," Studia Islamica, no. 78 
(1993). 
111 A version of this section was presented as part of a panel I organized on ‘Comparative Contextualizations of 
Jewish Legal History’ at the Association for Jewish Studies annual conference in Washington, D.C. (December 20, 
2011). 
112 See footnote 50.  But see Friedman, who argued that wife-initiated divorce was a pre-Islamic Jewish custom.  
Friedman, "The ransom-divorce," 298. 
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from Talmudic practice.113  This Gaonic decree’s classification is the site of a contest for legal 
authority and I will provide historical and critical evidence to offer an alternative 
understanding of this Jewish law in its presumed “Islamic” context.   
  A late medieval rabbinic consensus gradually developed in the West that viewed the 
Gaonic decree as an “innovation” caused by the “influence” of Gentile courts.  Contemporary 
scholars have presumed that the Gentile courts were Islamic and thereby characterize the 
Gaonic decree as being caused by Islamic pressure – of some kind.114  But these two 
characterizations of “innovation” and “influence” must be reevaluated because they obscure a 
complicated historical struggle for legal authority.  Discrediting the Gaonic legal practice of 
facilitating a recalcitrant wife’s divorce claim may be a manifestation of Western rabbinic 
authority overpowering Eastern rabbinic authority.115 
  The implications of the two characterizations that I will challenge are manifest in a 
specific example.  There is suggestive evidence of Jewish women divorcing their husbands 
prior to the Islamic period and the interpretation of that evidence is impelled by 
interpretations of the Gaonic decree.  In other words, those who view the decree as an 
extension of a continuous practice (i.e., the Talmud sanctions the practice of coercing 
husbands to divorce a wife) thus recognize that Jewish wives had a long-standing ability to 
initiate unilateral divorce.116  In contrast, those who view the decree as a legal “innovation” 
based on “foreign influence” thereby negate the possibility that Jewish wives could initiate 
divorce outside the judicially-recognized justifications.117  Therefore, the historical and 
contemporary interpretation of this decree has significant stakes for Jewish legal practice. 
 
                                                                  
113 My claim is that the characterization of the Gaonic decree as deviating from the Talmud or as exceeding the 
limits of Gaonic authority is implicitly based on an evaluation of the Gaonic context.  In other words, those 
Rishonim who rejected the Gaonic ordinance as an innovation did so because they believed it was “caused” by 
Islamic influence.  Case in point, Westreich describes the opinion of Rishonim: “Halakhic sources explicitly 
indicate that the aim of this ruling was to prevent malicious manipulations in Moslem [sic] courts that forced 
Jewish men to grant a divorce demanded by women claiming ‘repulsion.’” Westreich, "The rise and decline," 217 
(citing Hilkhot ha-Rosh, Ketubot 85, sec. 35). 
114 Contemporary scholars perpetuate these assumptions about “innovation” and “influence.”  For instance, like 
other contemporary scholars, Brody characterizes the Gaonic decree as “dictated by profound changes in the 
circumstances affecting Jewish life in the Muslim world, and more particularly in Babylonia, which necessitated a 
departure from Talmudic law.” Brody, The geonim of Babylonia: 62 (emphasis added). 
115 As Libson observed, “Rejections of geonic rulings are more common among Ashkenazi scholars, who allowed 
themselves more latitude in legal decisions than the Sephardim.” Libson, "Halakhah and law," 241. 
116 See footnote 19.  Jewish wives appear to have been able to initiate divorce in Babylonia (possibly prior to the 
Gaonic decree) and in Palestine (based on a practice of including a stipulation in the marriage contract).  
Elimelech Westreich notes that “between the Talmudic period and the time close to the Shul an Arukh, Jewish law 
had sustained a divorce regime enabling the woman to coerce her husband to grant a divorce without submitting 
a defined ground.” Westreich, "The rise and decline," 207. 
117 See footnote 18.  But see Brody, "Evidence for divorce by Jewish women?."  See also Libson, Jewish and Islamic 
law: 158.  
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Challenging the conventional narrative: reevaluating causal influence 
  At the time of the Gaonic decree (mid-7th century),118 a minority of the population was 
Muslim and Islamic courts were not adjudicating outside the garrison towns established during 
the Arab/Muslim conquests.119  That a minority Muslim presence could have such significant 
effect on Jewish legal practice as to provoke the enactment within decades of the beginning of 
Iraq’s conquest is improbable.  In other words, the orthodox narrative that the Gaonim 
“deviated” from Talmudic practice in order to defend against the threat of Muslim “influence” 
– coercive or otherwise – is based on inaccurate historical evidence.120  Because the majority 
population at this time was likely Christian or Zoroastrian, it is essential to examine the 
Eastern Christian and Zoroastrian legal practices pertaining to wife-initiated divorce.  Among 
Christians and Zoroastrians, women returning their dowers in order to effect a divorce is a 
historically-verified practice.121  Since even after the Muslim conquests local communities 
operated courts, the Gentile courts that provoked the Gaonic decree may not have been 
Islamic.122  Indeed, wife-initiated divorce may not have been the dominant Islamic legal 
practice, since it was the subject of intense juristic debate among Muslims and possibly only 
one of many legal positions.123  Moreover, it is particularly improbable that any potential 
Islamic legal “influence” was coercive.  The orthodox Jewish narrative inaccurately assumes 
the existence of Islamic influence that is actually negated by historical evidence.   
  More probable than the existence or prevalence of Islamic courts is the possibility that 
Jewish women simply knew that Muslim women who demanded divorces did not have to wait 
one year, in addition to having relatively more expansive inheritance and property rights.  
Threatened by the possibility of Jewish women converting, Gaonic rabbis likely reduced the 
                                                                  
118 Libson dates the decree to 650 or 651 and while it may be possible to date it to a slightly later period, these 
historical observations hold true.  Libson, Jewish and Islamic law: 111. 
119 Morony observes that Islamic law was not applied to Jews and he suggests that rabbinic authority increased as 
a result of the non-involvement of Muslims in the internal legal affairs of Jews. Michael G. Morony, Iraq after the 
Muslim conquest  (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), 320, 518.  In contrast, Libson rejects that the 
decree’s proximity in time to the Arab/Muslim conquests weakens the assumption of influence. Libson, 
"Halakhah and law," 238.  But Libson does not provide historical evidence about the administration of Islamic 
courts in the mid-seventh century to substantiate his influence claim. 
120 Indeed, common interpretations of the Gaonic decree suggest prejudicial and anachronistic assumptions.  For 
example, a contemporary scholar argues that the Gaonic decree does not represent “absorption of legal concepts 
of one culture into another culture, but rather a defensive act of a minority culture against the destructive 
influence of the surrounding majority culture.” (my translation)  Yehudah Zvi Stampfer, "Islamic influence in the 
divorce laws of Rav Samuel Ben Hofni Gaon and the Rambam," in ʿ le ʿasor: divre ha-veʿidah ha-ʿasirit shel ha-hevrah 
le-heker ha-tarbut ha-ʿ rvit-ha-yehudit shel yeme-ha-benayim, ed. Congress Society for Judaeo-Arabic Studies, et al. 
(Beer-Sheva: Hotsaat ha-sefarim shel Universitat Ben-Guryon ba-Negev, 2008), 312.  It is unacknowledged that the 
majority of the population in Iraq (or the Near East more generally) was Christian and did not become Muslim 
until several centuries later.   
121 See footnotes 153, 156, 158, and 161. 
122 See footnote 119. 
123 For debates among Muslim jurists, see, by way of example, the various opinions on the necessity of having a 
legal justification or court involvement for  hulʿ.  Ibn Qudāmah al-Maqdīsī (d. 1223; Syria), al- ughnī: v. 10, p. 268-
69 (Ḥanbalī: conflicting reports about necessity of court involvement in khulʿ).  See also Dhahabī, al-Khulʿ wa-
a  āmuhu fī al-sharīʿah al-islāmīyah: 51-59.  Gil noted that “there was still no clear-cut Muslim law with regard to 
divorce.” Moshe Gil, A history of Palestine, 634-1099  (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 164.  
Libson acknowledges this possibility, but discounts it. Libson, "Halakhah and law," 238. 
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waiting period; this practical modification can be interpreted as responding to a communal 
necessity – not necessarily “influence.”  In legal terminology, we can identify this kind of legal 
change as “social welfare” or “public interest” and it is endemic to all legal systems.  While 
Jewish women in the Near East and North Africa were able to acquire divorces in rabbinic 
courts under a recalcitrant wife claim throughout the medieval period,124 they apparently still 
frequented state (i.e., Islamic) courts.125  Since even in places where rabbinic courts facilitated 
wife-initiated divorce, Jewish women availed themselves of state (i.e., Islamic) courts, the 
Gaonic enactment did not prevent Jewish women from accessing other legal options.126  To 
appreciate the dynamics of legal pluralism, we need to recognize such complexities as venue 
shopping and socio-economic barriers to legal consumerism.   
  In addition, the “influence” theory does not sufficiently explain how the Gaonic 
enactment “protected” the Jewish community from two realities: the availability of state (i.e. 
Islamic courts) that facilitated a Jewish wife’s divorce and the possibility of conversion.127  The 
orthodox narrative claims that Jewish women who had to wait twelve months for a divorce fell 
into indecency (i.e. illicit affairs) or apostatized (presumably becoming Muslim).128  Ostensibly, 
the Gaonim dispensed with the long waiting period in order to hasten a Jewish woman’s 
divorce and prevent her apostasy for the purpose of divorcing her Jewish husband.129  Yet a 
                                                                  
124 Westreich notes that at the end of the 14th century, “Jewish communities living in a distinctively Moslem [sic] 
environment where the rebellious wife suit was accepted without question.” Westreich, "The rise and decline," 
216.  This was likely practiced in different ways.  Goitein suggests, based on surviving documentary evidence, that 
women often initiated divorces; Genizah evidence indicates that some powerful women were able to pressure 
their ex-husbands to give them considerable divorce settlements that appear to have exceeded their dowers.  See 
Goitein, A Mediterranean society: v. 3, p. 266. 
125 Goitein mentions a Jewish woman who divorced her husband in an Islamic court.  Goitein, A Mediterranean 
society: v. 3, p. 265.  See also Aryeh Shmuelevitz, The Jews of the Ottoman Empire in the late fifteenth and the sixteenth 
centuries: administrative, economic, legal, and social relations as reflected in the responsa  (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1984), 67 
("sixteenth century matrimonial cases were frequently referred to Muslim law courts.").  Pertaining to the early 
modern period, al-Qattan notes “The frequency and ease with which Jewish and Christian men and women went 
to the Muslim court in connection with marriage and divorce suggests, on the one hand, that such recourse was 
neither unusual nor fraught with communally burdensome consequences.  It also illustrates the ways in which 
Christian and Jewish women availed themselves of the wife-instigated kinds of divorce not available to them 
according to the rules of their respective faiths.” Najwa al-Qattan, "Dhimmis in the Muslim court: legal autonomy 
and religious discrimination," International Journal of Middle East Studies 31, no. 3 (1999): 435. 
126 It may, however, be the case that Jewish (rabbinic) women continued to seek judicial divorce decrees from 
state (i.e., Islamic) courts in situations where a Jewish husband refused to deliver a divorce decree. 
127 Libson, Jewish and Islamic law: 111.   
128 An anonymous thirteenth century text identifies both moral indecency and apostasy as causal factors 
motivating the Gaonic decree. Riskin, A Jewish woman's right to divorce: 52-53. 
129 By the early medieval era, the consensus of Muslim jurists was that a married woman who became Muslim 
would be divorced unless her husband also converted within her divorce waiting period.  al-Shāfiʿī (d. 820; 
Arabia/Egypt), al-Kitā  al-Umm: v. 5, kitāb al-nikā , p. 149 (Shāfiʿī: if a woman becomes Muslim and her husband 
does not convert within the waiting period, they are divorced).  Sa nūn (d. 854; Tunisia) et al., al-Mudawwanah: v. 
2, p. 216 (Mālikī: a woman's conversion to Islam constitutes divorce unless husband converts within waiting 
period).  Tirmidhī (d. 892; Khurāsān), Sunan al-Tirmidhī wa-huwa al-Jāmiʿ al-ṣahī : v. 2, p. 405 (husband of Prophet’s 
daughter became Muslim within her waiting period; this is the opinion of Mālik ibn Anas, al-Awzāʿī, al-Shāfiʿī, 
A mad, and Is āq).   Ibn Abī Zayd al-Qayrawānī (d. 996; Tunisia), al-Risālah al-fi hīyah: p. 196 (Mālikī: a non-Muslim 
woman who becomes Muslim is divorced from her non-Muslim husband unless he converts).  Ibn Ḥazm (d. 1064; 
Spain), al- u allā: v. 7, p. 364 (Ẓāhirī: a woman who becomes Muslim while married to a non-Muslim is divorced 
immediately).  al-Shīrāzī (d. 1083; Iran), al-Muhadhdhab: v. 2, p. 456 (Shāfiʿī: a woman who becomes Muslim is 
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Jewish woman who became Muslim would not necessarily have been automatically divorced 
because this Islamic doctrine was not clearly established in the mid-seventh century.130   
  How could the Gaonic rabbis have compelled a husband to deliver a divorce decree 
instantaneously when husbands very often delayed the process?  If the Gaonic practice 
removed the twelve-month waiting period and then relied on coercing the husband to grant a 
wife a divorce, then the “threat” of conversion to Islam remained.  That is, a Jewish woman 
might simply become Muslim and demand a judicial divorce decree from an Islamic court, 
rather than wait for her husband to deliver her divorce decree under coercion.  It is no 
coincidence then that the Karaites did accept judicial divorce decrees and that Maimonides 
denounced the practice as heretical.131  Notably, the specific wording of several Gaonic texts 
implies that courts granted or gave Jewish women divorces, without explicitly delineating that 
the courts coerced husbands to deliver divorce decrees.132  While we cannot make conclusions 
based on this precise terminology, it is likely that judicial divorce decrees became a site of 
Jewish orthodox contestation in the medieval period.  It was not only Muslim “influence” that 
concerned the rabbis, but the sectarian influence of Karaites.  Western rabbinic jurists may 
have marked the boundaries of rabbinic orthodoxy against Karaite “heresy” through this 
particular legal issue.  The extent to which generalizations may be made from this case study 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
divorced after the waiting period unless her husband also converts).  Ibn Qudāmah al-Maqdīsī (d. 1223; Syria), al-
 ughnī: v. 10, p. 8-10 (Ḥanbalī: a woman who becomes Muslim is divorced after the waiting period unless her 
husband also converts).  al-Nawawī (d. 1277; Syria) et al., al- a m ʿ: v. 15, p. 451-59 (Shāfiʿī: a woman's conversion 
to Islam is divorce).  See also text #9 in Appendix I.  
130 It is unclear if the seventh-century Muslim community viewed the conversion of a wife as automatically 
resulting in a divorce.  The main precedential authority for this doctrinal rule is that the Prophet’s daughter 
(Zaynab) became Muslim prior to her husband (Abī al-ʿ  ī) and the latter was not forced to convert, although he 
did so eventually.  There are other narratives from the Prophetic era about non-Muslim husbands being given 
time (one month to several months) to convert after their wives became Muslim.  Medieval jurists seem to have 
understood the Prophetic practice of giving husbands an opportunity to convert as corresponding to the divorce 
waiting period. (See, for example, Sa nūn (d. 854; Tunisia) et al., al-Mudawwanah: v. 2, 211-15 (Mālikī).)  But it is 
conceivable that some jurists interpreted historical narratives in such a way as to legitimate the judicial practice 
of a divorce waiting period because the key precedential issue is the amount of time between the conversion of 
the Prophet’s daughter and her husband.  There are reports that the length of time between Zaynab’s conversion 
and her husband’s conversion was significantly longer than the divorce waiting period of a few months.  Tirmidhī 
(d. 892; Khurāsān), Sunan al-Tirmidhī wa-huwa al-Jāmiʿ al-ṣahī : v. 2, p. 405 (citing six years between the conversion 
of the Prophet's daughter and her husband).  Similarly, Ibn ʿAbbās reports that the Prophet’s daughter became 
Muslim eight years prior to her husband and jurists offered various “rationalizations” for why this length of time 
either did not constitute a precedent or was inaccurate.  Ibn Qudāmah al-Maqdīsī (d. 1223; Syria), al- ughnī: v, 10, 
p. 10-11 (Ḥanbalī). 
131 “Au XIe siècle, probablement sous influence musulmane, la loi caraïte évolue vers le renforcement des droits de 
la femme.  Dorénavant, le divorce peut être effectué à la demande de la femme par le tribunal, si le mari refuse de 
rédiger la lettre de divorce.  Cette possibilité de divorce par decision juridique constitue une difference important 
par rapport au droit rabbanite.  Par consequent, un divorce caraïte obtenu de telle façon ne pouvait être valable 
selon la loi rabbanite.  Cependant, il semble que le divorce par decision juridique avait un caractère exceptionnel 
et que la façon la plus répandue de divorcer nécessitait toujours la redaction d’une letter par le mari.  En effet, la 
Geniza du Caire ne nous fournit que des exemples de ce dernier type de documents.” Judith Olszowy-Schlanger, 
"La lettre de divorce caraïte et sa place dans les relations Caraïtes et Rabbanites au Moyen Age," Revue des Études 
Juives 155, no. 3 (1996): 342.  But note that I disagree with the author’s characterization of this Karaite practice as 
being based on Islamic “influence.” 
132 See text #6 and #8 in Appendix I. 
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to broader processes of sectarian resistance and regional competition in the shaping of 
rabbinic Jewish orthodoxy is a matter for further research.   
 
Challenging the conventional narrative: giving voice to the Gaonim 
  Most Gaonim did not view their practice of facilitating wife-initiated divorce as 
divergent from Talmudic traditions.133  The Gaonic enactment included two aspects: (a) the 
removal of the twelve-month waiting period (stipulated in the Babylonian Talmud) for the 
recalcitrant wife and (b) coercion of the husband to grant a recalcitrant wife a divorce.134  The 
Gaonim perceived the first aspect as new, but not the second.135  Yet, later rabbinic authorities 
interpreted both aspects of the decree as “innovative,” despite the Gaonic perspective that 
they had preserved rabbinic Jewish tradition.136  The orthodox narrative thereby marks as 
heretical the prolonged practice of Gaonic communities who facilitated wife-initiated 
divorce.137 
  What underlies the characterization of the Gaonic decree as an “innovation” is the 
causal presumption of “influence.”  It is commonly assumed that the availability of divorce for 
women in contemporaneous Islamic courts led Gaonic rabbis to modify divorce practices.138  
However, Gaonic texts do not explicitly identify Islamic courts as being a causal influence on 
the decree.  For example, Na rōnāī ben Hilāī (or Natronai Gaon, d. 9th century, Iraq) explained 
the rationale for the decree as “so that Jewish women should not stray towards lewdness and 
indecency.”139  Some Gaonic sources do not mention a reason for the enactment.140  Of course, 
these Gaonim may have been influenced by Islamic legal practices and simply did not admit it.  
But in analyzing this historical event, we should focus on the consistency and plausibility of 
                                                                  
133 Westreich notes that “according to the Geonim, the source of the halakha coercing the husband to grant a 
divorce to his rebellious wife is the Talmud itself.  Several geonic writings indeed state so specifically.” Westreich, 
"The rise and decline," 209.  See also Friedman, Jewish marriage in Palestine: v. 1, p. 324. 
134 A third aspect concerns the dower payment since Gaonim made it collectable on movable property. Libson, 
"Halakhah and law," 237.  I suspect that it may be possible to add a fourth aspect: the possibility that rabbinic 
courts granted Jewish women divorces without requiring a formal deliverance of the divorce decree from the 
husband.  But this possibility necessitates more research than the scope of this chapter allows. 
135 Since the Gaonim identified the Talmud as the source for (b), only (a) was perceived by them as innovative.  
Libson explains, “Rav Sherira holds – and this seems to be the view of all the Geonim – that the compulsory 
nature of the divorce had already been laid down in the Talmud, the only new element in the taḳḳanah being the 
stipulation that divorce be granted forthwith, without delay.” Ibid.  See also Westreich, "The rise and decline," 
209.   
136 This is reflected in much of the scholarly literature.  By way of example, Libson notes that “since the talmudic 
text itself could not be easily interpreted and the details of the taḳḳanah itself were not known, the interpretation 
became a matter of controversy among the Geonim themselves.  It is therefore difficult to determine the 
taḳḳanah’s precise degree of deviation from Talmudic law proper.” Libson, "Halakhah and law," 236 (emphasis 
added).  
137 By way of example, Geniza evidence indicates that in Palestinian marriage contracts of the 10th and 11th 
centuries, “Either party was empowered, thereby, to demand a divorce for purely subjective reasons and was not 
compelled to prove cause.” Friedman, Jewish marriage in Palestine: v. 1, p. 330. 
138 “There is no doubt that the redress open to women in the Shariʿa courts spurred the geonim to provide similar 
redress in Jewish law.” Libson, Jewish and Islamic law: 111.  See also Westreich, "The rise and decline," 217-18. 
139 Riskin, A Jewish woman's right to divorce: 51.  See text #17 in Appendix I. 
140 Halakhot gedolot does not explain the enactment’s rationale. Ibid., 48-49. 
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historical interpretations.  In light of the aforementioned historical evidence, early Gaonim did 
not cite Islamic “influence” for the decree because no such “influence” existed in their time. 
  In contrast, Sherira ben Ḥanina (Sherira Gaon, d. 1006 CE, Iraq), writing in the late tenth 
century, identified the decree as being an attempt to prevent Jewish women from asking 
Gentile courts to coerce their husbands because only a Jewish court can legitimately coerce a 
Jewish husband to divorce his wife.141  In Sherira Gaon’s lifetime, Islamic courts were prevalent 
and, when petitioned by Jewish wives, they coerced Jewish husbands to deliver divorce decrees 
– or possibly granted divorce decrees to Jewish wives.142  Sherira Gaon may have 
anachronistically interpreted the reasons for the seventh-century Gaonic decree based on his 
own reality; that is, since Sherira was surrounded by Islamic courts, he may have simply 
assumed that his Gaonic predecessors were likewise “competing” with Muslim jurists for 
Jewish litigants.  Notably, Sherira Gaon is the only known Gaonic figure to attribute the 
influence of Gentile courts to the Gaonic decree.143   
 
Which context? 
  What is problematic about “influence” as a characterization for a particular historical 
event?  “Influence” is really code for “infiltration” or “impurity.”  The orthodox understanding 
of the Gaonic decree focuses on the causal factors (rather than context) that led to its 
enactment and presents the decree’s gradual overturning as if it occurred in the absence of 
causal factors (or a context).  The orthodox Jewish narrative validates a specific bias that can 
be identified in terms of time (medieval era) and space (the West): it was Western Rishonim 
who characterized the Gaonic decree as unorthodox.144  What is notable about the orthodox 
narrative is that Catholic “influences” are unacknowledged or minimized, while Muslim 
“influences” are vilified – and both legal systems are drastically oversimplified.145   
  While it is not surprising that Western Rishonim did not describe their annulling of the 
Gaonic decree as being the result of Western “influence,” it is remarkable that contemporary 
scholars perpetuate this selective application of the notion of “influence.”  Westreich, for 
instance, noted that “the process of erosion [of the recalcitrant wife divorce] moved along the 
                                                                  
141 Ibid., 58.  See also Elon, Jewish law: v. 2, p. 659-60. 
142 Maimonides’ critique of non-Jewish courts coercing Jewish husbands is evidence that the practice existed, but 
not a negation of the possibility that non-rabbinic courts provided judicial divorce decrees.  Maimonides (d. 1204; 
Spain/Egypt), Mishneh Torah: p. 177-78, 4.II.II.20. 
143 Riskin, A Jewish woman's right to divorce: 74 (citing Tykocinski as having made this observation). 
144 See footnote 71 (discussing “Western” Rishonim who overruled North African practices in the late fourteenth 
century). This is also discernible in the writing of Maimonides (see text #13 in Appendix I). 
145 In reference to (Christian) Europe, Westreich, for example, claims that “the influence of the Gentile 
environment also affected the decline of the rebellious woman ground, ultimately leading to its abolition.  This 
influence, however, is indirect, as Jewish society internalizes the social norms of the Gentile environment as a 
result of a prolonged encounter, and projects them onto Jewish law through a complex mutual relationship whose 
stages cannot be traced.” Westreich, "The rise and decline," 218.  Compare this to Westreich’s description of 
Muslim influence: “Halakhic sources explicitly indicate that the aim of this ruling was to prevent malicious 
manipulations in Moslem [sic] courts that forced Jewish men to grant a divorce demanded by women claiming 
‘repulsion’…the geonic ordinance clearly originated as a result of factors that, although directly affecting Jewish 
circumstances, were extraneous to Halakhah.” Ibid., 217-18.  The historical evidence presented above establishes 
that no such Islamic “influence” existed for the Gaonic decree. 
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lines of advance of Christian society, which gradually conquered and dominated areas that had 
so far been under Moslem [sic] influence and control, at least in Spain.”146  Westreich explicitly 
observes that Rabbenu Tam’s legal opinion against the recalcitrant wife divorce occurred “as 
Christian society became monogamous and imposed Catholic laws making divorce 
impossible.”147  Contemporary scholars pose a question about the “influences” that provoked 
the Gaonic decree, but not about the “influences” that led to the overturning of that decree.   
  To be clear, I am not arguing for Western-Christian “influence” on the Western 
Rishonim; to do so would replace one problematic “influence” paradigm with another.  
Instead, I contend that all legal communities are constituted by their contexts.  Just as the 
Gaonim read the Talmud through the intellectual concerns and socio-political realities of their 
times, so too did the Western Rishonim.  These two historical moments – the enactment of the 
Gaonic decree and its abolition by Western Rishonim – are both reflective of and mediated by 
their contexts.  Late medieval, Western jurists marked a seventh-century Gaonic decree as an 
“innovation” caused by Gentile “influence” within a struggle for legal authority: the Gaonic 
decree was marked as “deviant” not because it occurred under Gentile “influence,” but 
because its revocation occurred in a Western-Catholic context.  Contemporary scholars 
delineated the “other” by placing a Jewish law in an imagined “Islamic” context – instead of a 
historical one.  Both some Western Rishonim and some contemporary scholars employ a 
notion of “influence” that manifests reductive causality and, thereby, is an impediment to 
deeper and more complex understanding of legal change.  Comparison and contextualization 
can move us beyond simplified notions of “influence” that are themselves legal-political 
strategies.   
  This brief exploration into the Gaonic decree on a recalcitrant wife indicates that our 
task is to situate Jewish law in historical contexts based on evidence and, in doing so, to resist 
uncritically accepting the suppositions of orthodox narratives.  The extent to which 
generalizations may be made from this case to broader processes of sectarian resistance and 
regional competition in the shaping of rabbinic Jewish orthodoxy is a matter for further 
research.148  To understand each legal system’s transformations, we need to recognize the 
unending dialectic between internal legal logic and changing socio-political circumstances.  In 
the next section, I narrate wife-initiated divorce outside the orthodox framework, with the 
background of Near Eastern legal culture. 
 
V. An interwoven narrative of wife-initiated divorce 
                                                                  
146 Ibid., 218. 
147 Ibid. 
148 Libson observed that “Although it [the recalcitrant wife decree] was recorded in geonic codifcatory works, such 
as Halakhot Peṣuḳot and Halakhot Gedolot, it did not win acceptance in later rabbinic literature – a fate similar to 
that of many other taḳḳanot and customs from the geonic period.” Libson, "Halakhah and law," 238. 
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Antiquity and late antiquity (up to 750 CE) 
While most Near Eastern legal systems in antiquity appear to have granted men an 
unencumbered right to divorce,149 women were not precluded from divorcing their husbands.  
Indeed, there is evidence of women initiating divorces.150  Common Near Eastern customs are 
apparent in some surviving ancient Mesopotamian legal texts; as in the case of Jewish divorce 
practices in antiquity, there is scholarly debate on the issue of a woman’s ability to divorce in 
ancient Mesopotamian law.151  The nature of the surviving historical evidence (primarily legal 
texts and some court records) results in this inconsistency in the historical evidence 
(jurisprudence or practice) surrounding women and divorce in the ancient Near East.  But it 
may be concluded that the ambiguous nature of the historical evidence itself reflects a diverse 
legal reality in which wives did divorce their husbands.152  Despite a male, jurisprudential 
rhetoric legitimating divorce as a male prerogative, women could and did divorce their 
husbands in practice.153  At least in some cases, women in the ancient Near East had to seek 
judicial intervention in order to divorce their husbands.154  Even this condensed “pre-history” 
suggests that, by the late antique period, there were diverse Near Eastern customary practices 
of men divorcing women, women divorcing men, and judges intervening to effect divorces.     
                                                                  
149 David L. Lieber et al., "Divorce," in Encyclopaedia Judaica, ed. Michael Berenbaum and Fred Skolnik (Detroit: 
Macmillan Reference USA, 2007), 710-11. 
150 Roman provincial law recognized wife-initiated divorce and was likely practiced throughout the Near East. 
Gillian Clark, Women in late antiquity: pagan and Christian life-styles  (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 18. Jewish 
women divorced their husbands in second century Egypt and in Palestine under Roman law.  See Brewer, "Jewish 
women divorcing their husbands," 354.   
151 “The right of a wife to divorce her husband in  B [ ld Babylonian] law has been the subject of considerable 
dispute.”  Raymond Westbrook, Old Babylonian marriage law, Archiv für Orientforschung, Beiheft 23 (Horn, Austria: 
F. Berger, 1988), 79.  “Scholars disagree as to whether a wife had the legal capacity to divorce her husband.” Russ 
VerSteeg, Early Mesopotamian law  (Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic Press, 2000), 88.   
152 Westbrook concludes that the conflicting evidence of a wife’s ability to initiate divorce is the manifestation of 
“the difference between theory and practice.” Westbrook, Old Babylonian marriage law: 85.   
153 By way of example, a Zoroastrian legal text notes, “When a woman having got divorce on the woman’s own 
inclination…” Sohrab Jamshedjee Bulsara, The laws of the ancient Persians as found in the "  t   n   haz r d tast n  or 
"The digest of a thousand points of law"  (Bombay: H.T. Anklesaria, 1937), 72.  The main source for Zoroastrian law is 
the Mādigān ī hazār dādistān and it is commonly dated to approximately 620 CE.  See also "Mādigān ī hazār 
dādistān. English, The book of a thousand judgements: a Sasanian law-book; introduction, transcription and 
translation of the Pahlavi text, notes, glossary and indexes by Anahit Perikhanian; translated from Russian by 
Nina Garso an,"  in Persian heritage series; no. 39 (Costa Mess, Calif.: Mazda Publishers in association with Bibliotheca 
Persica, 1997), 252-59.  Das sasanidische Rechtsbuch "Matakdan i hazar datistan" (Teil II), trans. Maria Macuch 
(Wiesbaden: Deutsche Morgenländische Gesellschaft: Kommissionsverlag, F. Steiner, 1981), 25-29, 97-120.   
154 The Laws of Hammurabi (ca. 1750 BCE) mention that if a wife repudiates her husband, an inquiry is made; if she 
is found to be not at fault, then she takes her dowry and leaves, but if she is found to be at fault, she is thrown into 
the water. Martha Tobi Roth et al., Law collections from Mesopotamia and Asia Minor  (Atlanta, Ga.: Scholars Press, 
1997), 108.  Likewise, Johns asserts that “It was far harder for a woman to secure a divorce from her husband.  She 
could do so, however, but only as the result of a lawsuit.  As a rule, the marriage-contracts mention death as her 
punishment, if she repudiates her husband.” C. H. W. Johns, Babylonian and Assyrian laws, contracts and letters  
(Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1904), 143. 
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Ancient Near Eastern legal texts consistently reference divorce in terms of men paying 
divorce settlements.155  Since the default Near Eastern norm was for husbands to pay dowers to 
their wives as part of the marriage process, they maintained stronger privileges to divorce, 
which also entailed payment of a divorce settlement to the wife.  This is why women who 
divorced their husbands paid for this prerogative in nearly all late antique Near Eastern legal 
cultures – Jewish, Sasanian, Byzantine, and Islamic.156  Indeed, a basic presumption in the 
region seems to have been that if a wife returned her entire dower, then that act in and of 
itself constituted divorce.157  For example, late antique divorce documents (written in Greek on 
papyrus) from Nessana indicate that Christian women – both prior to and soon after the 
Arab/Islamic conquest – relinquished their dowers in order to acquire a divorce.158   
These monetary exchanges related to divorce resemble the conceptually related 
slavery and ransoming practices of the region.  At the level of terminology, slaves could 
financially redeem themselves to receive a manumission decree that resembles a divorce 
decree in Jewish law.159  Similarly, the Qurʾānic verse that grants women the option of 
initiating divorce indicates that women may “ransom” themselves.160  There is a late antique 
exception that, perhaps, proves the rule: while a wife may repudiate her husband according to 
the late antique Corpus Juris Civilis (Roman legal code), the husband does not pay a dower, 
                                                                  
155 Laws of Ur-Namma (ca, 2100 BCE) sec. 9-11 (man pays upon divorcing wife, based on wife’s status) Roth et al., 
Law collections: 18.  Laws of Lipit-Ishtar (ca. 1930 BCE) sec. 28, 30 (limits a man’s ability to divorce his first wife; 
indicates that men pay divorce settlement) ibid., 31-32.  Sumerian Laws Handbook of Forms (ca. 1700 BCE) iv 12-16 
(husband pays divorce settlement) ibid., 50.  Laws of Eshnunna (ca. 1770 BCE) sec 59 (husband is financially 
punished for divorcing a wife who is mother of his children) ibid., 68.  Laws of Hammurabi (ca. 1750 BCE) sec. 137-
141 (husband who divorces wife with whom he has children pays her dowry and half of his assets; husband who 
divorces wife who is childless, pays a divorce settlement that varies depending on the status of the wife) ibid., 107.   
One exception is Middle Assyrian Laws (ca. 1076 BCE) A sec. 37-38 (husband may divorce wife without paying 
divorce settlement) ibid., 167. 
156 The late antique Roman provincial (or Christian) evidence has not previously been cited: “A woman who 
divorced without grounds lost dowry and gifts and had to wait five years to remarry; a man who divorced without 
good reason merely lost dowry and gifts.” Clark, Women in late antiquity: pagan and Christian life-styles: 24.  See also 
Judith Evans Grubbs, "'Pagan' and 'Christian' marriage: the state of the question," in Christianity and society: the 
social world of early Christianity, ed. Everett Ferguson, Recent studies in early Christianity (New York: Garland, 1999), 
190 (noting that after Constantine, husbands could financially benefit if divorce was the wife's "fault"). 
157 Case in point: while ketubbah actually means marriage contract, it is commonly used in rabbinic literature to 
refer specifically to the dower payment.  In other words, the marriage contract and the dower are equivalent. 
158 There are two relevant papyri from Nessana (in the Negev).  The first (document 33) dates to the 6th century 
(pre-Islamic) and is between Stephan and Sergius, father of Sarah; Stephan retained the dowry and was given 
back the dower in order to divorce Sarah.  Casper J. Kraemer, Excavations at Nessana. Non-literary papyri, Colt 
Archaeological Expedition, 1936-1937 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958), 104-06.  The second 
(document 57) dates to 689 CE (post-Islamic, under the Umayyad empire) and is an agreement between Nonna and 
John (a priest) that is signed by seven witnesses.  Ibid., 161-67.  Nonna’s document states that she “waives all 
property claims, and asks for a divorce or release.”  Ibid., 162.  Kraemer suggests that document 57 is related to a 
libellus repudii – a document of repudiation that Theodosius II (d. 450 CE) required (in Nov. Th. 12 pr. enacted in 439 
CE) either spouse to send to the other in a divorce.  Kraemer further proposes that document 57 resembles other 
6th century papyri of repudiations – including one (POxy 129) sent from a father-in-law to a husband.  Ibid. 
159 Mishnah: Gī  īn 1.4 (comparing delivery of divorce and emancipation documents).  The slave’s emancipation 
decree is get shi hr r (רוּרְח ִׁש טֵּג) and a woman’s divorce decree is get nashīm (םי ִׁשָנ ט ֵּג).  See also Babylonian Talmud: 
Gī  īn 9a (similarities between divorce and emancipation documents) and Qiddushin 16a (discussing slaves 
redeeming themselves by payment).   
160 Qurʾān 2:229 (a wife may “redeem” herself from a marriage). 
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whereas the wife pays a dowry in order to marry and her husband profits from it during the 
marriage.161  Moreover, Near Eastern women of higher social status had relatively more access 
to divorce, further indicating that financial means figured into a woman’s ability to procure a 
divorce.162   
Recognition of the diversity of late antique Near Eastern legal practices and women’s 
agency suggests that there were a variety of legal maneuvers for women to obtain divorces.  It 
should be noted that judicial involvement likely varied according to region – with some areas 
functioning without an official court.  We may characterize this period as being legally 
heterodox.   
 
Medieval era (750-1400 CE) 
Processes of legal systematization and professionalization transformed legal practice in 
the Near East.  By the twelfth century, divorce became a primarily court-mediated process and 
some court intervention became normative for most divorce situations.163  The 
professionalization and centralization of legal education resulted in the consolidation of 
juristic opinions.  Some form of legal “orthodoxy” is evident in both Jewish and Islamic legal 
texts that present a hierarchy of divorce practices: 
(1) husband divorces wife and pays full divorce settlement 
(2) court divorces husband and wife because of husband’s impotence, defects, or 
unreasonable behavior; husband pays full divorce settlement 
(3) husband divorces wife or wife divorces husband; husband does not pay divorce 
settlement or pays only part of the settlement because wife has agreed to accept less or 
has been declared recalcitrant 
The third category is an intentional collapse of two distinct forms of divorce that became 
ambiguous in the medieval period.  The divorce of a recalcitrant wife in the Jewish legal 
tradition and the forfeiting wife in the Islamic legal tradition are procedurally the same: they 
are both situations of women acting to divorce their husbands and losing some money in the 
process.  Similarly, the formalist expectation that a Jewish husband deliver a divorce decree or 
                                                                  
161 Dig. 23.3.1 et seq (woman pays dowry at marriage); Dig. 24.3.1 et seq (elaborating various dowry-related cases 
and husband’s rights to dowry’s profits); Dig. 24.2.1 et seq (wife or husband may repudiate spouse) in The Digest of 
Justinian   (Although redacted in the 6th century, the Digest of Justinian contains legal traditions dating to earlier 
generations of jurists, including to the Roman republican period.  Beirut’s Roman law school was destroyed in an 
earthquake in 551 CE and it is unclear to what extent formal Roman law was subsequently taught or practiced in 
the region.  I use the term Roman provincial law in recognition of the hybrid Roman and customary practices that 
were likely prevalent in the Near East prior to the Muslim conquests.) 
162 For instance, in the Parthian period, “In contrast to the legal limitations imposed upon the commoners, the 
noblewomen could easily divorce their husbands. This class privilege, judging by the tenacity of legal and social 
institutions, must have continued in Sasanian times.”  Muhammad A. Dandamayev et al., "Divorce," in 
Encyclopaedia Iranica (December 15, 1995).  This same article notes that a woman who consented to divorce lost 
some of her financial rights.  Also, in Palestine, “Some rich or influential Jewish women divorced their husbands 
under the Roman law.” Brewer, "Jewish women divorcing their husbands," 356.     
163 That wife-initiated divorce occurred in an earlier period without court intervention is substantiated by juristic 
texts.  Sarakhsī (d. 11th cent; Transoxania), Kitā  al- a s  : v. 6, p. 173 (Ḥanafī: khulʿ can occur inside or outside 
courtroom).  Two late antique Muslim jurists – al-Ḥasan al-Ba rī (d. 728 CE) and Ibn Sīrīn (d. 729 CE) – ruled that 
 hulʿ is only permissible with judicial oversight. Ka lāwī, al-Khulʿ: 69. 
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that a Muslim husband consent to the wife’s divorce settlement are both legal-formalist 
perspectives that gained ascendancy in the medieval periods.   
In all these enumerated divorce types, men or women pay a divorce settlement 
depending on which party was considered – by the court or customary norms – to be the 
breaching party.  Generally, women who initiated or demanded divorce in the absence of 
judicially-recognized justifications lost money in the divorce process.  Between late antiquity 
and the middle ages, these judicially-recognized justifications became more formalized.  There 
is a substantive difference in how the exchange is abstracted: whereas earlier divorce was akin 
to a contract dissolution (modeled after ransoming or receiving an emancipation decree), in 
this period, divorce became a contractual breach (modeled after a market procedure, or 
termination of a labor contract).  Just as the employer-employee relationship is a legally 
rationalized version of the master-slave relationship, so too is medieval divorce a judicially 
rationalized version of late antique divorce in the Near East.  Market dynamics and property-
ownership indisputably changed between late antiquity and the medieval era in ways that 
directly influenced the daily lives of women.  While there is undoubtedly a connection 
between the region’s legal and economic history, these economic changes cannot be 
reconstructed with the available historical sources.164   
Jurisprudential rhetoric about recalcitrant wives should be understood as disguising 
situations of women demanding divorces and using a variety of legal strategies to obtain a 
divorce.  From this perspective, a subtle and gradual change occurred: the legally-recognized 
justifications for a wife’s divorce with a full divorce settlement were expanded while her 
ability to initiate a divorce without a justification became restricted.  This is effectively an 
elaboration of a fault-system of divorce that is familiar in a variety of other contexts.165  Late 
medieval debates about Gaonic practices were not unique, but rather reflect a socio-legal 
process that is evident in both Jewish and Islamic legal texts of the period: a wife’s ability to 
divorce her husband became more deeply embedded within legal procedures that complicated 
an older practice of women simply “paying” for a divorce.  This process is discernible in the 
increasing emphasis on identifying one of the spouses as being “at fault” with the consequence 
of “paying” for the divorce. 
By appreciating that the relationship between these legal systems was one of a shared 
social space and historical tradition, we can begin to investigate what parallel legal 
transformations can tell us about their socio-political context.  Muslim and Jewish jurists did 
not elaborate comparable legal schemata for divorce because they were building on similar 
scriptural texts or legal precedents – indeed, they were not.  Nor did they “borrow” from the 
“influencing” legal system of the “other.”  Instead, the schemata are essentially alike because 
they reflect the comparable customary practices, socio-political circumstances, and 
jurisprudential logic of Near Eastern legal culture.   
 
                                                                  
164 As Gordon has noted, “Because the economy is partially composed of legal relations, legal and economic 
histories are not histories of distinct and interacting entities but simply different cross-cutting slices out of the 
same organic tissue.” Robert W. Gordon, "Critical legal histories," Stanford Law Review 36, no. 57 (1984): 124.  See 
also Ron Harris, "The encounters of economic history and legal history," Law and History Review 21, no. 2 (2003).  
165 Lawrence M. Friedman, "A dead language: divorce law and practice before no-fault," Virginia Law Review 86, no. 
7 (2000).  
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VI. Speculating on the interwoven narrative  
I have presented a Jewish chronology, followed by an Islamic chronology, and then 
finally a Near Eastern story.  I contend that the narrative of Near Eastern legal pluralism is a 
more exact and coherent interpretation of the historical evidence than the two preceding 
chronologies.  Moreover, the interwoven narrative is not implicated in any particular self-
justificatory or orthodox belief; it is then relatively more objective.166  The crux of the 
interwoven narrative is that changes occurred between the eighth and twelfth centuries that 
resulted in limitations on women’s abilities to initiate divorces.167  It should be noted that 
consumers of these legal systems likely demanded more judicial intervention as a means of 
clarifying domestic relationships that had significant financial implications (inheritance, post-
divorce alimony and maintenance, etc.).  But without sources that give “voice” to these 
consumers, it is difficult to reconstruct how, why, or when they sought court involvement in 
marriage and divorce.  Consequently, these micro-histories offer limited explanations and it is 
necessary to consider the macro-context of this case study on wife-initiated divorce.  The 
historical sources do demonstrate that whereas in late antiquity women had more flexibility to 
simply divorce their husbands without state (whether Byzantine, Sasanian, or, later, Islamic) 
involvement, by the medieval era divorce had become a state-dominated procedure.  I want 
briefly to consider what broad political and social processes shaped this legal change. 
In both legal systems, the role of jurists in declaring divorces intensified and jurists 
thereby staked more control for themselves and, by extension, for husbands.168  In late 
antiquity, divorce often occurred without judicial intervention: Jewish men delivered 
notarized divorce decrees and Muslim men pronounced an oral divorce statement but neither 
procedure necessitated court registration or involvement.  But in the medieval era, local 
courts – proliferating throughout the empire – gradually came to process most divorces.  The 
courts, in turn, were staffed by jurists who were being trained in religious institutions of 
learning that were steadily becoming more technical and bureaucratic.  The informal legal 
circles and networks of the late antique period transformed into the grand academies of 
learning that dictated the form and substance of legal education.169  The hundreds of legal 
schools that existed at the beginning of Islamic history consolidated into the several that came 
to dominate in the medieval era; likewise, numerous Jewish sects disappeared as rabbinic 
Judaism came to ascendancy.  While the diversity of academies of learning preserved some of 
the region’s legal plurality, the boundaries between legal orthodoxy and legal heresy were 
being defined ever more narrowly.  These changes in the transmission of knowledge and 
                                                                  
166 I define objectivity in post-foundationalist terms.  Bevir asserts that “Historians can justify their theories by 
showing them to be objective, where objectivity arises not out of a method, not a test against pure facts, but 
rather a comparison with rival theories.” Mark Bevir, The logic of the history of ideas  (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), 104.  
167 Not coincidentally, more historical evidence survives from the 12th century than from the 8th century.  This 
certainly has an effect on how we perceive historical change, but the changes enumerated here do not appear to 
be fabrications of the historical evidence. 
168 An exception, however, is that Rabbenu Gershom (d. 1028 CE) in Germany “enacted a decree which made it 
impossible for a husband to divorce his wife against her will.” Riskin, A Jewish woman's right to divorce: xii, 109. 
169 See my co-authored pieces in Ira M. Lapidus, A global history of Islamic societies: from the seventh to nineteenth 
centuries  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
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identification of religious authority were occurring simultaneously among Muslims and Jews 
in the Near East.  
What the interwoven narrative further indicates is that modifications in a woman’s 
access to divorce is one site where we can witness Jewish and Muslim jurists responding to 
regional, socio-economic and political changes.  In both legal systems, the notion that the 
breaching party should suffer a financial loss underlies the medieval juristic discourse on 
divorce.  Changes in women’s financial autonomy likely corresponded to their ability to 
initiate divorce by paying out divorce settlements.  But the available historical evidence does 
not permit a clear analysis of the economic changes that accompanied the legal changes 
described here.  As previously mentioned, the medieval processes of urbanization and 
commercialization – and their effects on law – cannot be easily measured.  Likewise, it is 
unclear if a demographic shift in the number or age of men resulted in increased limitations on 
women’s divorce options or protection of men’s status; for instance, there may have been an 
interest in preventing women from divorcing their husbands while the latter were away at 
war.  There are many questions that cannot be answered. 
But there is a specific question for which we can articulate a relatively substantive 
answer: how did the legal profession change?  Broad transformations in the state and in 
religious institutions had concrete consequences for the legal profession.  Recent research has 
revealed not only that the number of judges increased, but also that their salaries doubled in 
the mid-eighth century as the ʿAbbāsid Empire (750-1258 CE) began a gradual process of 
systematizing and centralizing its empire.170  These ʿAbbāsid judges received higher salaries 
because the empire was more prosperous, there was greater demand for judicial services, and 
these judges had more training than their predecessors.  This legal professionalization resulted 
from the growing strength and diffusion of institutions of religious learning and training, 
which appointed or designated jurists for both Muslim and Jewish subjects.171  Judges 
transformed a late antique practice of divorce as mediation into a medieval practice of divorce 
as judicial procedure. 
 
VII. Conclusions 
The syncretic framework presented here emphasizes understanding legal systems 
through historicization and contextualization; it also offers a model to be applied to other 
comparative legal studies.  This mode of inquiry refutes the reification of religions that leads 
to false assumptions about the religion’s “essence” or “primordial nature.”  Religious 
communities, like all communities, are the products of their contexts and cannot be 
understood as transhistorical (or universal) categories.172   
The reader may wonder how medieval legal opinions and procedures are relevant to 
contemporary realities, considering the myriad socio-political and legal changes of the early 
modern and modern periods.  Beyond the precedential value of these jurisprudential ideas, 
their canonical status keeps them germane.  The Islamic chronology of wife-initiated divorce 
can be concisely continued: The Iraqi-based Ḥanafī school – one of the four surviving orthodox 
                                                                  
170 al-Qāḍī, "The salaries of judges in early Islam: the evidence of the documentary and literary sources." 
171 See my co-authored pieces in Lapidus, A global history. 
172 As Asad has noted, “a transhistorical definition of religion is not viable.” Asad, Genealogies of religion: 30. 
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Sunnī schools of law that became dominant during the medieval period – provided women 
with the least divorce options;173 this school became the official legal school of the Ottoman 
empire, whose family law codes are the basis of family laws in contemporary Middle Eastern 
states.174  In the early modern period, Ottoman court records attest to the common practice of 
women paying for divorces.175  Divorce law reforms during the twentieth century in the Middle 
East primarily modified Ḥanafī doctrines.176  Likewise, the Jewish chronology of wife-initiated 
divorce can be briefly continued: Post-medieval rabbinic authorities viewed coercing a 
husband to divorce a recalcitrant wife as an “innovation” resulting from “outside (i.e., Islamic) 
influence” and therefore rejected it.177  But even in the early modern era, Jewish women 
relinquished their financial rights to acquire divorces in Ottoman courts.178  Modern Jewish 
courts follow Western Rishonim in effectively denying wives the ability to divorce their 
husbands without specific grounds.179  Contemporary laws are based not simply on 
“authoritative” or “orthodox” precedents, but on ideologically-based interpretations of legal 
history.  I have attempted to demonstrate that these gradual historical processes were 
contingent, not inevitable.180  While some may choose to use historicism as a normative legal 
strategy, specific doctrinal changes will likely be unsuccessful if they are not coupled with 
deep understandings of legal-historical changes and the power dynamics underlying them. 
Understanding the porous frontier between Jewish and Muslim legal systems 
necessitates combining thick descriptions of law with historically contextualizing narratives.181  
Late antique Jewish and Muslim jurists continued, modified, and practiced Near Eastern legal 
                                                                  
173 “Unlike wives in the non-Hanafi schools, and especially the Maliki school, which was the most liberal in this 
regard, wives under Hanafi law had to endure desertion and maltreatment with no recourse through divorce.” 
John L. Esposito, Women in Muslim family law  (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1982), 53.  
174 Ibid.  See also Leila Ahmed, "Early Islam and the position of women: the problem of interpretation," in Women in 
Middle Eastern history, ed. Nikki Keddie and Beth Baron (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), 61. 
175 “In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, hul (Arabic  hulʿ), divorce, whereby a wife materially 
compensates her husband in exchange for his consent to divorce, was a common practice in the empire from 
Istanbul to Cairo and points in between.” Madeline C. Zilfi, "Muslim women in the early modern era," in The 
Cambridge history of Turkey: the later Ottoman Empire, 1603-1839, ed. Suraiya Faroqhi (Cambridge, UK; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), 247. 
176 J.N.D. Anderson, "Modern trends in Islam: legal reform and modernisation in the Middle East," in Islamic law and 
legal theory, ed. Ian Edge, The International library of essays in law and legal theory, 7 (New York: New York University 
Press, 1996).  
177 Libson, "Halakhah and reality," 99. 
178 “The vast majority of the [ hulʿ] cases involved Muslims, the predominant population of the area, although 
cases concerning Christians and Jews can also be found here and elsewhere.” Zilfi, "Muslim women in the early 
modern era," 247. 
179 Riskin claims that “Rabbenu Tam’s reading of the Talmudic texts, notwithstanding its universal acceptance by 
successive generations of scholars and final incorporation into the codes, was indeed a minority opinion, and that 
there is no reason not to restore the means—accepted by the Geonim, and the early authorities of North Africa, 
Spain, and France—of enabling the woman to free herself from an intolerable marriage…there are sufficient legal 
grounds to do so, and it is up to the contemporary halakhic community to grant the woman her proper due.” 
Riskin, A Jewish woman's right to divorce: xiii.  Westreich, "The rise and decline," 207. 
180 This is the objective of genealogy.  See Bevir, "What is genealogy?." 
181 In other words, I seek a balance between synchronic and diachronic explanations: “Synchronic rational 
explanations uncover the conditional connections between the beliefs that hang together in a given web of 
beliefs.  Diachronic rational explanations uncover the conditional connections between a tradition, an initial web 
of beliefs, a dilemma, and a later web of beliefs.” Bevir, The logic of the history of ideas: 252.  
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pluralism.  This case study on a woman’s access to divorce has demonstrated the significance 
of both comparative and historical examination of doctrinal issues, but the implications for 
social identity are countless.182  In both Jewish and Muslim traditions, identity is intimately 
intertwined with law; consequently, challenging hermetic presumptions of each legal system 
by demonstrating their integrated histories contests essentialized identity claims.  An anti-
essentialist understanding of law will facilitate exploring the dialectical interchange between 
these legal systems, thereby illuminating the cultural and situational contexts in which laws 
are formulated from their antecedents – customary practices.183   
The evaluation of historical evidence by jurists, laypeople, and historians of both Jewish 
and Islamic legal systems is deeply embedded within an inherited tradition of unchallenged 
presumptions.  In presenting this historical evidence, I have attempted to illustrate how 
contemporary understandings of law are entangled within orthodox narrative assumptions.  In 
so doing, I have chosen to elucidate aspects of Jewish and Islamic legal historiography silenced 
by orthodoxy.  There are more stories of Jewish and Islamic laws that remain untold. 
  
                                                                  
182 Glenn observes that “Recognition and acceptance of the diverse legal traditions of the world has implications 
for the identities which people in the world give themselves.  Recognition of other traditions as partially your 
own means adhering, however partially, to those traditions.  It means identifying with them in some measure.  
Identity then becomes less clear...” Glenn, Legal traditions of the world: 360. 
183 Merry, "Legal pluralism," 889-90. 
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Conclusion 
 
 I began this dissertation with a critical review of contemporary Islamic legal 
historiography, suggesting alternative philosophical foundations and heuristics that draw 
upon recent scholarship in critical theory and in interdisciplinary studies.  I also introduced 
some critical assessments of previous scholarship that compares Jewish and Islamic law, 
arguing for more contextualized, critical, and systematic approaches.  Each of the three case 
studies modified conventional ideas about Islamic law.  Chapter 1 demonstrated the 
overlapping roles of jurists and historians in late antique Islamic societies by focusing on the 
analytical and evidentiary slippages of legal arguments about the execution of prisoners of 
war.  Chapter 2 illustrated the legal and political ways in which charity taxation was used to 
negotiate late antique Muslim identity.  Chapter 3 tracked parallel changes in divorce practices 
among Jews and Muslims in the Near East and argued that changes in law must be situated 
within specific contexts.  In delving into the intricacies of juristic analyses of these substantive 
areas of doctrinal law, I chose to illuminate the rich dynamics of internal juristic methods, 
which differ significantly from both orthodox assumptions and scholarly depictions.  In so 
doing, I have offered an alternative means of understanding the relationships between Islamic 
and Jewish legal systems – not as legal systems that “borrow” from each other, but rather as 
legal systems that similarly change in response to a shared context.  I employed comparative 
techniques as a strategy for deepening our historical understandings of both Islamic and 
Jewish legal systems.  Together, the case studies illuminated subtle dynamics of legal thinking 
and legal practice in late antique and medieval Islamic societies.   
 
I. Comparative legal historicism of the “Near East”1 
 Within contemporary Jewish and Muslim communities, law is legitimated by its 
orthodoxy – that is, by its habitual, ancient, presumably uninterrupted practice.2  Both Jewish 
and Islamic legal histories are similarly emplotted to legitimate contemporary forms of Jewish 
law or Islamic law.  As Hayden White has noted, “every history, even the most ‘synchronic’ or 
‘structural’ of them, will be emplotted in some way.”3  Meta-narratives about law are crucial to 
the determination of doctrinal authority because the broad stories about a legal system’s 
history play concrete roles in the determination of law in the contemporary moment.  This 
conclusion will clarify some of the ways in which believers and “secular” scholars share 
                                                                  
1 The periodization outlined in this section was improved by the input of Ira Lapidus and Laurent Mayali; errors 
are mine alone.  The research underlying the ideas presented here is elaborated in co-authored sections on legal 
and women’s history that will appear in Lapidus, A global history.  My future publications will further expand and 
detail this periodization.  A version of this section was presented at the Law and Society Association annual 
meeting in San Francisco on June 4, 2011; I would like to thank my co-panelists and the audience for helpful 
feedback. 
2 I recognize the problems with using the term “orthodoxy,” but do so in the absence of an adequate alternative.  I 
define legal orthodoxy as the existence of a hierarchical legal institution (not necessarily empowered by a state) 
that can label laws as deviant and can punish – through social pressure or otherwise – legal deviance. 
3 Hayden White, Metahistory: the historical imagination in nineteenth-century Europe  (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1975), 8. 
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common ideas about legal systems and their histories; I argue that academic scholarship is 
invested in orthodox narratives about the law.  
 
II. Orthodox narratives of Jewish and Islamic legal histories 
 Orthodox believers tell self-justifying, historical narratives about their legal systems; 
they emplot these stories by ascribing habit-based continuity from ancestral authority figures 
to later generations of orthodox communities.  This practice, however, is not limited to 
orthodox believers, since it characterizes the practice of scholarship (even “secular” 
scholarship).  I will outline extremely abbreviated and over-simplified versions of the 
“orthodox” stories of Jewish law and Islamic law.  These stories are not comprehensive or the 
subjects of any explicit consensus; however, they are prevalent in the discourse of religious 
communities, as well as in scholarship and in the processes of socialization in the disciplines of 
Jewish studies and Islamic studies.  In other words, the stories I will outline here are discursive 
interpretations – or instructive caricatures – of the structurally similar (historical) narratives 
told by scholars and believers.4  My objective here is not to accurately portray the legal history 
perspectives of orthodox believers or of scholars (believers or non-believers), but rather to 
offer a strategic reduction.5 
  The “story of Jewish law”6 is the story of orthodox rabbinic Judaism, so non-rabbinic 
Jewish sects (such as Karaites) are effectively absent.7  It typically begins with the rabbinic 
sages (the Tannaim and the Amora’im, 70 through 500 CE) who preserved and elaborated 
ancient Jewish legal traditions; their authoritativeness is generally unquestioned.  The 
redaction of the Babylonian Talmud is assumed to have been completed by the early 7th 
century (by the Savora’im or Stammaim, 500-620 CE) and is conceptualized as the culmination 
of the rabbinic tradition.  The Gaonic period (620-1050 CE) is poorly understood and typically 
viewed as a period of stagnancy.  The medieval commentators, known as the Rishonim (1050-
1400 CE), authored the definitive commentaries of rabbinic literature that remain canonical 
until today.8  This somewhat standard periodization of Jewish law is based on classifying or 
grouping generations of rabbinic scholars as playing particular roles in Jewish legal authority.  
Each generation of rabbinic scholars legitimates itself by claiming that its legal output 
preserves orthodox customs.   
  The “story of Islamic law”9 is likewise the story of orthodox Sunnī Islam, so Shīʿī and 
other sectarian legal expressions are ignored.  The late antique period (seventh and early 
eighth centuries) of Islamic law is categorized in terms of generations of authority: the 
                                                                  
4 It should be noted that while these conventional stories are modeled after the narratives of evolutionary biology 
and therefore should be critiqued for being philosophically untenable, this is not the purpose of my analysis here 
today.  For a critique of evolutionary approaches to Islamic legal history, see the Introduction to this dissertation. 
5 I am invoking the idea of “strategic essentialism” as a component of subaltern historiography.  For a similar 
application of postcolonial theory to medieval studies, see Bruce W. Holsinger, "Medieval studies, postcolonial 
studies, and the genealogies of critique," Speculum 77, no. 4 (2002). 
6 See Appendix II, Table 1.  The general outlines of this story are evident in both scholarly literature and in 
orthodox discourse.  See the preceding section’s literature review. 
7 Karaism is a Jewish sect that rejects talmudic-rabbinic tradition.  See Meira Polliack, ed. Karaite Judaism: a guide to 
its history and literary sources (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2003).  
8 However, the Sulkhan Arukh (early 16th century CE) is considered to be the culminating work of the Rishonim. 
9 See Appendix II, Table 2. 
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Prophet, the Companions, and the Successors.10  The traditional story then identifies a period 
of authoritative legal scholars (roughly the eighth and ninth centuries), with particular 
emphasis on the eponyms of the surviving legal schools (Ḥanafī, Mālikī, Shāfiʿī, Ḥanbalī) as 
having laid the foundations for later legal practice.  In the medieval period (roughly mid-
eighth to fourteenth centuries), it became normative for Muslim jurists to be committed to a 
canonized jurisprudential methodology (i tihād fī al-madhhab or ta līd).  As in the case of the 
Jewish law story, this story classifies every generation of jurists as playing a certain role in 
Islamic legal authority and each generation of jurists legitimates itself by claiming to preserve 
orthodox practices.   
  The similar plots of these stories operate as narratives about continuity and, in this 
way, they legitimate orthodoxy.11  Both orthodox stories coincide with broader historiographic 
modes of emplotment: “antiquity,” “middle ages,” and “renaissance” are all historiographic 
categories that have implicit value meanings.  Moreover, these stories have real world 
consequences because it is primarily the legal interpretations of the late medieval period that 
are considered authoritative within orthodox communities.  These stories function as 
disciplinary techniques: to narrate legal history in line with the emplotment of these stories – 
even if modifying certain particulars – is to acquiesce to orthodoxy.  In other words, the 
orthodox stories demand obedience to the status-quo by legitimating the authority of 
orthodox elites.  When scholars present the normativity of these orthodox stories as historical 
descriptions, they further legitimate orthodox legal power. 
 
III. The orthodoxy of scholarship 
  Some form of these condensed stories of Jewish and Islamic law has been in circulation 
for centuries and remains largely unquestioned in the disciplines of Jewish studies and of 
Islamic studies.  Indeed, while historians – particularly historians of gender, sexuality, and race 
– have actively dismantled master narratives in a variety of fields, these orthodox legal 
histories remain relatively untarnished.12  The points of emphasis in terms of legitimacy or 
authority in these stories correlate to scholarly focus.  For example, more scholars specialize in 
the study of the Babylonian Talmud, presumably redacted in the “authoritative” period, than 
in Gaonic responsa literature or in the medieval legal commentaries, just as the narrative 
about Jewish law elevates the Talmud over these other Jewish legal texts.13  Likewise, as 
discussed in this dissertation’s introduction, most Islamic law scholars focus on the 
                                                                  
10 There is, however, a general recognition of geographic diversity.  Hallaq observes, “Each locale, from Syria to 
Iraq to the Hejaz, established its own legal practices on the basis of what was regarded as the sunna of the 
forefathers, be they the Companions or the Prophet, although the Prophet more often than not merely sanctioned 
the ancient Arabian sunan.” Hallaq, Sharīʿa: 47. 
11 See Appendix II, Table 3.  See Peter Brooks, Reading for the plot: design and intention in narrative  (New York: A.A. 
Knopf, 1984). 
12 See Daniel Klein, "The Islamic and Jewish laws of usury: a bridge to commercial growth and peace in the Middle 
East," Denver journal of international law and policy 23, no. 3 (1995).  By comparison, interesting and innovative 
research has been done on Jewish-Christians, for example; historians are uncovering aspects of Jewish history in 
antiquity and late antiquity by exploring underused sources and rethinking assumptions.  See Richard Lee Kalmin 
et al., eds., Jewish culture and society under the Christian Roman Empire (Leuven: Peeters); Seth Schwartz, Were the Jews 
a Mediterranean society?: reciprocity and solidarity in ancient Judaism  (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010); 
Seth Schwartz, Imperialism and Jewish society, 200 B.C.E. to 640 C.E  (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001). 
13 Consider that the Babylonian Talmud is commonly identified as Gemara, which means completion. 
 115 
 
authoritative legal texts or the contested beginnings of the professional schools of Islamic law, 
while very few specialize in the legal schools that do not survive.  Scholars in Islamic legal 
studies legitimate the aforementioned story of law by using the term “classical” to describe the 
period of Islamic legal history (roughly, the tenth century) that is esteemed by the 
aforementioned orthodox narrative.14  Similarly, scholars of Jewish law use the same 
classification of Jewish legal history that orthodox believers use.  When scholars make general 
claims about what “Islamic law” or “Jewish law” is, they invariably refer to legal ideas or texts 
that the orthodox narrative identifies as canonical or authoritative.15  In public discourse, the 
statements “Islamic law does not allow…” or “Jewish law requires…” are not merely descriptive 
claims because they are implicated in orthodox ideas.   
 
IV. Consequences of orthodox narratives 
  What is the significance of these stories?  First, these stories are insular: they present 
law as entirely disconnected from socio-political contexts; legal systems are presumed to 
march along a linear continuum from “point a” to “point b” without any interference from 
non-legal factors.  Second, these stories are incomplete representations of legal systems: they 
fail to consider the substantive changes within legal literature, legal education, and legal 
professionalization.  Third, these stories have significant doctrinal consequences: they 
influence the everyday lives of people who are unaware that modifying these stories radically 
alters precedential authority in these legal systems.  Finally, these orthodox stories are 
ideologically problematic: they voice the perspective of an orthodox elite, including its biases 
against groups it deems as “other.” 
  The theme of continuity in Jewish and Islamic legal historiography has significant 
socio-political ramifications.  While most of the jurists – both Muslim and Jewish – in the late 
antique and medieval periods likely perceived themselves as continuing or maintaining legal 
traditions, gradual changes nevertheless occurred.  If we understand orthodoxy as being the 
ideology of a particular class – in this context, religious scholars, particularly those affiliated 
with the dominant political power – then this class narrates its own victory by declaring its 
practices as being the same as the practices of its predecessor classes.16   Thus, there are two 
dilemmas: the first is uncovering the changes that underlie juristic narratives of legal 
continuity in both Jewish and Islamic legal traditions; the second is accounting for continuity 
across generations of jurists without legitimating the orthodox narrative.  I seek to resolve 
both challenges by using concrete historical evidence to outline a periodization of Jewish and 
Islamic legal histories that both contextualizes and historicizes.   
 
V. An unorthodox historical narrative 
                                                                  
14 Léon Buskens, "A medieval Islamic law? Some thoughts on the periodization of the history of Islamic law," in O 
ye gentlemen: Arabic studies on science and literary culture in honour of Remke Kruk, ed. Arnoud Vrolijk and J. P. 
Hogendijk, Islamic philosophy, theology and science: texts and studies, v. 74 (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2007), 470.   
15 “In general usage, also among Islamicists, ‘Islamic law’ is often equated with the classical body of normative 
writings of Muslim legal scholars known as fiqh.  This classical corpus of ideas and rules developed on the basis of 
an orthodox understanding of the Qur’an and traditions of the Prophet, which was already established around 900 
AD.” Ibid., 472. 
16 Walter Benjamin, "Theses on the philosophy of history," in Illuminations, ed. Hannah Arendt (New York: 
Schocken Books, 2007).  
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The periodization I present is an evolving framework based on observable changes in 
legal literature, in the identity and training of jurists, in the role of the state or political 
authority,17 and in modes of legal reasoning.  There are three risks to my periodization that I 
want to acknowledge.  First, demarcating blocks of time and labeling them can have 
historiographically limiting effects because it provokes debates about the classification labels 
and the cut-off dates that can be unproductive.  Second, any periodization relies on identifying 
a historical context that is constructed by historians.18  Indeed, the changes within and 
between periods are contingent upon a variety of social, economic, political, and legal factors 
that need further, critical elaboration.  Third, the very structure of periodization invokes 
evolutionary ideas of history that are linear and downplay contingency.  But these limitations 
are ultimately unavoidable and should not paralyze historical inquiry.  Moreover, despite 
these difficulties, I propose a periodization for Near Eastern legal history as a less problematic 
alternative to the aforementioned (orthodox) stories of law.  In proposing a chronological 
framework, I am sensitive to the necessity of balancing emphasis on contingency (instead of 
“evolutionary” process), with incremental changes, with continuity, and with rupture.  The 
periods of Jewish and Islamic legal history are historical moments in which certain 
jurisprudential modes became dominant.  The objective of this periodization is not 
substantiation with a surplus of historical evidence.19  Instead, I will simply present my 
narrative as an alternative to the aforementioned “orthodox” stories and as a starting point 
for future research and inquiry.  The aim of the periodization proposed here is to offer an 
alternative means of describing and classifying legal change in both Jewish and Islamic legal 
historiography. 
 
Diffusion and diversity of legal conventions (roughly 610–800 CE)20 
 
During this transformative period, Arab-Muslims created a burgeoning empire and 
integrated or assimilated the region’s diverse religious and ethnic communities.  Legal 
education occurred primarily in study circles around particular jurists, who sometimes served 
as judges in (Muslim or Jewish) local courts.21  Jewish and Islamic legal literature integrated 
narrative and legal content, which jurists gradually differentiated as their profession became 
more specialized.22  After the ʿAbbāsid empire established Baghdad as the political-intellectual 
capital (in 762 CE), Iraqi schools of legal thought began a gradual rise to dominance in both 
                                                                  
17 My understanding of the state is based on Bevir, Mark, and R. A. W. Rhodes. The state as cultural practice. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010. 
18 I thank Christopher Tomlins for reminding me of this challenge.  Tomlins explains, “Historians are taught to 
locate objects in time and in relationship to other objects similarly located, and to examine the nature of the 
relationships that result from the objects’ placement.” Tomlins, "What is left of the law and society paradigm 
after critique? Revisiting Gordon's “Critical Legal Histories”," 164. 
19 The footnotes do contain some historical substantiation.  More detailed and precise research demonstrating this 
periodization will be presented in future publications. 
20 See Appendix II, Table 4. 
21 I distinguish between legal circles (geographic or local schools), legal networks (personal schools), and legal 
schools (doctrinal schools).  This is an adaptation of Hallaq’s terminology: “During the second/eighth century, 
therefore, the term madhhab meant a group of students, legists, judges and jurists who had adopted the doctrine 
of a particular leading jurist.” Hallaq, Sharīʿa: 63. 
22 See Barry S. Wimpfheimer, Narrating the law: a poetics of talmudic legal stories  (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2011). 
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Jewish and Islamic legal systems.23  Despite being institutionalized in academies, legal activity 
was not centralized and was primarily privately organized by jurists, with little state or public 
intervention.  Debates about the role of oral law (or juristic customs) occurred in both legal 
communities.  During this period, individuals we may describe as pre-Karaites presented their 
opposition to rabbinic oral law.24  The redaction of the Babylonian Talmud may be understood 
as a response to Karaite opposition that elevated the legal significance of the Mishnah (as 
embodying the oral Torah) to be on par with the (written) Torah.25  This parallels a similar 
debate and process occurring in Muslim circles about the significance of “oral law,” which 
manifests itself in the increasing importance of (recorded/written)  adīth in Islamic legal 
literature.26  Generally, legal practice was both diffuse and diverse, largely based on customary 
practice and on the legal conventions of antecedent jurists. 
 
Synthesis and systematization (roughly 800–1000 CE)27 
 
As the Islamic empire developed an increasingly more complex bureaucratic system, 
the state and jurists participated in professionalizing the legal schools.  Among Muslim jurists, 
a transition from legal networks to legal schools occurred as part of a broader synthesis of 
Islamic legal reasoning.28  Consolidation of legal schools (from hundreds to a few in the case of 
Islamic jurisprudence) occurred in reaction to/against sectarian resistance.  Similarly, rabbinic 
jurists articulated their understandings of Judaism in reaction to/against Karaite (and other 
sectarian) challenges.  Jewish and Muslim jurists based in Iraq became stronger centers of legal 
authority by the beginning of the ninth century, if not earlier.29  Jurists systematized the 
                                                                  
23 This move soon resulted in a shift of rabbinic authority as the Babylonian academies gradually gained 
ascendancy.  “There is little doubt that, in pre-Islamic and early Islamic times, the Jews in the countries originally 
belonging to the Byzantine empire, such as Palestine, Syria, and Egypt, looked up to the yeshiva of the Holy Land 
as their highest religious and legal authority.” Samuel D. Goitein, "The interplay of Jewish and Islamic laws," in 
Jewish law in legal history and the modern world, ed. Bernard S. Jackson, The Jewish law annual. Supplement 2 (Leiden: 
Brill, 1980), 62.  The Iraqi jurisprudential style may be differentiated from the Syrian: “the tendency to rely 
primarily on custom represents a continuation of the ancient Palestinian approach, which placed a greater 
emphasis on the living, day-to-day tradition and a lesser emphasis on learned argumentation than did the 
Babylonian.” Brody, The geonim of Babylonia: 116. 
24 I use pre-Karaite for Astren’s term “proto-Karaite,” although I reject the linear, evolutionary assumption 
underlying use of the term. See Fred Astren, Karaite Judaism and historical understanding  (Columbia, S.C.: University 
of South Carolina Press, 2004). 
25 While I do not want to delve into the complicated issue of historically dating the redaction of the Babylonian 
Talmud, I suspect that sectarian conflict played a role in the elevation of the text’s importance.  Moreover, the 
parallel debates and shifts from oral to written legal authority among Muslims and Jews are unlikely to be merely 
coincidental.  
26 For instance, Muslim juristic circles debated the authority of the companion or successor jurists.  See Kamali, 
Principles of Islamic jurisprudence: 313-22 (discussing the legal opinions of Companions). 
27 See Appendix II, Table 5. 
28 Hallaq observes, “The intellectual and legal history of Islam between 150 and 350 H (c. 770 and 960 AD) 
represents a dynamic competition among several forces that crystallized in the opposing movements of 
traditionalism and rationalism, movements out of which emerged the Great Synthesis.” Hallaq, Sharīʿa: 57. 
29 “Iraq and the West had the most jurists, Sham and the East the fewest.” Monique Bernards et al., "The 
geographic distribution of Muslim jurists during the first four centuries AH," Islamic Law and Society 10, no. 2 
(2003): 174. “By the end of the Geonic period, although they retained their traditional names, both leading 
academies had actually relocated in Baghdad, the capital of the Abbasid empire.” Brody, The geonim of Babylonia: 
36.  
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transmitted legal opinions of predecessor jurists in texts that would later be identified as 
canonical.  The power of particular law schools (or academies) became entrenched and 
nominally linked to state power as legal education became focused on emerging legal canons.  
Babylonian rabbinic Judaism became increasingly authoritative and dominant as reflected in 
treatises and commentaries of individual Gaonic rabbis.30   
 
Legal structure (roughly 1000-1200 CE)31 
 
  The subsequent period consisted of further systemization of both Rabbinic and Islamic 
legal literature, roughly from the 11th through 13th centuries.32  Generally, in this period, 
Rabbinic and Muslim jurists wrote commentaries on canonized or codified legal texts of 
predecessor jurists (who had been identified as authoritative) and created condensed legal 
manuals.  An example is the Hilkhot ha-Rif (Isaac ben Jacob Alfasi ha-Cohen, d. 1103), which 
presents practical legal decisions in an abridged form – following the order of the Talmud but 
presenting only the conclusions or definitive opinions (as determined by Rabbi Alfasi).  
Moreover, this resembles the Islamic mukhtaṣar genre of abridged legal manuals.33  These 
abridgements became the main texts of study for students of both legal traditions.34  Among 
both Muslim and Jewish jurists, a clear separation between literary and legal materials became 
prevalent as they further systematized the pragmatic legal rulings of previous generations.  
For example, the writings of the Jewish jurist and philosopher, Maimonides (d. 1204) adapted 
the structure prevailing in contemporaneous Islamic legal texts.35  The Babylonian Tamud is, to 
                                                                  
30 These include Halachot Pesukot by Yehudai Gaon, She'iltot by Achai Gaon, and Halachot Gedolot by Simeon Kayyara.  
Zvi Septimus has pointed out to me that Rashi cited to or relied on these texts rather than Gaonic responsa.  
Brody observed that “the Babylonian center achieved independence in calendrical matters in the course of the 
ninth century, and by the 920s considered itself competent to overrule its erstwhile mentors.” Brody, The geonim 
of Babylonia: 120. 
31 See Appendix II, Table 6. 
32 A canonization process has been identified for this period: “the tenth through the thirteenth centuries of the 
common era, which witnessed also the acme of Jewish-Islamic symbiosis.  It was the time when everything we 
regard as Judaism: Jewish law and ritual, the text of the Hebrew Bible and the synagogue service, Jewish thought 
and ethics, were put into their final shape and received authoritative status.” Goitein, "The interplay of Jewish 
and Islamic laws," 62. 
33 The Rif removed all haggadic materials and kept only halakhic passages.  Similarly, mukhtaṣar texts abbreviate 
earlier legal texts to offer straightforward legal answers.  Hallaq explains that “abridgments (mukhtasars) were 
generally preferred after the fifth/eleventh century when they became abundant.  Some of these abridgments 
were specifically produced by professors for teaching purposes, their intent being to sum up fiqh doctrine by 
invoking legal principles and alluding to ‘cases’ that supported these principles.” Hallaq, Sharīʿa: 138. 
34 The Rif was studied in Yeshivas in North Africa and legal schools were using mukhtaṣar texts. 
35 See Sarah Stroumsa, Maimonides in his world: portrait of a Mediterranean thinker  (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 2009); Michael Schwarz, "Al-Fiqh, a term borrowed from Islam used by Maimonides for a Jewish 
concept in his Sefer haMizwoth and in the Guide of the Perplexed," in Adaptations and innovations: studies on the 
interaction between Jewish and Islamic thought and literature from the early Middle Ages to the late twentieth century, ed. 
Joel L. Kraemer, Y. Tzvi Langermann, and Jossi Stern, Collection de la Revue des études juives, 44 (Paris; Dudley, MA: 
Peeters, 2007).  On Maimonides more generally, see Gerald J. Blidstein, "Where do we stand in the study of 
Maimonidean halakhah?," in Studies in Maimonides, ed. Isadore Twersky (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1990); Herbert A. Davidson, "Maimonides' putative position as official head of the Egyptian Jewish 
community," in Ḥazon Na um: studies in Jewish law, thought, and history presented to Dr. Norman Lamm on the occasion of 
his seventieth birthday, ed. Yaakov Elman and Jeffrey S. Gurock (New York, NY; Hoboken, NJ: Michael Sharf 
Publication Trust of the Yeshiva University Press ; Ktav, 1997); Mordechai A. Friedman, "Maimonides: head of the 
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this day, read alongside, through, and within the commentary of, for example, Rashi (d. 1105).  
The technical literature of both legal traditions in this period indicates abbreviation and 
systematization.  These legal-literary changes coincided with the increased involvement of the 
state with the legal profession.36   
 
Legal autonomy (roughly 1200–1400 CE)37 
 
By the thirteenth century, Muslim and Jewish jurists were creating abridged versions of 
canonical legal commentaries and the locus of jurisprudential activity was shifting away from 
the Iraqi sphere of influence (both geographically and intellectually).  This was a direct result 
of the Mongol invasion of Baghdad, capital of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate in 1258; in addition to the 
destruction of Baghdad’s libraries, the city’s role as an intellectual center came to an abrupt 
end as regional centers.   In provincial centers of legal activity, legal manuals and their 
commentaries were produced.  For example, the legal compilation of Mordechai ben Hillel (d. 
1298) corresponds to a type of abridged Islamic legal texts known as “common law 
mukhtaṣars.”38  By this period, a type of process theory had gained ascendancy as jurists 
identified their role in legal-algorithmic terms.39 
 
VI. An alternate story of near eastern law40 
This rough timeline presents the plot for an alternate historical narrative about the 
gradual dominance of systemic legal thought, of a class of religious scholars, and of their 
institutions. It is intended to offer categories and classifications that are distinct from the 
aforementioned orthodox stories.  This periodization can be continued to offer a 
contextualized narrative outline of how and why law (both Jewish and Islamic) changed in the 
Near East.  This periodization offers a framework to bring together doctrinal analyses (as 
presented in the case studies of this dissertation’s three substantive chapters) with far-
reaching socio-political and legal transformations.  My intention is to illustrate that jurists in 
certain periods and places practice similar forms of legal reasoning.  By emphasizing 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Jews (ra'is al-yahud) in Egypt," in   l pi ha- e er : me  arim  e-hagut  ehudit uve-ma shevet  i ra el, mugashim le-
 a aḳov Blidstein, ed. Uri Ehrlich, Howard T. Kreisel, and Daniel J. Lasker (Beʼer Sheva: Universi at Ben-Guryon ba-
Negev, 2008); Jacob Lavinger, "Was Maimonides 'rais al-yahud' in Egypt?," in Studies in Maimonides, ed. Isadore 
Twersky (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, Center for Jewish Studies; distributed by Harvard University 
Press, 1990); Stroumsa, Maimonides in his world: portrait of a Mediterranean thinker.  
36 Hallaq clarifies that “By the end of the eleventh century, a substantial segment of the legal elite was in the pay 
of government.  With the incorporation of the professors into the madrasa system, the political domain 
encroached further into the terrain of the law, subordinating a considerable segment – even the elite – of the 
professorial profession and contributing to the increasing diminution of the “moral community” of the legists.”  
Wael B. Hallaq, An introduction to Islamic law  (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 53. 
37 See Appendix II, Table 7. 
38 I use the term “common law mukhtaṣar” as defined by Mohammad Fadel, "The social logic of ta līd and the rise 
of the mukhtaṣar," Islamic Law and Society 3, no. 2 (1996).  An example of a Mālikī mukhtaṣar is that of Khalīl b. Is āq 
al-Jundī (d. 1365). 
39 Compare to Henry Melvin Hart et al., The legal process: basic problems in the making and application of law, ed. 
William N. Eskridge and Philip P. Frickey (Westbury, N.Y.: Foundation Press, 1994). 
40 See Appendix II, Table 8. 
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institutional and contextual factors of change, this periodization directs the focus away from 
authority figures (famous jurists) and toward processes of change in legal systems. 
Contemporary Islamic legal historiography has primarily been focused on (a) Islamic 
“origins” and (b) Islamic continuity/rupture.  The political commitments of many Western 
scholars are manifested in (a) asserting the “false origins” of Islam by revealing its “non-
Islamic” (i.e., Jewish, Roman, etc.) influences or by delegitimizing its foundational 
texts/figures and (b) claiming the “backwardness” of Islam by minimizing changes and 
diversity within Islamic practices.  Likewise, the political commitments of many orthodox 
scholars are manifested in (a) establishing the “true origins” of Islam by affirming the purity of 
Islamic tradition and (b) proclaiming that orthodox authority is legitimate because it preserves 
Islamic traditions.  I argue that these two primary understandings of Islamic law (again, 
contemporary and historical) ask the same questions about “origins” and continuity, but 
provide mirror opposite answers that serve specific ideological goals – either reifying the 
other and attacking a perceived threat or legitimating the authority of orthodoxy and 
defending the tradition from “external” attack.  It is hoped that the present dissertation has 
contributed to deconstructing the ideology of “sharīʿah” – manifested in both scholarly 
literature and popular discourse – and replacing it with a contextual understanding of Islamic 
law.   
In interpreting the political uses of Islamic law – by orthodox or by imperialist groups – 
I replace the dominant “sharīʿah” myth with a historically contextualized, thick description of 
Islamic legal changes based on post-foundationalist heuristics.  My research deconstructs the 
ideological notion of “sharīʿah” by recognizing that all historical events/texts reflect their 
contexts, all historical events are contingent, and there is no linear progression in history.  
Late antique Jews and Muslims practiced, modified, and transformed Near Eastern legal 
pluralism.  They perceived their own legal systems as continuing earlier practices and only 
slightly modifying those practices when necessary.  They did not do so in isolated spaces, 
disconnected from their predecessors or neighbors – of any religious, ethnic, or political 
grouping.41   
 
VII. Further directions 
  I hope this effort to create a framework of Near Eastern legal history will direct future 
research by offering scholars alternate categories based on historical, contextual 
understandings – rather than orthodox evaluations of the relative authority of certain periods.  
This dissertation offers the first steps in a broader research project of rewriting the history of 
Islamic law in the late antique and medieval periods (with an eye to how that narrative 
continues in the modern era) in order to lay bare the deep and problematic emplottment of 
                                                                  
41 I correlate the intellectual output of a group to that of an individual and seek to explore the ways in which the 
newly formed Muslim community built upon and adapted its complex tradition, which necessarily included 
Jewish traditions.  Mannheim explains that “Strictly speaking it is incorrect to say that the single individual 
thinks.  Rather it is more correct to insist that he participates in thinking further what other men have thought 
before him. He finds himself in an inherited situation with patterns of thought which are appropriate to this 
situation and attempts to elaborate further the inherited modes of response or to substitute others for them in 
order to deal more adequately with the new challenges which have arisen out of the shifts and changes in his 
situation.” Karl Mannheim, Ideology and utopia: an introduction to the sociology of knowledge, trans. Louis Wirth and 
Edward Shils (New York: Harvest, 1985), 3. 
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existing Islamic legal histories.  This process of rewriting Islamic legal historiography revolves 
around two main ideas: (1) historicism through contingency and (2) contextualization.  The 
first intervention destablisizes Islamic legal orthodoxy by focusing on the extinct and 
heterodox aspects of Islamic legal history.  The second intervention subverts ideologically-
based stereotypes or myths about the “false” or “borrowed” “origins” of Islamic law (and, by 
extension, Islam) by comparing Islamic legal systems to their contemporaneous, neighboring 
legal systems (especially Jewish legal systems).  Both interventions seek to change the way 
Islamic law is described, analyzed, and theorized by non-specialists and specialists.  Both 
interventions argue that Islamic law is, has, and always will be a product of its changing, multi-
vocal contexts because Islamic law – like any legal system – has no essential core.  Beyond 
rethinking Islamic legal historiography, it is also possible to rethink the way law, religion, 
identity, and their interrelationships are conceptualized within the field of Islamic studies and 
Jewish studies.  My future research will continue the process begun here of resisting 
assumptions, scrutinizing the “obvious,” and reconsidering what a variety of historical-legal 
texts from multiple “religious traditions” can tell us about a past that is always simultaneously 
present and absent.  
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Post-script 
 
 
 This dissertation is a modest contribution to an evolving framework for re-conceptualizing 
Islamic legal history.  I hope that this is only a beginning.  Future research will dig deeper into 
the intricate details of legal practice and climb higher into the broad socio-political changes 
that animate the transformations of law in the “Near East.” 
 
 
 
 123 
 
Selected Bibliography 
 
ʿAbbās, I sān. Shadharāt min  utu  maf  dah fī al-tārī h.  Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 1988. 
ʿAbd al-Majīd, ʿAbd al-Majīd Ma mūd. al-Itti āhāt al-fi hīyah ʿinda aṣ ā  al- adīth fī al- arn al-
thālith al-hi rī.  Cairo: Maktabat al-Khānjī, 1979. 
ʿAbd al-Maq ūd, ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz  ūsuf. Ta addud al-zaw āt  ayna al-yah dīyah wa-al-naṣrānīyah wa-
al-islām: dirāsah mu āranah na dīyah.  Cairo: Dār al-Fikr al-ʿArabī, 2010. 
ʿAbdū, A mad Idrīs. al- āfī fī a  ām al-za āh: dirāsah mu āranah  ayna al-madhāhi  wa-ārāʾ al-
ʿulamāʾ.  ʿAyn Malīlah, Algeria: Dār al-Hudá, 2006. 
Abou El Fadl, Khaled. And God knows the soldiers.  Lanham, Maryland: University Press of 
America, Inc., 2001. 
———. "The rules of killing at war: An inquiry into classical sources." The Muslim World 89, no. 2 
(April 1999): 144-57. 
Abu-Odeh, Lama. "The politics of (mis)recognition: Islamic law pedagogy in American 
academia." The American Journal of Comparative Law 52, no. 4 (2004): 789-824. 
Abū  ūsuf (d. 798; Iraq),  aʿqūb ibn Ibrāhīm al-An ārī al-Kūfī. Kitā  al-āthār.  Beirut: Dār al-
Kutub al-ʿIlmīyah, 1978. 
Adghīrī, ʿAbd al-Salām bin al-Ḥasan. Ḥukm al-asr  fī al-Islām wa-mu āranatuhu  ī al- ān n al-dawlī 
al-ʿāmm.  Rabat: Maktabat al-Maʿārif, 1985. 
 ghā,  āli  Saʿīd. The revolution which toppled the Umayyads: neither  ra  nor ʿ   āsid.  Leiden; 
Boston: Brill, 2003. 
Ahmed, Leila. "Early Islam and the position of women: the problem of interpretation." Chap. 4 
In Women in Middle Eastern history, edited by Nikki Keddie and Beth Baron. 58-73. New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1991. 
al-Balkhī (d. 767; Iraq), Muqātil ibn Sulaymān. Tafsīr u ātil i n Sulaymān: 80-1 0 hi rīyah. edited 
by ʿAbd Allāh Ma mūd Shi ātah5 vols Cairo: al-Hayʾah al-Mi rīyah al-ʿ mmah lil-Kitāb, 
1979. 
al-Dūrī, ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz. The rise of historical writing among the Arabs. Translated by Lawrence I. 
Conrad. Modern classics in Near Eastern Studies. edited by Charles Issawi and Bernard 
Lewis Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983. Ba th fi nashʾat ʿilm al-taʾrīkh ʿinda l-
ʿArab (Beirut, 1960). 
al-Ḥimyarī al- anʿānī (d. 827;  emen), ʿAbd al-Razzāq ibn Hammām. al- uṣannaf. Manshūrāt al-
Majlis al-ʿIlmī, 39. edited by Ḥabīburra mān Aʿẓamī and Maʿmar ibn Rāshid. 2nd ed. 11 vols 
Beirut: al-Maktab al-Islāmī, 1983. 
———.  uṣannaf fī al- adīth. edited by Ḥabīb al-Ra mān al-ʿAẓamī11 vols Beirut: al-Maktab al-
Islāmī, 1970-. 
———.  uṣannaf fī al- adīth. edited by Maʿmar ibn Rāshid and Ayman Na r Azharī12 vols Beirut: 
Manshūrāt Mu ammad ʿAlī Bayḍūn, Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmīyah, 2000. 
 124 
 
al-Khurāsānī al-Ibāḍī (d. ca. 815; Khurāsān), Bishr ibn Ghānim. Mudawwanah al-kubrá. 2 vols 
 man: Wizārat al-Turāth al-Qawmī wa-al-Thaqāfah, 1984. 
al-Nawawī (d. 1277; Syria), Abī Zakarīyā Mu yī al-Dīn ibn Sharaf. Rawḍat al- āli īn. edited by 
ʿ dil A mad ʿAbd al-Mawjūd, ʿAlī Mu ammad Muʿawwaḍ and Jalāl al-Dīn  Abd al-Ra mān 
ibn Abī Bakr Suyū ī (d. 1505)8 vols Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmīyah, 1992. 
al-Nawawī (d. 1277; Syria), Abī Zakarīyā Mu yī al-Dīn ibn Sharaf, Abū Is āq Ibrāhīm ibn ʿAlī ibn 
 ūsuf Fīrūzābādī al-Shīrāzī (d. 1083; Iran), and Taqī al-Dīn ʿAlī ibn ʿAbd al-Kāfī Subkī (d. 
1355; Cairo/Damascus). al- a m ʿ, shar  al-Muhadhab. edited by Zakarīyā ʿAlī  ūsuf18 vols 
Cairo: Ma baʾat al-ʿ  imah, 1966-69. 
al-Qāḍī, Wadād. "The salaries of judges in early Islam: the evidence of the documentary and 
literary sources." Journal of Near Eastern Studies 68, no. 1 (2009): 9-30. 
———. "An Umayyad papyrus in al-Kindī’s Kitā  al-Quḍāt?". Der Islam 84, no. 2 (Dec 2008): 200-
45. 
al-Qattan, Najwa. "Dhimmis in the Muslim court: legal autonomy and religious discrimination." 
International Journal of Middle East Studies 31, no. 3 (Aug. 1999): 429-44. 
al-Qushayrī (d. 875; Khurāsān), Muslim ibn Hajjāj.  a i  uslim   eing traditions of the sayings and
doings of the prophet  uhammad as narrated  y his companions and compiled under the title al-
Jāmiʿ-uṣ-ṣa īh,   y  Imām uslim. Translated by ʿAbdul Ḥamīd  iddīqī. 4 vols Lahore: Sh. 
Muhammad Ashraf 1971-75. 
al-Rāfiʿī (d. 1226; Iran), ʿAbd al-Karīm ibn Mu ammad. al-ʿ zīz shar  al-wa īz: al-maʿr f  i-al-shar  
al- a īr. edited by ʿAlī Mu ammad Muʿawwaḍ and ʿ dil A mad ʿAbd al-Mawjūd14 vols 
Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmīyah, 1997. 
al-Sar ān, Mu yī Hilāl. Asrá al- ar  fī al-Islām wa-al- ān n al-dawlī.  Baghdad: al-Jumhūrīyah al-
 Irāqīyah, Wizārat al-Awqāf wa-al-Shuʾūn al-Dīnīyah, Majallat al-Risālah al-Islāmīyah, 1986. 
al-Shāfiʿī (d. 820; Arabia/Egypt), Mu ammad ibn Idrīs. al-Umm. Kitāb al-Sha b. edited by Ismāʿīl 
ibn  a y  Muzanī (d. 878). Reprint of the ed. published in Cairo, 1321 (1903/4) ed. 7 vols 
Cairo: Dār al-Shaʿb, 1968. 
———. al-Umm. 11 vols al-Man ūrah: Dār al-Wafāʾ lil- ibāʿah wa-al-nashr wa-al-tawzīʿ, 2001. 
———.  aws ʿat al-Imām al-Shāfiʿī al- itā  al-Umm. Silsilat mu annafāt Mu ammad ibn Idrīs al-
Shāfiʿī. edited by A mad Badr al-Dīn Ḥassūn10 vols Beirut: Dār Qutaybah, 1996. 
al-Shīrāzī (d. 1083; Iran), Abū Is āq Ibrāhīm ibn ʿAlī ibn  ūsuf Fīrūzābādī. al- uhadhdha  fī fi h 
al-Imām al-Shāfiʿī. 2 vols Cairo: Sharikat Maktabat wa-Ma baʿat Mu  af  al-Thānī al-Ḥalabī
wa-Awlādahu bi-Mi r, 1959. 
———. al- uhadhdha  fī fi h al-Imām al-Shāfiʿī. edited by Zakarīyā ʿUmayrāt and Mu ammad ibn 
A mad Ba  āl3 vols Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmīyah, 1995. 
al- uwarī, Mu ammad ʿAlī.     Dharr al-Ghifārī: al-ishtirā ī al-mu ārid.  Beirut: al-Muʾassasah al-
ʿArabīyah lil-Dirāsāt wa-al Nashr, 1979. 
al-Suyū ī (d. 1505; Egypt), Jalāl al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Ra mān ibn Abī Bakr. al-It ān fī ʿul m al-Qurʾān. 
edited by Mu ammad Abū al-Faḍl Ibrāhīm. Vol. 2nd, Tehran: Manshūrāt al-Raḍī, 1984. 
 125 
 
al-Ṭabarānī (d. 971; Syria), Sulaymān ibn A mad. al-  ādīth al- iwāl. edited by Mu  af  ʿAbd al-
Qādir ʿA ā Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmīyah, 1992. 
al-Ṭabarī (d. 923; Iraq), Abū Jaʿfar Mu ammad ibn Jarīr. The Conquest of Iraq, Southwestern Persia, 
and Egypt. Translated by G. H. A. Juynboll. The history of al-Ṭabarī, XIII.  Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1989. 
———. Jāmiʿ al- ayān ʿan taʾwīl āy al-Qurʾān. edited by  alā  ʿAbd al-Fatta  Khālidī and Ibrāhīm 
Mu ammad ʿAlī7 vols Damascus; Beirut: Dār al-Qalam; al-Dār al-Shāmīyah, 1997. 
———. Kitā  al- ihād wa- itā  al- izyah wa-a  ām al-mu āri īn min  itā  i htilāf al-fu ahāʾ. edited 
by Joseph Schacht Leiden: Brill, 1933. 
———. The last years of the Prophet: the formation of the State A.D. 630-632/A.H. 8-11. Translated by 
Ismail K. Poonawala. The history of al-Ṭabarī, IX.  Albany: State University of New  ork 
Press, 1990. 
———. The victory of Islam. Translated by Michael Fishbein. The history of al-Ṭabarī, VIII.  
Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997. 
al-Zaylaʿī al-Ḥanafī (d. 1342/3), ʿUthmān ibn ʿAlī, ʿAbd Allāh ibn A mad al-Nasafī (d. 1310; Iraq), 
and A mad ibn Mu ammad Shalabī (d. 1612/3). Ta yīn al- a āʾi   shar   anz al-daqāʾiq. 
edited by A mad ʿAzzū ʿInāyah7 vols Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmīyah, 2000. 
Anderson, J.N.D. "Modern trends in Islam: legal reform and modernisation in the Middle East." 
In Islamic law and legal theory, edited by Ian Edge. The International library of essays in law 
and legal theory, 7, 548-67. New York: New York University Press, 1996. 
Arabi, Oussama. "The dawning of the third millennium on shari'a: Egypt's Law no. 1 of 2000, or 
women may divorce at will." Arab Law Quarterly 16, no. 1 (2001): 2-21. 
Arafat, W.N. "New Light on the Story of Banū Qurayẓa and the Jews of Medina." Journal of the 
Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland  (1976): 100-07. 
Asad, Talal. Genealogies of religion.  Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993. 
Astren, Fred. Karaite Judaism and historical understanding.  Columbia, S.C.: University of South 
Carolina Press, 2004. 
ʿAthamina, Khalil. "The early Murji'a: some notes." Journal of Semitic Studies 35, no. 1 (1990): 109-
30. 
Avitzur v. Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d 136 (1983). 
Awzāʿī (d. 774; Syria), ʿAbd al-Ra mān ibn ʿAmr. Sunan al- wzāʿī: a ādīth wa-āthār wa-fatāwá. 
edited by Marwān Mu ammad al-Shaʿʿār Beirut: Dār al-Nafāʾis, 1993. 
ʿAzīzī, Mu ammad Rāmiz ʿAbd al-Fattā . Ta rīm al-ri ā: fi al-islām wa-al-diyānatayn al-yah dīyah 
wa-al-masī īyah. Min silsilat al-iqti ād al-Islāmī, 1.  Amman: Dār al-Furqān lil-Nashr wa-al-
Tawzīʿ, 2004. 
Babylonian Talmud. 
Bājī (d. 1081; Spain), Sulaymān ibn Khalaf. al- unta  : shar  muwa  aʾ  āli . edited by 
Mu ammad ʿAbd al-Qādir ʿA ā9 vols Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmīyah, 1999. 
 126 
 
Bamyeh, Mohammed A. The social origins of Islam: mind, economy, discourse.  Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1999. 
Banaji, Jairus. Theory as history: essays on modes of production and exploitation.  Leiden; Boston: 
Brill, 2010. 
Banakar, Reza. "Power, culture and method in comparative law." International Journal of Law in 
Context 5, no. 1 (2009): 69-85. 
Bashear, Suliman. "On the origins and development of the meaning of za āt in early Islam." 
Arabica XL (1993 1993): 84-113. 
Bayḍāwī (d. 1286; Shīrāz), ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿUmar.  nwār al-tanzīl wa-asrār al-tāʾwīl. Beidhawii 
Commentarius in Coranum: ex codd. Parisiensibus, Dresdensibus et Lipsiensibus. edited by 
Heinrich Leberecht Fleischer2 vols Lipsiae: Sumptibus F.C.G. Vogelii, 1846-1848. 
ben Na man (d. late 8th century; Iraq),  ehudai. Sefer halakhot pesukot. Sifre Mekhon "Ahavat 
shalom" Yerushalayim. edited by Solomon David Sassoon and Neil Danzig Jerusalem: 
Ahavat shalom, 1998. 
Benjamin, Walter. "Theses on the philosophy of history." Translated by Harry Zohn. In 
Illuminations, edited by Hannah Arendt. 253-64. New York: Schocken Books, 2007. 
Berg, Herbert, ed. Method and theory in the study of Islamic origins. Leiden: Brill, 2003. 
Berkey, Jonathon P. The formation of Islam: religion and society in the Near East, 600-1800.  
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 
Bernards, Monique, and John Nawas. "The geographic distribution of Muslim jurists during the 
first four centuries AH." Islamic Law and Society 10, no. 2 (2003 2003): 168-81. 
Bevir, Mark. The logic of the history of ideas.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. 
———. "What is genealogy?". Journal of the Philosophy of History 2, no. 3 (2008): 263-75. 
———. "Why historical distance is not a problem." History and Theory 50, no. 4 (December 2011): 
24-37. 
Bevir, Mark, and R. A. W. Rhodes. The state as cultural practice.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2010. 
Biale, Rachel. Women and Jewish law: an exploration of women's issues in halakhic sources.  New York: 
Schocken Books, 1984. 
Blidstein, Gerald J. "Where do we stand in the study of Maimonidean halakhah?". In Studies in 
Maimonides, edited by Isadore Twersky. 1-30. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1990. 
Bonner, Michael. "Poverty and economics in the Qur’an." Journal of Interdisciplinary History 
xxxv, no. 3 (Winter, 2005 2005): 391-406. 
Bowersock, G. W. Hellenism in late antiquity. Jerome lectures; 18th ser.  Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 1990. 
Boyarin, Daniel. Border lines: the partition of Judaeo-Christianity. Divinations.  Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004. 
 127 
 
Bravmann, M. M. "The surplus of property: an early Arab social concept." Der Islam 38 (1962): 
28-50. 
Brewer, David Instone. "Jewish women divorcing their husbands in early Judaism: the 
background to papyrus  eʾelim 13." The Harvard Theological Review 92, no. 3 (1999): 349-57. 
Brody, Robert. "Evidence for divorce by Jewish women?". The Journal of Jewish studies 50, no. 2 
(1999): 230-34. 
———. The geonim of Babylonia and the shaping of medieval Jewish culture.  New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1998. 
Brooks, Peter. Reading for the plot: design and intention in narrative.  New York: A.A. Knopf, 1984. 
Brown, Peter R. L. Poverty and leadership in the later Roman Empire. The Menahem Stern 
Jerusalem Lectures.  Hanover and London: University Press of New England, 2002. 
———. The world of late antiquity: AD 150-750.  New York: W.W. Norton, 1989. 
———. The world of late antiquity: from Marcus Aurelius to Muhammad. Library of European 
civilization.  London: Thames and Hudson, 1971. 
Broyde, Michael J. Marriage, divorce, and the abandoned wife in Jewish law: a conceptual 
understanding of the agunah problems in America.  Hoboken, NJ: KTAV Pub. House, 2001. 
Bukhārī (d. 870; Khurāsān), Mu ammad ibn Ismāʿīl.  a ī  al-Bu hārī   The translation of the 
meanings of  a i  al-Bu hārī,  ra ic-English  [Jamiʿ al-sahih]. Translated by Muhammad 
Muhsin Khan. 9 vols Medina: Dar al-Fikr, 1981. 
Bulsara, Sohrab Jamshedjee. The laws of the ancient Persians as found in the    t   n   haz r 
d tast n  or  The digest of a thousand points of law .  Bombay: H.T. Anklesaria, 1937. 
Buskens, Léon. "A medieval Islamic law? Some thoughts on the periodization of the history of 
Islamic law." In O ye gentlemen: Arabic studies on science and literary culture in honour of Remke 
Kruk, edited by Arnoud Vrolijk and J. P. Hogendijk. Islamic philosophy, theology and 
science: texts and studies, v. 74, 469-84. Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2007. 
Cappel, Andrew J. "Poor." In The Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium, edited by Alexander P. Kazhdan 
Oxford University Press, 1991. 
http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t174.e4417. 
Chamberlain, Michael. Knowledge and social practice in medieval Damascus, 1190-1350. Cambridge 
Studies in Islamic Civilization.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. 
Clark, Gillian. Women in late antiquity: pagan and Christian life-styles.  Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1993. 
Cohen, Elizabeth F. Semi-citizenship in democratic politics.  Cambridge; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009. 
Cohen, Mark R. "Maimonides and charity in light of the Geniza documents." In The Trias of 
Maimonides: Jewish, Arabic, and Ancient Culture edited by Georges Tamer. 67-81. Berlin: Walter 
de Gruyter, 2005. 
Collier, Jane F. "Intertwined histories: Islamic law and Western imperialism." Law & Society 
Review 28, no. 2 (1994 1994): 395-408. 
 128 
 
Constantelos, Demetrios J. Byzantine philanthropy and social welfare. Studies in the Social & 
Religious History of the Mediaeval Greek World, I. revised 2nd ed.  New Rochelle, NY: 
Aristide D. Caratzas, 1991. 
Coogan, Michael David, Marc Zvi Brettler, Carol A. Newsom, and Pheme Perkins, eds. The new 
Oxford annotated Bible. augmented third ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. 
Coulson, Noel J. A history of Islamic law.  Edinburgh: University Press, 1964. 
Cover, Robert M. "Foreword: nomos and narrative." Harvard Law Review 97, no. 1 (November 
1983): 4-68. 
Crone, Patricia. "Jāhilī and Jewish law: the  asāma." Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam 4 (1984): 
153-201. 
———. Roman, provincial and Islamic law.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 
Crone, Patricia, and Adam Silverstein. "The ancient Near East and Islam: the case of lot-
casting." Journal of Semitic Studies 55, no. 2 (September 1, 2010 2010): 423-50. 
Dandamayev, Muhammad A., Mansour Shaki, Sachiko Murata, Akbar Aghajanian, Jenny Rose, 
and Mujan Momen. "Divorce." In Encyclopaedia Iranica, December 15, 1995. 
Darwīsh, ʿAbd al-Ra mān ibn ʿAbd Allāh. al-Sharāʾiʿ al-sā i ah wa-madá  u  īyatihā fī al-sharīʿah al-
Islāmīyah.  Saudi Arabia: ʿA. al-R. b. ʿA. A. al-Darwīsh, 1989. 
Das sasanidische Rechtsbuch "Matakdan i hazar datistan" (Teil II). Translated by Maria Macuch.  
Wiesbaden: Deutsche Morgenländische Gesellschaft: Kommissionsverlag, F. Steiner, 1981. 
Davidson, Herbert A. "Maimonides' putative position as official head of the Egyptian Jewish 
community." In Ḥazon Na um: studies in Jewish law, thought, and history presented to Dr. Norman 
Lamm on the occasion of his seventieth birthday, edited by Yaakov Elman and Jeffrey S. Gurock. 
115-28. New York, NY; Hoboken, NJ: Michael Sharf Publication Trust of the Yeshiva 
University Press ; Ktav, 1997. 
Dhahabī, Mu  af . al-Khulʿ wa-a  āmuhu fī al-sharīʿah al-islāmīyah.  Cairo: Dār al-Ḥadīth, 2000. 
The Digest of Justinian Translated by Alan Watson. revised English-language ed. 2 vols 
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998. 
Donner, Fred M. Muhammad and the believers: at the origins of Islam.  Cambridge, Mass.: The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010. 
———. Narratives of Islamic origins. Studies in Late Antiquity and Early Islam 14.  Princeton: The 
Darwin Press, 1998. 
Dutton, Yasin. The origins of Islamic law: the Qurʾan, the  uwa  aʾ and  adinan  amal. Culture and 
civilization in the Middle East.  Surrey: Curzon, 1999. 
Elad, Amikam. "Community of believers of ‘holy men’ and ‘saints’ or community of Muslims? 
The rise and development of early Muslim historiography." Journal of Semitic Studies 47, no. 
2 (2002): 241-308. 
Elon, Menachem. Jewish law: history, sources, principles  [Ha-mishpat ha-Ivri]. Translated by 
Bernard Auerbach and Melvin J. Sykes.  Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1994. 
 129 
 
Esposito, John L. Women in Muslim family law.  Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1982. 
Fadel, Mohammad. "The social logic of ta līd and the rise of the mukhtaṣar." Islamic Law and 
Society 3, no. 2 (1996 1996): 193-233. 
Fadl, Khaled Abou El. "The rules of killing at war: An inquiry into classical sources." The Muslim 
World 89, no. 2 (April 1999 1999): 144-57. 
Faizer, Rizwi S. "Muhammad and the Medinan Jews: a comparison of the texts of Ibn Ishaq's 
Kitāb sīrat rasūl Allāh with al-Waqidi’s Kitāb al-maghāzī." International Journal of Middle East 
Studies 28, no. 4 (Nov., 1996 1996): 463-89. 
Fār, ʿAbd al-Wā īd Mu ammad.  sr  al-har : dirāsah fi hīyah wa-ta  ī īyah fī ni ā  al- ān n al-
duwalī al-ʿāmm wa-al-sharīʿah al-islāmīyah.  Cairo: ʿ lam al-Kutub, 1975. 
 atāwá al-ʿ lamgīrīyah (1664-1672). al-Fatāwá al-Hindīyah al-musammāh bil-Fatāwá al-
ʿ lamkīrīyah; wa-bi-hāmishih fatāwá Qāḍīkhān wa-huwá Fakhr al-Dīn Ḥasan ibn Man ūr al-
 zjandī al-Farghānī al-Ḥanafī. 6 vols Beirut: Dār I yāʾ al-Turāth al-ʿArabī, 1980. 
Fishman, Talya. Becoming the people of the Talmud: oral Torah as written tradition in medieval Jewish 
cultures [in English].  Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011. 
Fitzgerald, S.V. "The alleged debt of Islamic to Roman law." The Law Quarterly Review 67 (1951 
1951): 81-102. 
Fitzgerald, Timothy. Discourse on civility and barbarity: a critical history of religion and related 
categories.  New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. 
———. "Introduction." In Religion and the secular: historical and colonial formations, edited by 
Timothy Fitzgerald. 1-24. London; Oakville, CT: Equinox Pub., 2007. 
Fonrobert, Charlotte Elisheva, and Martin S. Jaffee. The Cambridge companion to the Talmud and 
rabbinic literature. Cambridge companions to religion.  Cambridge; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007. 
Foucault, Michel. The Foucault reader. Translated by Paul Rabinow. 1984. 
———. Religion and culture. edited by Jeremy R. Carrette New York: Routledge, 1999. 
Frenkel, Miriam, and Yaacov Lev, eds. Charity and giving in monotheistic religions. Berlin; New 
York: W. de Gruyter, 2009. 
Friedman, Lawrence M. "A dead language: divorce law and practice before no-fault." Virginia 
Law Review 86, no. 7 (October 2000 2000): 1497-536. 
Friedman, Mordechai A. "Divorce upon the wife's demand as reflected in manuscripts from the 
Cairo Geniza." Jewish Law Annual 4 (1981): 103-26. 
———. Geniza studies in Jewish marriage law.  s.l.: s.n., 1970. 
———. Jewish marriage in Palestine: a Cairo genizah study.  Tel-Aviv; New York: Tel-Aviv University, 
Chaim Rosenberg School of Jewish Studies; Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1980. 
———. "Maimonides: head of the Jews (ra'is al-yahud) in Egypt." In   l pi ha- e er : me  arim  e-
hagut  ehudit uve-ma shevet  i ra el, mugashim le- a aḳov Blidstein, edited by Uri Ehrlich, 
 130 
 
Howard T. Kreisel and Daniel J. Lasker. 1-23. Beʼer Sheva: Universi at Ben-Guryon ba-Negev, 
2008. 
———. "The ransom-divorce: divorce proceedings initiated by the wife in mediaeval Jewish 
practice." Israel Oriental studies 6 (1976): 288-307. 
Ghazālī, A mad. al- alā  al-infirādī wa-tadā īr al- add  minh  fī al-fi h al-islāmī wa-al-sharāʾiʿ al-
yah dīyah wa-al-masī īyah wa-al-waḍʿīyah wa-al-ta niyāt al-ʿara īyah al-muʿāṣirah: dirāsah 
mu āranah.  Cairo: Dār al-Nahḍah al-ʿArabīyah, 2000. 
Gil, Moshe. "The earliest waqf foundations." Chap. IX In Related worlds: studies in Jewish and Arab 
ancient and early medieval history. Aldershot, Hampshire, Great Britain; Burlington, Vt.: 
Ashgate, 2004. 
———. A history of Palestine, 634-1099.  Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992. 
Glenn, H. Patrick. Legal traditions of the world: sustainable diversity in law.  Oxford; New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2007. 
Goitein, Samuel D. "The birth-hour of Muslim law?". The Muslim World 50, no. 1 (1960): 23-29. 
———. "The interplay of Jewish and Islamic laws." In Jewish law in legal history and the modern 
world, edited by Bernard S. Jackson. The Jewish law annual. Supplement 2, 61-77. Leiden: 
Brill, 1980. 
———. A Mediterranean society: the Jewish communities of the Arab world as portrayed in the 
documents of the Cairo Geniza. 6 vols Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967-1993. 
Gordon, Robert W. "Critical legal histories." Stanford Law Review 36, no. 57 (January 1984): 57-
125. 
———. "Historicism in legal scholarship." The Yale Law Journal 90, no. 1017 (1981): 1017-56. 
———. "Introduction: J. Willard Hurst and the common law tradition in American legal 
historiography." Law & Society Review 10, no. 1 (Autumn 1975): 9-55. 
———. "The past as authority and as social critic: stabilizing and destabilizing functions of 
history in legal argument." In The historic turn in the human sciences, edited by Terrence J. 
McDonald. 339-78. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996. 
Grubbs, Judith Evans. "'Pagan' and 'Christian' marriage: the state of the question." In 
Christianity and society: the social world of early Christianity, edited by Everett Ferguson. Recent 
studies in early Christianity, 185-236. New York: Garland, 1999. 
Gutas, Dimitri. Greek culture, Arabic thought.  New York: Routledge, 1998. 
Haldon, John F. Money, power and politics in early Islamic Syria: a review of current debates.  
Farnham, Surrey, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2010. 
Hallaq, Wael B. "Groundwork of the moral law: a new look at the Qurʾān and the genesis of 
sharīʿa." Islamic Law and Society 16 (2009): 239-79. 
———.   history of Islamic legal theories: an introduction to Sunnī uṣ l al-fiqh.  Cambridge, UK ; New 
York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1997. 
———. An introduction to Islamic law.  Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009. 
 131 
 
———. The origins and evolution of Islamic law.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
———. "The quest for origins or doctrine? Islamic legal studies as colonialist discourse." UCLA 
Journal of Islamic and Near Eastern Law 2, no. 1 (2002-2003): 1-31. 
———. "Review: The use and abuse of evidence: the questions of provincial and Roman 
influences on early Islamic law." Journal of the American Oriental Society 110, no. 1 (1990): 79-
90. 
———. Sharīʿa: theory, practice, transformations.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. 
Harris, Ron. "The encounters of economic history and legal history." Law and History Review 21, 
no. 2 (Summer 2003): 297-346. 
Hart, Henry Melvin, and Albert M. Sacks. The legal process: basic problems in the making and 
application of law. edited by William N. Eskridge and Philip P. Frickey Westbury, N.Y.: 
Foundation Press, 1994. 
Hāshim, Khālid Mu  af . al-Jarīmah: dirāsah mu āranah  ayna al-sharīʿatayn al-yah dīyah wa-al-
islām.  Harindun, Farjiniya: al-maʿhad al-ʿālamī lil-fikr al-islāmī, 2007. 
Haythamī (d. 1405), Nūr al-Dīn ʿAlī ibn Abī Bakr. Ghāyat al-ma ṣ d fī zawāʾid al-Musnad. edited by 
Khalāf Ma mūd ʿAbd al-Samīʿ4 vols Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmīyah, 2001. 
Heidemann, Stefan. "The merger of two currency zones in early Islam: the Byzantine and 
Sasanian impact on the circulation in former Byzantine Syria and Northern Mesopotamia." 
Iran, Journal of Persian Studies 36 (1998): 95-112. 
———. "Numismatics." Chap. 16 In The formation of the Islamic world, sixth to eleventh centuries, 
edited by Chase F. Robinson. The new Cambridge history of Islam, 648-53. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011. 
Hill, Enid. "Comparative and historical study of modern Middle Eastern law." American Journal 
of Comparative Law 26, no. 2 (1978): 279-304. 
Holsinger, Bruce W. "Medieval studies, postcolonial studies, and the genealogies of critique." 
Speculum 77, no. 4 (2002): 1195-227. 
The Holy Qur-ān.  [in Arabic   English]. Translated by ‘Abdāllah  ūsuf ‘Alī.  Al-Madīnah Al-
Munawarah: King Fahd Holy Qur-ān Printing Complex, 1989-1990. 
Horovitz, Josef, and Lawrence I. Conrad, eds. The earliest biographies of the Prophet and their 
authors. Princeton: The Darwin Press, 2002. 
Hoyland, Robert G. Arabia and the Arabs: from the bronze age to the coming of Islam.  London: 
Routledge Press, 2001. 
———. "History, fiction and authorship in the first centuries of Islam." Chap. 2 In Writing and 
Representation in Medieval Islam: Muslim horizons, edited by Julia Bray. Routledge Studies in 
Middle Eastern Literatures, 16-46. London and New York: Routledge, 2006. 
———. "New documentary texts." Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 69, no. 3 
(2006): 395-416. 
 132 
 
Hurgronje, C. Snouck. "On the institution of za āt." Translated by Petra Marieke Sijpesteijn. 
Chap. 11 In The development of Islamic ritual, edited by G.R. Hawting. The formation of the 
classical Islamic world; v. 26, 191-210. Aldershot [England]: Ashgate/Variorum, 2006. 
Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr (d. 1070; Spain),  ūsuf ibn ʿAbd Allāh. Kitā  al- āfī fī fi h ahl al- adīnah al- āli ī. 
edited by Mu ammad Mu ammad A īd Wuld Mādīk Mūrītānī2 vols Riyadh: Maktabat al-
Riyāḍ al-Ḥadīthah, 1980. 
Ibn Abī Shaybah (d. 849; Iraq), ʿAbd Allāh ibn Mu ammad.  l- itā  al-muṣannaf fī al-a ādīth wa-
al-āthār. 9 vols Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmīyah, 1995. 
———. uṣannaf fī al-a ādīth wa-al-āthār. edited by Sa īd La  ām9 vols Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1989. 
Ibn Abī Zayd al-Qayrawānī (d. 996; Tunisia), ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿAbd al-Ra mān. al-Risālah al-
fi hīyah.  Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 1986. 
———. The Rís la: treatise on   lí   law of ʿ  dall h I n-Abî-Zayd Al-Qayrawânî (922-996): an 
annotated translation. Translated by Joseph Kenny.  Minna: Islamic Education Trust, 1992. 
Ibn  dam (d. 818; Iraq),  a y .  a yā  en  dam s Kitā  al- harā . Translated by Aharon Ben 
Shemesh. Taxation in Islām, v. 1.  Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1958. 
Ibn al-Farrāʾ (d. 1066; Iraq), Abū  aʿl  Mu ammad ibn al-Ḥusayn. al-   ām al-sul ānīyah. edited 
by Mu ammad Ḥāmid Fiqī Cairo: Mustaf  al-Babi al-Halabi, 1966. 
Ibn al-Mu ahhar al-Ḥillī (d.  1325;  Iraq),  al-Ḥasan ibn   ūsuf. Tadh irat al-fu ahāʾ. Muʾassasat  l 
al-Bayt li-I yāʾ al-Turāth. 20 vols Qum: Muʾassasat  l al-Bayt li-I yāʾ al-Turāth, 1993/1994. 
Ibn al-Naqīb (d. 1368; Egypt), A mad ibn Luʾluʾ. ʿUmdat al-sāli  wa-ʿuddat al-nāsi . edited by  āli  
Muʾadhdhin, Mu ammad Ghiyāth al- abbāgh  and  Mu yī  al-Dīn al-Kurdī Damascus: 
Maktabat al-Ghazzālī, 1979. 
Ibn Anas (d. 796; Arabia), Mālik. al-Muwa  aʾ [in Arabic   English]. Translated by Jīhān Abd al-
Raʾūf Hibah. 1st ed. 2 vols Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmīyah, 2007. 
———. Muwa  aʾ al-Imām  āli . edited by ʿAbd al-Wahhāb ʿAbd al-La īf. 2nd ed.  Beirut: al-
Ma baʿah al-ʿIlmīyah, 1979. 
Ibn Anas (d. 796; Arabia), Mālik, and Mu ammad ibn Mu ammad Rāʿī (d. 1449). " riginal Islam: 
Mālik and the madhhab of Madina." Culture and civilization in the Middle East  (2007). 
Ibn Barakah (d. 10th; ʿUmān), ʿAbd Allāh ibn Mu ammad. Kitā  al- āmiʿ. Turāthunā. edited by 
ʿ s   a y  Bārūnī. 2nd ed. 2 vols Beirut: Dār al-Fat , 1974. 
Ibn Ḥazm (d. 1064; Spain), ʿAlī ibn A mad. al- u allā. edited by Ḥasan Zaydān Ṭulbah12 vols 
Cairo: Maktabat al-Jumhūriyah al-ʿArabīyah, 1967-1971. 
———.  arāti  al-i māʿ fī al-ʿibādāt wa-al-muʿāmālat wa-al-iʿtiqādāt.  Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-
ʿIlmīyah, 1970. 
Ibn Is āq (d. 767; Iraq), Mu ammad, and ʿAbd al-Malik Ibn Hishām (d. 833; Egypt). The life of 
Mu ammad: a translation of Is ā ’s Sīrat ras l  llāh. Translated by Alfred Guillaume.  Karachi: 
Oxford University Press, 2004, 1955. 
 133 
 
Ibn Jaʿfar (d. 932?; Iraq), Qudāmah, and Abū  ūsuf  aʿqūb (d. 798; Iraq). Qudāma  . Jaʿfar s Kitā  
al- harā , part seven, and excerpts from       suf’s Kitā  al- harā . Translated by Aharon Ben 
Shemesh. Taxation in Islām, v. 2.  Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1965. 
Ibn Mājah (d. 887; Iran), Mu ammad ibn  azīd. Sunan al- uṣ af . edited by Abī al-Ḥasan
Mu ammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Hādī al-Sindī Ḥanafī2 vols Beirut: Al-Fikr, 1975. 
Ibn Mūsá (d. 818; Khurāsān), ʿAlī al-Riḍā. al- i h al-mans   lil-Imām al-Riḍā al-mushtahir bi-fiqh al-
Riḍā Silsilat ma ādir bi ār al-anwār; 1.  Beirut: Muʾassasat  l al-Bayt li-I yāʾ al-Turāth, 1990. 
Ibn Qudāmah al-Maqdīsī (d. 1223; Syria), Muwaffaq al-Dīn ʿAbd Allāh ibn A mad. al- ughnī. 
edited by ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿAbd al-Mu sin Turkī and ʿAbd al-Fattā  Mu ammad Ḥulw16 vols 
Imbābah, Cairo: Hajr, 1986. 
———. al- ughnī. edited by ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿAbd al-Mu sin Turkī and ʿAbd al-Fattā  Mu ammad 
Ḥulw. 2nd ed. 15 vols Cairo: Hajr, 1992. 
———. al-ʿUmdah fī al-fiqh al-Ḥan alī. edited by al-Hawwārī and Anwar Zahrāʾ Damascus: al-Dār 
al-Mutta idah lil-Ṭibāʿah wa-al-Nashr, 1990. 
Ibn Rushd II (d. 1198; Spain/Morocco), Averroes. Bidāyat al-mujtahid wa-nihāyat al-muqtaṣid 
edited by Mājid al-Ḥamawī4 vols Beirut: Dār Ibn Ḥazm, 1995. 
———. The Distinguished Jurist s Primer: a translation of Bidāyat al-mujtahid wa-nihāyat al-muqtaṣid 
Translated by Imran Khan Nyazee. edited by Muhammad Abdul Rauf2 vols Reading: Garnet 
Publishing, 1994. 
Ibn Saʿd (d. ca. 845; Iraq), Mu ammad. Kitā  al- a a āt al- a īr. Translated by S. Moinul Haq, 
assisted by H. K. Ghazanfar. 2 vols Karachi: Pakistan Historical Society, 1967. 
Ibn Taymīyah (d. 1328; Syria), A mad ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm. Ibn Taimiyya on public and private law in 
Islam; or, Public policy in Islamic jurisprudence  [al-Siyasah al-shar'iyah fi islah al-ra'i wa-al-
ra'iyah ]. Translated by Omar A. Farrukh.  Beirut: Khayats 1966. 
Ibn Taymīyah al-Ḥarrānī (d. 1254/5; Syria/Iraq),  Majd al-Dīn Abī al-Barakāt ʿAbd al-Salām ibn 
ʿAbd Allāh ibn al-Khiḍr.  u arrar fī al-fiqh ʿalá madhhab al-Imām   mad i n Ḥan al. edited by 
Shams al-Dīn Ibn Mufli  al-Ḥanbalī  al-Maqdisī (d. 1362; Syria), Mu ammad Ḥasan 
Mu ammad Ḥasan Ismāʿīl and A mad Ma rūs Jaʿfar  āli 2 vols Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-
ʿIlmīyah, 1999. 
Ibrahim, Mahmood. Merchant capital and Islam.  Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990. 
Ilan, Tal. History of Jewish women in late antiquity.  Jerusalem: The Hebrew University of 
Jerusalem, Rothberg School for Overseas Students, 1994. 
The Institutes of Justinian: text, translation, and commentary. Translated by J. A. C. (Joseph Anthony 
Charles) Thomas.  Amsterdam; New York: North-Holland Pub. Co.; American Elsevier Pub. 
Co., 1975. 
Jackson, Bernard S. "Some reflections on family law in the papyri." Chap. 9 In Jewish Law 
Association Studies XIV, edited by Hillel Gamoran. 141-77. Binghamton, NY: Global Academic 
Pub.; Binghamton University, 2002. 
Jazīrī, ʿAbd al-Ra mān, Mu ammad Gharawī, and  āsir Māzi . Kitā  al-fi h ʿal  al-madhāhi  al-
ar aʿah wa madhha  ahl al-bayt. 5 vols Beirut: Dār al-Thaqalayn, 1998. 
 134 
 
Jennings, Ronald C. "Divorce in the Ottoman sharia court of Cyprus, 1580-1640." Studia Islamica, 
no. 78 (1993): 155-67. 
Johns, C. H. W. Babylonian and Assyrian laws, contracts and letters.  Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1904. 
Jokisch, Benjamin. Islamic imperial law: Harun Al-Rashid's codification project. Studien zur 
Geschichte und Kultur des islamischen Orients. edited by Lawrence I. Conrad Berlin, New 
York: Walter de Gruyter, 2007. 
Ka lāwī, ʿAblah. al-Khulʿ: dawāʾ mā lā dawāʾ la-hu: dirāsah fi hīyah mu āranah.  Cairo: Dār al-
Rashād, 2000. 
Kalmin, Richard Lee, and Seth Schwartz, eds. Jewish culture and society under the Christian Roman 
Empire. Leuven: Peeters. 
Kamali, Mohammad Hashim. Principles of Islamic jurisprudence. Rev. ed.  Cambridge [England]: 
Islamic Texts Society, 1991. 
Karo (d. 1575; Spain), Joseph ben Ephraim. Sh l an ʿ r  h. 1563. 
Kāsānī (d. 1189; Syria), Abū Bakr ibn Masʿūd. Badāʾiʿ al-ṣanāʾiʿ fī tartī  al-sharāʾiʿ. edited by A mad 
Mukhtār ʿUthmān10 vols Cairo: Zakarīyā ʿAlī  ūsuf, 1968. 
Katsh, Abraham I. Judaism in Islām: Bi lical and Talmudic  ac grounds of the Koran and its 
commentaries. 3rd ed.  New York: Sepher-Hermon Press, 1980. 
Khalafallah, Haifaa. "The elusive ‘Islamic law’: rethinking the focus of modern scholarship." 
Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations 12, no. 2 (April 2001 2001): 143-52. 
Kīlānī,  āli  Mu ammad Mu yī al-Dīn.  asāʾil al-a wāl al-sha hṣīyah  ayna al-diyānāt al-thalāth: 
al-yah dīyah, al-masī īyah, al-islām.  Amman: Dār  āfā al-ʿIlmīyah lil-Nashr wa-al-Tawzīʿ, 
2009. 
Kister, M.J. "The massacre of the Banū Qurayẓa: a re-examination of a tradition." Jerusalem 
Studies in Arabic and Islam 8 (1986): 61-96. 
Klein, Daniel. "The Islamic and Jewish laws of usury: a bridge to commercial growth and peace 
in the Middle East." Denver journal of international law and policy 23, no. 3 (1995): 535. 
Kraemer, Casper J. Excavations at Nessana. Non-literary papyri. Colt Archaeological Expedition, 
1936-1937.  Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958. 
Kulaynī (d. 941; Iran), Mu ammad ibn  aʿqūb. al-Uṣ l min al-Kāfī. edited by ʿAlī Akbar Ghaffārī 
and Mu ammad  khūndī. 3rd ed. 8 vols Tehran: Dār al-Kutub al-Islāmīyah, 1968. 
Kuwait. al- aws ʿa al-fiqhiyyah. Vol. 19, Kuwait: Ministry of trusts and Islamic affairs, 1990. 
Lapidus, Ira M. A global history of Islamic societies: from the seventh to nineteenth centuries.  
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012. 
Lavinger, Jacob. "Was Maimonides 'rais al-yahud' in Egypt?". In Studies in Maimonides, edited by 
Isadore Twersky. 83-93. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, Center for Jewish Studies; 
distributed by Harvard University Press, 1990. 
Law, Emory University School of. "Islamic family law project: legal profiles."  
http://www.law.emory.edu/ifl/index2.html. 
 135 
 
Lazerow, Alan. "Give and 'Get?' Applying the Restatement of Contracts to determine the 
enforceability of 'Get settlement' contracts." University of Baltimore Law Review 39, no. 1 
(2009-2010): 103-36. 
Lecker, Michael. " Amr ibn Ḥāzm al-An ārī and Qurʾān 2, 256: 'No compulsion is there in 
religion'." Oriens 35 (1996 1996): 57-64. 
———. The "Constitution of Medina": Mu ammad's First Legal Document. Studies in Late Antiquity 
and Early Islam 23.  Princeton: The Darwin Press, 2004. 
———. "A note on early marriage links between Quraīshis and Jewish women." Jerusalem Studies 
in Arabic and Islam 10 (1987): 17-39. 
———. "Wāqidī's account on the status of the Jews of Medina: a study of a combined report." 
Journal of Near Eastern Studies 54 (1995): 15-32. 
———. "Zayd b. Thābit, 'a Jew with two sidelocks': Judaism and literacy in pre-Islamic Medina 
(Yathrib)." Journal of Near Eastern Studies 56 (1997): 259-73. 
Lev, Yaacov. Charity, endowments, and charitable institutions in medieval Islam.  Gainesville, FL: 
University Press of Florida, 2005. 
———. "Charity, pious endowments and royal women in medieval Islam." In Continuity and 
change in the realms of Islam : studies in honour of Professor Urbain Vermeulen, edited by Urbain 
Vermeulen, K. d Hulster and J. van Steenbergen. Orientalia Lovaniensia analecta, 171, 413-
22. Leuven: Peeters; Departement Oosterse Studies, 2008. 
———. "The ethics and practice of Islamic medieval charity." History Compass 5, no. 2 (2007): 
603-18. 
Libson, Gideon. "Halakhah and law in the period of the Geonim." Chap. 8 In An introduction to 
the history and sources of Jewish law, edited by Neil S. Hecht, Bernard S. Jackson, S.M. 
Passamaneck, D. Piattelli and A.M. Rabello. 197-250. Oxford; New York: Clarendon Press; 
Oxford University Press, 1996. 
———. "Halakhah and reality in the Gaonic period: taqqanah, minhag, tradition and consensus: 
some observations." In The Jews of medieval Islam: community, society, and identity, edited by 
Daniel Frank. 67-99. Leiden: Brill, 1995. 
———. "Jewish and Islamic law, a comparative review." In Encyclopaedia Judaica, edited by 
Michael Berenbaum and Fred Skolnik, 262-70. Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2007. 
———. Jewish and Islamic law: a comparative study of custom during the Geonic period. Harvard series 
in Islamic law, 1.  Cambridge, Mass.: Islamic Legal Studies Program, Harvard Law School, 
2003. 
Lieber, David L., Ben-Zion Schereschewsky, and Moshe Drori. "Divorce." In Encyclopaedia 
Judaica, edited by Michael Berenbaum and Fred Skolnik, 710-21. Detroit: Macmillan 
Reference USA, 2007. 
Lobban, Michael. "Introduction: the tools and the tasks of the legal historian." In Law and 
history, edited by Andrew Lewis and Michael Lobban. Current Legal Issues 2003, 1-32. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. 
 136 
 
Lockman, Zachary. Contending visions of the Middle East: the history and politics of Orientalism.  
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 
Lucas, Scott C. "Divorce,  adīth-scholar style: from al-Dārimī to al-Tirmidhī." Journal of Islamic 
Studies 19, no. 3 (2008): 325-68. 
Maas, Paul. Textual criticism. Translated by Barbara Flower.  Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967. 
Madanī (d. 825), ʿAlī ibn Jaʿfar.  asāʾil ʿ lī i n Jaʿfar wa-mustadra ātuhā. Silsilat ma ādir bi ār al-
anwār, 8.  Beirut: Muʾassasat  l al-Bayt li-I yāʾ al-Turāth, 1990. 
Madelung, Wilferd. Religious schools and sects in medieval Islam.  London: Variorum Reprints, 
1985. 
"Mādigān ī hazār dādistān. English, The book of a thousand judgements: a Sasanian law-book; 
introduction, transcription and translation of the Pahlavi text, notes, glossary and indexes 
by Anahit Perikhanian; translated from Russian by Nina Garso an." In Persian heritage series; 
no. 39. Costa Mess, Calif.: Mazda Publishers in association with Bibliotheca Persica, 1997. 
Maghen, Ze'ev. "Dead tradition: Joseph Schacht and the origins of 'popular practice'." Islamic 
Law and Society 10, no. 3 (2003): 276-347. 
Maghen, Zeʾev. After hardship cometh ease: the Jews as backdrop for Muslim moderation. Studien zur 
Geschichte und Kultur des islamischen Orients; Beihefte zur Zeitschrift "Der Islam", Neue 
Folge, Bd. 17.  Berlin; New York: De Gruyter, 2006. 
Maimonides (d. 1204; Spain/Egypt), Mūs  ibn Maymūn. Mishneh Torah. Yale Judaica series. 14 
vols New Haven: Yale University Press, 1949. 
Makdisi, John. "A survey of AALS law schools teaching Islamic law." Journal of legal education 55 
(2005 2005): 583. 
Mallat, Chibli. Introduction to Middle Eastern law.  Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 
2007. 
Mannheim, Karl. Ideology and utopia: an introduction to the sociology of knowledge. Translated by 
Louis Wirth and Edward Shils.  New York: Harvest, 1985. 
Marghīnānī (d. 1197; Farghāna), ʿAlī ibn Abī Bakr.  l-Hidāyah   the Guidance: a translation of al-
Hidāyah fī shar  Bidāyat al-mu tadī, a classical manual of Ḥanafī law. Translated by Imran 
Ahsan Khan Nyazee.  Bristol, England: Amal Press, 2006. 
———. The Hidaya: commentary on the Islamic laws. Translated by Zahra Baintner. 2 vols Karachi: 
Darul Ishaat, 2007. 
Marghīnānī (d. 1219/20; Farghāna), Ma mūd ibn A mad. al- u ī  al- urhānī fī al-fiqh al-Nuʿmānī. 
edited by A mad ʿIzzū ʿInāyah11 vols Beirut: Dār I yāʾ al-Turāth al-ʿArabī, 2003. 
Marwazī (d. 906; Samarqand), Mu ammad ibn Na r. I htilāf al-fu ahāʾ. edited by Mu ammad 
Ṭāhir Ḥakīm Riyadh: Aḍwāʾ al-Salaf, 2000. 
Māwardī (d. 1058; Iraq), ʿAlī ibn Mu ammad. The Ordinances of Government  [Al-ahkām al-
sul āniyya w'al-wilāyāt al-dīniyya]. Translated by Wafaa H. Wahba. The great books of 
Islamic civilization.  Reading Garnet, 1996. 
 137 
 
Melchert, Christopher. "The early history of Islamic law." In Method and theory in the study of 
Islamic origins, edited by Herbert Berg. 293-324. Leiden: Brill, 2003. 
Meron, Yaakov. "Points de contact des droits juif et musulman." Studia Islamica, no. 60 (1984): 
83-117. 
Merry, Sally Engle. "Legal pluralism." Law & Society Review 22, no. 5 (1988): 869-96. 
Minow, Martha. "'Forming underneath everything that grows': toward a history of family law." 
Wisconsin Law Review 1985, no. 4 (1985): 819-98. 
Mishnah. 
Modarressi Tabātabāʾi, Hossein.  n introduction to Shīʿī law: a  i liographical study.  London: 
Ithaca Press, 1984. 
Mohanty, Chandra Talpade. Feminism without borders: decolonizing theory, practicing solidarity.  
Durham; London: Duke University Press, 2003. 
Moodie, M. R., J. Conn, A. Y. al-Hibri, M. J. Broyde, P. J. Cataldo, W. B. Hallaq, E. N. Dorff, R. E. 
Smith, and W. E. May. "Symposium on religious law: Roman Catholic, Islamic, and Jewish 
treatment of familial issues, including education, abortion, in vitro fertilization, prenuptial 
agreements, contraception, and marital fraud." Loyola of Los Angeles international and 
comparative law journal 16, no. 1 (1993): 9-106. 
Morony, Michael G. Iraq after the Muslim conquest.  Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
1984. 
Motzki, Harald, ed. The biography of Mu ammad: the issue of the sources, Islamic history and 
civilization. Studies and texts, v. 32. Leiden; Boston, MA: Brill, 2000. 
———. Ḥadīth: origins and developments.  Aldershot; Burlington, VT: Ashgate/Variorum, 2004. 
———. "The mu annaf of  Abd al-Razzāq al- an ānī as a source of authentic a ādīth of the first
century A.H.". Journal of Near Eastern Studies 50, no. 1 (January 1991): 1-21. 
———. The origins of Islamic jurisprudence: Meccan fiqh before the classical schools  [Die Anfange der 
islamischen Jurisprudenz: Ihr Entwickllung in Mekka bis zur Mitte des 2./8. Jahrhunderts 
(1991)]. Translated by Marion H. Katz. Islamic history and civilization. Studies and texts, 
vol. 41.  Leiden; Boston Brill, 2002. 
———. "The question of the authenticity of Muslim traditions reconsidered: a review article." 
In Method and theory in the study of Islamic origins, edited by Herbert Berg. 211-58. Leiden: 
Brill, 2003. 
———. "The role of non-Arab converts in the development of early Islamic law." Islamic law and 
society 6, no. 3 (1999): 293-317. 
Mourad, Suleiman Ali. Early Islam between myth and history: al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī (d. 110H/728CE) and 
the formation of his legacy in classical Islamic scholarship. Islamic Philosophy, Theology and 
Science. Texts and Studies, 62.  Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2006. 
Muʿadlalī, Hind. al- awā  fī al-sharāʾiʿ al-samāwīyah wa-al-waḍʿīyah.  Damascus: Dār Qutaybah lil-
Ṭibāʿah wa-al-Nashr wa-al-Tawzīʿ, 2002. 
 138 
 
Mu aqqiq al-Ḥillī (d.  1277;  Iraq),  Jaʿfar  ibn  al-Ḥasan. u htaṣar al-nāfiʿ fī fi h al-imāmīyah.  
Tehran: Asadī, 1967. 
Mūs , Mu ammad  ūsuf. Tārī h al-fi h al-Islāmī. 2nd ed. 3 vols Cairo: Dār al-Maʿrifah, 1964-1966. 
Na  ās (d. 950; Egypt), A mad ibn Mu ammad. Nāsi h wa-al-mans  h fī al-Qurʾān al- arīm. 
edited by Mu ammad ibn ʿAli Udfuwī Egypt: al-Maktabah al-ʿAllāmīyah, 1938. 
Neusner, Jacob, and Tamara Sonn. Comparing religions through law: Judaism and Islam.  London; 
New York: Routledge, 1999. 
Nikēphoros II Phōkas (d. 969), Byzantine Emperor. Le Traité Sur la Guérilla de l'Empereur Nicéphore 
Phocas (963-969). Translated by Gilbert and Haralambie Mihăescu Dagron. Le monde 
Byzantin.  Paris: Editions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1986. 
Nöldeke, Theodor. Tārī h al-Qurʾān [Geschichte des Qorans]. Translated by Georges Tamer. edited 
by Friedrich Schwally, Gotthelf Bergstrasser, and Otto Pretzl Beirut: Konrad Adenauer 
Foundation, 2004. 
Olszowy-Schlanger, Judith. "La lettre de divorce caraïte et sa place dans les relations Caraïtes 
et Rabbanites au Moyen Age." Revue des Études Juives 155, no. 3 (1996): 337-62. 
Palestinian Talmud. 
Patriarch of Antioch (d. 1199; Syria), Michael I. Chronique de Michel le Syrien: patriarche jacobite 
d'Antioche (1166-1199). Translated by Jean Baptiste Chabot. 4 vols Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1899-
1910. 
Polliack, Meira, ed. Karaite Judaism: a guide to its history and literary sources. Leiden; Boston: Brill, 
2003. 
Posner, Raphael, Haim Hillel Ben-Sasson, and Isaac Levitats. "Charity." In Encyclopaedia Judaica, 
edited by Michael Berenbaum and Fred Skolnik, 569-75. Detroit: Macmillan Reference, 2007. 
Pregill, Michael E. "The Hebrew Bible and the Quran: the problem of the Jewish ‘influence’ on 
Islam." Religion Compass 1, no. 6 (2007 2007): 643-59. 
Qalʿah'jī, Mu ammad Rawwās.  aws ʿat fi h ʿ  d  llāh i n ʿ   ās. Fī sabīl mawsūʿah fiqhīyah 
jāmiʿah; Silsilat mawsūʿat fiqh al-salaf.  Beirut: Dār al-Nafāʾis, 1996. 
———. aws ʿat fi h ʿ  d  llāh i n ʿUmar: ʿaṣruhu wa- ayātuh. Fī sabīl mawsūʿah fiqhīyah jāmiʿah; 
7.  Beirut: Dār al-Nafāʾis, 1986. 
———.  aws ʿat fi h al-Ḥasan al-Baṣri. Fī sabīl mawsūʿah fiqhīyah jāmiʿah;9. 2 vols Beirut: Dār al-
Nafa  ʾis, 1989. 
———.  aws ʿat fi h ʿ lī i n   ī  āli . Fī sabīl mawsūʿah fiqhīyah jāmiʿah; Silsilat mawsūʿat fiqh 
al-salaf, 4.  Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 1983. 
———.  aws ʿat fi h I rāhīm al-Na haʾī. Fī sabīl mawsūʿah fiqhīyah jāmiʿah; 8. 2 vols Beirut: Dār 
al-Nafa   ʾis, 1986. 
———.  aws ʿat fi h Sufyān al-Thawrī. Fī sabīl mawsūʿah fiqhīyah jāmiʿah; Silsilat mawsūʿat fiqh 
al-salaf, 10.  Beirut: Dār al-Nafāʾis, 1990. 
 139 
 
———.  aws ʿat fi h ʿUmar i n ʿ  d al-ʿ zīz. Fī sabīl mawsūʿah fiqhīyah jāmiʿah; Silsilat mawsūʿat 
fiqh al-salaf.  Kuwait: Jāmiʿat al-Kuwayt, Lajnat al-Tāʾlīf wa-al-Tʿarīb wa-al-Nashr, 2001. 
Qalʿah'jī, Mu ammad Rawwās, and Saʿīd Fāyiz al-Dukhayyil.  aws ʿat fi h ʿ ʾishah umm al-
muʾminīn:  ayātuhā wa-fi huhā. Fī sabīl mawsūʿah fiqhīyah jāmiʿah; Silsilat mawsūʿat fiqh al-
salaf.  Beirut: Dār al-Nafāʾis, 1989. 
Qandīl, ʿAbd al-Rāziq A mad. al- awārīth fī al-yah dīyah wa-al-islām: dirāsah mu āranah. Silsilat 
Faḍl al-Islām ʿal  al-Yahūd wa-al- ahūdīyah, al-ʿadad 13.  Giza: Markaz al-Dirāsāt al-
Sharqīyah, Jāmaʿat al-Qāhirah, 2008. 
Qaraḍāwī,  ūsuf.  i h al-za āh: dirāsah mu āranah li-a  āmihā wa-falsafatihā fī ḍawʾ al-Qurʾān wa-
al-sunnah. 2 vols Beirut: Dār al-Irshād lil-Ṭibāʿah wa-al-Nashr wa-al-Tawzīʿ, 1969. 
Quick, Abdul Hakim. "Al-Mu'allaqa: the Muslim woman between divorce and real marriage." 
Journal of Islamic Law 3, no. 1 (Spring/Summer 1998 1998): 27-40. 
Radford, Mary F. "The inheritance rights of women under Jewish and Islamic law." Boston 
College international and comparative law review 23, no. 2 (2000): 135. 
Resnik, Judith. "Living their legal commitments: paideic communities, courts, and Robert 
Cover." Yale Journal of Law and the Humanities 17, no. 1 (2005): 17-54. 
Rets , Jan. The Arabs in antiquity: their history from the Assyrians to the Umayyads.  London; New 
York: Routledge Curzon, 2005. 
Ricks, Stephen D. "Kinship bars to marriage in Jewish and Islamic law." In Studies in Islamic and 
Judaic traditions, edited by William M. Brinner and Stephen D. Ricks. Brown Judaic studies; 
no. 110. Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1986. 
Riskin, Shlomo. A Jewish woman's right to divorce: a halakhic history and a solution for the agunah.  
Jersey City: KTAV Pub. House, 2006. 
Roberts, Robert. The social laws of the Qorân: considered and compared with those of the Hebrew and 
other ancient codes.  London: Curzon Press, 1971. 
Robin, Julien Christian. "La réforme de l’écriture arabe à l’époque du califat médinois." 
 élanges de l’Université Saint-Joseph 59 (2006): 319-64. 
Robinson, Chase F. "Conclusion: from formative Islam to classical Islam." In The formation of the 
Islamic world, sixth to eleventh centuries, edited by Chase F. Robinson. The new Cambridge 
history of Islam, 683-95. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. 
———. Empire and elites after the Muslim conquest: the transformation of northern Mesopotamia.  New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2000. 
———, ed. The formation of the Islamic world, sixth to eleventh centuries, The new Cambridge history 
of Islam, vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. 
———. "Reconstructing early Islam: truth and consequences." In Method and theory in the study of 
Islamic origins, edited by Herbert Berg. 101-35. Leiden: Brill, 2003. 
Ross, Lee. "The intuitive psychologist and his shortcomings: distortions in the attribution 
process." Chap. 5 In Advances in experimental social psychology, edited by Leonard Berkowitz. 
173-220. New York: Academic Press, 1977. 
 140 
 
Roth, Martha Tobi, Harry A. Hoffner, and Piotr Michalowski. Law collections from Mesopotamia 
and Asia Minor.  Atlanta, Ga.: Scholars Press, 1997. 
Rotman, Youval.  es esclaves et l’esclavage: de la  éditerranée anti ue   la  éditerranée médiévale : 
 Ie- Ie si cles.  Paris: Belles lettres, 2004. 
Rouland, Norbert. Legal anthropology. Translated by Philippe G. Planel.  Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1994. First published in France in 1988 by Presses Universitaires de France 
as Anthropologie juridique. 
Rubin, Uri. The eye of the beholder: the life of Mu ammad as viewed by the early Muslims: a textual 
analysis. Studies in late antiquity and early Islam, 5.  Princeton, NJ: Darwin Press, 1995. 
Sa nūn (d. 854; Tunisia), ʿAbd al-Salām ibn Saʿīd, Mālik Ibn Anas (d. 796; Medina), Mu ammad 
ibn A mad Ibn Rushd (d. 1126), and Jalāl al-Dīn  Abd al-Ra mān ibn Abī Bakr al-Suyū ī (d. 
1505; Egypt). al- udawwanah al- u r  li-Imām  āli  i n  nas al- ṣ a ī. edited by ʿ s  ibn 
Masʿad Zawāwī5 vols Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmīyah, 1994. 
Said, Edward. Beginnings: intention and method.  New York: Columbia University Press, 1985. 
———. Culture and imperialism.  New York: Vintage Books, 1993. 
Salaymeh, Lena. Review of Amy Singer, Charity in Islamic Societies (New York, Cambridge 
University Press, 2008). Journal of Interdisciplinary History 40, no. 4 (2010): 640-42. 
———. "Early Islamic legal-historical precedents: prisoners of war." Law and History Review 26, 
no. 3 (Fall 2008): 521-44. 
Sarakhsī (d. 11th cent; Transoxania), Mu ammad ibn A mad. Kitā  al- a s   li-Shams al-Dīn al-
Sara hsī. 30 vols Cairo1906-1913. 
Sarakhsī (d. 11th cent; Transoxania), Mu ammad ibn A mad, and Mu ammad ibn al-Ḥasan
Shaybānī (d. 804/5; Iraq). Shar  al-Siyar al-Ka īr. edited by  alā  al-Dīn Munajjid5 vols Cairo: 
Maʿhad al-Makh ū āt bi-Jāmiʿat al-Duwal al-ʿArabīyah, 1971/1972. 
Satlow, Michael L. "Beyond influence: toward a new historiographic paradigm." Chap. 1 In 
Jewish literatures and cultures: context and intertext, edited by Anita Norich and Yaron Z. Eliav. 
37-53. Providence, R.I.: Brown Judaic Studies, 2008. 
———. "Defining Judaism: accounting for ‘religions’ in the study of religion." Journal of the 
American Academy of Religion 74, no. 4 (2007): 1-23. 
Schacht, Joseph. "Foreign elements in ancient Islamic law." Journal of Comparative Legislation and 
International Law 32, no. 3/4 (1950): 9-17. 
———. "From Babylonian to Islamic law." Yearbook of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law 1 (1994): 29-
33. 
———. An introduction to Islamic law.  London: Oxford University Press, 1964. 
———. The origins of Muhammadan jurisprudence.  Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950. 
Schoeler, Gregor. The oral and the written in early Islam. Translated by Uwe Vagelpohl. Routledge 
Studies in Middle Eastern Literatures. edited by James E. Montgomery London and New 
York: Routledge, 2006. 
 141 
 
Schwartz, Seth. Imperialism and Jewish society, 200 B.C.E. to 640 C.E.  Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 2001. 
———. Were the Jews a Mediterranean society?: reciprocity and solidarity in ancient Judaism.  
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010. 
Schwarz, Michael. "Al-Fiqh, a term borrowed from Islam used by Maimonides for a Jewish 
concept in his Sefer haMizwoth and in the Guide of the Perplexed." In Adaptations and 
innovations: studies on the interaction between Jewish and Islamic thought and literature from the 
early Middle Ages to the late twentieth century, edited by Joel L. Kraemer, Y. Tzvi Langermann 
and Jossi Stern. Collection de la Revue des études juives, 44, 349-54. Paris; Dudley, MA: 
Peeters, 2007. 
Shahīd al-Awwal (d. 1384; Syria), Mu ammad ibn Makkī. al- umʿah al-Dimash īyah fī fi h al-
Imāmīyah. edited by Mu ammad Taqī Murwārīd and ʿAlī A ghar Murwārīd Beirut: Dār al-
Turāth; al-Dār al-Islāmīyah, 1990. 
Shahīd, Irfan. Rome and the Arabs: a prolegomenon to the study of Byzantium and the Arabs.  
Washington, D.C.: Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection, 1984. 
Shalabī, Raʾūf. al-Jihād fi sa īl  llāh: ma ālatuhu wa-wasāʾiluhu wa-āhdāfuhu.  Cairo: Dār al-Turāth 
al-ʿArabī, 1974. 
Shaybānī (d. 804/5; Iraq), Mu ammad ibn al-Ḥasan. The Islamic law of nations: Shay ānī s Siyar. 
Translated by Majid Khadduri.  Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press 1966. 
Shmuelevitz, Aryeh. The Jews of the Ottoman Empire in the late fifteenth and the sixteenth centuries: 
administrative, economic, legal, and social relations as reflected in the responsa.  Leiden: E.J. Brill, 
1984. 
Shoufani, Elias. Al-Riddah and the Muslim conquest of Arabia.  Toronto; Buffalo; [Beirut]: 
University of Toronto Press; Arab Institute for Research and Publishing, 1973. 
Sijpesteijn, Petra M. "Shaping a Muslim state: papyri related to a mid-eighth-century Egyptian 
official." Dissertation, Princeton University, 2004. 
Sizgorich, Thomas. "Narrative and community in Islamic late antiquity." Past & Present, no. 185 
(November 2004): 9-42. 
———. Violence and belief in late antiquity: militant devotion in Christianity and Islam.  Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008. 
Smart, Ninian. The world's religions. Cambridge University Press, 1989. 
Stampfer, Yehudah Zvi. "Islamic influence in the divorce laws of Rav Samuel Ben Hofni Gaon 
and the Rambam." In ʿ le ʿasor: divre ha-veʿidah ha-ʿasirit shel ha-hevrah le-heker ha-tarbut ha-
ʿ rvit-ha-yehudit shel yeme-ha-benayim, edited by Congress Society for Judaeo-Arabic Studies, 
Daniel J. Lasker, Haggai Ben-Shammai, Studies Society for Judaeo-Arabic and ba-Mizrah 
Mekhon Ben-Tsevi le-heker kehilot Yisrael. 309-16. Beer-Sheva: Hotsaat ha-sefarim shel 
Universitat Ben-Guryon ba-Negev, 2008. 
Strawson, John. "Encountering Islamic law." In,  Critical Legal Conference held in New College 
(1993). http://www.witness-pioneer.org/vil/Articles/shariah/jsrps.html  
———. "Islamic law and English texts." Law and Critique VI, no. 1 (1995): 21-38. 
 142 
 
Stroumsa, Sarah. Maimonides in his world: portrait of a Mediterranean thinker.  Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 2009. 
"Symposium on Gordon's 'Critical Legal Histories'." Law & Social Inquiry 37, no. 1 (2012): 147-
215. 
Ṭa āwī (d.  933;  Egypt),  A mad  ibn  Mu ammad.  u htaṣar al- ā āwī. Silsilat al-ma būʿāt,  8.
edited by Abū al-Wafāʾ al-Afghānī Cairo: Dār al-Kutub, 1950. 
Tirmidhī (d. 892; Khurāsān), Mu ammad ibn ʿ sá.  aʿīf sunan al-Tirmidhī. edited by Mu ammad 
Zuhayr Shāwīsh and Mu ammad Nā ir al-Dīn Albānī Beirut: al-Maktab al-Islāmī, 1991. 
———. Sunan al-Tirmidhī wa-huwa al-Jāmiʿ al-ṣahī . edited by ʿAbd al-Wahhāb ʿAbd al-La īf and 
ʿAbd al-Ra mān Mu ammad ʿUthmān5 vols Medinah: al-Maktabah al-Salafīyah, 1965. 
Tomlins, Christopher. "What is left of the law and society paradigm after critique? Revisiting 
Gordon's “Critical Legal Histories”." Law & Social Inquiry 37, no. 1 (2012): 155-66. 
Tosefta. 
Trimingham, John Spencer. Christianity among the Arabs in pre-Islamic times.  London: Longman 
Group Limited, 1979. 
Tucker, Aviezer. Our Knowledge of the Past.  Cambridge: Cambridge Unviersity Press, 2004. 
Turner, Bryan S. Marx and the end of Orientalism.  London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1978. 
ʿUtaybī, ʿInād Najr al-ʿAjrafī. al- inā wa-al- hamr fī al-yah dīyah wa-al-masī īyah wa-al-islām.  
Riyadh: Dār ʿ lam al-Kutub, 2002. 
ʿUtaybī, ʿInād Najr al-ʿAjrafī al-Qatl wa-al-sari ah fī al-yah dīyah wa-al-masī īyah wa-al-islām. 
Silsilat Tashrīʿ al- udūd fī al-adyān al-thalāthah, 1.  Riyadh: s.n., 1998. 
Vagelpohl, Uwe. Aristotle's Rhetoric in the East: the Syriac and Arabic translation and commentary 
tradition. Islamic philosophy, theology and science, v. 76.  Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2008. 
Van Hoecke, Mark, and Mark Warrington. "Legal cultures, legal paradigms and legal doctrine: 
towards a new model for comparative law." The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
47, no. 3 (July 1998): 495-536. 
Vansina, Jan. Oral tradition as history.  Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985. 
———. Oral tradition: a study in historical methodology. Translated by H. M. Wright.  Chicago: 
Aldine Pub. Co., 1965, c1961. 
VerSteeg, Russ. Early Mesopotamian law.  Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic Press, 2000. 
Wakin, Jeannette. Remembering Joseph Schacht (1902-1969). Occasional Publications 4.  Cambridge 
(MA): Islamic Legal Studies Program, Harvard Law School, 2003. 
Wāqidī (d. 822; Medina/Iraq), Mu ammad ibn ʿUmar, ed. Kitā  al- aghāzī. edited by Marsden 
Jones. Beirut: ʿ lam al-Kutub, 2006. 
Wasserstrom, Steven M. Between Muslim and Jew: the problem of symbiosis under early Islam.  
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995. 
Watson, Alan. Legal transplants: an approach to comparative law.  Athens: University of Georgia 
Press, 1993. 
 143 
 
Wegner, Judith Romney. "Islamic and Talmudic jurisprudence: the four roots of Islamic law 
and their Talmudic counterparts." The American Journal of Legal History 26, no. 1 (1982): 25-
71. 
———. "The status of women in Jewish and Islamic marriage and divorce law." Harvard Women's 
Law Journal 5 (1982): 1-33. 
Werblowsky, R., and Geoffrey Wigoder. "Christianity." In  ed. Michael Berenbaum and Fred 
Skolnik,  Encyclopaedia Judaica 4, (2007): 673-94. 
http://find.galegroup.com/gvrl/infomark.do?&contentSet=EBKS&type=retrieve&tabID=T0
01&prodId=GVRL&docId=CX2587504287&eisbn=0-02-866097-
8&source=gale&userGroupName=berk89308&version=1.0  
Westbrook, Raymond. Old Babylonian marriage law. Archiv für Orientforschung, Beiheft 23.  
Horn, Austria: F. Berger, 1988. 
Westreich, Avishalom. "Compelling a divorce? Early Talmudic roots of coercion in a case of 
moredet." Working Papers of the Agunah Research Unit  (May 2008). 
———. "History, dogmatics and hermeneutics: the divorce clause in Palestinian Ketubbot and 
the Geonic compulsion of divorce." Working Papers of the Agunah Research Unit  (March 2009). 
———. "Umdena as a ground for marriage annulment: between mistaken transaction (kiddushei 
ta‘ut) and terminative condition." Jewish Law Association Studies 20 (June 10, 2010): 330-52. 
Westreich, Elimelech. "The rise and decline of the law of the rebellious wife in medieval Jewish 
law." Chap. 13 In Jewish Law Association studies, XII (Zutphen conference), edited by Hillel 
Gamoran. Jewish Law Association Studies, 207-18. Binghamton, N.Y.: Global Publications, 
State University of New York at Binghamton, 2002. 
White, Hayden. Metahistory: the historical imagination in nineteenth-century Europe.  Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975. 
Wimpfheimer, Barry S. Narrating the law: a poetics of talmudic legal stories.  Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011. 
Yadin, Yigael, Hannah Cotton, Andrew Gross, and ve-atikoteha Hevrah la-hakirat Erets-Yisrael. 
The documents from the Bar Kokhba period in the cave of letters: Hebrew, Aramaic, and Nabatean-
Aramaic Papyri. Judean Desert Series. 2 vols Jerusalem: Israel Exploration Society: Hebrew 
University of Jerusalem: Shrine of the Book, 2002. 
Young, Walter. "Stoning and hand-amputation: the pre-Islamic origins of the hadd penalties 
for zinā and sariqa." Master's thesis, McGill University, 2005. 
Zamakhsharī (d. 1144; Khwārazm), Ma mūd ibn ʿUmar. al-Kashshāf ʿan  a āʾi  al-tanzīl wa-ʿuy n 
al-a āwīl fī wu  h al-taʾwīl. edited by ʿAlī ibn Mu ammad al-Sayyid al-Sharīf Jurjānī, A mad 
ibn Mu ammad Ibn al-Munayyir and al-Ḥamawī Mu ibb al-Dīn Mu ammad ibn Abī Bakr4 
vols Cairo: al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1966. 
———. Ruʾ s al-masāʾil (al-masāʾil al-khilāfīyah  ayna al-Ḥanafīyah wa-al-Shāfiʿīyah). edited by ʿAbd 
Allāh Nadhīr A mad Beirut: Dār al-Bashāʾir al-Islāmīyah, 1987. 
Zaybārī, ʿ mir Saʿīd.    ām al- hulʿ fī al-sharīʿah al-islāmīyah.  Beirut: Dār Ibn Ḥazm, 1997. 
 144 
 
Zilfi, Madeline C. "Muslim women in the early modern era." In The Cambridge history of Turkey: 
the later Ottoman Empire, 1603-1839, edited by Suraiya Faroqhi. 226-55. Cambridge, UK; New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  541
 
 I xidneppA
 
 b36 tobbuteK ,dumlaT nainolybaB 1
 ,dnabsuh reh tsniaga ”sleber“ namow a erehw esac eht nI
 a iiraned neves yb decuder eb yam )rewod( habbutek reh
 kcab tnew sretsaM ruO .sciaport neves :dias haduJ .R .keew
 llahs reh gnidrager tnemecnuonna na taht detarebiled dna
 eht neht taht dna shtabbaS evitucesnoc ruof no edam eb
 nwonk ti eB“ :]gninraw gniwollof eht[ reh dnes llahs truoc
 henam derdnuh a rof si habbutek ruoy fi neve taht uoy ot
 ”ti detiefrof evah uoy
 
 תלמוד בבלי מסכת כתובות דף סג עמוד ב
פוחתין לה מכתובתה  -המורדת על בעלה 
שבעה דינרים בשבת, רבי יהודה אומר: 
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 תלמוד בבלי מסכת כתובות דף סד עמוד א
ומשהינן לה תריסר ירחי שתא אגיטא,  
ובהנך תריסר ירחי שתא לית לה מזוני 
 מבעל
 תשובות הגאונים שערי צדק חלק ד שער ד סימן טו 3
.  (במודפסות בקיצור סימן רע"א) וששאלתם: אשה שהיא יושב תחת בעלה ואמרה לו גרשני איני רב שרירא גאון
 רוצה לישב עמך, חייב ליתן לה כלום מכתובתה או לא, כגון דא הויא מורדת או לא.
כך ראינו: ששורת הדין היתה מעיקרא שאין מחייבין את הבעל לגרש את אשתו אם בקשה גירושין, חוץ מאותן 
שאמרו רבותינו בהן שכופין אותן להוציא.  וכשהאשה נמנעת מתשמיש ומן המלאכות שחייבת לעשות לו זו היא 
המורדת (כתובות סג ע"א) שפוחתין לה מכתובתה כלום בכל שבת ושבת וצריכה התראה.  ואחר כך התקינו תקנה 
אחרת (שם /כתובות/ ע"ב) שיהו מכריזין עליה ארבע שבתות זו אחר זו ושולחין לה מבית דין הוי יודעת שאפילו 
ים שולחין לה +(א"ע ע"ז א' ב' ג', פ' ט"ו)+.  כתובתיך מאה מנה הפסדת.  ואמרינן עלה אמר ראמי בר אבא פעמ
(כאן חסר לשון, וצריך לומר כמו דאיתא בגמרא: מבית דין אחת קודם הכרזה ואחת לאחר הכרזה.)  ומהנכסים 
שקבלם בעלה על עצמו ואינו מצוי בעינו או מה שבלה ואבד מן נדוניא שלה ומן תכשיטיה שהן נכסי צאן ברזל 
שצריך הבעל לשלם לה דמיהן, משום שאחריותן עליו, היו פוחתין לה מאשר על האיש שבעה דינרין בשבת.  לסוף 
התקינו שמכריזין עליה ארבע שבתות ומפסידה את כולן.  ואף על פי כן, לא היו מחייבין את הבעל לכתוב לה גט.  
ן תכשיטיה דתפוסה ואם מת נפטרו יורשיו מכתובתה מאשר הוא עליו כחוב, אבל הנמצא בעינו והוא קיים בין מ
לא מפקינן מינה ודלא תפוסה לא יהבינן לה.  והתקינו שמשהין אותה כשתובעת גירושין שנים עשר חדש שמא 
יתפייסו ואם לא יתפייסו לאחר שנים עשר חדש כופין את הבעל וכותב לה גט.  ואחרי רבנן סבוראי כשראו חכמים 
שבנות ישראל הולכות ונתלות בגויים ליטול להן גטין באונס מבעליהן ויש כותבין גיטין באונס ומסתפק גט מעושה 
בדין או שלא בדין וקא נפיק מינה חורבא (עיין להתוספות ז"ל בפרק אף על פי, כתובות דף ס"ג ע"ב, שכתבוה 
לתקנה זו, א"ח: עיין בהגהת אשירי פרק אעפ"י) תקינו בימי מר רב רבה בר מר הונאי נוחם עדן למורדת ותובעת 
גירושין, שכל נכסי צאן ברזל שהכניסה לו משלה תשלם ואפילו מה שבלה או אבד ישלם לה תחתיו, מה שכתב לה 
על עצמו, מה שאינו מצוי לא ישלם לה, ומה שהוא מצוי נמי אע"ג דתפוסה לה מפקינן מינה ומהדרינן ליה לבעל.  
וכופין אותו וכותב לה גט לאלתר ויש לה מנה מאתים.  ובזאת אנו מתנהגין היום כשלש מאות שנה ויותר.  אף 
 אתם עשו כן.  עד הנה.  
 
 asnopser cinoaG
 )nolybaB ,8301 .d( noaG arirehS vaR
 
 ehs fi efiw sih ecrovid ot dnabsuh eht ecreoc ton od ew taht saw tnemeriuqer lagel eht ,yllanigirO
 ot mih ecreoc od yeht taht detats sibbaR eht hcihw ni ]sesac[ esoht ni tpecxe ,ecrovid a stseuqer
 …reh ecrovid
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Later, they made another decree that they would make an announcement concerning her for four 
consecutive weeks… 
 
Finally, they decreed that they announce about her for four weeks and she would forfeit 
everything.  Nevertheless, they did not coerce the husband to write her a divorce document… 
 
And they decreed that they make her wait for a divorce for 12 months (from the time she asks for a 
divorce) because they might reconcile and if they do not reconcile after 12 months, they coerce 
the husband and he writes a divorce document for her.  After our Sabboraic rabbis, when our sages 
noticed that the daughters of Israel were going and relying upon Gentiles to acquire for them 
divorce documents by force from their husbands and there would be those who write divorce 
documents by coercion and it would be doubtful whether it was a legal or illegal divorce and this 
would lead to calamity… 
 
They decreed in the time of Mar Rav Rabba son of Rav Hunai (may they rest in Eden) about a 
recalcitrant wife who requests a divorce, that all of the nikhsei tzon barzel (dowry) that she brought 
with her [into the marriage] he must pay for and that even what was destroyed or lost he must pay 
her… 
 
And they coerce him and he writes for her a divorce document immediately and and she receives 
one or two hundred [the standard dower].  By this custom we practice today as we have for three 
hundred years and more.  So should you do as well. 
4 Gaonic Responsa (Harkavy sec. 19) 
A married woman who says to her husband, “divorce me, I 
do not want to be with you” he is liable to give her nothing 
and she is a recalcitrant wife… 
טי ןמיס יבכרה - םינואגה תובושת 
  ול הרמאו הלעב תחת תבשוי איהש 'ש]אה[
 הל ןתיל בייח ךמע בשיל ה]צור יניא ינשרג[
 תדרומ 'לוכו םולכ 
5 Gaonic Responsa 
…for when she “rebels” and forfeits her ketubbah, he needs 
to record it in court that she forfeited to him her 
ketubbah… 
 ב רעש ג קלח קדצ ירעש םינואגה תובושת
וכ ןמיס 
 התבותכ ול הריזחהו איה תדרומ אמש
 ול הריזחהש ןיד תיבב תודוהל ךירצו
התבותכ 
6 Gaonic Responsa (Harkavy sec. 71) 
After the gemara, our rabbis decreed that even what she 
seizes we take to him from her and we give her a divorce 
immediately… 
אע ןמיס יבכרה - םינואגה תובושת 
 אסיפתד יאמ וליפאד ןנבר וניקת ארמג רתב
 אטיג הל ןניבהיו הנימ היל ןניקפנהמ
...רתלאל 
 
7 Gaonic Responsa 
As for what you asked: If a man marries a second wife and 
his wife rejects this, she is recalcitrant and she is divorced 
without a ketubbah for Rava said that a man may marry 
several women in addition to his wife as long as he can 
provide his marital obligations… 
וס ןמיס לנורוק - םינואגה תובושת 
 ותשא לע השא אשנש ימ םתלאששו
 איה ךכב ותשא התצר אלו תחא הצרמב
 אשונ אבר רמאד הבותכ אלב אצתו תדרומ
 רשפיאד אוהו ותשא לע םישנ המכ םדא
...היקופיסב םקימל 
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8 Halakhot Gedolot (9th century), sec. 36, laws of marriage 
And now in the two yeshivas they rule on the recalcitrant 
wife that even though she seized something from her 
ketubbah, we take it from her and we give it to the husband 
and we give her a divorce document immediately. 
 תוכלה - ול ןמיס תולודג תוכלה רפס
תובותכ 
 ןיקספ ןיכה אתביתמ ןיתרתב אנדיאהו
 םעדימ אשיפתד בג לע ףאד תדרומב
 היל ןיבהיו הנימ היל ןיקפמ אק התבותכמ
...רתלא אטיג הל ןניבהיו לעבל 
9 Sa nūn (d. 854/5 CE, Tunisia), al- udawwanah al- u r  li-
imām āli  I n  nas al- ṣ a ī (v. 2, 212-213) 
If he converts during her waiting period, a [non-Muslim] 
husband has a right to his [Muslim] wife, but [if he does 
not convert] he has no right to her if her waiting period 
concludes, even if he converts afterwards. 
ىربكلا ةنودملا , نونحس 
 ,اهتدع يف يهو ملسأ اذإ ةأرملاب كلمأ جوزلا
 نإو اهيلع هل ليبس لاف اهتدع تضقنا اذإف
.كلذ دعب ملسأ 
10 Rabbeinu Gershom (d. 1028, France), Responsa sec. 41 
 ur Savoraic rabbis, after the “instruction,” they decreed 
that the “practical law” is to take from her what she seized 
from his property and give it to him and he gives (her) a 
divorce document immediately so that the daughters of 
Israel do not go out to evil culture. 
אמ ןמיס םושרג וניבר ת"וש 
 הכלה וניקת הארוה רתב יארובס ןנבר
 הילידמ הספתד יאמ הנימ לקשמל השעמל
 אטיג ביהי והיאו היל בהימו ידכ רתלאל
.הער תוברתל לארשי תונב ןאצת אלש 
11 Rashi (d. 1105, France), Ketubbot 63b 
 ne who says “I want him” – we should force her by 
reducing her ketubbah 
 
But if she said “He is repulsive to me” – I do not want 
either him or his ketubbah 
 
No pressure is placed on her – to delay her, but rather he 
gives her a divorce document and she is divorced without 
a ketubbah  
 
ב דומע גס ףד תובותכ י"שר   
 
וכ היל אניעב הרמאד '--  ידי לע הפוכל שיש
התבותכ תתיחפ 
 
ילע סיאמ הרמא לבא --  אלו אוה אל
אניעב ותבותכ 
 
 הל ןניפייכ אל--  הל ןתונ אלא התוהשהל
התבותכ אלב האצויו טג 
12 Rabbeinu Tam (d. 1171, France),  efer ha-yashar, Responsa, 
sec. 24 )see also Toṣafot, Ketubbot 63b( 
 
The Gaonim decreed that we do not delay her 12 months 
for a divorce document, but rather we coerce him (to give 
it).  Heaven forbid that our rabbis should increase the 
mamzerim in Israel, for we established that Ravina and 
Rav Ashi were the end of the “instruction.”  And granted 
that the Gaonim were able to establish that the ketubbah of 
a woman could be collected on movable property [whereas 
in Talmudic times it was only collectable on immovable 
property], based on halakhah or their own opinion, that is 
the monetary issues.  But to permit an invalid divorce 
document, we do not have the authority from the days of 
Rav Ashi to to the days of the messiah. 
 
דכ ןמיס )תובושתה קלח( רשיה רפס 
 יחרי רסירת ןניהשמ אלד םינואגה ונקתש
 ונברל הלילח  .תוא ןיפוכ אלא אטיגא אתש
ל ברו אניבר ל"קד לארשיב םירזממ תוברה
 םילוכי םינואגהד יהנו  .הארוה ףוס ישא
 יפ לע וא ןילטלטמה לע השא תבותכ ןקתל
 לבא ,אנוממ ונייהד םתעד יפ לע וא הכלה
 בר תומימ ונידיב חכ ןיא לוספ טג ריתהל
  .חישמה תומי דעו ישא 
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13 Maimonides (d. 1204, Spain/Egypt), Hilkhot Ishut, 14:14 
The Gaonim reported that in Babylonia they have different 
customs pertaining to the recalcitrant wife, but those 
customs did not spread to the majority of Israel and many 
great scholars in many places disagree with them.  We 
ought to recognize and to rule according to Talmudic law. 
 
די קרפ תושיא תוכלה ם"במר 
די הכלה 
 תוגהנמ לבבב םהל שיש םינואגה ורמאו
 תוגהנמה ןתוא וטשפ אלו ,תדרומב תורחא
 םהילע ןיקלוח םילודגו םיברו לארשי בורב
 שופתל יואר דומלתה ןידבו תומוקמה בורב
ןודלו 
14 Cairo Geniza  
TS 13 J 3, fol. 22, copied from S.D. Goitein's Typed Texts. 07-09-90, N.H. (p).  Document of a full-
fledged bara'a (release of spouse from obligations upon divorce) in which husband and wife from 
al-Mahalla appear before the court of Fustat, Ab 4973/Ab 1524/August 1213.  [spouse is husband] 
 
15 Rabbi Yitzhak Ben Moshe (d. 1250, Vienna),  efer or zaruʿa, 
Section 1, Responsa section 4354 
The Gaonim of the yeshivas of Babylonia, our Savoraic 
rabbis who were after the “instruction”, decreed that they 
coerce a husband to give a divorce document to a 
recalcitrant wife immediately and also the Baʿal of 
Halakhot Gedolot wrote and also Rav Hai and Rav Sherira 
wrote and all the Gaonim, that for more than 300 years 
from their days this decree was decreed and there is no 
deviation from this.  And thus also Rav Alfasi wrote his 
legal opinion and there is no one who can uproot the 
decree of the great bet din of Babylonia.  Therefore, this 
divorce document is legitimate and there is no questioning 
it.  And, moreoever, she has a strong claim that he cannot 
have sex with her and since he agreed to give her a 
divorce document even though by coercion, then his 
divorce is valid.  For we have here a commandment to 
obey the words of the sages, the decree of the great bet 
din… 
 תובושתו תולאש - א קלח עורז רוא רפס
דנשת ןמיס 
 ויהש יארובס ןנבר לבב לש תובישיה ינואג
 ןתיל לעבה תא ופוכיש ונקת הארוהה רחא
 בר םג ובתכ ךכו ג"הב כ"כו דימ תדרומל טג
 רתויש םינואגה לכו ארירש ברו /יאה/ ייה
 וז הנקתנש םהימיב היה הנש תואמ 'גמ
 ספלא בר םג כ"כו הנממ זוזל ןיאו הנקתה
ו קספה ד"ב תנקת רוקעל לוכיש ימ ןיא
 רשכ טג וז לש הטיג ךכלה לבבבש לודגה
 הנעט הל שיש ש"כו וילע סכרפל ןיאו אוה
 ןויכו הילא קקזהל לוכי וניאש הלודג
 טג וטיג יושיע י"ע 'יפא טג ןתיל הצרתנש
 תנקת םימכח ירבד עומשל הוצמ ןאכ שיד
 לודגה ד"ב 
  
16 Rashba (d. 1310, Spain), Responsa, Part 2, sec. 276 
Nevertheless, if it is their custom in those places to do as 
Maimonides, let them.  Because even Gaonim, you know 
they said: we coerce (him) to divorce (her) as long as she is 
recalcitrant.  And in the places where they follow that 
tradition, we have no authority to disagree with them or 
to void their words. 
 
וער ןמיס ב קלח א"בשרה ת"וש 
 ,תומוקמה ןתואב וגהנ םא ,םוקמ לכמו
 יכ  .םהל חנה ,ל"ז ם"במרהכ ןישוע תויהל
 ןיפוכש  :ורמאש תעדי ,ל"ז םינואגה םג
 וגהנש תומוקמבו  .תדרומ איהש לכ ,שרגל
יפ לע לטבלו ,םהילע קולחל חכ ונב ןיא ,םה
םהירבד 
17 זע ןמיס תובותכ תוכלה רזעה ןבא רוט 
 ...הליחתב הב ונקת תונקת הברה שימשתמ הלעב לע הדרמש השאהו 
 
 ...רקפה לארשי תונב יוהיל אלד יכיה יכ םיתאמ הנמ הבותכ רקיע הל ביהי רמאקד ןואגל אניזחו 
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 תולות אטיגא אתש יחרי רסירת יהשמ יאו לארשי תונבב לוקליקה וארש יפל רשפא ספלא בר ירבד לע ל"ז ש"ארה
 ...ולטב הער תוברתל תואצויו ם"וכעב ןמצע 
 תנעטב שרגל ףוכל אלש ןייד לכ רהזי ןכל שרגל לעבל ףוכל ןיא ילע סיאמ תנעטבש תפרצו זנכשא ימכח ומיכסהו
 ןיפוכ ןיא ןכו ילע סיאמ...ולצא תויהל התוא  
 
 aʿqov ben Asher (d. ca. 1349 CE, Spain), Ṭur, Even Haʿezer, marriage laws, section 77 
 
The woman who refuses her husband sex there are many decrees enacted on the subject… 
 
We saw a Gaonic (text) that states to give her (a recalcitrant wife) her essential ketubbah of 100 or 
200 so that the daughters of Israel do not become illicit (i.e., engage in immoral sexual behavior)… 
 
The Rosh, according to the words of Rav Alfasi, said that when they saw the denigration among the 
daughters of Israel and that if they waited 12 months for a divorce document they would rely upon 
idol-worshippers and go out to evil culture… 
 
The sages of Ashkenaz and Sefard agreed that in the case of “he is repulsive to me” it is not 
permissible to coerce the husband to divorce so every judge should be careful not to coerce a 
divorce in the case of “he is repulsive to me.”  And also they do not coerce her to be with him… 
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Appendix II 
 
Table 1: an orthodox story of Jewish law 
Early Rabbinic (Tannaim) (70-220 CE) 
Middle Rabbinic (Amora'im) (220-500 CE) 
Late Rabbinic (Savora'im or Stammaim) 
(500-620 CE) 
Early Gaonic (620-800 CE) 
Late Gaonic (800-1050 CE) 
Rishonim (1050-1400 CE) 
authority preservation (stagnancy) canon (perfecting) 
 
 
Table 2: an orthodox story of Islamic law 
prophet (610-632 CE)     
companions (ca. 632-661 CE)          
successors (661-750 CE) 
eponyms of the legal schools & their 
students (ca. 750-950 CE) 
jurists following precedents (950-
modern era) 
authority preservation (perfecting) canon (stagnancy) 
 
 
Table 3: orthodox stories of Jewish and Islamic law 
Early Rabbinic (Tannaim) (70-220 CE)          
Middle Rabbinic (Amora'im) (220-500 CE)          
Late Rabbinic (Savora'im or Stammaim) 
(500-620 CE) 
Early Gaonic (620-800 CE)             
Late Gaonic (800-1050 CE) 
Rishonim (1050-1400 CE) 
authority preservation (stagnancy) canon (perfecting) 
authority preservation (perfecting) canon (stagnancy) 
prophet (610-632 CE) 
companions (ca. 632-661 CE) 
successors (661-750 CE) 
eponyms of the legal schools & 
their students (ca. 750-950 
CE) 
jurists following 
precedents (950-
modern era) 
 
 
Table 4: diffusion and diversity of legal conventions (610-800 CE) 
600 650 700 750 
Late Rabbinic 
(Savora'im or 
Stammaim) 
(500-620 CE) 
Early Gaonic (620-800 CE) 
Bavli Gaonic responsa; Halakhot Pesukot (ca. 760 CE) 
Legal circles & networks (610-750 CE) Professionalization 
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(750-900 CE) 
compiling legal practices of companions (sīrah, maghāzī, muṣannafāt, 
masānīd) 
legal texts of personal 
legal schools 
 
 
Table 5: synthesis and systematization (800-1000 CE) 
800 850 900 950 
Late Gaonic (800-1050 CE) 
Halakhot Gadolot (early 9th century) Karaite law 
Professionalization (750-900 CE) 
Consolidation & 
officilization 
(950-1250 CE) 
legal texts of personal legal schools 
compromise between 
ra'y and hadith 
 
 
Table 6: legal structure (1000-1200 CE) 
1000 1050 1100 1150 
Late Gaonic (800-1050 
CE) 
Rishonim (1050-1400 CE) 
Hilchot of the Rif (11th 
century) 
commentaries; Mishneh Torah (Rambam, 12th century) 
Consolidation & officilization (950-1250 CE) 
legal compendia; normativity of "classical" uṣ l al-fiqh; mukhtaṣar genre 
 
 
Table 7: legal autonomy (1200-1400 CE) 
1200 1250 1300 1350 
Rishonim (1050-1400 CE) 
more commentaries, some abridged; Moredechai (13th century) 
Consolidation & 
officialization 
(950-1250 CE) 
Technocratization (1250-1400 CE) 
"common law" mukhtaṣar 
 152 
 
Table 8: a timeline of near eastern legal history
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